US v. John Moore - Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF AP PEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 24 - 4195 UNITED ST ATES OF AMER ICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JOHN HENRY MOORE, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Co urt for the Western District of No rth Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., District Judge, and Frank D. Whitney, Senio r District Judge. (3:19 - cv - 0008 6 - FDW - SCR) Argued: December 11, 2025 Decided: March 3, 2026 Before KING, HARRI S, and RICHARDS ON, Circuit Judges. Remanded with instruction s by unpublished opinion. J udge Harris wrote the op inion, in which Jud ge King and Judge Ric hardson j oined. ARGUED: Jona than D. Byr ne, OFFICE OF TH E FEDERA L PUBLIC DEF ENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Ap pellant. Anthony Joseph Enright, OFF ICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Wesley P. Page, Federal Pu blic Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Lawrence J. Cameron, Acting

2 United States Attorney, OFFICE OF TH E UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding p recedent in this circuit.

3 PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge: John Henr y Moore was convicted by a jury of charges arising from two armed robberies of retail stores. On ap peal, he raises multiple challenges to h is convictions and sentence. In this opinion, w e address just one: Moore’s argumen t that evidence police seized from his apartment during two searches on the day of his arrest should h ave been suppressed under the Fourth Amendmen t. If Moore is right as to his Fourth Amendment claim, t hen he may be entitled to vacatur of his convictions on that ground alon e. But the district cou rt denied Moore’s motion to suppress without conducting the evidentiary hearing necessary to assess disputes of fact material to Moore’s claim. Accordingly, we remand to the district court with instructions to conduct such a hearing and reconsider Moore’s motion. I. A. On December 1, 2018, a man i n a black hooded sweatshirt with a Nike insig nia robbed a s tore in a Charlotte, North Carolina, shopping center while brandishing a gun. Nine days later, a man wearing what appeared to be the same black hoodie robbed a grocery store in the same shopping center, th reatening to shoot the store’s employees. The police quickly identified John Henry Moore as a suspect. At arou nd 6:30 or 7:00 a.m. on December 12, two days after the second rob bery, a team of officers from th e Charlotte - Mecklenburg Police Department (“CMPD”) executed an arrest w arrant for Moore at the apartment wh ere he lived. The officers handcuffed Moore at his fro nt door

4 and then conducted a “protective sweep” of the apartment, looking for anyon e who could pose a danger to the arresting officers. S ee Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 3 34 –36 (1990) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment perm its a “protective sweep” of a suspect’s h ome incident to arrest, limited to a “cursory inspection of those spaces wh ere a person may be found”). After establishing that nobody else was on the prem ises, the officers brought Moore back inside his apartment. At this point, the parties’ accounts d iverge. According to Moore, the po lice turned off their body - worn cameras and then, without a search warrant, proceeded to conduct a more intensive search of his apartm ent, exceeding the bound s of a lawful protective sweep. Moore alleges that while he was held in his livin g room, the police “searched through all [his] clothes that were in [h is living room], searched [his] jewelry box,” and “look ed under [his] bean bag chair.” J.A. 7 0. He also claims that h e could h ear officers in the back rooms “pull things off the shelves” an d “open [his] safe,” and – critically – that he saw officers “looking under the mattress where [a] gun was [later] allegedly found.” Id. The government disputes those allegation s. It acknowledges that the officers who arrested Moore did not have a warrant to search Moore’s apartment. But it denies that the officers went beyond the scope of a protective sweep to conduct the more invasive s earch described by Moore. The parties agree, however, that when the officers brought Moo re to the police station after his arrest, th ey also brought three items – about $400 in cash, a cellphone, and a green jacket – seized from Moore’s apartmen t. The parties also agree that at 8:51 a.m., abou t two hour s after Moore’s arrest, a separate robbery unit of the CMPD applied for and obtained a search warrant for Moore’s

