US v. Connie Jamerson - Criminal Contempt Affirmed

PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF AP PEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 25- 4045 UNITED ST ATES OF AMER ICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. CONNIE JAMER SON, Third - Party Custodian for Steven McClain Jamerson, Appellant, a nd STEVEN MC CLAIN JAMER SON, Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Co urt for the Western District of North Carolina, at A sheville. Martin K. Reidinger, Chief District Judge. (1:21-cr-0 011 6-MR-W CM -1) A rgued: December 12, 202 5 Decided: February 27, 2026 Before KING, THACKER, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judge s. Affirmed b y publishe d opini on. Judge Ki ng wrote the opinion, in w hich Judge Thacker and Judge Benjamin joined. Judge Benjami n wrote a c oncurri ng opini on. ARGUED: Eric Jason Foster, LAW OFFICE OF RICK F OSTER, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Donald David Gast, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Russ Ferguson, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

2 KING, Circuit Judg e: In this appeal from the Western District of North Carolina, app ellant Con nie Jamerson challenges the district co urt’s January 2025 judgment adjudicat ing her guilty of “ indirect criminal contempt ” relative to her son ’s failing to report to serve a prison sentence in March 2024. See United States v. Jamerson, No. 1:21 - cr - 00 116 (W.D.N. C. Jan. 16, 2025), ECF No. 54 (the “Contempt Judgment”). In November 2023, Ms. Jamerson had been ap pointed third - party custodian for her son, Steven McClain Jamerso n, in connection with revocation proceedings that related to Mr. Jam erson’s violation of superv ised release conditions whi ch stemmed from his prior federal conviction. As exp lained herein, we reject Ms. Jamerson’s appellate con tentions and affirm the Contempt Judgment. I. A. As background, in late 2023, Steven Jamerson was in the process of concluding a sentence for a prior federal conviction. Specifically, Mr. Jamerson was then on supervised release in western North Carolina. Mr. Jamerso n violated his terms of supervised release, however, and his probation officer promptly initiated revocatio n proceedings in the district court. Mr. Jamerson was returned into federal custody o n Novembe r 20, 2023, and a federal magistrate judge conducted a detention hearing two days later. In Mr. Jamerson’s initial detention hearing, the m agistrat e j udge con cluded, by clear and convi ncing e videnc e, that Mr. Jamerson did not pose a flight risk nor a danger t o the community. Critically, the m agistrate j udge then imposed a set of conditions on M r.

3 Jamerson’s release. See J.A. 17 - 21 (the “Release Order”). 1 Pertinent h ere, the Release Order directed that Mr. Jamerson b e placed in the custody of his mother, appellant Connie Jamerson, while he was on release pending the revo cation proceedings. And by Ms. Jamerson agreeing to be her son’s third - party custodia n during the pen dency thereof, she became responsible for his compliance with th e various conditions of release. Of especial relevance to th is appeal, the Release Order ob ligated Mr. Jamerson to “appear in court as required and, if convicted, surrender to serve any sentence imposed.” See J.A. 17 (the “ self - surrender condition”). And Ms. Jamerson acknowledged that, if she failed to ensure that Mr. Jamerson abided by the self - surrender condition o f the Release Order, she would then be “subject ... to adverse consequences.” Id. at 18. B. I n Februar y 2024, Steven Jamerson appeared for his revocation hearing in the district cour t in Asheville. During the revocation hearing, the court resolved to revoke Mr. Jamerson’s term of supervised release, and it ord ered him to serve an additional sentence of four months in prison, to be f ollowed by eight months of superv ised release. At that juncture, however, the court did n ot remand Mr. Jamerson to federal custody. The court instead allowed Mr. Jamerson to remain free and then self - surrender to the federal authorities at the appropriate time. T h e court explained to Mr. Jamerson as follows: With regard to your [self - surrender ] . .. you’re going to be given that notice on when and where to appear to begin serving the balance of that sentence. Until then, you are released un der the same terms of the bond th at you had 1 Citatio ns herein to “J.A. ___” refer to the contents of the Joint A ppendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

