Lanesborough 2000 LLC v. Nextres LLC - Court Opinion

24-2211 (L) Lanesbor ough 2000, LLC v. N ext res, LLC United States Court of Appe als for the Se cond Circuit August Ter m 2025 Argued: January 14, 2026 Decided: February 6, 2026 No s. 24-2211 (L), 25-662 (Con) L ANESBOROUGH 2000, LLC, Petitioner-Appellee, v. N EXTR ES, LLC, Respondent-Appellant. * Appeal from the Unite d States D istric t Cou rt for the Southern District of New Yor k No. 23-cv-07584 P. Kev in Ca ste l, Ju dge. * The Cl erk of the C ourt is respec tfully d irected to amend the cap tion as se t forth ab ove.

2 Before: C AR NEY, P AR K, and R OBINSON, Circuit Judges. Petitioner Lanes borough 2000, LLC br ought clai ms against Respondent Nextres, LLC under an arbi tration agreemen t, alleging that Nextr es vio late d the partie s ’ loan agreemen t. The arbitrato r ruled for Lanesboro ugh, and the district court (Cas tel, J.) confirmed most of the arbitra l award, enjoined a state - court proceeding to effectuate that confirmation, and gran ted Lane sborough post -award prejudgment interest. Nextres challenges those d ecisions on appeal. But Lanesborough ar gues that we lac k jurisdict ion be cause the part ies waived the “right to appe al” in their arbi tration agreeme nt. We conclude that the parties’ contractua l waiver of the “ righ t to appeal ” is not clea r and unequivocal an d thus cannot foreclose our review of the dis tric t court ’ s judgmen t o n the arbitral award. T he waiver provision is ambiguous because it fails to specify w hat is meant by the “ right to appeal.” We thus proceed to review the distr ict co urt ’ s judg ment on the meri ts, without deciding whether a clear waiver of the ri ght to appeal a distri ct court’s order confirming, vacating, or otherwis e ruling on an arbitration a ward wou ld be enforceable. On the merits, we conclude that the district c ourt did not err in partial ly co nfirming the arbitrator ’ s awards or in awarding post- award prejudg ment interest to Lanesbor ough. But the district court erred by fai ling to consider w hether its injunction of a s tate - court foreclosure acti on was consistent w ith the Anti - Injunc tion Ac t, which prohibits most injunctions of state - court proceedings. We thus AFFIRM i n pa rt and VACAT E in part the j udgment of the distr ict co urt and REMAND for further proceedings.

3 Z ACHARY G. M E YER, Sutt on Sachs Mey er PLLC, New York, NY, for Respondent-Appell ant. D ANI EL L EV ER, Clyde & Co. US LLP, New York, NY, for Petitioner-Appellee. P ARK, Circuit Judge: Petitioner Lanes borough 2000, LLC br ought clai ms against Respondent Nextres, LLC under a n arbitration agreem ent, alleging that Nextr es vio late d the partie s ’ loan agreemen t. The arbitrato r ruled for Lanesborou gh, and the district c ourt confirmed most of the arbitral award, enjoine d a state - court proceeding to effec tua te that confirmation, and g ranted Lanesboroug h post - award preju dgment interest. Nextres challenges tho se decisions on app eal. But Lanesborough argue s that we lack jurisdiction because the par ties waived the “right to appe al” in their arbi tration agreeme nt. We conclude that the parties’ contrac tual waiver of the “ r ight to appeal ” is not clear and unequivocal and thus canno t forecl ose our review of the dis tric t court ’ s judgmen t o n the arbitral award. The waiver provision is ambiguous because it fails to specify w hat is meant by the “ right to appeal.” We t hus proceed to review the distr ict co urt ’ s judg ment on the meri ts, without deciding wh ether a clear waiver of the ri ght to appeal a distri ct court’s order confirming, vacating, or otherwise r uling on an arbitration award w ould be enforceable. On the merits, we conclude that the distric t court d id not err in p artiall y confirming t he arbitrator ’ s awards or in awarding post- award prejudg ment interest to Lanesbor ough. But the district court erred by fai ling to consider whether its injunction of a state - court foreclosure act i on was consis tent with the Anti - Injunc tion A ct,

