Supreme Court Orders List and Certiorari Denials

(ORDER LIST: 607 U.S.) MONDAY, MAR CH 2, 2026 ORDERS IN PE NDING CASE S 24A475 HAMILTON, RUEL M. V. UNITED STAT ES The applica tion for stay addressed t o Justice Ja ckson and referred to the Court is denied. 25A171 MONTE IRO, ROBERT V. UNITED STA TES The applica tion for bail addressed t o Justice Ka vanaugh and referred to the Court is denied. 25A549 IN RE HENRY L. KLE IN The applica tion for stay addressed t o Justice Go rsuch and referred to the Court is denied. 25A773 LONDO N, KATHERINE V. USCA 7 The applica tion to vacat e addressed to Justice T homas and referred to the Court is denied. 25M62 MITCHELL, CHANT EL V. OFFICE DEPOT, INC. The motion for lea ve to file a petition for a wr it of certiorari u nder seal wit h redacted co pies for the public reco rd is denied. 141, ORIG. TEXAS V. NEW MEXICO, ET A L. The Fourth Interim Repor t of the Spe cial Master is received and ordered filed. Exce ptions to the Report, with supporting briefs, may be filed wit hin 45 days. Replies, if any, with supporting b riefs, may b e filed withi n 30 days. S ur-replies, if any, with su pporting bri efs, may be f iled within 3 0 days. 1

24-1260 WATSON, MS S EC. OF STATE V. REPUBLICAN NAT. COMM., ET AL. The motion of Vet Voice Foundation, et al. for d ivided argument is denied. The motion of re spondents for divided argument is denied. The motion of th e Solicitor G eneral for leave to par ticipate in oral argument as amicus curiae and f or divided argume nt is granted. 25-406) FCC, ET AL. V. AT&T, INC.) 25-567) VERIZON COMM UNICATIONS IN C. V. FCC, ET AL. The motion to dispense w ith printing the joint a ppendix is granted. 25-5715 IN RE DANIEL E. HALL The motion of petitioner for reconsi deration of order denying leav e to proceed in forma paup eris is denied. 25-6434 BASKIN, NATA SHA T. V. PIT RE, ALGERNON M. The motion of petitioner for leave t o proceed in forma pauperis is denied. Peti tioner is allowed un til March 23, 2026, within which to pay the d ocketing fee required by Rule 38(a) a nd to submit a petiti on in compliance wit h Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Cour t. CERTIORARI DE NIED 24-1155 VINCENT, MEL YNDA V. BONDI, ATT'Y GEN. 25-255 HORTO N, DION, ET A L. V. BEEMER, ADMIN. JUD GE, ET AL. 25-343 CASHC ALL, INC., ET AL. V. CFPB 25-368 TAYLOR, HA L V. SINGLETON, JONA THAN 25-379 PUB. INTEREST LEGA L FOUND. V. SCHMIDT, SEC. OF PA., ET AL. 25-416 CANGREJE ROS DE SANTURCE, ET AL. V. LIGA DE BéISBOL PR, INC., ET AL. 25-427 ABDEL AZIZ, WALID, ET AL. V. LO LOMANIA SOAK AI, ET AL. 25-437 PUB. INTEREST LEGA L FOUND. V. BENSON, MI S EC. OF STATE, ET AL. 2

25-449 THALE R, STEPHEN V. PERLMUTTER, SHIRA, ET A L. 25-523 UNITE D WATER CONSE RVATION DIST. V. UNITED STATES 25-558 HAMM, COMM'R, AL D OC V. SOCKWE LL, MICHAEL 25-577 CHALDEAN C OALITION, INC. V. SA N DIEGO INDEP. COMM' N, ET AL. 25-603 QUE, WENBI N V. SONG, LIHUA 25-750 COSTA NZA, CALVIN M. V. FL MARI NE TRANSPORT ERS, LLC 25-754 WOODL AND, RODNEY V. HILL, MONT ERO L. 25-760 MOHAM UD, HAMDI A. V. WEYKER, H EATHER 25-768 MAINV ILLE, CHARITY V. USDC MD NC 25-769 LORIL LARD TOBACCO COMPANY V. S CIARROTTA, M ARITA R. 25-771 CAROL LO, JOE V. FU LLER, WILLIA M O., ET AL. 25-777 THOMPSON, CHRISTOPHER L. V. IL LINOIS 25-865 PERLE S LAW FIRM, P.C. V. QATAR NATIONAL BA NK, ET AL. 25-911 GADDY, LAURA, ET A L. V. CORP. CHURCH OF JE SUS CHRIST 25-929 SHEEL Y, JOSEPH, ET AL. V. FEEZ LE, HAROLD R., ET AL. 25-5434 THOMPSON, CH RISTIAN L. V. UNITED STATE S 25-5953 HENDERSON, C HRISTOPHER M. V. ALABAMA 25-5964 OLADOKUN, OL ADAYO V. UNITED STAT ES 25-6217 WUCHTER, CHR ISTOPHER V. U NITED STATES 25-6443 AMELIO, CARM INE V. DEUTSCHE BANK NA TIONAL TRUST CO. 25-6446 BENSON, DAVI D A. V. SUPERIOR COURT OF CA, ET AL. 25-6467 MORALES DIAZ, ROBERTO V. FLORIDA 25-6475 CHEN, MAY V. MFRS. & TRAD ERS CO., ET A L. 25-6526 WALLS-BEY, J OHNNY R. V. A RIZONA 25-6541 NICHOLS, LON ZIE V. MISSIS SIPPI 25-6552 LAWSON, ANGE LIINA L. V. L AWSON, JONATH AN D. 25-6560 KLEIN, TONY D. V. UN ITED STATES 25-6561 MAGEE, JOSHU A D. V. MISSI SSIPPI 3