4 when you came here today and th at will be the constraints up on you during th[is] interim period. See S.A. 18. 2 T he court advised Mr. Jamerson to “talk to [you r] probation officer before you leave here today so that you make sure that you and he are on the same page.” Id. Of note, C onnie Jamerson was in the Asheville courtroom du ring her son’s revo cation h earing. Shortly thereafter, the Un ited States Marshals Service fixed a report date for Mr. Jamerson of March 26, 2024. To ensure that he w as fully in formed, the Marshals Service transmitted to Mr. Jamerson a letter notifying him of the March 26 report date. Meanwhile, Ms. Jamerson was also notified of her son’s report date by the probation office. But Mr. Jamerson did not report as directed on March 26. And despite Ms. Jamerson having knowledge o f her son’s report date and the requirement for him to self - surrender thereon, she did not take any action to ensure that the self - surrender occurred. Rather, Ms. Jamerson later stated to the authorities that her son was a “grown person” who was “old enough t o be ... responsible for himself.” See J.A. 40. Mr. Jamerson was apprehended nearly a month later, on April 20, 20 24, by pol ice officers in Marshall, North Carolina. C. In June 2024, the government filed a motion in the district court, seeking a court order directing Conn ie Jamerson — as custodian of her son, Steven Jamerson — to show cause why she should not be held in criminal contempt, pursuant t o 18 U.S. C. § 401(3) (specifying that court may punish con tempt caused by “disobedience or resistan ce to its 2 Citations herein to “S.A. ___” refer to the conten ts of the Supplemental Appendix filed by the government in this appeal.

5 lawful writ, process, order, rule, d ecree, or command”). The m agistrate j udge appoi nted Ms. Jamerson a lawyer for the contempt pro ceedings, accepted briefing concerning the pertinent issues, and conducted a hearing on Nov ember 18, 2024. By order of December 20, 2024, the m agistrate j udge grant ed the government’ s show - cause motion and directed Ms. Jamerson to appear before the district court to sho w cause — if she could — why she should not be hel d in “ indirect criminal contempt ” for violating the Release Order. 3 D. On January 16, 2025, the district court conducted its bench trial in this matter. During t hose proceedings, the prosecuto rs introduced evidence demonstrating that Connie Jamerson had abdicated her duties and obligations as her son Steven Jamerson’s third - party custodian. According to the prosecution, in abd icating those responsibilities, Ms. Jamerson violated the Release Order’s mandate that she was responsible for ensuring Mr. Jamerson’s prompt compliance with the self - surrender condition. The prosecution also produced a video of Ms. Jamerson discussing the situation with the authorities. Meanwhile, by her lawyer, Ms. Jamerson argued that she could not ha ve viol ated her obligations concerning the self - surrender condition imposed on Mr. Jamerson, in that the November 2023 Release Order memorializing that condition had e xpired on February 1, 202 4 — that is, when t he court resentenced Mr. Jamerson for v iolating his terms of supervised release. 3 We observe that “ [i] ndirect, o r out - of - court, contempt” is criminal contempt that occurs outside of the presence of a judicial authority. See, e.g., United States v. Neal, 101 F.3d 993, 996 - 9 7 (4th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that “[i]ndirect. .. [cri minal] con tempt does not occur within the presence of the court”).

