Stephanie Reddin v. Kristi Noem - Employment Discrimination Appeal

PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF AP PEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 24 - 1141 STEPHANIE M. REDDIN G Plaintiff – App ellant, v. KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of Hom eland Security, in her official capacity f or the Department of Homeland Security Defend ant – Appellee. Appeal from the United S tates District Court for the Eastern D istrict of Virginia, at Alexandria. David J. Novak, District Judge. (1:23−cv−01325 −DJN−JFA) Argued: December 9, 2025 Decided: March 3, 2026 Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREG ORY, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Gregory joi ned. ARGUED: Theresa Dawn Truit t Kraft, WTK & ASSOCIA TES LLP, W ashington, D.C., for Appellant. Kirstin O’Connor, OFFICE OF THE UNITED ST A TES A TT ORNEY, Alexandria, V irginia, for A ppellee. ON BRIEF: Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorn ey, Y uri S. Fuchs, Assistant United States A ttorney, Hugham Chan, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED ST A TES A TTORNEY, Alexandria, V irginia, for Appellee.

2 WILKINSON, Circuit Judge: Plaintiff - Appellant Stepha nie Reddi n g, a former Federal Air Marshal (“FAM”), br ought suit against the Transportation S ecurity Administration (“TSA”) under the Rehabilitation Act, alleging a failure to accommodate her numerous medical conditions. But far from neglecting its statutory dut ies, T SA repeatedly engaged with Redding to identify solutions to keep her employed within the federal government. T hese efforts culminated in Redding’s transfer to the Federal L aw Enforcement Training Centers (“FLETC”) — a position she self - selected for reassignmen t. Redding now claims that TSA should have ke pt her perm anently i n the temporary “light duty” position she held when reassignment became necessary. The district court dismissed this suit on the basis that Redding had not adequately pled that she was a “qualified individual” capable of performing her desired job’s essential functions. And indeed, both because Redding conced ed this inability and because TSA already provided reasonable accommodations, we now affirm. I. We hear this case on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and t herefore take the well - pleaded facts in Redding’s co mplaint as true; we “ do not consider evidence beyond tha t pleading.” Stanley v. C ity of Sanford, 145 S. Ct. 2058, 2 062 (2025). Th e facts pled are as follows. For over seven years, Redding worked as a FAM within the Federal Air Marshal Services (“FAMS”) division of TSA. When she was originally hired in 2011, Redding

3 provided TSA with documentation of h er “Degenerative Progressive Myopia (Severe Myopia) and Keratoconjunctivitis Sicca (Chronic Dry Eyes),” noting that “her unco rrected vision was poor.” J.A. 8. But, after a preemployment medical examination, TSA determined that Redding could perform th e duties of a FAM. During the course of emp loyment, Redding deve loped a number of other medical conditions, including cardiac iss ues, b orderline p ulmonary h ypertension, h ypoglycemia, and a t y pe of chronic muscle and nerve pain. This wor sening led TSA to place Redding on extended p eriods of “temporary ‘ light duty ’ s tatus,” dur ing whic h she was “restricted from performing the normal duties as a n FAM. ” J. A. 8. And, f rom March 2016 to May 2018, Redding served as a Reg ional Coordinator in the Aviation Program s Bran ch — a “ g round - based ” assignment th at “required [her] to fly in ‘m ission status’ only once per month,” substantially less than a typical FAM. J.A. 8 –9. A sizable po rtion of this tenure w as formally considered “light duty.” J.A. 8; see Oral Arg. at 17:18 – 17:2 6. In April 2017, Redding completed a TSA - ma ndated biannual physical examination and provi ded vario us supplemental medical in formation to the agency ’s med ical examiner. Later that summer, TSA informe d Redding of “concerns that her uncorrected vision no longer met the requirements for duty.” J.A. 9. And, in Ja nuary 2018, the agency sent her a formal memorandum with the subject line, “Inability to Perform Essential Duties o f Your Position/Inability to Meet FAMS Medical Standards.” 1 J.A. 11, 319. The memorandum 1 While the complain t itself does not detail exactly wh ich essential duties Redding could not perform, the parties bo th ap pear to agree that the complaint is inherently (Continued)