4 which prohibits most injunctions of state - court proceedings. We thus affirm in par t and vacate in par t the ju dgment of the distr ict court and remand for further proceedin gs. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Bac kground In July 2022, Ne xtres agre ed to loan Lane sborough $2 million to finance the cons truction of a self - stora ge facility in C orning, New York. The deal was memorialize d in a “ B uildin g Loan Agreement ” and an “ Arbitration Ag reement,” both of which are governed by New York law. Under t he Loan Agreement, Nextres a greed to disburse $2 million to an e scrow accoun t at the clos ing. Lanesbor ough would receive around $500,000 im med iate ly a nd t he r est in d istr ibu tions based on its construc tion progress. Nextres secured the l oan with a mortgage on the Corning property. T he loan was also cross- collateralized by the property se curing another loan t hat Nextres had made to Batchwo od 1998, LLC, a company controll ed by Lanesborough’s owner and sole member, Rebecca S tayton. Cross - default prov isi ons in th e Lanesborough and Batchwo od loan agreement s all owed Nextres to foreclose on either property based o n a default on either lo an. In the Arbit ration Agreem ent, the pa rties agreed th at “any Dispu te invo lv ing th e Loan. .. shall be resolved exclusively by bindin g a rb itra tion ” under “ the rules of the Amer ican Arbit ration Association” (“A AA”). App’x at 48. A “ Dis pute ” inc lud e d any “ claimed wrongdoing, such as mi srepresentation, negligenc e, breach of contract, . . . [and] breach of the covenant of good fa ith and fair

5 dealin g.” Id. But it did not inc lud e actions “ for prov isional remedies s uch as a temporary res training order or prelim inary injunction or for a permanen t injunction based upon an ar bitration award.” Id. Th e Arb itration Agreement also state d th at each “ party shall bear t heir own attorney [’]s fees ” and t hat “ [j]udgm ent on the award may be entered in any court of competent jurisdi ction. ” Id. Fina lly, a “Waivers ” clause in the Arbit ration Agreement stated: THE PARTIES HEREBY FREELY WAIVE THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JU DGE OR JURY, T HE RIGHT TO APPEAL, PRETRIAL D ISCOVERY AND APPLICATION O F THE RULES O F EVIDENC E. Id. B. The Arb itration Lanesborough brought an arbitration claim for damages and injunc tive rel ief, a lleging tha t Nextres vi olated the Loan Agre ement by failing to disburse the loan funds. The AAA a rbitr ator he ld a five- hour “ emergency heari ng ” on Lanes borough ’ s claims for injun ctive relief and then ordered Nextres to disburse the loan funds to Lanesborough in several em ergency awards. After a final h ear ing on the merits, the arb itrator issued an Interim Award concluding that Nextres had breached the Loan Agreement and the implied covenan t of good faith and fair dealing. The arb itrator granted Lan esborough declaratory an d injunctive re lief and consequential damages. But the ar bitrator denied Lanesborough’ s req uest for int erest on the undisbursed l oan funds because he “ regard[ed] an award of inter est to be redundan t ” of his

6 award of conseq uential da mages, whi ch included interest paid during “the year long delay caused by Nextres.” App’x at 8 26. The arb itrator also c oncluded that Lanesb orough was ent itled to atto rney ’s fees bas ed on an arbitration r ule allow in g for an award of fees if both par ties request such an award. Although the arbitrator grounde d his authority to award fees in the arbitration rule, his rationale for awarding fee s rested on Nextres ’ s “ b ad faith conduct [which] continued throughout the arbitration.” Id. at 827. Tha t conduct i ncluded N extres refusi ng to an swer an interrogator y after being ordered to d o so, providing “ irre levant bank records ” to substantiate i ts (apparently false) c laim that i t had deposited th e loan funds into the escrow account, and arg uing in bad fai th that an attachment to the L oan Agreement that Lanesborough offer ed into evidence was fa lsif ie d. Id. at 82 0-21. T he arbitrato r then de nied as moot Lanesborou gh’s req uest for an aw ard of attor ney’s fe es as a sanction. After receiving further submissi ons on attorney ’ s fees, the arbitrator iss ued a Final Awar d granting Lanesborough over $300,000 in attorney ’s fees. The arbit rator explained aga in that Ne xtre s’s conduct had been “improper in the extreme ” an d “inexcusab le,” he recounted the litany of Nextres’s misconduct, and “[t]here fore,” he awarded Lanesboro ugh attorney’s fee s. Id. at 2212. The arb itrator also pointed to t he arbitration rule as a “ separate and indepe ndent basis for awarding fe es.” Id. C. District C ourt Pro cee dings Lanesborough and Nextres filed cro ss - peti tions to confirm and to vacate the Inter im and Final Aw ards. The distric t court in iti ally concluded that the arb itrator exceeded his powers under the

