Cooper v. City of Wheeling - Malicious Prosecution Claim

PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF AP PEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 25 - 1596 ASHLEY ANNA COOPER, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. CITY OF WHEE LING, OFFI CER CODY MC CORMICK, OFFICER BEN YOUNG, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for th e Northern District of West Virginia, at Wheeling. John Preston Bailey, District Jud ge. (5:24 - cv - 00230 - JPB) Argued: December 11, 2025 Decided: March 3, 2026 Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and THACK ER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed in part, r eversed in part, and rema nded by p ublished opinion. Judge T hacker wrote the opinion in which Judge Wilkins on and Jud ge Agee joi ned. ARGUED: Paul Zachary Stewart, CAREY & STEWART, PLLC, Weirton, West Virginia, for Appellant. Thomas E. Buck, BAILEY & WYANT PLLC, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Benjamin P. V isnic, BAILEY & WYANT PLLC, Wheeling, West Virginia, for App ellees.

2 THACKER, Circuit Judge: Ashley Anna Cooper (“Appellant”) appeals the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia ’s dismiss al of her malicious pro secution claim brought pursuant t o 42 U.S. C. § 1983 against the City of Wheeling and the officers involved in obtaining her arrest warrant. In dismissing her claim, the district cou rt applied West Virginia’s one year statute of limitations, fo und in West Virginia Code § 55 -2- 12(c), and held that her claim, which accrued 23 month s prior to suit being filed, was time barred. On appeal, Appellant contends that the two year statute of limitations found in W est V irginia Code § 55 -2- 12(b) should have been applied, and that, under that statute, her suit was timely filed. We agree. However, because Appellan t additionally brings a claim against th e City of Wheeling, a municipality, without alleging anything approximating a municipal policy or custom as required by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 – 91 (1978), w e affirm dismissal as to the City of Wh eeling. T herefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. I. On December 17, 2021, o fficers from the Wheeling Police Departmen t began investigating a battery com plaint and later obtained an arrest warrant for the named perpetrator, Ash le y Cooper. Nearly a year l ater, on No vember 13, 2 022, when r espondi ng to an unrelated domestic violence incident at Appellant’s residence, o fficers from the City of McMechen arrested Appellant -- whose name is Ashley Cooper -- pursuant to the active warrant relative to the December 2021 battery co mplaint.

3 However, on January 23, 2 023, at the initial hearing related to Appellant’s arrest, the Assistant Prosecuting Attorney dismissed the charg e against Appellant after determining that the actual perpetrator was Ashley Marie Cooper, not Appellant, Ashley Anna Cooper. As a result of that series o f unfortunate events, on December 16, 2024, Appellant sued the City of Wheeling and the officers involv ed in obtaining a warrant for her arrest (“Appellees”). Her complaint brought a single § 1983 claim, alleging that the officers arrested her without probable cause in vio lation of the Fourth Amendment. In response, Appellees filed a “Mo tion to Dismiss, Or, In T he Alternative, Fo r a More Definite Statement” (“M otion”). Appellees’ Motion m ade four arguments relevan t to this appeal. First, Appellees argued that a more definite statement was needed as it was unclear whether the claim was one of wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution, or both. Next, Appellees argued that if the claim was for wrongful arrest, the one year statute of limitations ha d p assed. Appellees further argued that Appellant did not plausibly allege a claim against the City of Wheeling because cities cannot be held liable pursuant to § 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior. F inally, Appellees contended that if the claim was for malicious prosecution, Appellant failed to all ege sufficient facts to suppo rt such a claim. Of note, at that time, Appellees agreed with Appellant that the statute of limitations for a malicious prosecution claim in West Virginia is two years. See J.A. 34 – 35 (“[Appellees]

4 agree with [Appellant] that her maliciou s prosecution claim, unlike a wrongful arrest claim, is not time - barred.”). 1 The district court granted Appellees’ Motion on April 23, 2025. In its Order, the court first determined that Appellant’s complaint alleged a malicious prosecution claim, brought pursuant to § 1983. T he court then held that West Virg inia’s one year statute of limitations found in W est Virginia Code § 55 -2- 12(c) applied to Appellant’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. 2 And because Appellant filed suit on December 16, 2 024, 23 months after her claim accrued on J anuary 23, 2023, the court dismissed Appellant’s claim as untimely. This appeal followed. II. “The proper construction and application of a statute of limitation s is a question of law we review de novo.” Fed. Ener gy Regul. Comm’n v. Powhatan E nergy Fun d, LLC, 949 F.3d 8 91, 897 (4t h Cir. 202 0). We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civ il Procedure de novo. Ba rnett v. Inova Health Care S ervs., 125 F.4th 465, 46 9 (4th Cir. 2025) (cit ing Barbour v. Garlan d, 105 F.4th 579, 589 (4 th Cir. 2024). In conducting such a review, we accept the complaint ’ s factual allegations as true 1 Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal. 2 The d istrict court did so sua sponte given that, as noted, the parties agreed the statute of limitations for a malicious pro secution claim is two years.

