Beckford v. Elevance Health, Inc. - Employment Discrimination Appeal

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF AP PEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 25 - 1433 BRIDGET BECKFORD, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. ELEVANCE HEALTH, INC., f/k/a Anthem, Inc., Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United S tates District Court for the Eastern D istrict of Virginia, at Richmond. M. Hannah Lauck, Chief District Judge. (3:23 - cv - 00828 - M HL) Argued: January 29, 2026 D ecided: March 3, 2026 Before NIEMEYER, KI NG, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges. Vacated and remanded by unpubli shed per curiam opinio n. ARGUED: Christopher Edwin Brown, THE BROWN FIRM PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Ashley Zeiler H ager, TROUTMAN PEPPER LOCKE LLP, Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Andrew J. H enson, TROUTMAN PEP PER LOCKE LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. U npublishe d opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

2 PER CURIAM: On March 12, 2021, Elevance Health, Inc., term inated the employment of Bridg et Beckford as a group underwriter on the Virgina Key Accoun ts Team in Richmond, Virginia, pursuant to a reductio n in force (“RIF”) initiated in 2020 for cost - cutting reasons. In implementing the RIF in her underwriting d epartment, Maria Gregory, then the manager of the department, eliminated three positions in the department and left unfilled the position of an outgoing retiree. One o f the employees whose employment was terminate d through this RIF was Bridget Beckford, an African - American. Beckford commenced this action against Elevance Health, alleging, as relevant here, that she was selected for termination because of her race, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Virginia Human Rights Act. In a thorough 40 - page opini on da ted March 28, 2025, the district court gran ted summary judgment to Elevance Health. On appeal, Beckford contends, among other things, that in conn ection with he r race - related claims, the “District Court’s assessment that [sh e] failed to make a prima facie case [was] based on its decision to ignore the actual ‘burden shifting’ model and review the evidence in the light most fav orable to the moving party.” More particularly, Beck ford argues that the “District Court obfuscate[d] th e final element of the prima facie case.” As she explained, the court “effectively shift[ed] the basis for dismissal to th e alleged non - discriminatory reasons proffered by [Elevance Health], but refus[ed ] to engage in a review of whether those reasons were pretextual — when neither of tho se s teps shoul d occur unt il the prima facie case is established.” We agree with Beck ford.

3 To establish a prima facie case for d iscrimination in the context of a RIF, we hav e held that the plaintiff must “estab lish (1) that she was in a protected class, (2) she was selected for demotion, (3) she was perform ing her job at a level that met the employer ’ s expectations, and (4) th at her employer did no t treat the protected status n eutrally, or there were other circu mstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. ” Dugan v. Albemarl e Cnty. Sc h. Bd., 293 F. 3d 716, 720 – 21 (4th Cir. 2002) (citati ons omitted). On ly after the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case must the employer then present a “legitimate, non - discriminatory reason for the emp loyment action.” Id. at 721. “If the [employer] meets its burden of p roduction, the presumption raised by th e prima facie case is rebutted and ‘ drops from the case.’” Id. (q uoting Texas Dep ’ t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 2 55 n.10 (1981). At that point, the plaintiff carries the ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination, and this may be done by show ing that the empl oyer’s legitimate, non - discriminatory reason was a pretext. Id. In this case, the parties, as w ell as the district court, ag reed that Beckford readily satisfied the first three criteria for establishin g a prima facie case, leaving for resolution whether she established th e fourth factor that “her employer did not treat the protected status neutrally, or there were other circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.” In assessing the fourth factor, the district court relied substantially, if not mostly, on Elevance Health’s pro ffer of legitimate, non - discriminatory reasons for its decision to terminate Beckford to conclude that Beckford failed in showing the fou rth factor for establishing a prima facie case. T he district cou rt, while addressing the fourth factor, stat ed

4 that “Ms. Gregory identified multiple reasons for selecting Ms. Beckford over Ms. A ye rs for the RIF.” It then itemized the several independent reason s given by Elevance Health for why it did not select Beck ford. While the district court inappropriately considered the employer’s legitimate, non - discriminatory reasons for its d ecision when addressing Beckford’s prima facie case, it also inappropriately did not allow Beck ford to respond to those reasons by show ing that the y were a pretext. As t he court said, “Instead, [Beckford] prematurely jumps to her argument that Ms. Gregory’s reasons fo r selecting her for termination were pretextual.” After so collapsing the analysis, the court then concluded, “A s a result, [Beckford] does not show a prima facie case of race discrimination. Having concluded that Ms. Beckford cannot mak e this prima facie showing, the cou rt must dismiss her race discrimination claims.” The district court similarly collapse d the elements of Beckford’s retaliation claim in concluding that “Beckford has failed to show a prima facie case of re taliation” — i.e., failed to show the third element that evidence show “a causal connection between her race - related complaints and her termination.” In short, when c onducti ng its analysis of whether Beckford showed a p rima facie case in her race - related claims, th e district court imported the employer’s proffer o f legitimate, non - discriminatory reason s for its decision into the p reliminary analysis on whether the plaintiff pr ov ed a prima facie case, which was error. But then it also, unfairl y, denied the plaintiff the right to sho w th at the proffered reasons were a pretext.

5 In view of this analysis, we vacate the district court’s order March 28, 2025, insofar as it resolved Beckford’s race d iscrimination and retaliation claims, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. VACATED A ND REMANDE D