25-6593 JONES, JASON V. FLORIDA 25-6610 BROWN, ROBER T F. V. ARIZO NA 25-6662 BURNS, PIERR E V. UNITED S TATES 25-6664 REED, FREDDR ICK V. UNITED STATES 25-6665 BOYER-LETL OW, TRA'VEN V. UNITE D STATES 25-6667 NEGRóN-CRUZ, ALEXIS D. V. UNITED STATE S 25-6668 DAVIS, MATTH EW E. V. CURT IS, DOUGLAS 25-6674 EATON, JUSTIN K. V. U NITED STAT ES 25-6675 WRIGHT, PAUL V. CO LLINS, SEC. OF VA 25-6677 MORGAN, JOHN W. V. UNITED STATES 25-6682 ARAMBOLES, F IDEL V. UNITE D STATES 25-6691 McLEAN, NEDR Y V. UNITED S TATES 25-6692 MANCIO, ANA R. V. PA RKER, ACTING WARDE N 25-6694 MORENO, DONN Y R. V. UNITE D STATES 25-6698 GARNER, DALA NDO T. V. UNI TED STATES 25-6699 GUTIERREZ-BA RBA, MARTIN V. UNITED STAT ES 25-6700 GURUNG, AITA V. VERMONT 25-6701 GETACHEW, ES KENDER V. UNITED STA TES 25-6702 KOKINDA, JAS ON S. V. UNITED STATES 25-6703 VILLALOBOS-E SPINOZA, PEDR O C. V. UNITE D STATES 25-6715 CHAVERRA MOR ENO, CRISTIAN V. UNITED ST ATES 25-6716 ORTEGA-BOR UNDA, RAMON M. V. UNIT ED STATES 25-6724 KING, DIAMON D V. USPS, ET AL. 25-6755 FELDMAN, ROB ERT W. V. COL ORADO The petitio ns for writs of certiorar i are denied. 25-517 MARYL AND, ET AL. V. 3M CO. The petitio n for a writ of certiorar i is denied. Justice Alito took n o part in the consideratio n or decisio n of this 4

petition. 25-6450 SMITH, SAMUE L L. V. ROSAD O, CARLOS, ET AL. The motion of petitioner for leave t o proceed in forma pauperis is denied, and t he petition f or a writ of certiorari is dismissed. See Rule 39.8. As the pet itioner has repeatedly abused this Court's proce ss, the Clerk is directed not to acce pt any further petiti ons in noncrimina l matters from petit ioner unless the d ocketing fee required by R ule 38(a) is paid and th e petition is submitted in compliance wi th Rule 33.1. See Ma rtin v. District of Col umbia Court of Ap peals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). HABEAS CORP US DENIED 25-6768 IN RE MARK A. MORRIS 25-6769 IN RE DAVID J. GOTTORFF The petitions fo r writs of habeas corp us are denied. REHEARINGS DE NIED 24-858 BEEMA N, KARI, ET A L. V. MUSKEG ON CTY. TREA SURER 24-1095 KOETTER, CHE LSEA V. MANIS TEE CTY. TREA SURER, ET AL. 24-7002 IN RE CLIFFO RD L. NOLL 25-203 McGEE, JOHANNA, ET AL. V. ALGE R CTY. TREAS URER, ET AL. 25-451 HOWAR D, FAYTIMA V. MACOMB COUN TY, MI 25-506 STROMA MED ICAL CORP., ET AL. V. BLU MBERG, SAMUEL 25-562 AHMAD, MAHFOOZ V. DAY, COLIN, ET AL. 25-5461 MADDOX, GARY E. V. UNITED STATES 25-5642 McGEE, TONNE RRIOUS J. V. TEXAS The petitio ns for rehear ing are deni ed. 5

