Appeals Court Rules on Defendant's Trial Competency

24-2485-cr United States v. Woods Unite d States Court of App eals For the Sec ond Circ uit August Term, 2024 (Argued: June 1 2, 20 25 Decided: February 5, 2026) Docket N o. 24-2485-c r __________________ ______________ _____ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. JONES J. WOODS, Defendant-Appell a nt. __________________ ______________ _____ Before: LOHIER, CARNE Y, and PÉREZ, Ci rcuit Judges. In June 2023 the United States Distr ict Court for the Wes tern Distric t of New York fou nd that de fendant Jones J. Woods was incompete nt to stand trial. If a criminal defen dant is found in compet ent to stand trial, the district cour t must order him hospita lized in federal custody for a “reasonable pe riod of time, not to exceed four months.” 18 U.S.C. § 4 241(d)(1). For the crimina l case to proceed, the cou rt must then find th at the re exis ts a “subs tantial proba bility th at in the foreseeable f uture” the defen dant will be restored to com petency. Id. An d if the court makes that fin ding, it can order that the defendant rem ain in custodial hospitalization for “a n additional reas onable period of time” u ntil he becomes competen t. Id. § 4241(d)(2)(A). But in the even t the district co urt finds that the defendant likely can not be restored to competency, t he Government must t hen

2 decide w hether to release the de fendant or, if it believes tha t release would pose a danger to the co mmunity, seek the def endant’s civil co mmitment in a s uitable facility that can adeq uately treat h is ment al illness. Id. §§ 4241(d), 4246(a), 4248(a). Here, as the Governmen t conside red how to proceed, the D istrict C ourt ordered Woods’s c ust odia l hosp ita liz ation for 45 days under 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b) after he had alre ady been h ospitalized for more than four m onths. Th is appeal raises two ques tion s: (1) whet her any challenge to the District Court’s now - expired order ex tending Woods ’s hospita lization is moo t; and (2) whether the District C ourt c ould prolong W oods’s hospita lization for an ad ditional reasonable period p ast the in itially author ized four months while the Governm ent weighed whether to s eek his civil commitm ent. We AFFIRM the District Court ’s order as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2)(B) insofar as it compelled W oods’s cont inued hospita lization beyond the four- month perio d. Because we con clude that the re mainder of Woods’s challenges to the Dis trict Cour t’s order are moot, the appeal is otherw ise DISMISSED. M ARTIN J. V OGELB AUM, Assistant F eder al Pub lic Defender, Office of the Federal Pub lic Defender for the Western Distr ict of Ne w York, Buffalo, N Y, for Defendant - Appellant. S EAN C. E LDRID GE, Assistant United States Att orney, for Michael DiGiacomo, United States Attor ney for the Western Dis trict o f New York, Roc hester, NY, for Appellee. L OHIER, Circuit Judge: If a criminal defen dant is fo und incompet ent to stand tri al, the d istrict court must order him ho sp italiz e d in fed eral custody for a “r easonab le period of time, not to exceed fo ur months.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1). For t he c rim inal case to

3 proceed, the court m ust then find th at the re exists a “subst antial probability that in the fo reseeable future” th e defendant will be rest ored to competenc y. Id. And if the co urt mak es th at findin g, it c an order that the defe ndant remain in custodial hospital ization for “an add itional reas onable period of time” until he becomes competent. Id. § 4241(d)(2)(A). But the Govern ment also plays an impor tant ro le in the event the d istric t cou rt finds that the defendant likely can not be restored to competency. T h e Government must then deci de whether to release the defendant or, if it believes that relea se would pose a dang er to the community, to seek t he defendant’s c ivil commitment in a s uit able facility that can adequately treat his me nta l illne ss. Se e id. §§ 4241(d), 4 246(a), 4248(a). Here, as the Government was cons ider in g its op tio ns, the District Court ordered that defenda nt Jones J. Woods be custod ially hospitalize d for 45 days after it found that Woods l ikely could not be restored to comp etency and W oods had already bee n hospitalized for more than four months. This appe al raises the ques tion whe ther the D istr ict C ourt co uld prolong Woods’s h os pita lizat ion for an additional reason able period pas t the initial ly authorized fo ur months wh ile the Gov ernment weighe d whether to seek his civi l co mmit me nt. We AFFIRM the D istrict Court’s or der insofar as it ordered Wo ods’s