4 notified Redding that her medical evalu ation results could result in termination from her position and accordingly recommended that she seek reassignment to a d ifferent positi on within TSA or another federal agency. Redding took this recommendation in stride and submitted a request for accommodation, seeking reassignment to a “retirement position not a ffected by medical restrictions.” J.A. 11. N otably, in her request, she acknowledged her “inability to p erform the essential duties of [her] current position.” J.A. 11. Sho rtly thereafter, the agency informe d Redding t hat there were no vacant TSA position s that could accommodate her. So R edding identified two potential vacancies in FLETC —a division of the Department of Homeland Security distinct from TSA. J.A. 12. Her reassignment to FLETC as a Law Enforcement Specialist was granted on May 27, 201 8, and TSA closed her accommodation case several days later. After this t ime, Redding began to experience “difficulty with the conditions of the assignment to FLETC,” in part due to “a new co ndition that would require surgery,” and “began having conversations with [FLET C] personnel regarding how to req uest reconsideration of the reassignment as an accommodation.” J.A. 13. In July 2019, Redding contac ted the TSA accommodation office, wh ich advised that it could not assist her as she was no longer a TSA employee. J.A. 12 – 14. referring, at least in part, to Redding’s inability to meet TSA’s standards for flight missions. See Oral Arg. at 06:41 – 07:02, 16:16 – 16: 22.

5 In July 2022, Redding filed a complaint putting forth a failure - to - accommodat e, disabilit y- discrimination claim und er the Rehabilitation Act. The district court dism issed the complaint fo r failure to state a claim, determining that Redding had failed to “plausibly ple [a] d that she [wa ] s a qualified ind ividual. ” J.A. 459. Redding timely appealed. II. The Rehabilitation Act and its cousin, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), set precise standards governing when, for whom, and what accommodations are appropriate. Generally speaking, the Rehabilitation A ct protects a “ qualified individual with a disability ” from, “ solely by reason of her or his disability, b e [ing] excluded from the participation in, be [ing] denied the benefits of, or be [ing] subjected to discrimination. . . under any program or activity conducted by any Executi ve agenc y. ” 29 U.S.C. § 794 (a). And, b y its very terms, the Rehabilitation Act adopts the standards set forth in Title I of the ADA. Id. § 794 (d). Not all individuals with disabilities are ent itled to reasonable acco mmodations under this system. Ind eed, a “qualified ind ividual” is only one who, “ with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essentia l functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires. ” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (emphasis added). Indeed, a pilot’s reasonable accommodation could not be that they never fly a plane, nor c ould a deep - sea fisherman ’s reasonable accommodation be that they never go out on the water. Activities that are so “fund amental” to the job are nonnegotiable. 29 C.F.R.

6 § 1630.2 (n)(1). A reasonable accommodation can help an employee fulfill a core responsibility that she coul d not do otherwise, but it cannot eliminate the duty completely. I t is not the provin ce of employees or this cou rt to prescribe the “essential functions” of an agency job. To allow such in trusion would sprea d confusio n in federal employment. Job descriptions would be come constantly mutable, sub ject to extreme variation from the actual intentions and goals of the employer. I t is thus the expertise and judgment of the employer that ultimately merit “ considerable deference.” Elledge v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., LLC, 979 F.3d 1004, 1009 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks o mitted) (quoting D’Amico v. City of New Y ork, 132 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 1998)). Employers are in timately aware of the day - to - day work environ ment and how each employee fits into the mosaic of the agency’s overall mission, objectives, and responsibilities. We lack t he necessary expertise to second - guess such informed business judgments. See, e.g., i d.; Lloyd v. Swifty Transp., Inc., 552 F.3d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 2009); Ma son v. Avaya Commc’ns, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1119 (10th Cir. 2004). Our review is instead limited to determining w hether a function “bear [s] more than a marginal relationship to the job at issue,” and, eve n the n, we give great “consideration. . . to the employer’s ju dgment.” Tyndall v. Nat’l Ed uc. Ctrs., Inc. of Cal., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 13 93 – 94 (5th Cir. 1993)); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1), (3)(i). E ven if that an employee is a “qualified in dividual” able to perform a job’s essen tial functions with reaso nable accommodations, the employee may no t unilaterally dictate the terms of th o se accommodation s. Determining what accommodations are reasonab le