7 Arbitration Agr eement when he a warded Lan esborough inj unctive relief and attorney ’s fees, citi ng the Arb itration Agreement ’ s provisions that actio ns for “ provisio nal remedie s ” were not arbitrable and tha t each “ p arty sh all bear their own attor ney [’]s fees. ” App’x at 2601, 2606, 2608. The court also re jected Lanesbor ough’s argument that Nextres had wa ived this o bjectio n by requesti ng attorney’s fees un der the Arbitrati on Agreement because Nex tres had requested fees u nder the Loan A greement. So it confirmed the portions of the Interim Award granting L anesborough consequential damages and dec laratory rel ief, vacated the por tions of the I nterim Award granting Lan esborough injunctive relief, and vacated the Final Award granting La nesborough attor ney ’ s fees. The district court also invited Lanesborough to “ move for perm anent inju nctive or equitabl e relief based on th e declaratory relief that the Co urt has confirmed,” reason ing that the parties “ ha ve the right to br ing such a claim in court ” under the Arbit ration Agreement. Id. at 2613-14. After Lan esborough moved for reconside ration of th e distr ict court ’s judg ment, t h e distri ct court reversed i ts vacatur of the Fi nal Award an d confirmed the award of attorne y’s fees to Lanesbor ough. It determined that the Arbit ration Agreement ’ s fee provision did not curtail an “ arb itrator ’ s inherent p ower to award attorney ’ s fees for bad faith conduc t, ” a nd ex pla ined tha t th e arbitra tor had “ ex plic itly found that Nextres acted in bad fai th.” Id. at 3213. T he distric t court als o granted Lan esborough’s motion for new injunc tive rel ief t o be issued by the district court. It ordered N extres to send Lanesborou gh over $1 million in loan pr oceeds and otherwise to comply with the L oan Agreement. It also enjoi ned Nextres “from the institution or continued maintenance of any foreclos ure action,”

8 inclu ding a foreclosure action Nex tre s had brought against Batchwood, Nextr es, LLC et al. v. Batchwood 1998 LL C, et al., No. EFCA2024-000708 (N.Y. S up. Ct.) (the “Batch wood F oreclosure A ction ”). App’x at 3221. The district c ourt reasone d that Lanesborough wo uld “ suffer irreparabl e harm ” without that injunction because the “ continued exis tence of Nextres ’ foreclosure proceeding s is an impedimen t to [Lanesborough] s ecuring alt ernate financing ” for its self - storage facility in C orning. Id. at 3220 -21. Finally, the district court granted Lanesb orough pre - and post - judgmen t interest. Nextres timely app eale d. The d istric t court s tayed the enforcement of its j udgment pendin g our review. II. DISCUSSIO N A. Appe llate J ur isdic tion Lanesborough moves to di smiss Nextres ’ s appeal, arguing th a t we lack jur isdic tion on the ground that Nextres waived the “ right t o appeal” in the Arbitration Agreem ent. Nextres argues that th e parties wa ived the AAA’ s ar bitration appeals proce ss “ witho ut placing any lim itation upon the scop e of post - arbitral judic ial proceedings. ” Opp. to Mo t. to Dismiss at 4. The Federal Arb itration Act (“FAA”) per mits parties to app eal an order “ confir ming or denying confir mation of an award or p artial award” and “ a f inal decision with re spect to an ar bitration ” subjec t to the FAA, so we have statu tory jurisdiction over th is appeal. 9 U.S.C. § 16 (a)(1)(D), (a)(3). T he “ no rmal construction of the jurisdic tion rules inclu des a presumption tha t, where juris dictio n exists, it cannot be ousted or waived absent a clear indication of such