4 continued hospita lization beyond the fo ur -month period. Bec ause we conclude that the re mainder of Woods’s ch alle nge s to th e orde r are moot, the appeal is otherwi se DISMISS ED. I Woods was char ged with depredation against federa l propert y in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1361 fo r thr o wing rocks at t he windows of the United Sta tes Attorney’s Office in Buffalo, New Yor k in Januar y 2023. On J anuary 31, 2 023, Woods entered an initial appearance before the Ma gistrate Judge i n t he United States D istrict C our t for the Weste rn Dis trict of New Y ork, b ut his erratic behavior dur ing th at and a late r appearan ce prompted t he court to or der a psych iatr ic ev alua tio n. A fter a hearing in June 2023, the court f ound Woo ds incompe tent to stand trial and ordered him hos pita lize d in a su itab le Burea u of Prisons (“BOP”) f acility for a pe riod not to ex ceed four months to determine whether he co uld be restored to co mpetency. See id. § 4241(d)(1). After de lays that are not at issue on this appe al, Woods was fina lly h osp ita lize d in January 2024 for evaluation at FMC D evens i n Massachusetts. Although W oods’s four- mon th period of custodial hospitalization lapsed in May 2024, he remained in custody at FMC D evens. Some three months lat er,

5 in August 2 024, after receiving an eval uation from an FMC Dev ens physician, the M agistra te J udge fou nd that the re was no substant ial probab ilit y that Woods would be resto red to compet ency and, over the objections of W oods’s counsel, ordered that he remain hospitaliz ed at F MC Deve ns for another 45 days u nder 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b) an d also order ed the dire ctor of FMC Deve ns t o evaluate whether Woods posed a danger to othe rs. Woods appealed the Magistr ate Judge’s order to the Distric t Court, which affi rmed the order in i ts entirety on September 6, 2024. 1 In lat e Augus t 2024, w ith the Magistr ate J udge’s order still in effect, the Government filed a “ certificate of d angerousness ” as to Woods in the Western District of New Y ork. Such a certificate reflect s the Governme nt’s belief that a defendant who is otherwise poi sed to be released from federal detentio n is “presently suffer ing from a menta l disease or defect as a result of which his release would create a substant ial risk of bodily in jury to anothe r person or serious damage t o proper ty of another.” I d. § 4246(a); see a lso id. § 4248(a). Filing the certificate autom atica lly “stay[s] the r elease of the [defend ant] pending [the] completion of” c ivil commitment proce dure s. Id. § 4246(a); see also id. § 4248(a). 1 We refer to the Magistrate Ju dge’s August order and the Distri ct Co urt’s September affi rmanc e colle ctively a s “the Augus t 2024 order” or “the Distri ct Cou rt’s o rder.”

6 The Government’s ce rtificate of d angerous ne ss ensure d that Woods remained com mitted at FMC Deve ns even after the August 2024 order’s 45-day extension of custodia l hospitalization laps ed. Shortly after c ert ifyin g tha t Woods continued to pose a danger, the Government fil ed a civil c omm it ment pe tit ion against Woods in the District of M assachusetts. See United Stat es v. Woods, No. 24- CV -11524, 2025 W L 1489979, at * 2 (D. Mass. Ma y 23, 2025). That ac tion remains ongoing. O n appeal to this Cour t, Woods challenges the District C ourt’s statutor y auth ority t o ente r the Au gust 20 24 o rder in the Western Dist rict of New York. II We first address whether Woods ’s challenge to the now - expired August 2024 order is moot in view o f the fact tha t the Gover nment c om pleted its psychiatric evalua tion of Woods for dangerousn ess and Woods, though s till detained, is techn ically no longer subject to th at order. S ee Stee l Co. v. Citizens f or a Better Env’t, 523 U. S. 83, 94–95 (1998). A s we e xpla in b elo w, we are persuaded that the appeal is moot only in p ar t. “A case becomes moot—and ther efore no longer a ‘Case’ or ‘C ontroversy’ for purposes of Art icle III [of the Un ited States C onstitution] — when the issues