1 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) S OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNI TED STATES TOPAZ JOHNSON, ET AL. v. HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON, ET AL. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 25–457. Decided March 2, 2026 The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. J USTICE K AGAN would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari. J USTICE S OTOMAYOR, with whom J USTICE J ACKS ON joins, dissenting from denial of certiorari. This case asks whether federal law prohibits the poorest prisoners from splitting the $350 fee required to file a fed- eral lawsuit when it allows everyone else to do so. The an- swer statutorily appears to be no. Because the decision be- low held otherwise and deepened a split among the Courts of Appeals, the Court should grant the petition for a writ of certiorari. I A Filing a federal lawsuit costs money. Title 28 U. S. C. §1914(a) provides that “parties instituting any civil action” must “pay a filing fee of $350.” Because that fee is assessed per case, if multiple plaintiffs file one case, they can split the fee among themselves. See §1914(a). Not everyone, whether filing alone or together, can pay $350. Rather than close the courthouse doors to those fac- ing financial hardship, federal law permits indigent plain- tiffs to proceed “ in forma pauperis,” or IFP. §1915(a). Dis- trict courts may except IFP plai ntiffs from pa ying the full filing fee and other fees if they make a sufficient showing of financial need when they initiate their lawsuit. Ibid. There is an exception to this exception. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), federal courts may

2 JOHNSON v. HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON S OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting not waive or reduce the filing fee for an indigent prisoner proceeding IFP. §1915(b)(1). Instead, the statute provides that a prisoner proceeding IFP “shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee,” and ins tructs courts to deduct the fee in installments from the prisoner’s account. Ibid. At the same time, the PLRA specifies that “[i]n no event shall the filing fee collected exceed the amount of fe es per- mitted by statute for the commencement of a civil action.” §1915(b)(3). B Petitioners Topaz Johnson and Ian Henderson were in- carcerated at High Desert Sta te Prison in California when they filed this lawsuit in federal court. According to their complaint, corrections officers forced them and a third pris- oner to stand in filthy cages that reeked of urin e and meas- ured 2.5 feet by 2.5 feet. They alleged that the officers forced them to stand in those cages for nearly nine hours with their hands cuffed behind their backs. Petitioners and the third prisoner then jointly sued, con- tending that their treatment violated the Eighth Amend- ment. They also sought leave to proceed IFP and filed affi- davits stating that they had no money in their accounts and no income. The District Court ordered the three prisoners to file three separate lawsuits. It concluded that, because the PLRA requires IFP prisoners to pay “the full amount of a filing fee,” but also prohibits federal courts from collecting more than “the amount of fees permitted by statute,” each plaintiff had to file his own lawsuit and pay the full $350 fee in order to proceed IFP. §§1915(b)(1), (3). The District Court therefore severed petition ers from the case. Petition- ers then appealed. The Ninth Circuit reversed the decision to sever, but af- firmed as to the filing fee, holding that the three plaintiffs could proceed in one suit but each needed to pay $350. 127

Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) 3 S OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting F. 4th 123, 134 (2025). Agreeing with the Th ird, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, the Ninth Circuit held that the PLRA requires each individual prisoner to pay the full fil- ing fee. Judge Graber dissented as to the filing fee. Id., at 137. The full Ninth Circuit denied en banc review. 145 F. 4th 1052 (2025). Judge Fletcher, joined by Judge Graber, issued a statement in which he expressed “the hope the Su- preme Court will grant certiorari.” Id., at 1058. II The Ninth Circuit’s decision is likely incorrect. Starting with the text, §§1915(a)(1) and (b)(1) create an exception t o the usual IFP rule for indigent plaintiffs. Section 1915(a)(1) sets forth the general rule that courts may allow an indi- gent person to commence a suit “without prepayment of f e e s. ” I t a l s o s a y s t h a t t h i s rule is “[s]ubject to subsection (b).” Section 1915(b)(1), in turn, specifies that, “[n]otwith- standing subsection (a), if a prisoner brings a civil action. . . in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.” In other words, §1915(b)(1) denies to a prisoner one usual ben efit of proceeding IFP: a waived or reduced filing fee. Prisoners proceeding IFP still receive some benefit, howeve r: Under §§1915(b)(1) and (2), they can pay most of the filing fee in monthly installments over time, rather than all at once up front. The question then becomes whether, by denying prison- ers one of the benefits of IFP status (waiver or reduction of the filing fee), Congress also silently denied to indigent pris- oners the ability to split the fee. It did not. To start, the ability to split filing fees does not come from IFP status or from §1915. Instead, it comes from §1914(a), which requires “the parties ... to pay a filing fee of $350” when initiating a civil lawsuit. That provision makes two things clear: first, that the filing fee is assessed per case, and second, that “the parties” are collectively responsible for paying “a filing fee.” Ibid. There is no dispute among