5 apartment. The supporting affidavit noted that CMPD had arrested Moore at his apartment earlier that morning, but it did not mention any evidence observed or collected during the arrest. Moore alleges, however, that in decid ing to seek the search warrant for his apartment, the robbery unit did rely on evidence and information gathered by the police during his arrest. Acco rding to Moore, the robbery unit was “not activ ely trying to get a search warrant” until it learned from the arresting officers what they had discovered at Moore’s apartment. J.A. 79. Th e government appears to dispute that allegation, too. The CMPD robbery unit executed the search warrant later that morning, at 9:45 a.m., and recovered items inclu ding a black Nike hoodie and a Glo ck handgun. The handgun was found on the floor under th e mattress in the back bedroom of the apartment – the same mattress that, according to Moore, the arresting officers h ad examined earlier that day. B. In March 2019, a grand jury indicted Moore on two counts of armed robbery, o ne count of brandishing a firearm durin g a crime of violence, and on e count of possession of a firearm by someone previously conv icted of a felony. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951; id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); id. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e). Before trial, Moore filed a pro se motion to suppress “any and all ev idence seized by CMPD [] officers during a[] search incident to arrest of [his] apartment. . . and any and all evidence seized during th e execution of the supposedly valid search warrant of [his] apartment on or about December 12, 2018.” J.A. 65. According to Moore, all such evidence “was obtained in violation of [h is] Fourth Amendment rights.” Id.

6 The first search, Moore claimed, violated the Fourth Amendment because it exceeded the scope of a lawfu l protective sw eep and was conducted without con sent or a search w arrant. A s for the second search, Moore alleged that the CMPD robbery u nit did not decide to seek a search warrant for his apartment until “after the[y] w[ere] given the illegally seized evidence from [his] apartment” by the arresting officers. J.A. 79. Thus, evidence discovered in that second, with - warrant search was discovered “only through exploitation” of the in itial illegality. J.A. 66. It foll owed, Moore claimed, that all th e evidence seized from his apartment – the cash, phone, and green jacket recovered during the first search, and the black Nike hoodie, handgun, and other items recovered during th e second – should be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment. Moore also requested a hearing on the issue. The government opposed Moore’s motion. It denied Moore’s factual allegation that the arresting officers h ad turned off their bo dy - worn cameras and conducted a search of his apartment beyond the scope of a protective sweep. An d even if the arresting officers had conducted an illegal search, the go vernment argued in the alternative, th e evidence seized from Moore’s apartment would still be admissible: The second, with - warrant search was lawful because the magistrate judge who issued the warrant “never considered any illegally obtained information,” and anything recovered during the first search “inev itably would have been discovered” during that second, lawful search. J.A. 8 6 – 87. The district court denied Moore’s motion. It did not hold an evidentiary hearing, and it did not resolve the p arties’ dispute as to wh ether the arresting officers had conducted a warrantless search that exceeded the scope of an authorized protective sweep. Instead, it

7 agreed with the government’s alternative argument, holding that even if the arresting officers did conduct an illegal search, the record established that th e challenged evidence was not the result, or “fruit,” of that v iolation. United States v. Moore, 2022 WL 16579804, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 1, 2022). After litigation of other pretrial iss ues, 1 the cas e proceeded to trial, and Moore was convicted by a jur y on all counts. During the trial, the government introduced several pieces of evidence recovered during the two December 12 searches of Moore’s apartment. Of note, the b lack hoodie seized during th e second search matched the one seen in videos from both robberies, and it contained DNA that matched both Moore’s sample and DN A found on an item at the scene of th e first robbery. Mean while, the handgun discov ered under Moore’s mattress supported Moore’s fi rearm convictions. The district court sentenced Moo re to three life sentences and a concurrent 84 months’ imprisonment. Moore ti mely appealed. T his cou rt has jurisdiction over his app eal pursuant to 28 U. S.C. § 1291. II. Although Moore raises several issues on appeal, we address here on ly his Fourth Amendment suppressi on claim. That claim, if resolved in Moore’s favor, could be 1 One of th o se pretrial issues, regarding Moore’s motion to recuse the district judge presiding over his trial, came to this court twice before on unsu ccessful petitions for a writ of mandamus. S ee In re Moo re, 2022 WL 17716 771 (4th Cir. Dec. 15, 2022); In re Moore, 955 F.3d 3 84 (4th Cir. 2020).