5 and construe the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ba rbour, 105 F.4th a t 589 (citing Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 685 (4th Cir. 2 018)). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must be pled with sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 – 79 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 5 70 (2007)). III. On appeal, Appellant asserts the d istrict court applied the wro ng statute of limitations. That is, instead of applying the one year statute of limitations foun d in West Virginia Code § 55 -2- 12 (c), she argues that the district court should have applied the two year statute of limitations found in Section 55 -2- 12(b). We agree. When conc luding that S ection 55 -2- 12(c) applied, the district court exclusively cit ed decisions from the Northern and Sou thern Districts of West Virginia. That was error. A s explained below, binding precedent from the United States Supreme Court and our Circuit, as well as interpretations from the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, require courts to apply S ection 55 -2- 12(c) to § 198 3 claims. A. There is no specific statute of limitations govern ing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. For most of the twentieth century, the S upreme Court instructed courts to apply the state statute of limitations “most analogous,” and “most appropriate,” to the particular § 1983 claim, so long as the chosen limitations period was consistent with federal law and policy. B d. of Regents v. Toman io, 446 U.S. 478, 4 88 (1980); see also Johnson v. R y. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 4 54, 462 (1 975). However, that approach resulted in confusi on and

6 inconsistent results in the lower courts. Accordingly, in 1985, the Supreme Court provided the lower courts new instructions: “§ 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions,” and therefore, a state’s person al injury statute of limitations should be applied to all § 1983 claims. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985). While Wilson made clear that § 1 983 claims are governed by the forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations, confusion lingered in those states that had multip le statute s of limitations for person al injury actions. So, the Court addressed th at issue and clarified, “ where state law provides multiple statutes of limitatio ns for personal injury actions, courts considering § 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statu te for personal injury actions.” Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249 – 50 (1989). But, the Court made clear that “[c]ourts should resort to resid ual statutes of limitations only where state law provides multiple statutes of limitation s for personal injury actions an d the residual one embraces, either explicitly or by judicial construction, unsp ecified personal injury actions.” Id. at 250 n.12. I n other words, when determining the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim, federal courts mu st uniformly apply the state’s residual or general perso nal injury statute, not any tort - specifi c limitations period. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (holding that the statute of limitati ons in § 1983 cases “is that which the State provides for personal - injury torts.”). Our court has embraced this Sup reme Court holding time and again: “Section 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations. Thus, to determine the timely filing of a § 1983 claim, courts borrow the statute of limitations fro m the most analogous state - law cause of action. [] For § 1983 su its, that cause of action is a pers onal injur y suit.” Owens v.

7 Baltimore City State’s Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4t h Cir. 20 14), (citing Okure, 488 U.S. at 249 – 50) (emphasis suppl i ed); see also Battle v. Ledford, 912 F.3d 708, 71 3 (4th Cir. 2019) (“[t]he Supreme Court has directed that we apply a state’s ‘statute o f limitations governing general person al injury actions’ when considering § 1983 claims.” (emphasis supplied)) (citation omitted)). Thus, both the Sup reme Court ’s and our own prece dent req uire federal courts to apply the forum state’s general personal injury statute of limitations for § 1983 claims. Here, West Virginia is the forum state, and West Virg inia’s p ersonal injury statute of limitations, found in West Virginia Code § 55 -2- 12, contains three sub sections: Every personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought: (a) [w]ithin two years n ext after the right to bring the same shall have accrued, if it be for dam age to property; (b) within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for damages for personal injuries; and (c) within one year next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be fo r any other matter of such nature that, in case a party die, it could not have been brought at common law by o r against his personal representative. W. Va. Code § 55 -2- 12 (emphases supplied). Consistent with the statute’s plain text an d settled precedent, both our Circuit and the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia have held that § 1983 claims filed in West Virginia are subject to the two year statute of limitations period set forth in West Virginia Code § 55 -2- 12(b). Smith v. Tra velpiece, 31 F.4t h 878, 883 (4th Cir. 2022) (“ As the