7 involves an “info rmal, interactive process” between the employe r and “ the individual with a disability in need of th e accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). Such g ood - faith collaboration may result in various “modification s or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed.” Id. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). And it is the employer who has the “ultimate discretion” to “reduc[e] th is wide solution - space to a concrete accommodat ion.” Elledg e, 979 F.3d at 1011 (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630. 9 (202 0)). The whole process is one that contemplates some give and take among the parties, some mutual recognition that the perfect may be the enemy of the good. III. We review the district court’s dismissal de novo and view the well - pleaded facts in the complaint as true. Basta v. Novan t Health Inc., 56 F.4th 307, 318 (4th Cir. 2022). T o “ survive ” a Rule 12(b)(6) dismiss al, “ a complaint mu st contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘ state a claim to relief that is plausible o n its face. ’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 6 78 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Redding’s complaint fails this test: it reveals both that she is not a qualified individual for her desired R egional Coordinator p osition an d that TSA did in fact provide reasonable accommodations.

8 A. For starters, Redding admits in her complaint that “ reassignment was requested due to the inability to perform the essential d uties o f [h er] current [Regional Coo rdinator] position.” J.A. 1 1 (emph asis added). Th is admission is a dam aging one. S ee Cleveland v. Pol’y Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999) (“[A] plaintiff’s sworn assertion in an application for disability ben efits that she is, for ex ample, ‘ unable to work ’ will appear to negate an essential element of her ADA case. . . . ”); accord. Stanley, 145 S. C t. at 2065. Redding’s principal argument on appeal is that TSA should ha ve permanently reassigned her to the Regional Coordinator position. See Oral Arg. at 11:50 – 12:0 3. But TSA canno t be requir ed to do s o when Redd ing concedes an inability to fulfil l the necessary responsibilities of that exact p osition even with existing accom modations. Even Regio nal Coordinators in the Federal Air Marshal Service are requ ired to be “mission ready” to perform regular flight duties, as Redd ing acknowledges. Id. at 1 8:05 – 18: 20; J.A. 9. This was a function that due to her d eteriorating medical conditions, includ ing poor eyesight, Redding was unfortunately unable to perfo rm. O ral Arg. at 17:40 – 18:04; J.A. 8 – 9, 11. T SA rightly assessed that no adjustments wou ld permit Redding to perform the critical duties of this role — a point which Redd ing’s complaint does not appear to co ntest. See J.A. 11 – 12 (“ There is no paperwork su ggesti ng that [the Regiona l Coordina tor] position, with or without accommodations, would be an appropriate alternative to her position as an FAM. ”). Put simpl y, Reddi ng essentially pleads that she is not a “ qualified individual ” for the permanent Regional Coordin ator job that she seeks, and thu s her failure - to - accommodate claim fails on its own terms.