9 a purpose. ” John Boutari & Son, Wi nes & Spirits, S.A. v. Attiki Importers & Distribs. Inc., 22 F.3 d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1994) (q uotation mark s omitted). Re lying o n this principle, w e have held that “[f]orum selec tion c lause s lac king any clear exclusionar y or obligatory language ” w ill not be con strued to dep rive courts of jur isdiction. Glob. Seafood Inc. v. Bantry Bay M ussels Ltd., 659 F.3d 221, 225 (2 d Cir. 2011). And we have revi ewed a district court ’ s vacatur of an arbitral award even though the parties a greed to a vague waiver of appellate review. See Hoeft v. MVL Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 60 (2 d Cir. 2003), abrogated on other g rounds b y Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, In c., 552 U.S. 576, 584 -85 (2008) (resolving appeal when arbitrat ion agreement said arbitrator ’ s deci sion shall not be subject t o “ any type of review or appeal whatsoever” (emphasis added)). We thus conclude t hat a contract ual waiver of the right to appeal that is not clear an d unambiguous c annot foreclose ou r review of a district c ourt ’ s judgment on an arb itral awar d. That conclusion is consistent with t he Tenth Circuit’s holding that “contractual provisions limiting the right to appeal from a district court’s judgment confirm ing or vacating an arbitrat ion award” must be “clear and unequivoc al.” MACTEC, Inc. v. Gorelick, 427 F.3d 821, 830 (10th Cir. 2 005). Here, the scope of the waiver of t he “right to appeal” in the Arbi tration Agreement is a mbiguous, so it cann ot bar our consideration of the merits of this appeal. W e thus ne ed not decide wheth er a clear and unambiguous waiver of appell ate review of the district court’s judgmen t on an arbitral award wo uld be enforceabl e under the FAA. Cf. Hoeft, 3 43 F.3d at 64 (dec lining to enforce an agreemen t that “bar[re d] all ju dicial review” of an arbitral award (emphasis a dded)).

10 The ambigui ty in the Arbitration Agreement arises from a tension between the text and t he context of the waiv er pro vision. The text s tates b road ly that the parties waived the “ righ t to a ppe al, ” with n o lim itat ion. App’x at 48. Lan esbor ough thus ar gues that the wai ver applies to all actions betwee n the parties, including arbitrations an d suits brought in court. But that broad r eading is inconsistent with the contex t of the waiver, which suggests a narrower interpret ation. The partie s wa ive d the “ right to appea l ” in a clause that also waives “ the r ight to trial by judge or j ury,. . . pretrial discovery and ap plication of the r ules of evidenc e. ” Id. Collecti vely, these wai ved rights represen t procedura l protections of the court system, wh ich the par ties waive d for “ Disp utes ” s ubject to arbitration. In c ontext then, the wa iver of the “ righ t to a ppea l ” can be understood to encompass onl y potential appea l s of the me rits of arbitrators’ decis ion s. Cf. Dole v. United Steelworke rs of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990) (“ The traditional canon of construction, noscitur a sociis, dictates that words grouped in a l ist should be given related meanin g. ” (c leaned up)). Nextres ’s appeal to our court il lustrate s the inco mpa tibil ity o f these two interpretations, and th e re sulti ng ambig uity in t he w aiver. A w aiver of all appea ls wo uld in clu de Nextres ’ s appeal of the d istrict court ’ s grant of po st - award prej udgment int erest and injunctive relief. B ut if the parties waived only appeals of arbitral awards, the waiver would not includ e those grants, w hich the distr ict co urt made in the first inst ance. It is als o un clea r whether a w aive r of appeals of arbitral awards wo uld include Nextres ’s appeal of the district court’ s confirmation order because an app eal of a confirmation order typic ally cons iders the statu tory ground s for vacating an ar bitral award, not the substance of the award. See Wise v. Wachovia Sec., LLC,