4 JOHNSON v. HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON S OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting courts that §1914(a) works in this way: All district courts collect a single fee per case, no matter how many plaintiffs filed it. So under §1914(a)’s default rule, when multiple prisoners file one lawsuit, the prisoners together must pay $350. That default rule matters because Congress passed the PLRA knowing how civil litigation and IFP status ordinar- ily work. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U. S. 199, 216 (2007). Ac- cordingly, this Court has explained, “when Congress meant” for the PLRA “to depart from the usual procedural requirements, it [said] so expressly.” Ibid. Here, the PLRA does not expr essly instruct courts to col- lect multiple fees for one suit from indigent prisoners. In fact, it says the exact opposite: “In no event shall the filing fee collected exceed the amount of fees permitted by statute for the commencement of a civil action.” §1915(b)(3). This unequivocal prohibition makes clear that, even when mul- tiple prisoners proceed IFP in a single lawsuit (an “event” in §1915(b)(3)’s terms), courts cannot collect more than what federal law permits them to charge when “parties in- stitut[e] any civil action”: $350, per case. §1914(a). Thus, if anything, Congress explicitly forbade the result that the panel below reached: requiring collection of $1,050 in one case when §1914(a) permits collection of only $350 per case. In holding otherwise, the panel extended §1915(b)(1) to provide that each “prisoner shall be required to pay the fu ll amount of a filing fee,” and recast §1915(b)(3) to “refe[r] to the filing fee paid by each prisoner,” 127 F. 4th, at 129. Re- spondents here echo that §1915(b)(3) simply prevents courts from charging IFP prisoners more than a single fil- ing fee each. Brief in Opposition 7–8. The upshot of these positions, however, is to leav e §1915(b)(3) a dead letter and only the poorest prisoners, alone among all litigants, to pay multiple times the ordinary filing fee otherwise set by fed- eral law. There is no indication that Congress intended to accomplish either absurd result here.

5 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) S OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting The panel’s reading of §1915(b)(1) also produces unfair results. As §1915(b)(1) applies only to prisoners who pro- ceed IFP, all agree that non- IFP prisoners can share the fil- ing fee. The result is that two prisoners with enough money can sue together and pay $175 each. Two prisoners without enough money, however, must each pay $350 even if they sue together. If Congress me ant to change civil procedure to make those with less pay more, it would have said so. Without such a command, it makes no sense to think that Congress intended for non-IFP prisoners to pay a fraction of what IFP prisoners must pay. The panel suggested that these unfair results were justi- fied as a means of advancing Congress’s goal of reducin g frivolous prisoner litigation. See 127 F. 4th, at 131–132. As Judge Graber pointed out, however, requiring each prisoner to pay the full filing fee removes any incentive to file jointly and may lead to prisoners filing additional, duplicative law- suits. Id., at 139. Permitting prisoners to split filing fees thus serves judicial economy by encouraging them to file a single suit. In any event, even if treating the poorest pris- oners in this way is consistent with Congress’s purpose, “ ‘[n]o legislation pursues it s purposes at all costs.’ ” Bowe v. United States, 607 U. S. __, __ (2026) (slip op., at 19) (alteration in original). The only reasonable way to make sense of the statutory scheme in its entirety is to recognize that courts may not, under §1915(b)(1), waive or reduce a prisoner’s filing fee, but also may not, under §§1914(a) and 1915(b)(3), collec t more than a single filing fee for the whole case. What that means is that indigent prisoners must be allowed to share the cost of a single filing fee. The Ninth Circuit likely erred in holding otherwise. 1 —————— 1 Recognizing the tension between §§1914(a), 19 15(b)(1), and 1915(b)(3), the District Co urt attempted to harmonize the three by