9 B. Even ass uming a rguendo that Redding could perform the essen tial duties of a normal FA M or Regio nal Coor dinator, TSA already provided reasonable accommodation s by reassigning her to FLETC. Redd ing claims on appeal that the FLETC reassignment was unreasonable because she experienced difficulties in that ro le, and because TSA could have kept her in the Regional Coordinator role permanently, even if she could not perform flight missions. See Oral Arg. at 0 3:20 – 0 4:22, 11:50 – 12:0 3; Opening Br. at 15 – 16. Redding wr ongly assumes, howe ver, that she can dictat e the core responsibilities of her desired job. As aforementioned, “the decision about a position’s essential functions belongs, in the first instance, to the employ er.” Elledge, 979 F.3d at 1009. Such deference is especially important when employ ees act, as here, within law - enforcement and national - security enterprises. Ag encies in these fields must ensure that th eir employees remain mission ready at a moment’s notice. Significant interference with the agency’s ability to dictate what baseline criteria an e mployee must meet could have adv erse effects on our government’s response to critical emerg encies. In deed, F AMS ’s role wo uld be materially diminished if law forbade it from requiring that employees execute airborne law - enforcement activities. “Air” is literally in the ag ency’s name. Considering its discretion in this sphere, TSA has b een measured and reasonable in applyin g its understanding of the essential - functions standard to Redding. First, it determined that Redding could not perform the essential responsibilities of a normal FAM and thus put her on temporary “light duty” status with more limited essential functions. Then, whe n she could no lo nger perform even tho se adjusted duties, the agency looked to

10 see if Redding could perform the essential fun ctions of any other vacant positio ns with in FAMS or TSA. When it determined that she could not, TSA finally b eg a n collaborating with Redding on reassignment to another federal agency. This progression is wholly consistent with our caselaw and th e E qual Empl oyment Opportunity Commission’s guidance that reassignment be a measure of “la st resort,” required only when “(1) there are n o effective accommod ations that will enable the employee to perform the essential fu nctions of his/her current position, or (2) all other reasonable accommodations would impose an undue hardship [on the employer].” Wirtes v. City of Newport News, 996 F.3d 234, 240 – 41 (4th Cir. 2021) (alteration in original) (emp hasis omitted) (quoting EE OC, Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, N o. 915.022, 20 02 WL 3199 4335, at *20 (Oct. 17, 2002)); see also Elledge, 979 F.3d at 1014. W e are sympathetic to Redd ing’s medical struggles and resulting hardsh ips. But through out this whole process, TSA co llaborated and communicated with Redd ing in good faith. I nteractive p rocess under the Rehabilitation A ct does no t guarantee an employee their desired outcome. See Reya zuddin v. Montgomery Cnty., 789 F. 3d 4 07, 415 (4th Cir. 2015). R ather, it gives them a meaningful voice in such process. Redding had that voice; she self - selected her reassignment to FLETC. S he now comes back, over a year after reassignment, dissatis fied with her selection. But d issatisfaction does not a mount to a failure to accommodate. The very natu re of placing “ultimate discretion” in the hands of the employer ensures that employees may, on occasion, disagree with accommodation decisions. Elledge, 979 F.3d at 1011. But so long as an employer identifies a “ reasonable ”

11 “ alternative ” to the employee’ s preferred accommod ation, we have no grounds on which to reject that determination. R eyazuddin, 789 F.3d at 415. Here, reassignment to FL ETC was manifestly reasonable, and that is wh ere our analysis ends. Certainly, if Redding continues to experience disability - related d ifficulties in her FLETC position, she may request from FLETC o ther reasonable accommodations to aid in the performance of the essential functions of this n ew role. Bu t TSA is no longer part of the equation because it is no longer Redding’s employer. TSA’s obligati ons to Re dding ceased when they facilitated the reassignment. The Rehabilitation Act does not permit Redding to link all her current and futu re d ifficulties to TSA’s accommodation decision. I V. Redding comes to us seeking yet another bite at the apple, but th e accommodation process must end somewhere. The law does not permit plaintiffs to burden em ployers with Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims when all the evidence points in the same direction: the employee conceded ineligibility, and the employer p rovided reasonable accommodations and interactive process at every step along the way. We must thus affirm the district court’s dismissal of Redding’s complaint. AFFIRMED