11 450 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 2006) (Federal courts “are not” “ engaged in judicial review of ar bitration awar ds under the Fe deral Arbitration Act.”); 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). The waiver of the “ right to ap peal ” is thus “ susce ptib le t o mor e than one reasonable interpretation ”: first, it could mean that the partie s waived all appeals, and s econd, it could mean that the parties waived only appeals of the substance of arb itral awards. Brad H. v. City of New York, 951 N.E.2d 743, 746 (N.Y. 2011). That rend ers the waiver ambigu ous, id., and thus unenforceable. This conclusion is consistent wit h other C ircu its ’ interpret ations of appe llate waivers in ar bitration agreemen t s. The Arbitrati on Agreement i s unlike waivers that other C ourts of Appeals have construe d to bar app ellate review of distr ict court s’ order s confirming arbitra l awards, wh ich were expli cit about the “ right t o appeal” at issue. For example, t he Tenth Circuit enforced an appellate waiver stat ing that “ [j] udgment u pon the award re ndered by th e arbitrator sha ll b e f inal a nd nonappea lable.” MACTEC, 427 F.3d at 827 (emphasis adde d). And the Fourth Circui t enforce d a waiver stat in g th at an a rbitral award was “ enforce able in any court of competent jurisdiction without any right of judicial revie w or appeal.” Beckley Oncology Asso cs., Inc. v. Abumasmah, 993 F.3d 261, 2 62 (4th Cir. 2021) (quotation mar k s omitted). I n contrast, the waiver of the “ right to appeal ” here does not identify which appeals the parties waived. Lanesborough responds tha t we should construe any ambiguity in the Arbitration Agreement against Nextres, wh ich drafted it. See Alba ny Sav. Bank, FSB v. Halpin, 11 7 F.3d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1997) (“ New York contract law includes the rule that ambigu ities in contracts s hould be constr ued against the drafter.”). But that rule

12 applie s “ only as a m atter of las t resor t after all aids to construction have been employe d without a satisfa ctory res ult. ” Id. (c itation omitted). The Supreme Court has thus declined to apply thi s canon of construction when “ the FAA provides the default r ule for res olving. . . ambiguities in a rbitration agreements ” throu gh a clear - statem ent requirement. Lam ps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U.S. 176, 186, 189 (2019). So too here. A pplying t he rule tha t appe lla te w aivers must be clear and un equivocal means tha t we need not cons ider the rule tha t ambiguo us contractual language should be con strued against the drafter. B. Confirmation of Arb itral Awards Nextres argues that the d istrict court erred i n partial ly confirming t he Interim Award and in confirming the Final Awa rd. “ We review a district court ’ s decision to co nfirm an arbitration a ward de novo to the exte nt it turns on legal questions, and we review any findings of fact for clear err or. ” A&A Ma int. Enter., I nc. v. Ramnarain, 982 F.3d 864, 86 8 (2d Cir. 2020) (c itation omi tted). W e afford “ strong deference ” to “ arbitral awards and t he arbitral process ”— we do not conduct “ de novo review of an arb itral award. ” Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. v. S aint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 668 F.3d 60, 71 -72 (2d Cir. 2012) (quota tion marks om itted). 1. Interim Award T he dist rict court c orrectly reject ed Nextres ’ s argument tha t the arbitrator was guilt y of misconduct an d exceeded h is authority in issui ng the Int erim Award. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3)- (4) (awards may be vacated when an arbitrator “ exceeded [hi s] powers ” or is “ guilty of . . . misbehav ior by which the righ ts of any part y have be en prejudi ced ”).

13 Nextres says that the arbi trator engaged in “ pre jud icia l misconduct” and exceeded his authority by (1) “ improperly accord[ing] ‘law o f the case’ treatment to the ‘ emergency ’” injunctive awards he issued, (2) “ allowing [L anesborough ’ s] attorne y to te stify ” at the mer its hearing and “ uti lizin g su ch t est imony as t he b asis fo r his findin g of liab ilit y, ” (3) awarding La nesborough consequential damages when Lanes borough ’ s witness had in adeq uate “ kn owledge or informa tion” ab out l iab ility an d d amages, and (4) a warding conseque ntial dama ges when Lanesbor ough “ failed to prove the under lyin g liab ility.” Appellant ’ s Br. a t 39, 46, 4 9, 52. T hese poi nts do not support Nex tres ’ s c laim that th e distr ict cour t shoul d have vacated the Inter im Award. First, arb itral awar ds may be vaca ted for “ preju dicia l misconduct” on ly “ where fundamental fairne ss is violated, ” such as when an arbitrator fails to give each p arty “ to th e dispu te an a deq uate opportunit y to present i ts eviden ce and argument. ” Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1997) (quotation ma rk s omitted). Nextres cannot satisfy that s tandard because, as the arbitrator obse rved, “ Nextres had the r ight and opportun ity to call and cross any witness it wished, ” including “ anyone affiliated with Lanesborough,” at the final hea r ing. App’x at 824. An d t he arbitrator concluded tha t Lanesboro ugh ’ s claims were “ w ell substantiated b y the evidence, including the documentary evidence submitte d by bo th parties ” and “ the testimony of Nextres ’ own witness. ” Id. 1 So “ fundamental fairness ” was not “ v io lated ” at the final hearing. Tempo Shain, 120 F.3d at 20. 1 As Nex tres admit s, the arb itrator said he was con siderin g Lanes borough ’ s attorn ey’s sta tements “ a s an openi ng argument. ”