6 In a n oral ruling at the conclusion of the January 16, 2025 bench trial, the dist rict court concluded that the Release Order of November 2023 was in effect at the time of Mr. Jamerson’s required self - surrender on March 26, 2024. And t he court ruled that Ms. Jamerson had willfully violated the terms of t he Release Order, reasoning as follows: [R]egarding the element of specificity of the notice and particularly the notice of whether or no t the responsibilities of the custod ian [i.e., Ms. Jamerson] extended beyond th e February 1st, 2024, revocation hearing. I believe the terms of the document itself are clear th at the conditions of release extend all the way up until th e beginning of the service of a sentence in th e event that a sentence is, in fact, im posed. So the doc ument whi ch is in evi dence whi ch is undis puted, na mely th e November ‘ 23 order, clearly extended. . . the resp onsibilities of Ms. Jamerson. . . beyond Febr uary 1, 2024. With regard to the issue of willfulness, I rely entirely on the video wherein Ms. Jamerson, at various po ints, acknowledges, I believe each of these points. She knew what her ob ligations were and yet no twithstanding that knowledge, did not fulfill those o blig ations. And I think willfulness is most clearly sh own by the statement that she made, I believe more than once — I think it was actually stated twice on the videos — [that] Mr. Jamerson [was] an adu lt. He should be responsible for himself. Essentially [Ms. Jamerson was ] expressing h er abdication of any responsibility for [Mr. Jamerson] meeting the conditions of release. Therefore, having found beyond a reasonable doubt each of th e elements regarding indirect criminal contempt in this matter, I fin d that Ms. Jamerson is, in fact, guilty of such contemp t. See J.A. 115. That very day, Januar y 16, 2025, the district court entered its Contemp t Judgment and f ound Connie Jamerson guilty of indirect criminal contempt. See Cont empt Judgment 1 (providing that “ [b] ased on th e evidence presented by the parties and the arguments of counsel, and for the reaso ns as stated in open cou rt, the Court hereby finds Conn ie

7 Jamerson GUILTY of indirect criminal contempt, and she is. .. committed to the custody of the United States Marshals to be imp risoned for a term of THREE (3) DAYS ”). 4 * * * Ms. Jamerson has timely noted this appeal from the Contempt Judgmen t, a nd we possess appellate jurisdiction pursu ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. II. Our Court reviews “judgmen ts resulting from a bench trial un der a mixed standard of review; factual findings may be reversed only if clearly erroneous, while conclusions of law are examined de novo.” See United S tates v. Perez, 140 F.4th 23 7, 242 n. 3 (4th Cir. 2025). To that end, whether v alid court order s exist a re pu rely question s of law that we review under the de novo standard. See United States v. Linney, 134 F.3d 274, 282 (4t h Cir. 1998). And wheth er such an order is specific enough is a question of fact that we review for clear error. See United States v. McM ahon, 104 F.3d 6 38, 642 (4th Cir. 1997). III. On appeal, Connie Jamerson challenges the district court’s Con tempt Judgment on two grounds. F irst, Ms. Jamerson argues that, at the time her son Steven Jamerso n was required to self - surrender to the Marshals Service in March 2024, there was no valid cou rt 4 The Contempt Judg ment also released Ms. Jamerson “on h er own recognizance” pending the outcome of this appeal, pu rsuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1343(b).

8 order in place that required her to act as h is custodian and to ensu re that he complied with the self - surrender condition of the Release Order. Second, Ms. Jamerson maintains that, if a valid court order then existed, it was not clear eno ugh to support her con tempt conviction. W e assess — and reject — each of Ms. Jamerson’s appellate contentions in turn. A. Before assessing Ms. Jamerson’s contentions, some table - setting is warranted. Ms. Jamerson was convicted of what is called “ indirect criminal contempt. ” See, e.g., United States v. Neal, 101 F.3d 993, 997 (4th Cir. 1996) (sp ecifying that “[i]ndirect ... contempt does not occur within the presence of the court”). We hav e recogn ized that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), “[a] court may punish ‘contempt of its authority’ such as ‘[d ]isobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.’” See United States v. Westbrooks, 780 F.3d 593, 5 95 (4th Ci r. 2015) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 401(3)). Put differently, a n individual may be found i n contempt of a court order if she “willfully violated a decree that was clear and left no un certainty in the minds of those that heard it.” See In re Gates, 600 F.3d 333, 341 (4t h Cir. 2010) (citation modified). Whether a c riminal contempt has been pr oven depends on three elements. That is, there must be “(1) a reason ably specific order; (2) violation of the o rder; and (3) the willful intent to violate the order.” See Gates, 600 F.3 d at 338 - 39 (citation modified). In this appeal, Ms. Jamerso n focuses her appellate challenges on the first element — i. e., whether there was a reasonably specific court order in place as of March 2024 — and on the second element — that is, whether there had been a violation of any su ch court ord er.