7 presented are n o longer li ve or the parties la ck a legally cog nizable interest i n the outcome.” Already, LLC v. Nik e, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (quo tation marks omitted). So a case o n appeal is m oot if the poss ibility of relief is “too remote and speculative to sa tisfy the case-or - controversy requi rement of Arti cle III.” United States v. Key, 6 02 F.3d 492, 494 (2d C ir. 2010) (cleaned u p). But “the availability of a par tial remedy is sufficien t to prevent a case from be ing moot” even though th at re lie f is less than “fully s atisfactory.” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 177 (2013) (c leaned up). An appeal is moot, in othe r words, only when it is “ impossible for the co urt to grant any effec tual relief whatever to a p reva ilin g party.” C nty. of West chester v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. D ev., 778 F.3d 4 12, 416 (2d Cir. 2015) (emph asis added) (quotat ion marks o mitted); see Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 29 8, 307–08 (20 12). For tha t reason, a defendant’s appea l from an expired detention order remains a live ca se or controversy as long a s “p re vail ing o n app e al wo uld re liev e him of some concrete and identifiable co llateral effect of that” or der. United States v. Hamdi, 432 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 20 05).

8 A W ith these principles in mind, we conc lude that Woods ’s appeal from the August 2024 order is moot insofar as the order authorized the Governmen t to evaluate Woods for dangerousn ess. The Governm en t co mple t ed its eva lua tion long ago, and Woods has not reques ted that the Di strict Court order the Government to con duct a reeva luation. Woods canno t show that he would receive “a ny effectual rel ief” if we were to vacate this portion o f the order. Knox, 567 U.S. at 307 (quo tation marks o mitted). B T he Distric t Court’s order is not moot, however, insofar as it committed Woods to 45 addit io nal days of custodial hospitali zation after August 2. During that 45 -day p eriod, t h e Gove rnme nt init ia ted civ il comm it ment pro ceed ings against Woods in the Dis trict of M assachusetts pursuan t to 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). For that s tatu te to ap ply, W oods must have been lawfu lly “co mmitte d to the custody of the A ttorney General pursuant to [18 U.S.C. §] 4241 (d) ” at the time that th e Go vern me nt f iled its pe tit ion in t he D istrict of M assa c huse tts. 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) 2; see also id. § 4248(a). Woods co ntends that th is precondition was n ot 2 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) provides in relevant pa rt:

