US v. Charles Scott - Criminal Appeal

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF AP PEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 25 - 4181 UNITED ST ATES OF AMER ICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. CHARLES EDW ARD SCOTT, a/k /a Whop Whop, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for th e Northern District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, District Judg e. (3:22 - cr - 00026 - GMG - RWT -1) Submitted: February 11, 202 6 Decided: February 27, 2026 Before GREGORY, THACKER, and HEY TENS, Circuit Judges. Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpub lished per curiam op inion. ON BRIEF: David O. Schles, LAW OFFICE OF DAVID SCHLES, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Lara K ay Omps - Botteic her, OFFICE OF T HE UNITE D STATES ATTORNEY, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for App ellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding p recedent in this circuit.

2 PER CURIAM: Charles Edward Scott pled guilty, pursuant to a Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) p lea agreement, to distribut ion of eutyl one, in viol ation of 21 U.S. C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). T he district court imposed a 156 - month sentence — within the binding sentencing range — and three years’ supervised release. Scott’s counsel has fil ed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no nonfrivolous grounds for appeal but questioning whether Scott’s guilty plea is valid and whether the 156 - month sentence is procedurally and substantively reason able. Scott exercised his rig ht to file a pro se supplemental brief, raising addition al issues. The Gove rnment moves t o dismiss Scott’s appeal as barred by the appeal waiver in his plea agreement. We affirm in part and dismiss in part. Although Scott’s plea agreement contains an app eal waiver, h is allegation that the Government breached the plea agreement survives the waiver. United States v. Wilson, 149 F.4th 448, 453 n.1 (4th Cir. 2025). “It is well - established that the interp retation of plea agreements is rooted in contract law, and that each party should receive the benefit of its bargain.” Id. at 4 53 (citation modified). “When a promise made by the prosecutor is part of the inducement or consid eration for a guilty plea, the pro secutor must fulfill that promise.” Id. at 454 (citation modified). If the government fails to do so, a breach occurs. United States v. Tate, 845 F.3d 571, 575 (4th Cir. 2017). But “the government is held only to those promises that it actually made to the defendant.” Wilson, 149 F.4th at 454 (citation modified). And “in determining what promises the government made, we read a plea

3 agreement’s plain language in its ordin ary sense.” Id. (citation modified). We review Scott’s claim of breach of the plea agreement for p lain error. Id. at 453. Scott asserts in his pro se brief that the Government breached the plea agreement by failing to fulfill a verbal promise to grant sentencing credit beginning March 15, 2022. 1 Our review of the plea ag reement leads us to con clude that the Government did not promise Scott would receive sentencing credit. Scott also contends that the Government failed to recommend that his federal sentence run concurrently with an undischarged state sentence, but th e plea agreement did not contain any reference to running the federal and stat e sentences concurrently. Importantly, S cott stated at the plea hearin g that he had no t been induced to enter his guilty plea by promises outside those contained in th e plea agreement. S ee Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (“Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption o f verity.”). We therefore conclude that the Government did not breach the plea agreement. Next, Scott’s counsel questions the validity of Sco tt’s guilty plea. The appeal waiver in the plea agreement does not preclude our review of the validity of the guilty plea or the waiver of appellate rights i n the plea agreement. United States v. Taylor - Sanders, 88 F.4th 516, 5 22 (4th Cir. 2023). Beca use Scott did not move to w ithdra w his plea or 1 Scott raises a related argument that the district cou rt failed to consider the sentencing credit provision in th e plea agreement and that he did not receive any credit. But “[t]he Attorney General, throu gh the Bureau of Prisons. . ., computes the amount of the credit in a particular case aft er the defendant b egins his sentence.” United States v. Jackson, 952 F.3d 492, 497 - 98 (4th Cir. 20 20) (citing United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334 (1992)).