9 B. 1. Against this backdrop, we begin w ith Ms. Jamerson’s contention that, as of March 2024, there was no valid court order in place that required her to act as Steven Jamerson ’s third - party custodian and thus to ensure that he complied with the self - surrender condition of the Release Order. In support of that proposi tion, Ms. Jamerson argues that the Release Order — which created the custodial relationship between her and Mr. Jamerson — only covered Mr. Jamerson’s p retrial release pe riod. Ms. Jamerson argues that, after the revocation of Mr. Jamerson’s superv ised release in November 2023, and following his resentencing in early February 2024, the Release Order was no longer in effect. On that basis, Ms. Jamerson says that she was not oblig ated to comply with — and therefore did not violate — the Release Order’s terms in March 2024, when Mr. Jamerson failed to self - surrender to the federal authorities to serve his four - month prison sentence. Ms. Jamerso n premises her contention on the fact that the Release Order cited 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (c)(1)(B)(i). Sectio n 3142 authorizes a judicial officer to gran t pretrial release to a defendant, if the judicial officer determines that th e defendant poses neither a flight risk nor a d anger to the community. For its part, § 3 14 2 (c) expressly prov ides the judicial officer with additional authority to impose condition s of release that will mitigate against such risks. A nd among the options available is th at of § 3142(c)(1)(B)(i), which grants the judicial officer authority to order that the defendant remain in the custody of a d esignated person, who agrees to assume supervision and to report any violation of a release condition to th e court, if the designated person is able reasonably to assure th e ju dicial officer that the

10 person will appear as required and will no t pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(i). Fatal to her contention, however, Ms. Jamerson overlooks another p rovision of Title 18 — that is, § 3143, wh ich covers a release pend ing sentencing and, like § 3142, authorizes the judicial officer to release a d efendant “who has been found guilty of an offense and who is awaiting imposition or execution of sentence.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1). Importantly, § 3143(a) specifi cally authorizes the judicial o fficer to release the defendant after the sentencing hearin g and to allow for his self - surrend er. Id. We conclude that the Release Order of N ovember 2023 remained in effect as of March 2024, notwithstanding its citation to § 3142(c)(1)(B)(i). At leas t two of our sister circuits have determined that a district court’s authority to detain — or, by implication, release — a defendant b etween his initial appearance on a supervised release vi olation and his final supervised release revocation hearing derives from both Federal Rule o f Criminal Procedure 32.1(a)(6) and § 3143(a)(1). See, e.g., United States v. Fe rnandez, 152 F.4th 124 (2d Cir. 2025); U nited States v. Smalls, 155 F.4 th 216 (3d Cir. 2025). In that regard, § 3143(a)(1) “authorizes detention of a d efendant charged with a supervised release violation pending revocation proceeding s.” See Fernandez, 152 F.4th a t 135; Smalls, 155 F.4th at 223. Accord ingly, as those courts have ruled, a person serving a term of supervised release “has been found guilty of an offense” — which is the underlying offense of conviction and not the violation of supervised rele ase — such that § 3143 applies, rather than § 3142. See Fernandez, 152 F.4th at 135; Smalls, 155 F.4t h at 221 - 22.

11 Here, the district court released Steven Jamerson in February 2023 after he was resentenced, as part of his revocation proceedings. In so doing, the court complied with § 3143(a)(1) and imposed the same cond itions of release that it had previously imposed in the Release Order of November 2023, pursuant to § 3142(c). See S.A. 18 (explaining that Mr. Jamerson was “released und er the same terms of the bond that you h ad when you came here today and that will be the con straints upon you during that interim p eriod”). Accordingly, th e court’s directive fro m the bench during the February 202 4 revocation hearing complied with § 3143(a)(1) and otherwise served to continue the custodial relationship between Ms. Jamerson an d her son, as created by the Release Order. 5 2. Having determined that there was a binding court order in effect on Steven Jamerson’s self - surrender date in March 202 4, we turn to Ms. Jamerson ’s contention that such a court o rder was not clear enough to suppor t her indirect criminal con tempt conviction. W e have recognized that, in order to support a criminal contempt conviction, 5 Challen ging the proposition that the d istrict court’s February 2024 directive from the bench carried over the prior custodial relationship that had been established by the Release Order, Ms. Jamerson m aintains on appe al that the court was required to conduct a separate legal analysis at two separate hearings. But Ms. Jamerson conceded that argument as meritless in the und erlying proceedings. Specifically, her lawyer recog nized that the court was not required to conduct two separate hearings. Otherwise, Ms. Jamerson argues on appeal that she did not know that the Release Order had carried over follow ing her son’s resentencing in Feb ruary 2024. But Ms. Jamerson was in the Asheville courtroom when the district court announced that it was continuing the cond itions of the Release Order through her son’s self - surrender date.