9 satisf ied at t he ti me t he Gov ern men t in itia ted c ivil com mit ment pr ocee dings against him because the Western District of New York ’s August 2024 deten tion orde r is in vali d. In the District of Mas sachusetts, whe re Woods move d on that basis to dismiss as untimely the Governmen t’s petition to ha ve him c ivilly committed, t he Government did not disp ute tha t it can initiate civ il commitment proceedings only ag ainst a person who is already in lawful cus tody purs uant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). See Woods, 2025 WL 1489979, at *4. But the Government requested that the D istric t of M assa chusetts hold Woods’s motion in abe yance pending our (a) Institut ion of P roceeding. — If the director of a facility in which a per son is hos pital ized c ertifie s that a pers on in th e custod y of the Bu reau of Prison s whos e sente nce is a bout to expi re, or who has been com mitted to th e cus tody of the A ttorn ey Gene ral purs uant to sectio n 4241(d), or against whom all criminal charge s have been dismissed solely for reasons related to the men tal con ditio n of the person, is pre sently s uff ering f rom a men tal disease o r de fect as a resul t of whi ch his re lease wo uld cre ate a subst antia l risk of bodily i njury to another p erson o r seriou s dam age to pro perty of another,. . . he sha ll tra nsmi t the certi fica te to the cl erk of th e cou rt for th e distr ict in wh ich the p er son is co nfine d. The clerk sha ll send a c opy of the certif icate to th e perso n, an d to the attorn ey for th e Gove rnment, and, i f the person was c ommitte d pursua nt to section 4241(d), to the clerk of th e court that orde red the c ommi tment. The cou rt shall orde r a hearin g to determ ine whether the person is presently su ffering from a men tal disease or def ect as a result of which his r elease would cr eate a substant ial risk of bodily injury to anoth er pe rson or seri ous da mage to prop erty of anot her. A cert ificat e filed under this subsectio n shall stay the release of t he person pending completion of pro cedures contained in this se ction.

10 resolution of the vali dity of the Augus t 2024 order in this appe al. Id. at *3. Because the legal b asis for Woods’s § 4241(d) detent ion was on appeal before th is Court, the Dis trict of Massach usetts denie d Woods’s motion t o dismiss the Governm ent’s petition but did so without prejudi ce to refil ing t he motion, depending on the ou tcome of th is appe al. Id. at *4, *6. T h e Dis tr ict of Massachusetts described its reasoning as follows: Between May 1 6, 2024, and September 16, 2024, Woods was committed pursu ant to orders fr om the Western D istrict of New York. The cour t denies considerati on of the motion to dismiss the petit ion as to Woods’ [s ] com mitment durin g that period, where t he matter is pending in the Second Circuit. If the Second Ci rcuit affirm s those orde rs, there will be no further matter for this court to consider as to that period. If the Second Circuit vacates those orders, Woods may renew his motion to dismiss based on his d etenti on prior to Septem ber 16, 2024. Id. at *4. As this complicated s et of proceedin gs in compet ing fora shows, t he federal civil commitment sche me contemplates a ro le for both the d istrict c ourt that in itia lly “ ordered the co mmitment” of the defendant p e nding the initiation of civil commitmen t proceedings — here, the Western Di strict of New York —and “the court for the district in which the [de fendant] is confined” pursuant to that order— here, the District of Massachusetts. 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). T he latter court

11 typic ally even tua lly presides over t he defendant’s c ivil commitment proceedings. W hich court, though, is best posit ioned to evaluate w hether the timi ng deadlines of § 4241(d) and § 4246(a) we re violated? Consider, as in this c ase, the de fendant w ho is sub ject to distr ict c ourt c ivil commitment proceedings in Circuit B but fir st challenges h is dete ntion order on direct, exp edited appeal in C ircui t A. By t he time C ircuit A hea rs the appeal, the detention order will likely have expired and the defendant’s release automatically “stay[ed ] ” pending the completion of c ivil commitment proceedings in C ircu it B. See id. The stay may compe l Circu it A to d ismiss the appeal as moot on the ground that a “ne w statutor y bas[i]s sup ers eded the original bas[i]s for [t he] order[] chal lenged on appe al,” such that vaca tur would not lead to the defe ndant’s releas e. Unite d States v. Alhindi, 12 4 F.4th 869, 874 (11th Cir. 2024); se e id. at 875 (“Be cause Alh indi’s current co mmitment is authorized by sect ion 4246, no t section 4241(d), th is appeal is moot.”). Or, flip ping the stor ylin e, suppose t he def endant cha llenge s the lawfu lnes s of his deten tion order in the dis tric t court in Circ uit B that presides ov er his c ivil commitment proceedings, rather t han on appeal to C ircu it A f rom the dist ric t court tha t entered the order—in effect, a n improper horizontal appeal from one