14 Second, courts vac ate arbitral awar ds for “ excess of authori ty ” only when an arbit rator lacks “ the power, based o n the parties ’ submis sions or the arbi tration ag reement, to re ach a certain issue.” A&A Maint., 982 F.3d at 868 (quotat ion ma rk s omi tted). This i nqu iry does not consi der “ whether the arbitrator [] corr ectly decide d that issue. ” Id. (cleaned up). T he d istrict court confirmed only the portions of the Interim A ward that gr anted Lanesbor ough’ s cla ims fo r breach of contract and bre ach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, an d that awar ded Lane sborough declara tory relief and damages. Th ose decisions fell within the a rbitra tor ’ s powers under the A rbitration Agreem ent, which subj ect ed claims for “ bre ach of contract ” and “ b reach of the covena nt of good fa ith and fair dealin g ” to man datory arbitration, and withdr ew from arbitration only actions f or inju nctiv e r elief. App’x at 48. So th e dis trict co urt did no t er r in par tia lly c onfir min g the I nte rim A ward. 2. Final Award T he dist rict court c orrectly reject ed Nextres ’ s argument tha t the arbitrat or exceeded his po wers in granti ng attorney ’ s fees to Lanesborough. In ReliaStar Life Ins urance Co. of N ew York v. EMC Nat ional Life Co., 564 F.3d 81 (2d C ir. 2009), we held tha t a n arbitration agreeme nt stat ing th at “ each party will bear its own attorney ’ s fees ” did not limit an arbitr ator ’ s authority to award fee s to “ sanction bad faith conduct. ” Id. at 88. So too here. T he Arbitra tion Agreement states th at “ [e]ach party sha ll bear their own attorney [’]s fees. ” App’x at 48. W e interpret t hat language “ to reflect the parties ’ agreement that the arbitra tor [] may not factor attorne y ’s . . . fees into Appellant’s Br. at 47 (quotation mark s omi tted). We s ee no reason to doubt th at rep resenta tion.

15 awards that result fr om the parties ’ expected good faith arbi tration of a dispute,” not to “ preclud[e] an award of attorne y ’s . . . fees [based on] a party’s bad fa ith dealings.” ReliaStar, 564 F. 3d at 88. The arbitr ator ’s d isc ussio n makes it cle ar that h e award ed attorney ’ s fees to Lane sborough base d on Nextres ’ s “ bad faith conduct [which] con tinued throughout the arbitration. ” App’x at 827; see also id. at 2212. 2 As the arbitrator found, and the district court reiterated, that c onduct include d Nextres refusin g to answer an interrogatory, prov iding irre levant documents t o substantiat e false claims, and objecting in bad faith to documents Lanesbor ough offered into evidence. Nextres offer s no explanation for that conduct, and inste ad bro adly cla ims th at it “ exh ibite d no ‘ bad faith ’ either prior to or after commencem ent of the arbitration.” App ella nt ’ s Br. at 33. E ven if Next res dispute d the arbitrator ’ s s pecific findings of bad faith, that challenge would fai l because an “ a rbitrato r ’ s factu al fin ding s ” generall y “ are n ot su bject to judic ial chal lenge.” Westerbeke C orp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 214 (2d Cir. 2002). So t he d istric t court also di d not err in conf irm ing the Final Award. C. Injunction of Batchw ood Foreclosure Action Nextres argue s that the district cou rt ’ s injunction of the Batchwood Foreclos ure Action is inconsistent with t he Anti - 2 The f act tha t the arb itrator consi dered L anes borough ’s sep arate reques t for arbi tral f ees as a s anction to b e moot does not n egate th is conc lusi on. Neither does the arbitrato r’s refe rence to a n arbitra l rule allowing him to award fee s when both partie s r equest them — which he described as a “separ ate and independent” basis in the Final Awar d. App’x at 2212. The arb itrator expla ine d that Ne xtres ’s “unfair,” “inexcusable,” and “bad faith conduct” warranted its award. Id. at 827, 2212.