12 the court order must be “definite, clear, specific, and le[ave] no doubt or uncertainty in t he minds of those to whom it was addressed.” S ee McMahon, 104 F.3 d at 642. We conclude, however, that both the Release Order of Nov ember 2023 and the district court’s February 2024 orde r — i.e., the court’s directive from the bench that continued all aspects o f the prio r custodial relationship established by the Release Order — were a bundantly clear to Ms. Jamerson. I n these circumstances, M s. Jamerson was her son’s third - party cu stodian at all relevant times, and she had a conti nuing o bligatio n to ensure that he compl ied with the self - surrender condition at the appropriate time, as specified in the Release Order. See J.A. 1 7 (recognizing that Mr. Jamerson “promises to appear in court as required and, if conv icted, surrender to serve any sentence imposed”). * * * At bottom, w e discern no infirmity in the Con tempt Judgment. Not only did the district court correctly determine that a valid court order existed when Mr. Jamerson w as required to self - surrend er in March 2 024, the cou rt properly fou nd that M s. Jamerson had knowledge of that self - surrender condition and her obligations under the Release Order. IV. Pursuant to the foregoing, we are satisfied to reject each of Ms. Jamerson’s appellate contentions and affirm the Contempt Judg ment. AFFIRMED

13 D E ANDREA G IST BENJ AMIN, Circuit Judge, con curring: I concur fully in the majority opinion. I write separately t o express my concern that an unrepresented third - party custodian could be held in criminal contempt for violation o f a release order without that penalty first b eing specified. I acknowledge the broad discretion afforded the district court in u tilizing its contempt powers. Those p owers are necessary “to secure jud icial authority from obstruction in the performance of its duties. . . [and] to punish a n act de rogatory t o the power and authority of the court.” Brandt v. Gooding, 6 36 F.3d 124, 135 (4th Ci r. 2011) (cleaned up). Yet, I find it alarming that an unrepresented th ird - part y custodi an may be subject to such criminal pen alties without knowledge of the specific penalties. M s. Jamerson was only informed th at she may be “subject.. . to adverse consequences” if she failed to ensure her son met h is self - surrender condition. J.A. 18. Sh e received no notice she might be held in criminal con tempt. The Federal Rules of Criminal Proced ure require that defendants be in formed of the maximum penalties they may face both at initial appearances and in ex change for a plea. See F ED. R. C R IM. P. 58(b)(2)(A) (requiring co urts to inform defendant s o f the ma ximum penalty at the initial appearance on a misdemeanor or petty offense); id. 11(b)(1)(H) (requir ing courts to inform defendant s of the maximum penalty before accepting a plea). In asking one to submit to the court’s authority and serve as a custodian of a defendant on release, the court should similarly inform that prospective custodian of the penalties they may face for failing to submit to that authority. Such disclosure wou ld be good pra ctice. Third - party custodians play an integral role in ensuring defendants comp ly with conditions

14 of release. See e.g., J.A. 1 8 (third - party custodians “agree to su pervise the defendant in accordance with all of the co nditions of release, (b) to u se every effort to assure th e defendant’s appearance at all scheduled court proceedings, and (c) to notify the [c]ou rt immediately if the defendant violates any condition of release”). District courts should strive to fully inform custod ians (as well as any other individual subject to the cou rt’s authority) not only of their d uties to the court bu t any penalty of criminal contempt, including incarceration, that might follow abdication of those duties.