12 district court to an other. See Klay man v. R ao, 49 F.4th 550, 552–53 (D.C. Cir. 2022). Circ uit B m ay then conclude that the defe ndant “waived h is right to chal lenge the alleged[ly]” un lawful order because he failed to raise his ar gument “at the proper ti me and place” — that is, by challe nging the order on appeal to Cir cuit A. United States v. Ryan, 52 F.4th 719, 72 2–23 (8th Cir. 202 2). Both scenarios il lus trat e the vexin g procedural d ilemma tha t a defe ndant in Woods’s p osition faces. Whe ther the D istrict of Massach usetts decides to dismiss t he Government’s civ il commitment p roceedings as untim ely depends on this Court’s re solution of the lawfulness of the August 20 24 order entered i n the Western Distr ict of New York. Yet whether the appea l in this Court remains alive or is moot depend s on the likelih oo d th at the D istric t of Mas sachuse tts w ill dismiss the civil commitment proceedings if we find the order t o be invalid. An added complication is that Woods raised his chal lenge to the ti meliness of the proceedings in both th is Court and the Dis trict of Massach usetts. A s th e Distr ict of Massachusetts’s or der sugge st s, both co urts facing tha t situation r isk en gag in g in a never - ending “gastonette,” e ach “awaiting a f irst move by the other,” wh i le leavin g Woo ds “consign[ed] . .. to a jur isd icti ona l limbo.” In re McLean I ndus., Inc., 857 F.2d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 1988) (Newm an, J.).

13 Even with these complexities, t he circums tances of this case persuade us that th e appeal is not moot. If we were to vacate the Aug ust 2024 order, the District of Massa chu setts has already te legraphed that it w ill grant Woods leave to re file h is motio n to dis miss th e Go ver nme nt’s c ivi l co mmit ment pet ition as untimely. See Woods, 2025 WL 1489979, at *4. To be sure, Wood s’s motion in Massachusetts, “like any” motion, “ mig ht prove fruitless” o n the merits. Czyzewski v. Jevic Hol ding Corp., 580 U.S. 451, 463 (2 017). “[B] ut the mere possibility of failure d oes not eliminate the value of the [motion] or [Woods’s] injury in b ein g unab l e to b ring it.” Id. at 4 63–64. So w e cannot s ay that it is “impossible” for us t o “grant any effectual relief whatever” to Woods. Knox, 567 U.S. at 307 (qu otatio n marks o mitte d). T o the contrary, the appeal of an expired detenti on order survives as long as vacatur could partially redr ess a n injur y by creating an opport unity for re lief in anoth er court. See, e.g., Jan akievski v. Exec. Dir., Rochester Psychi atric Ctr., 955 F.3 d 314, 324 (2d C ir. 2020) (cha llen ge to state civil commitment orders was not moot because vacat ur would p rovide opportunity to challenge state conditions of release); see al so Hamdi, 432 F.3d at 120 (appeal of expired sentence was not moot because “a sentence reduction presents a reas onable and sufficient probability of affecting a f avorable outco me

14 in a future applic ation for . . . rel ief ” under § 212(d)(3) of the Imm igration and Nation al ity A ct, wh ich allows for re - entry into the Unit ed States at the Att orney General ’s discretion). For these reas ons, we conclude that the appeal is not moot insofar as i t challe nge s the D istr ict Co urt’s ord er co mmittin g Woo ds to 45 additional days of custodial hospital ization. III Turning to the merits of that challenge on appeal before us, Woods’s s ole argument is th at a di strict court has no s tatuto ry author ity to or der his continued custodial hospital ization (in Wo ods’s case, for 45 days) if, as he re, the defendant’s initia l four-month pe riod of c ustodial hospital ization has lapsed without a find ing of a s ubstantial probab ility that he can be restored to compet ency in the foreseeable fut ure, and the Government has not yet fil ed a cert ifica te of da ngerousn ess. W e disagree and hold that the complex web of statutory prov isions in 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241(d), 4246, and 4247 pe rmits a dis tr ict c ourt to order a defe ndant’s continue d co mmitme nt af ter an in iti al fo ur - mon th