8 dispositive. But further factual development is required to decide the Fourth Amendment issue Moore presents and to assess its consequences for the rest of Moo re’s appeal. Se e Andrews v. Baltimore City Police Dep ’t, 8 F.4th 234, 235, 238 – 39 (4th Cir. 2020) (remanding Fourth Amendment claim for furth er factfinding). Moore raised and sufficiently preserved his Fourth Amendment argument before the district court. We thus review the district cou rt’s legal conclusions de novo, any factual findings for clear error, and the district court’s decision not to hol d an evide ntiar y hearing for abuse of discretion. United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th C ir. 1992); United States v. Bowman, 106 F.4th 29 3, 300 (4th Cir. 2024). We also construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, as the p revailing party below. United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 4 46, 473 (4t h Cir. 2012). Under that standard, we agree with Moore that the district court ab used its discretion by not holding a n evidentiary hearing on Moore’s motion to suppre ss. At bottom, this issue turns on a n except ion to the Fourt h Amendme nt exclusi onary rule known as the “independen t source” doctrine. That doctrin e allows the admission of evidence first discovered in an unlawful search “if officers ind ependently acquired it from a separate, independent source” – like a subsequent with - warrant search – that was “ untainted by the illegal evidence - gathering activity.” U tah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 238 (2016) (first quotation); Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 – 38 (19 88) (second quotation). Moore alleges that th e first search of his h ome, conducted by the arresting officers without a search warrant, was unlawful, and that the items retrieved from that search should have been excluded from trial. But his primary fo cus is on the critical

9 evidence seized in the second, with - warrant search, including the black Nik e hoodie and the handgun. That evidence, he say s, should have been suppressed as “fruit” o f the first unlawful search, because the CMPD robbery unit decided to seek a search warran t only after the arresting officers sh ared what they had learned fro m their illegal search. See Strieff, 579 U.S. at 237. S o to deny his motion to suppress, Moore con tends, the district court had to find either that the first search w as in fact lawful, or th at the second search was truly “independent” of the first. But, says Moore, the district court fou nd neither. We agree. Moore’s allegations “raised a qu estion as to whether the [CMPD robb ery unit’s] decision to seek the warrant w as prompted by what [the arresting officers] had seen” during their allegedly illegal search earlier that morning. United S tates v. Hill, 776 F.3d 243, 252 (4th Cir. 2015) (in ternal quotation marks omitted). If it was, then the second search was not a “genuinely independent source” of the evid ence seized during that search, and that evidence – “ [] tainted by the initial illegality” – is inadmissible. Murray, 487 U.S. at 537, 542. And to resolve this issue in th e government’s favor, well - settled precedent required the district court to make two distinct findings: first, that the allegedly unlawful initial search did not “affect[] the officer[s’] decision to seek the warrant” fo r the second search; and second, that it did not affect “the magistrate jud ge’s decision to issue” the warrant. Hill, 776 F.3d at 251 (internal q uotation marks omitted). The district court here made only one of those findings. It did find, as the parties agree, that the first search had no effect on the magistrate judge’s decision to issue a search warrant for the second. Moore, 2022 WL 165798 04, at *3. And Moore doe s not dis pute that this finding was supported by the record, which shows that the warrant application

10 before the magistrate judge did not mention or rely on any information obtained by the arresting officers earlier that morning. But the district court did not address wh ether the initial search affected the officers’ (i.e., the robb ery unit’s) decision to seek a search warrant – despite the fact that Moore’s motion to suppress put that question squarely at issue. That was error. Moore met his burden of presenting a factual dispute as to whether the second search was “genuinely independent” of th e first. Hill, 776 F.3d at 251 (in ternal quotation marks omitted); see Bowm an, 106 F.4th at 300. U nder those circumstances, the district court could not assume the illegality of the first search and still deny Moore’s motion to suppress without hol ding an evi dentia ry hearing a nd determining whether the fi rst search affected the officers’ subsequent decision to seek a search warrant. Bowman, 106 F.4th at 300. The government offers two resp onses, both unavailing. First, the government contends that the district court properly relied on the inevitable discovery doctrine, rather than the independent source doctrine, to admit the challenged evidence. These are two closely related doctrines, and there is room for confusion. But while the independent source doctrine, as discussed above, allows admission of evidence obtained th rough a search untainted by an initial illeg ality, the inevitable discovery doctrin e allo ws admission of evidence that was obtained illegally, so long as that evidence “would i nevitabl y have been discovered” through indep endent and legal means. Nix v. William s, 467 U.S. 431, 44 4, 448 (1984). In the government’s view, the d istrict court correctly concluded that CMPD would inevitably have discovered all th e evidence it seized from Moore’s apartment when the robbery unit conducted the second search, based on a search warrant th at was