8 [Section 1983] claim here arose in West Virginia, West Virginia's two - year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies. ” (citing W. Va. Code § 55 -2- 12(b)); Patton v. Cnty. of Berkeley, 242 W. Va. 31 5, 317 n. 3 (2019) (providing that § 1983 claims arising in West Virginia are gov erned by the two - year statute of limitations pu rsuant to W. Va. Code § 55 -2- 12(b)). B. Despite th is clear guidan ce, the federal district courts in West Virginia do not uniformly apply the two year statu te of limitations in subsection (b) to § 1983 claims. Sometimes they do. 3 But other times, as in th is case, they continue to apply the one year statute of limitations found in subsection (c). 4 Th e district courts that have applied a one 3 Denma rk v. Starcher, 2014 WL 72 72789, at *3 (N.D.W. Va. Dec. 1 8, 2014) (Keeley, J.) (applying the two year statute of limitations set forth in W est Virginia Code § 55 -2- 12(b) to § 1983 action s) (citations o mitted); Gaylord v. City of Beckley, 2018 WL 3581093, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. July 25, 2018) (Berger, J.) (citations omitted); Mo rale s v. Robinso n, 2007 WL 1074836, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. Ap r. 6, 2007) (Copenhaver, J.); Frederic k v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health and Human Services, 2019 WL 1172 258, at *32 (S. D.W. Va. Mar. 13, 2019) (John ston, J.) (cit ation omitted); Greene v. Putnam Coun ty Commission, 2022 WL 16 857014, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. Nov. 10, 2022) (Chambers, J.) (ci tation omitted); Tilley v. Pierson, 2025 W L 3207816, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. N ov. 17, 202 5) (Goodwin, J.) (citation s omitted). 4 H amlet v. West Virginia, 2009 WL 261450, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 3, 2009) (Faber, J.) (applying West Virginia Code § 55 -2- 12 (c)’s one year statute of limitations to § 1983 actions); A zeez v. Keller, 2012 WL 13098039, at *7 (S.D.W. Va. Apr. 6, 2012) (Berger, J.); Coss v. Blatt, 2019 WL 357 979, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. Ja n. 29, 2019) (Copenhaver, J.) (citation omitted); Hammit v. Stump, 2019 WL 46 96349, at * 7 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 25, 2019) (Berger, J.); Miller v. Ashton, 2019 WL 5342529, at *6 (N.D.W. Va. Oct. 21, 2019) (Stamp, J.); Young v. Lacy, 2020 WL 42 51798, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. July 24, 2020) (Faber, J.); Spence v. Swartz, 2022 WL 14814120 (N.D.W. Va. Oct. 25, 2022) (Groh, J.); Gravely v. Hinchman, 2025 WL 20587 77, at *1 (S. D.W. Va. July 23, 20 25) (Chambers, J.).

9 year statute of limitations to § 1983 malicious prosecution claims did so because West Virginia Supreme Court cases such as Wilt v. State Auto mobile Mutual Ins ur ance Co., 203 W. Va. 165 (1998); McCammon v. Oldaker, 205 W. Va. 24 (1999); and Herbert J. Thomas Mem oria l H osp ita l Ass ocia tion v. Nutter, 238 W. Va. 375 (2016), utilized a one year statute of limitations for state malicio us prosecutions claims. In doing so, those cou rts construed the state malicious prosecution on e year limitations period as the “most analog ous cause of action” for § 1983 malicious prosecution claims. At first blush, this line of reasoning may h ave some intuitive appeal. But, it cannot be squared with binding precedent that has explicitly h eld that the “m ost analogous cause of action” for § 1983 claims are general personal injury actions, no t state tort - specific causes of action. Okure, 488 U.S. at 24 0– 42; Wilson, 471 U.S. at 280; Wallace, 549 U.S. at 38 7; Baltimore City State ’ s Atty ’ s Office, 767 F.3d at 388; Tr avelpiece, 31 F.4th at 8 83. C. D uring oral argu ment, Appellees posited -- for the first time -- that Wilt support s th e application of the one year limitations period pu rsuant to West Virginia C ode § 55 -2- 12(c) because a West Virginia maliciou s prosecution claim does not surv ive the death of a party. Wilt, 203 W. Va. at 170 (“D etermining which torts fall into subd ivision (c) of West Virginia Code § 55 -2- 12 requires reference to the surviv ability provisions set forth in West Virginia Code § 55 -7- 8a. . . [c]onsequently, personal tort actions such as libel, defamation, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution take the one - year statute provided by West Virginia Code § 55 -2- 12(c) because th ey are excluded from statutory survivability under West Virginia Code § 55 -7- 8a.”) (emphasis sup plied); s ee W. Va. C ode § 55 -2- 12(c)