15 period of custod ial hospitalization has lap se d, even if it f ind s that there is no substantial probab ilit y that the defendan t would be restored to competency. Under § 4241(d)(1), a defendant must be committed to BOP custody for a “reasonable” perio d of time after a distr ic t court finds h im incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1). Be fore the cr iminal case can proce ed, t he court must determi ne that there exists “a substantial probability that in the for eseeable future” the defendant will be restored to compet ency. Id. The s tatute lim its this initia l period of cust odial hospitalization to “four months. ” Id. As the first four - mon th period expires, however, § 4241(d)(2) provides that the distr ict co urt ma y com mit the defe ndant for “an a dditiona l reasonable per iod of time until” one of two events takes place: (A) “h is mental co ndition is so improved that tria l may proceed, if the cour t finds that ther e is a substant ial probability that within such a dditional pe riod of time he wi ll attain the capa city to permit the proceedin gs to go forward,” or (B) “the pending charges agains t him are disposed of according to law,” “ whichev er is earlie r.” Id. §§ 4241(d)(2)(A), (B). In United States v. Magassouba, we explained that § 4241(d)(2)(B) “is m ost obviously cons trued to per mit additional cus todial hospitalization of incompetent de fendants who are not expected to regain

16 competency until the criminal charges aga inst them are dismissed in favor of civil commitment proceedings.” 544 F.3 d 387, 405 n.9 (2d Cir. 2008). So w he re, as here, a defendant’s charges have not been “dispose d of acco rding to law” 3 and the d istr ict c o urt determine s that there is no substantial probability that the defendant wil l regai n competency to s tand tr ial in the foreseeable future, § 4241(d)(2)(B) authorizes the defendan t’s continued cust odial hos pitalization for “an additional reaso nable period of time” to permit the Government t o decide whether to seek his civil commi tment. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2)(B); see also United States v. Wayda, 966 F.3d 294, 305 (4th Cir. 2020). To be sure, the Distri ct Court d id no t rely on § 4241(d)(2)(B) wh en it entered its August 2024 order. It relied ins tead on § 4247(b), which perm its a court, “for the purpo ses of an ex amination pur suant to an ord er under . . . [§ 4246],” to co mmit a defendant “f or a reasonable pe riod, but not to ex ceed forty-five days, to the custody of the Attorne y General for plac ement in a su itable facility.” 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b). Th at statuto ry provision, howeve r, applies o nly after the government has filed a certificate of dange rousness, see 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a), and the government had not yet done so when the Magis trate Judge 3 Woods’s cha rges had not yet been dis miss ed at the tim e of the D istr ict Cou rt’s Augu st 2024 order.

17 entered it s order affir med by the D istrict Court. Bu t we affirm the Distri ct Court’s order on the basis that the D istrict Cour t had the autho rity to cont inue Woods’s hospita lization under § 4241(d) (2)(B). See Metzler Inv. Gmbh v. Chipotl e Mexican Grill, Inc., 97 0 F.3d 133, 148 (2d Cir. 2020). Our interpretati on of § 4241(d)(2)(A) and § 4241(d)(2)(B) f its n ea tly wi th in the co nsti tut iona l li mits ide ntif ied in Jackson v. India na, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). In Jackson, the Suprem e Court held that due process prohibite d t he indef init e detention of a defend ant “on the ground of incompetency alone,” but permitted his continued detention for no more than a “r easonable peri od of time” as necessary to determine whether there is a substantial prob abil ity t hat he wil l at tain that capacity in the forese eable future. If it is dete rmine d tha t this is n ot the case, then the [Government] must eithe r ins tit ute the customary civil commitment procee ding that would be requi red to co mmit indefinitely any o the r citizen, or r elease the defendant. Furtherm ore, even if it is d etermined t hat the defendan t probably soon wi ll be able to s tand trial, his continued commitmen t must be justified by prog ress toward that goal. Id. at 738. Congress enacted § 4241 specif ica lly “ in response t o the due process concerns identified in Jackson.” United States v. Bre nnan, 928 F.3d 210, 21 4 (2d C ir. 2019) (quotation m arks omitted). Section 4241(d)(2)(B) accord ingly offers the Government a reaso nable period to decide whether to initiate civil commi tment

