L.M. v. Jonathan Graham - Malicious Prosecution Appeal

PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF AP PEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 25 - 1213 L.M., a minor, by his next friends and p arents, Jane Roe #1 and John Doe #1, Plaintiff - Appellant, and M.G., a minor, by his next friends and parents, Jane Roe #2 and John Doe #2; E.R., a minor, by his next friends and parents, Jane Roe #3 and John Doe #3, Plaintiffs, v. JONATHAN GRAHAM, Detective, Leesburg Police Department, in his individual and official capacities, Defendant - Appellee, a nd MICHELLE SMI TH, Superintendent, Lo udoun County Juve nile Detention Center, in her official capaciti es; JOHN DOE #4, Loudoun Count y Juvenile Detention Ce nter, in his individual capa city; JOHN DOE #5, Loudoun County Juvenile Detenti on Center, in his individual capacity; JOHN DOE #6, Loudoun County Juve nile Detention Center, in his individual and officia l capacities; MARCUS TURNER, Loudoun County Juvenile Dete ntion Center, in his indivi dual capacity; ROB V ERMONT, Loudoun County Juvenile Det ention Center, in his individual capacit y, Defendan ts. Appeal from the United S tates District Court for the Eastern D istrict of Virginia, at Alexandria. Michael Stefan Nachmanoff, District Ju dge. (1:23 - cv - 01574 - MSN - IDD)

2 Argued: December 9, 2025 Decided: February 27, 2026 Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREG ORY, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by published opinion. J udge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge King jo ined. Jonathan P. Sheldon, SHELDON & FLOOD, PLC, Fairfax, V irginia, for Appellant. Heather Kathleen Bardot, MCGA VIN, BOYCE, BARDOT, THORSEN & KA T Z, P.C., Fairfax, V irginia, for App ellee.

3 GREGORY, Circuit J udge: L.M., a minor, was detained pursuant to a juv enile petition charging him with aggravated sexual battery of a fellow middle school student. These charg es resulted in part from an investigation by Jonath an Graham, a detective with the local police department. The charges against L.M. were eventually dropped, and L.M. brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious prosecution. The d istrict court dismissed L.M.’s complaint for failure to state a claim. We agree that L.M. failed to a state a claim f or malicious prosecution, so we affirm. I. A. L.M. and Graham present conflicting versions of the events at issue. T he facts as presented come primarily from L.M.’s complaint and certain exhibits attached to G raham’s motion to dismiss. See Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 2016). We may properly consider the extrinsic do cuments and video s attached to Graham’s motion to dismiss because “ a cou rt may consider official public records, document s central to plaintiff’s claim, and documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint so long as the authenticity of these documents is not dispu ted.” Withhohn v. Federal Ins. Co., 164 F. A pp’x 395, 396 (4th Cir. 200 6) (citing Phillips v. LCI Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d 6 09, 618 (4t h Cir. 199 9)). No party disputes on appea l that the attached exhibits are “authentic” and address facts “ integral ” to the complaint. Six v. Generatio ns Fed. Credit Union, 891 F.3d 508, 512 (4th Ci r. 2018) (citing Sec’y of State for Defence v.

4 Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4t h Cir. 2007)). Because L.M. did not challenge the authenticity of thes e materials below or on ap peal, the district court p roperly considered them at the Rule 12(b)(6) stag e. 1 In October 2022, A.D., a Loudon County P ublic Schools (“ LCPS”) student, reported to Y.A.’s brother th at A.D. had seen three students assault Y.A. Y.A. is a n 11 - year - o ld boy with autism who attended school w ith A.D. On October 23, 2022, Y.A.’s b rother emailed LCPS, explaining A.D.’s account of the bullying and sexual assault Y.A. had experienced. LCPS forwarded the email to Jonathan Graham, a detective with the local police department. Graham then questioned A.D. at school. A.D. identified three stud ents who he h ad seen sex ually assault Y.A. One of the stud ents was identified as a stud ent named “L” — he had the same first name as L.M. R. Doc. 21 - 5 (A.D. Forensic Interview). Later, A.D.’s mother brought A.D. to th e police department for a foren sic interview; A.D. had been sharing details at h ome that he had not disclosed in his initial interview with Graham. In the recorded forensic interview, A.D. shared more detailed in formation about the sexual assaults committed against Y.A. He iden tified the three perpetrators again. A.D. also described L.M. physically and noted that he had an issue earlier in the year with “L” because “L” had been bul lying hi m. 1 These documents include: an email chain between Y.A.’s family and the school reporting the allegations; a video reco rding of Y.A.’s forensic interview; a v ideo recording of A.D.’s forensic interview; Graham’s affidavit in support of the search warrant and his case affidavit; and an audio recording of Graham ’s phone call with L.M.’s father.