6 JOHNSON v. HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON S OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting III The remaining certiorari factors also favor granting this petition. See this Court’s Rule 10. First, there is an en- trenched split on this issue. Before the decision below, the Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits all had held that prisoners proceeding IFP cannot split fees when joining in one lawsuit. See Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F. 3d 146, 155 (CA3 2009); Boriboune v. Berge, 391 F. 3d 852, 856 (CA7 2004); Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F. 3d 1194, 1195 (CA11 2001). The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, permits IFP prisoners to split fees. In re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 105 F. 3d 1131, 1138 (1997) (In re PLRA). 2 The Ninth Circuit’s deci- sion here deepened that entrenched split. See 127 F. 4th, at 130, n. 6 (declining to follow the Sixth Circuit’s ap- proach); see also Hagan, 570 F. 3d, at 154 (noting disagree- ment between the Sixth and Seventh Circuits). —————— prohibiting IFP prisoners from joining together in multiple-plaintiff law- suits at all. Jones v. High D esert State Prison, 2022 WL 3 969635, *1 (ED Cal., Aug. 31, 2022). As the Ninth Cir cuit recognized, this reasonin g runs into a distinct problem: Federa l Rule of Civil Proced ure 20(a)(1) al- lows parties like petitioners to “join in one action,” while the District Court’s reasoning prohibits such join der. That amounts t o a determina- tion that the PLRA (which does not me ntion Rule 20) implicitly repealed Rule 20(a)(1) as to pr isoner litigants. “ ‘[R]epeals by implication,’ ” how- ever, “ ‘are not favored’ and will not be presumed unless the ‘intention of the legislature to repeal [is] clear and manifest.’ ” National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U. S. 644, 662 (2007) (quot- ing Watt v. Alaska, 451 U. S. 259, 267 (1981)). No such intention is ap- parent here. 2 The panel below noted that District Courts in the Sixth Circuit “are split on the precedential effect” of In re PLRA. 127 F. 4th 123, 130, n. 6 (CA9 2025). Although In re PLRA was an administrat ive order issued by the Sixth Circuit’ s Chief Judge, that Circu it has affirmed its rule and treated the order as binding in other cases. See, e. g., Talley-Bey v. Knebl, 168 F. 3d 884, 885 (1999) (“ We ... take this occasion to affirm the posi- tion that, for the purposes of the [PLRA], when a dis trict court imposes fees and costs upon multiple prisoner s, the fees and costs are to be pr o- portionally assessed among th e prisoners”); see also Singleton v. Smith, 241 F. 3d 534, 543 (CA6 2001) (treatin g In re PLRA as binding).

7 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) S OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting Second, this case presents an important, recurring issue of federal law. According to petitioners’ estimate, federal courts denied fee splitting at least 84 times in a 12-month span. Pet. for Cert. 17. Had those cases been brought in the Sixth Circuit, those plaintiffs could have divided the fees up among themselves. 3 The ability to split fees matters because $350 is a signifi- cant amount of money, particularly to indigent prisoners. On average, prisoners make between $0.13 to $1.30 per hour. Brief for Public Justice et al. as Amici Curiae 12. Paying the full $350 fee therefore requires prisoners to work for hundreds, if not thousands, of hours. Prisoners also cannot put every cent of their wages toward paying a filing fee. Instead, they must also spend their meager earn- ings on basic necessities: food to supplement prisons’ inad- equate portions, phone calls to loved ones that must be paid for by the minute, clothing, hygiene products, medical care, and more. See id., at 4–11. Requiring indigent prisoners each to pay the full $350 filing fee needlessly and unfairly makes it harder for them to vindicate their rights, challenge conditions of confinement, and (like petitioners) obtain re- dress for alleged mistreatment. To add to their financial burdens, prisoners who wish to appeal the initial filing fee must pay an additional $600. See §1915(b)(1); Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts, Court of Appeals Miscellaneous Fee Schedule (Dec. 1, 2023), https://www.uscourts.gov/court-programs/ fees/court-appeals-miscellaneous-fee-schedule. That con- siderable sum makes it even harder for prisoners earning cents on the hour to obtain justice. One of the three plain- tiffs in this case chose not to appeal at all. I can only hope that the next time indigent pr isoners facing this issue raise —————— 3 The real number of denials is likely higher, given limitations in fed- eral courts’ recordkeeping and the fact that many orders denying fee splitting are likely unav ailable in commercial database s. See Pet. for Cert. 16–17.

8 JOHNSON v. HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON S OTOMAYOR, J., dissenting nearly $1,000 each just for the opportunity to knock on this Court’s door, my colleagues will choose to open it. I respect- fully dissent.