18 proceedings against a defendant whose i ncompetency establi shes the lack of subs tant ial pr obab il ity “that he will ever be able to partic ipate fully in a tria l.” Jackson, 406 U.S. at 73 9. Urging a contrary conclusion, Wood s con tends tha t the D istr ict Cou rt relinq uish ed its s tatu tor y authority to ord er his cont inued custodia l hospitalization, regar dless of i ts restorability fin ding, when it faile d t o act with in the ini tial f our -mon th period of c ustodial hospitalization conte mplated by § 4241(d)(1). We ca nnot squar e t hat argu ment with our hol ding in Magassouba that § 4241 “d oes not affirm atively requ ire a district court to issue a § 424 1(d)(2) commitmen t order before the expi ration of [the] § 4241(d)(1) hos pitalization order, nor does it s trip a district co urt of th e authority to do so thereafter.” Magassouba, 544 F.3d at 409. Although Magassouba rel ated to an order entered pursuant t o § 4241(d) (2)(A), its r at iona le a pplie s with e qual force to c omm itmen t orders entered under § 4241(d)(2)(B). IV To be clear, today we hold on ly that § 424 1(d) author ize s d istrict c ourts to subject a defendant t o an additional reas onable period of cust o dial hospitalization after the in iti al fo ur - mon t h hospitalizat ion period and after

19 findin g th at there is no substantial pro ba bility that he will be restored to competency. Because Woods d id not rais e further issues on a ppeal, we do n ot address whether Woods’s entire period of pretri al custody can be cast as “reasonable” with in the mean ing of § 4241(d) or the Due Proce ss Clause. N or do we resolve whether the 45 day-per iod aut horized in t his case its elf reflects a “reasonable” perio d of continued h ospital ization within the meaning of § 4241(d)(2). Fina lly, we expect th at “when dealing with incompetent defendants, district courts will, in fact, genera lly strive to avo id breaks in c ustodial hosp itali zat ion b y en ter ing § 4 241(d)(2) or ders, whene ver possible, b efore the expiration of § 4241(d)(1) orders.” Magassouba, 544 F.3d at 409. As for the Governm ent’s obligatio ns, we agree with the following observation of the Fourth Circ uit: W hen the government has in i ts custody an individual whose incapacity renders him unable to stan d trial and therefor e eventuall y subject eithe r to possible relea se or civil commitmen t, we expect the governmen t to “strive to certify” indiv idua ls in a t ime fra me that elim ina tes or at le ast min im izes the time spent as an incompetent, unrestorable person waiting for a § [4246 or §] 4248 determination. T his pr inc iple alig ns with the § 4241(d) commitment provisions because it su ggests a lim itin g prin cip le f or the § 4241(d)(2)(B) “until the pending charges against h im ar e disposed of accor ding to law” period.

20 That “reasonable pe riod of ti me” should not be so short as to not accord the gover nment reasonable time to seek an d file certification of a person pursuant to [§] 4246 . . ., b ut it s ho uld only be so long as to allow for re asonable explainable admin istra tive de lay s in th at c ertif ica tion pr oces s. Wayda, 966 F.3d at 308 (cleaned up). We have consider ed Woods’s r emaining a rguments and conc lude that the y are with out merit. For the foregoin g reasons, we AF FIRM the District Cour t’s order insofar as it committed Woods to custodi al hospitalizat ion for 45 days, and we otherwise DISMISS the appea l.