5 After th e interview, Graham presented A.D. with photograph s of all the male students who entered the gym locker ro om during the timeframe at issue. A.D. identified two of the stude nts — not parties to this appeal — who ha d sexuall y assaul t ed Y.A. But A.D. noted that th e third student, the boy whose name began wi th “L, ” was not pictured in th e roster presented. A.D.’s mother suggested that Graham contact LCP S to obta in the student’s full name, since A.D. had reported him to the school for bullying earlier that school year. The school identified L.M. as the student who bullied A.D. At that point, Y.A. was brought into a Child Advocacy Center for a forensic interview. In the taped interv iew, Y.A. stated that A.D. cou ld identify the boys who h ad assaulted him because A.D. witnessed the assault. He added that the boys “S.E.X. at [him]. ” J.A. 133. Y.A. was then given a piece of paper with a diagram of a body on it; he was told to circle the parts of his b ody that the boys touched. Y.A. circled the en tire diagram. He told the interviewer that he was “shaken up” by th e assault. J.A. 133. Graham compiled the info rmation from his investigation and submitted it to Lo udon County Juvenile Intake on Nove mber 8, 2022. Juvenile Intake assesses whether the information submitted suffice s to establish prob able cause for a juvenile petition. See Va. Code § 16.1 - 260. G raham also spoke to L.M.’s father and notified him that L.M. was a suspect in the investigation. Soon after, Juv enile Intake notified Graham that probable cause existed to file a j uvenile p etition against L.M. fo r aggravated assault of Y.A. Juvenile Intake also issued a detention order for L.M. alongside the juvenile petition. Graham called L.M.’s father to inform him of the petition and detention order, and L.M.’s father told

6 Graham that L.M. did not know Y.A., L.M. was not in a class with Y.A., and th at they had not had the opportunity to provid e their side of the story. Graham signed the detention order and transported L.M. to the Juvenile Detention Center. About a month later, Grah am met with the Assistant Commonwealth Attorney (“ACA”) to discuss the in vestigation, at which point h e learned that A.D.’s statements to the ACA conflicted with his statemen ts to Graham during the forensic interview. Graham then encouraged the ACA to drop the charges against the boys, inclu ding L.M. The ACA nolle prossed the charges against L.M. soon after. B. L.M., along with two plain tiffs not party to this appeal, b rought a malicious prosecution claim against Graham and others und er 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting violations of Virginia law and the Fo urth Amendment of the United States C onstitution. Graham moved to dis miss the complaint for failure to state a claim. After briefing and oral argument, the district court granted Graham’s motion and dismissed him from the case with prejudice. The district court reasoned that L.M. failed to allege facts that, when t aken as true, demonstrated that L.M.’s seizure was not supported by proba ble cause. And the court found that, even if the p rosecution was not ad equately supported by probable cause, L.M. failed to plausibly allege that Graham “caused” L.M.’s seizure since the prob able cause determination is made by another entity altogeth er — the Juvenile Intake Officer. L.M. timely appealed.

7 II. T he facts as alleged do no t give rise to a cogn izable malicious prosecution claim under federal or state law. Accordingly, we affirm th e district court’s dismissal of L.M.’s complaint. A. The Federal Rules of Civ il Procedure permit dismissal of a complaint when it fails “to state a claim upon wh ich relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6). To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its f ace” when accepting all well - pleaded allegation s as true. As hcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 67 8 (2009) (citations omitted). We review de n ovo the dismissal of a com plaint for failure to state a claim. See Moretti v. Thorsdottir, 157 F.4th 352, 3 59 (4th Ci r. 2025). To succeed on a malicious prose cution claim under bot h Virginia law and the Fourth Amendment to the United S tates Constitutio n, the pl aintiff “mus t allege tha t the defendan t (1) caused (2) a seizure of the plai ntiff pursuant to legal proce ss unsupported by probabl e cause, and (3) crimina l proceedings termi nated in plaintiff’s favor.” Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012). See O’Connor v. Tice, 704 S.E.2d 572, 575 (Va. 2011). 2 Neither party disputes that the juv enile proceedings terminated in L.M.’s fa vor. Thus, the qu estion before us is whether L.M. sufficien tly plead ed that his seizure w as not supported by probable cause and that Graham caused L.M.’s seizure. 2 Virginia law requires the plaintiff plead an additional elemen t: m alice. However, the Virginia Supreme Court has determined that malice may be inferred from a “lack of probable cause,” so we need not reach the question of whether L.M. adequately plead ed malice. See Dill v. Kroger Ltd. P’ship I, 300 Va. 99, 112 (2 021).