16 Injunction Act (“AIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2283. We review a district c ourt’s decision to grant or deny injunctive relie f for abuse of discretion bu t review l egal questions, includ ing the in terpretation of the AIA, de novo. Wyly v. Weiss, 697 F.3d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 2012). The AIA prohibits federal courts fro m granting “ an injunction to stay proceedin gs in a State c ourt ” un less an injunction is “ expressly authorized by Act of C ongress, ” “ necessar y in aid of [the court ’ s] jurisd ict ion, ” or necessary “ to protect or effectuate its judg ments. ” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The parti es dispute w hether the inju nction of the Batchwood Foreclos ure Action f alls under the “ in ai d of ju risd ictio n ” ex ception or the exception for federal court s to “ protect or effectuate ” the ir judgments, often called the “ re litig ation ” exception. Id. The “ in a id of jur isdic tion ” exception appl ies “ where the effect of a state court proceeding wou ld be to de feat or impa ir the jur isdic tion of the federal court. ” Wyl y, 697 F.3d at 13 7 (c leaned up). The “ rel itig ation ” exception “ au thorizes a federal co ur t to enjoin sta te litig atio n of a claim or issue that pre viously was prese nted to and dec ided by the federal court.” Id. at 139 (quotation mark s om itte d). T he se “ exceptions are narrow and are not to be enlarged by loos e statutory construction. ” Chick Kam Choo v. E xxon Corp., 48 6 U.S. 140, 146 (1988) (cleaned up). So a ny “ d oubts as to the proprie ty of a federal injunction against s tate court proceedings should be re solved in favor of permi tting th e state courts to p roceed.” Atl. Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive En g’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 297 (1970). The district court did not assess whether its injunction of the Batchwood Forec losure Action fe ll unde r these narr ow exceptions. Inste ad, it issued that injunction on the g round that the “ continued

17 existence of Nextres ’ forecl osure proceeding s is an impediment t o [Lanesborough] secu ring alternate f inancing ” for its cons truction of the Corning self - storage facility. App’x at 3220. That r ationale appears to have no b asis in the AIA, so we vacate the injunction and remand for the district cour t to assess whether it co mports with the AIA or requires reformulatio n. D. Prej ud gment Int erest The district cour t awar ded Lanesborough prejudgment interest from the date of the Interim Award “ thro ugh the date of the entry of the judgment in this action. ” App’x at 3223. Nextres arg ues tha t this award was b arred by the law of the case. “ We review a distric t court ’ s award of prejudgment interest for an abuse of discretion. ” Fed. Ins. Co. v. Am. H ome Assur. Co., 639 F.3d 557, 566 (2d C ir. 2011). “ New York recogn izes two distinct periods of ‘ prejudgment interest ’”: pre - awar d and post -awar d. ExxonMobil Oil Corp. v. TIG Ins. Co., 44 F.4th 163, 179 (2 d Cir. 2022). Unlike pre -award prejudgment interest, “post- award prejudgment interest is a sta tutory requirement that falls inherently outside an arb itrator ’ s authority and with in the aut horit y of the c ourts. ” Id. at 180. Di str ict co urts generall y grant pos t- award preju dgment interest. Cf. Waterside Ocean Navigation Co. v. Int’l Navigat ion Ltd., 737 F.2d 150, 1 54 (2d Cir. 1984) (reco gniz ing “presumpt ion in fa vor” of such interest for Convention on the Recogn ition and Enforcement of Foreign A rbitral Awards). Nextres ’s “ law of the case ” argument conflates pre -awar d prejudgment interest wi th post - award preju dgment int erest. The arbitrator determine d that Lanesboro ugh was not entit led to the former, and the distr ict court awarded the latter. The “ doc trine of

18 law of the c ase come s into play only with respect to issue s prev iously determi ned.” Quer n v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 347 n.18 (1979). It has no application here b ecause the arbitrator did not, and could not, decide whether Lanesbor ough was entitled to post -award prejudgment interest. III. CONCLUSIO N For the foregoing reasons, we deny Lanesborough ’ s mot ion to dismiss and affirm the district court ’ s partial confirmation of the Interim Award, its co nfirmation of the Fin al Award, and its aw ard of prejudgment interest. Bu t we vaca te the injunction of the Batchwood Foreclos ure Action and rem and for the district c ourt to consider w hether the AIA permits that injunction.