10 (“Every personal action for which no limitation is oth erwise prescribed shall be brough t . . . within one year next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for any other matter of su ch nature that, in case a p arty die, it could not ha ve been broug ht at common law by or against his personal representative. ”) (emphasis supplied). Appellees’ reliance on Wilt is misplaced. In Wilt, the West Virginia Supreme Court addressed a certified qu estion from the United States District Cou rt for the Northern District of West Virginia con cerning which statute of limitations applies to claims brought pursuant to the West Virginia Un fair Trade Practices Act. Wilt, 203 W. Va. at 16 5 – 66. Here, by contrast, Appellant has brought a federal § 1983 claim for her malicious prosecution -- not a state claim. Beyond that, Appellees overlook all of the fe deral law discussed above, as well a s the West Virginia Supreme Court’s recogn ition that subsection (b)’s two year statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims. Patton v. Cnty. o f Berkeley, 242 W. Va. 315, 31 7 n. 3 (2019) (“civil rights claims fi led in state court pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 are personal injury actions governed by state two - year statute of limitations, rather than one - year statute of limitations.”); Rodgers v. Corp. of Harpers Ferry, 179 W. Va. 637, 641 (1988) (“[W]e hold that all claims filed in West Virginia pursuant t o 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are personal injury actions governed by the two - year statute of limitations set forth in W. Va. Code § 55 -2- 12(b) (1981).”), abrogate d in par t on other grounds by Courtne y v. Court ney, 190 W. Va. 126 (1993). And, in any event, applying different statutes of lim itations for different § 1983 claims filed in the same forum state, depending on their survivability or underlying tort, would defy the Su preme Court’s holding that we are to treat all § 1 983

11 claims the same and uniformly apply the residual or general personal injury statute to each claim. Accordingly, we make clear today -- to the extent it was no t already clear -- that the applicable statute of limitations period fo r § 1983 claims arising in West Virginia is two years pursuant to Section 55 - 2- 12(b), regardless of the survivability of a claim in state law, because the Supreme Cou rt has held that all § 1983 claims are to be governed by the state’s general or residual personal injury limitations period when a state prov ides multiple statutes of limitations for personal in jury actions. Okure, 488 U.S. at 24 9 – 50. T he district court below applied the one y ear statute of limitations set forth in West Virginia Code § 55 -2- 12(c) and held that Appellants claim was time barred. That was error. Appellant’s claim is governed by the two year statute of limitations set forth in West Virginia Code § 55 -2- 12(b). Appellant’s claim accrued on January 23, 2023, when h er criminal case was dismissed. Se e McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 116 (2019) (hol ding that a malicious prosecution claim accrues “once the u nderlying criminal proceedings have resolved in the plaintiff’s favo r.”); Thompson v. Cl ark, 596 U.S. 36, 3 9 (2022) (finding tha t a state’s voluntary dismissal is “a favorable termination of the underlying criminal proceeding.”); Baltimore City State’s Atty’s Office, 767 F.3d at 390 (explaining that a malicious prosecution claim accrues “on the date that proceedings against [a def endant are] favorably terminated”). 5 And Appellant’s civil complaint was filed on December 16, 2024. 5 The parties do not dispute that Appellant’s cl aim accrued in January 2023.

12 Thus, Appellant filed suit one month prior to h er statute of limitations running, and the district court erred in dismissing her claim as time barred. IV. Appellees further contend that Appellant’s complaint does not state a claim against the City of Wheeling upon which relief can be granted. We agree. A lthough the district court dismissed Appellant’s complaint solely o n timeliness grounds, “[t]he matter of wh at questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of th e courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individu al cases.” Cnty Bd. of Arlington Cnty. v. Express Scripts Ph armacy, Inc., 996 F.3 d 243, 254 (4th Cir. 2021) (“Generally, federal appellate courts should not consider issues that were not first addressed by the district court.”) (citing Bakker v. Grutman, 942 F.2d 236, 242 (4th Cir. 1991)). Here, the issue as to dismissal of the City of Wheeling has been fully briefed and the interest of judicial economy fav ors resolving it at this juncture. Section 1983 provides an avenue for plaintiffs to file suit against an y person who “subjects, or cause to be subjected, any citizen of the United States…to th e deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured b y the Constitution and laws” of the Unite d States. 42 U.S.C. S ection 1983; see also Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 37 7 (2012). In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 6 58, 690 (1 978), the Supreme Court determined that “municipalities and other local go vernment units” are subject to suit p ursuant to Section 1983. But, to hold a municipality liable for a constitu tional violation pursuant to Monell, a plaintiff must establish “the existence of an official policy o r custom that is fairly attributable to the municipality and that proximately caused the deprivation of their righ ts.

13 Howard v. City of Du rham, 68 F.4th 934, 952 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Jackson, 15 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 1994)). Appellant’s complaint does not put forth any allegation against the City o f Wheeling that could plausibly approximate a mun icipal policy or custom that would support the City’s liability under a Monell theory. In fact, the one and only instance in which the C ity is directly identified in the complaint is in the “Parties” section, where Appellant identifies the City of Wheeling as a “municipality.” W hile Appel l ant did not have to prove her claim in her complaint, she did need to plausibly allege a claim against each defendant, and she plainly di d not do s o as to the City. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s d ismissal as to the City of Wheeling. V. For the foregoing reasons, the judgmen t of the district court is AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERS ED IN PART, AND REMANDED.