8 B. We begin with probable cause. A probable cause determination mandates considering the “totality - of - the circumstances.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983). To assess probable cause, we consider “the suspect’s conduct as known to the [judicial] officer, and the contou rs of the offense thought to be committed by that conduct.” Graham v. G agnon, 831 F.3d 17 6, 184 (4t h Cir. 20 16) (quoting Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 1992)). The relevant qu estion is whether the officer took “rea so nably prudent steps” to determine t he correct individual was seized. Smith v. Munday, 848 F.3d 248, 254 - 55 (4th Cir. 2017). L.M. contends that his seizure w as unsupported by probable cause beca use Graham’s case submissio n contained material factual omissions that would have negated finding probable cause. Thus, L.M. must h ave plausibly alleged that Graham omitted from the affidavit “material facts with t he intent to make, or with reck less disregard of whether they thereby made, the affidavit misleading.” Mo retti, 157 F.4th at 360 (citing Miller v. Prince George’s Cnty., 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007)). “ For an omitted fact to be material, the omission must do more than potentially affect the probable cause determination: it must be necessary to the find ing of probable cause.” Id. (cita tions omitted). “To determine materiality, we excise the offending inaccuracies ... and then determine whether or not the corrected warran t affidavit would provide adequate grounds for the [seizure]. ” Evans, 703 F.3d at 651 (cleaned up). Reck less disregard “can be established by evidence that a police officer failed to inform th e judicial officer of facts he knew woul d negate probabl e cause. ” Miller, 475 F.3d at 627 (citations omitted).

9 Va. Code § 18.2 - 67.3 defines aggravated sexual battery as sexual ab use of a person under the age of thirteen through the use of the victim’s “men tal incapacity or physical helplessness.” N o party disputes that Y.A. was under thirteen and ha s “diminished mental capacity due to his autism,” J.A. 9 3, so the question is simply whet her a “fair probability” existed to believe that L.M. was one o f the individuals that allegedly sexually assaulted Y.A. Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014). We hold that it did. A mple facts support ed fin ding probable cause here, in cluding Y.A.’s descrip tion of his ass ault; Y.A.’s s tatement that A.D. witnessed th e event and cou ld identify the perpetrato rs; and A.D.’s d etailed description to Graham on two separa te occasions of th e events in question. See E nglish v. Clarke, 90 F.4th 636, 646 (4th Ci r. 2024) (“A victim’s ‘rel iable identifi cation o f his attacker’ almost alway s suffices t o establish probable cause.”) (citing T orchinsky v. Siw inski, 942 F.2d 257, 262 (4 th Cir. 1991)). L.M., however, argues that exculpatory evidence existed to demonstrate that A.D.’s allegations were wholly fabricated. He alleges that Grah am learned prior to L.M.’s detention that A.D. had previous ly falsely reported that L.M. was bullying him, J.A. 19 ¶ 30; th at L.M. was “was not in the 8th - period P.E. class when the purported assault was alleged to have occurred,” J.A. 19 ¶ 31; and that Y.A. denied A.D.’s account of the assault. J.A. 19 ¶ 28. L.M. contends that Graham’s omission of this ev idence fro m his case file contravenes the Fourth Amendment. However, we do not believe these omissions are material, and we therefore hold that excluding this factual contex t did not unde rmine probable cause in this case.