11 obtained without referring to evidence from the first. See Moore, 2022 WL 1657980 4, at *3. That argument begs the question with which we started. The inevitable discovery doctrine salvages evidence obtained illegally on ly if the evidence would have been discovered “by la wful means ” at a la ter point. United States v. Bullette, 854 F.3d 261, 265 (4th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added). But wh ether the second, with - warrant search qualifies as “lawful means” is exactly the question Moore has put at issue: If the initial search was illegal (as we assume for these purpo ses) and it affec ted the robbery unit’s decision to seek a search warrant (as Moore alleges), then the warrant wa s tainted by illegality and cannot support a f inding of inevitable discovery “by lawfu l means.” Id.; see United States v. Thomas, 955 F.2d 207, 2 11 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he fact making discovery inevitable must arise from circumstances other than those disclosed by the illegal search itself.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Instead, w e are right back where we started, in n eed of a determination by the district court as to wh ether the second, with - warrant search w as fully independent of the first. Hill, 776 F.3d at 251. In the alternative, the government ventures that the district court did, at least in effect, make the second finding required for application of the independent source d octrine: that the robbery unit ’s decision to seek a warrant for a second search was not affected by any information it learned as a result of the first search. Th e district court did not u se “indepen dent - sourc e lang uage” in ma king t his purpor ted findi ng, the g overnme nt concedes. But the court go t close enough, the government say s, when it stated that the challenged evidence “would have been inevitably d iscovered during the lawful execution

12 of the search warrant.” Moore, 2022 WL 16579804, at *3. We must respectfully disagree. It is not clear how we could read in to that statement any finding regarding the officers’ state of mind when they sought a search warrant for Moore’s apartment. And even if we could, we would be left with the p roblem that Moore h as alleged facts disputing th e requisite state of mind – and yet the district court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing to assess the truth of those allegations. See Bowman, 106 F.4th at 30 0 (d iscussing circumstances under which an evidentiary hearin g on a suppression motion is required). In sum, Moore asserted facts putting at issue b oth the legality of the first search of his apartment and the impact of that search on the decision of the ro bbery unit to seek a warrant for the second search. The district court erred when it denied Moore’s motion to suppress without holding the evidentiary hearing necessary to resolve at least one of those disputes in the government’s favor, finding either that the first search was in fact legal or that the first search did no t affect the officers’ decision to seek a warrant for the secon d. III. When a district court fail s to hold a n evidentiary hearing to make the requisite findings on a motion to suppress, the ap propriate remedy is typ ically to remand with instructions to do so. United States v. Campbell, 945 F.2 d 713, 71 6 (4th Ci r. 1991); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 – 50 (1984). W e follow that course here. We leave to the district court th e order of operations. Th e district court may wish to begin by determining wheth er the initial search of Moore’s apartment ex ceeded the scope of a lawful protective sweep, as Moore contends, or whether the arresting office rs

13 did no more than wh at was authorized to protect their safety. If the initial search was lawful, then it would be unnecessary to consider the independent source and inevitable discovery exceptions to the exclusion ary rule. Alternatively, the d istrict court may elect to begin with an inquiry into whether the requirements of tho se doctrines were satisfied here, with respect to the item s seized in each of the tw o searches and introdu ced at trial. 2 We o f course express no judgment as to the u ltimate outcome of these inquiries. If the district cou rt concludes that all of the challeng ed evidence was properly admitted at trial, then we will proceed to review that ho lding along with the remaining issues in Moore’s app eal. If, instead, the district court c oncludes that any of the evid ence should have been excluded from trial, then th at court should determine the consequences of that decision for Moore’s convictions. 3 This court will retain jurisdiction during the pendency of the remand proceedings. And rews, 8 F.4th at 239. REMANDED W ITH INSTR UCTIONS 2 In apply ing these doctrines on reman d, it may be necessary to d ifferentiate between the two sets of evidence at issue: evidence seized in the first search, at the time o f Moore’s arrest, and evidence seized in the second, when the robbery unit returned to Moore’s apartment with a search warrant. In its order denying Moore’s motion to suppress, the district court did not distinguish between the two or specify which evidence it was analyzing. The government’s brief before the district court addressed only the item s recovered from the first sear ch, though Moore also moved to suppress the items recovered from the second. And Moore’s brief on appeal does not separately address the two sets of evidence or clearly distinguish them. We trust that the district cou rt will sort this out, as necessary, on remand. 3 Neither party has addressed here whether, if any of the evidence were sup pressed, it would be “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational ju ry would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” United States v. Pratt, 915 F.3d 266, 2 73 (4th Ci r. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).