4 object to the plea hearing in the district court, our review is for plain error. Un ited States v. Garrett, 141 F. 4th 96, 103 (4th Cir. 2025). When accepting a guilty plea, the district c ourt must conduct a plea colloqu y in which it informs the defendant of, and ensures that the defendant understands, the righ ts he is relinquishing by pleading guilty, the nature of the charge to which he is plead ing, and the possible consequences o f pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). The court also must ensure that the plea is volun tary and not the result of threats, force, or p romises extrinsic to the plea agreement and th at a factual basis exists for the plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), (3). “A pro perly conducted [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 11 colloquy raises a strong presumption that the plea is final and binding.” Taylor - Sanders, 8 8 F.4th at 522 (citation modified). Here, the magistrate judge 2 fully co mplied with Rule 11 and condu cted a thorough plea colloquy before accepting S cott’s gu ilty plea. 3 The transcript of the Ru le 11 hearing establishes that Scott was competent and that his plea was know ing, voluntary, and supported by an independent factual basis. Sc ott’s guilty plea is th erefore valid. Next, we review an appeal waiver d e novo to determine its enforceab ility. United States v. Smith, 134 F.4th 248, 255 - 57 (4th Cir. 2025). “A waiver is valid if the defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to waive the right to app eal.” Id. at 257 (citation modified); United States v. Carter, 87 F.4th 217, 224 (4th Cir. 2023) (requiring evaluation 2 Scott consented to proceed before a magistrate jud ge. 3 The district court subsequently accepted the plea agreement and the plea.

5 of “the totality of the circumstances”). “Generally .. . , if a district court q uestions a defendant regarding the waiver of appellate rights during the Rule 11 colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant understood the fu ll significance of the waiver, the waiver is valid [and enforceable].” Carter, 8 7 F.4th at 224 (citation modified). “When[, as here,] the government seeks to enfo rce an appeal waiver and has no t breached the plea agreement, we will enforce the waiver if it is valid and if the issue being appealed falls within its scope.” Id. (citation modified); see Smith, 134 F.4th at 257. Upon review of the record and considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Scott knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights. And Scott’s challenge to the reasonablen ess of his sentence and the district cou rt’s sentencing decisions fall squarely within the scope of h is v alid appeal waiver. See United Sta tes v. Copeland, 707 F.3d 522, 529 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that sentencing challenges generally fall within scope of valid appeal waivers). Although Scott’s sentencing claims are barred b y the waiver, his pro se contention that the district court e rred by den ying his motions to w ithdraw and substitute counsel is not barred. See U nited States v. Cohen, 888 F.3d 667, 683 (4th Cir. 201 8); United Sta tes v. Porter, 405 F.3d 11 36, 1141 (10t h Cir. 2005). In determining whether the district co urt abused its discretion in denying a motion to substitute counsel, “we consider (1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the adequacy of the court’s subsequent inquiry; and (3) whether the attorney/client conflict was so great that it had resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense.” United States v. Lamborn, 159 F.4th 230, 240 (4th Cir. 20 25) (citation m odified) (stating standard of review). Provided the

6 district court conducted a thorough inqu iry into a defendant’s dissatisfaction with counsel, we review the district court’s “ factual findings on the breakdown of attorney - client communication for clear error.” Id. at 241; see id. at 240. Scott concedes that the motions to withdraw and substitute counsel were untimely. Regarding the remaining factors, we have reviewed the relevant pleadings and conclude that Scott is not entitled to relief. T he district court did not clearly err in its factual determinations, nor did it abu se its discretion in forgoing an evidentiary hearing and denying the motions for withdrawal and substitution of counsel. See United States v. Smith, 749 F.3d 4 65, 493 (6t h Cir. 201 4). Finally, Scott’s pro se claims of ineffective assistan ce of counsel fall outside the valid waiver’s scope. “But claims of in effective assistance of coun sel may be raised on direct appeal only where the record conclusively establishes ineffective assistance.” United States v. Perry, 92 F.4th 500, 517 (4th Cir.) (citation modified), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2643 (2024); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 - 88, 694 (1984) (providi ng standard). Otherwise, an ineffective assistance claim should be raised, if at all, in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. United States v. Freeman, 24 F.4th 320, 331 (4 th Cir. 202 2) (en banc). Applying these standards, o ur review of the record leads us to conclude that ineffective assistance does no t conclusively appear on the face of the present reco rd. Thus, Scott’s claim s are not cognizable in this d irect appeal. In accordance with Anders, we hav e reviewed the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for appeal that are not barred by the appeal waiver. We therefore grant the Gov ernment’s motion to dismiss in p art and dismiss the app eal as to

7 any issues that fall within th e valid waiver’s scope. We also d eny the motion in part, decline to address Scott’s ineffe ctive assistance of coun sel claims, and affirm as to any issue not encompassed by the waiver. This court requires that counsel in form Scott, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further rev iew. If Scott requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believ es that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may mo ve in this court for leave to w ithdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Scott. We dispense with oral argument becau se the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN P ART