10 First, even if A.D.’s prior allegation against L.M. was false, as th e complaint alleges, Y.A. identified A.D. as the ind ividual who witnessed the assault in a forensic interview, and A.D. provided detailed descrip tions — twice — of the assault he witnessed by L.M. Graham also attempted to establish the identi t y o f the perpetrators through “multip le methods,” so he had ample reason to believe the veracity of A.D.’s statements. Sm ith, 847 F.3d at 254. Indeed, he does not seem to have misrepresented th e facts A.D. conveyed to him, including which individuals A.D. id entified as the perpetrators of the assault. Second, tho ugh L.M. alleges that Graham learned L.M. was not in the P.E. class at the time of Y.A.’s assault, the complaint does not specify whether Graham knew L.M. was not enrolled in the P.E. class when the incident occurred or if Graham learned L.M. was not present in the locker room d uring the assault. And, im portantly, this fact alone is no t enough to defeat probable cause wh en weighed against the totality of th e information Graham possessed at the time he submitted his case file. Finally, though L.M. alleges that Y.A. denied A.D.’s account of the events at issue, J.A. 19 ¶ 28, this allegation is squarely contradicted by Y.A.’s forensic interview, which was attached as an exhibit to Grah am’s motion to dismiss. Indeed, Y.A. specific ally stated that the boys had “S. E. X. at [h im]” and that A.D. could identify the perp etrators bec ause he saw the event happen. J.A. 133 (citing R. Doc. 21 –3). So, while Y.A. d id not himself identify L.M. as a perpetrator o f the assault, he affirmed that the assault occurred and recognized that A.D., a witness to th e event, could identify the perpetrators. Th is, too, validated Graham’s reliance on A.D.’s statements and accordingly support ed finding probable cause.

11 We have found probable cause lack ing in cases where the evidence was “so sca nt” it was essentially “n onexistent.” Smith, 848 F.3d at 255. But here, wher e A.D.’s identificatio n of L.M. was “specific and relatively certain,” ther e was no reason for Graham to doubt the truth of A.D.’s identification. English, 90 F.4th at 646. Nor would inclusion of the all eged omissions be enough to ov ercome A.D.’s detailed eyewitness testimony. Grah am inve stiga ted the events reported to him, and he relied on eyewitness testimo ny when developing his case fi le. Perhaps Graha m could have in terview ed L.M. earl ier in his inv estig ation or attemp ted to furth er cor robo rate A.D.’s story. But his f ailu re to do so do es not cont ravene t he Fou rth Amendment in this case. See W adkins v. Arnold, 214 F.3d 535, 543 (4th C ir. 2000) (noting that an investiga ting officer need not “e xhaust[] every potential a venue of investigation ”). We agree with the district cou rt: L.M. did not allege facts that, if proven true, wo uld negate probable cause. On this basis alone, L.M.’s m alicious prosecution claims fail. C. We now turn to the question of cau sation: whether Graham was the but - for and proximate cause of L.M.’s seizure. Evans, 703 F.3 d at 647. Generally, “subsequent acts of independent decision - makers” can “break the causal chain” between an investigating officer’s misconduct and the plaintiff’s seizure. Id. Bu t this rule has limits: t he causal chain does not sever when a law en forcement officer fails to disclose exculpatory evidence to a prosecuting official or otherwise misleads th em. Id. at 647 – 48. The mere fact that the Juvenile Intake Officer made the u ltimate probable cause determination in this case does not alone absolve Graham of liability.

12 However, L.M. failed to include any allegations in his complaint relating to Graham’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to the Juvenile Intake Officer. T he complaint alleges th at Graham himself made the probable cause determination. See J.A. 21. To the contrary, Virginia Code § 16.1 - 260 specifies that the juvenile “intake officer” determines if there is “probable cause for the issuance of [a]” petition after he “receive[s] a complaint alleging facts which may be sufficient to inv oke” the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. The statute also auth orizes the Juvenile Intake Officer to “refuse to autho rize the filing of a petition” “if the intake officer b elieves that probable cause does no t exist.” Va. Code § 16.1 - 260(C). Without specific allegations that Graham w ithheld material facts from the Juvenile Intake Officer or u nduly influenced the officer’s pro bable cause determination, L.M. did not allege that Graham caused L.M.’s seizure. So L.M.’s malicious prosecution claim fails on this basis, too. * * * We recogniz e this case is laden with diffic ulties for bot h parties. As the district cour t rightly acknowled ged, the initial accusations against L.M. were serious, as are L.M.’ s allegations that the accusations are fa lse. We are co nstrai ned by the Fou rth Amendmen t to recognize tha t Graham’s failure to investigate the accusations f urther d oes not con travene th e Constitu tion. Bu t “ good constitutional law is not always good pol icy.” Rach el A. H armon, Why Arrest?, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 307, 328 (2016). We affirm the judgment of the district cou rt. AFFIRMED