Court Denies LVNV Funding's Motion to Transfer Venue
Summary
The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware denied LVNV Funding, LLC's motion to transfer venue in a civil case. The court found that the factors weighed against transfer, upholding the plaintiff's chosen forum.
What changed
The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware has denied LVNV Funding, LLC's motion to transfer venue to the District of Massachusetts in the case of DeCosta v. Equifax Information Services, LLC, et al. The court applied the Jumara factors for evaluating venue transfer motions and determined that, on balance, the interests of the parties and justice did not support the requested transfer, thus denying the motion.
This decision means the litigation will proceed in the District of Delaware as originally filed. For legal professionals involved in similar cases, this ruling reinforces the deference given to a plaintiff's choice of forum and the high burden a defendant must meet to justify a venue transfer. No immediate compliance actions are required for regulated entities, but it highlights the importance of forum selection in litigation strategy.
Source document (simplified)
IN THE UNITED ST A TES DISTRI CT COUR T FOR THE DISTRICT OF DEL A W ARE STEPHANIE DECOS T A,)) Plaintif f,) v.) C.A. No. 25-1401- JLH) EQUIF AX INFORMA TI ON) SER VICES, LLC, EXPERIAN) INFORMA TION SOLU TIONS,) INC., TRANSUNION, LLC,) BARCLA YS BANK DELA W ARE,) CREDIT ONE BANK, N.A.,) SYNCHRONY BANK, CITIBANK,) N.A., POR TF OLIO RECOVER Y) ASSOCIA TES, LLC, AND L VNV) FUNDING, LLC,)) Defend ants.) MEMORANDUM OR DER Pending before the Court is Defendant L VNV Funding, LLC’ s (“L VNV”) Motion to T ransfer V enue to the District of Massachusetts and Stay Pending Disposition of the T ransfer Motion. (D.I. 48.) The motion has been fully briefed. (D.I. 49, 53, 57.) For the reasons below, the Motion will b e DENIED. 1. Section 1404(a) of T itle 28 provides (in pertinent part) that, “ [f]or the convenience of parties a nd witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In evaluating a motion to transfe r, the Court must first determine whether the case could have been brought in the district to which the movant wishes to transfer. Jumara v. St ate Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 878 (3d Cir. 1995). If so, the Court then c onsiders the non - exclusive list of twelve fac tors set forth in Jumara in determining whether to transfer. Six of those interests are private in nature:
2 [1] plaintif f ’ s forum pr eference as manifested in the original choice; [2] the defendant ’ s pr eferen ce; [3] whet her the claim aro se els ewhere; [4] th e conv enience of the parties as indicated by their rela tive physical and financial condition; [5] the conven ience of t he witn esses — but only to the extent that the witnesses may actually be unavailable f or trial in one of the fora; and [6] the location of boo ks and records (similarly limited to the extent that the files could not be produced in the alternat ive fo rum). Id. at 879 (inter nal citations omitted). The othe r six are public in nature: [7] the enforceability of the judgment; [8] practical considerations that could make the trial ea sy, expeditious, or ine xpensive; [9] the relative administrative dif ficulty in the two fora resulting from court congestion; [10] the local interest in d ecidin g local controversies at home; [1 1] the public po licies of the fora; and [12] the familiar ity of the trial ju dge with the ap plicable state la w in diversity c ases. Id. at 879 – 80 (inter nal citations omitted). Factor [1] is usually given “pa ramount consideration.” Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970); see also Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879 (explaining that the plaintiff ’ s choice of venu e “should not be lightly di sturbed”) (citations omitted). 2. A defendant bears a heavy burden to estab lish that thes e interests weigh in favor of transfer. “[U]nles s the balance of co nvenien ce o f the part ies is str ongly i n favor of [the] defendant[s], the plaintiff 's choice of forum should prevail. ” Applied Pr edict ive T ech., In c. v. MarketDi al, In c., No. 18 - 963- CFC, 2019 WL 2745 724, at * 1 (D. Del. Jul. 1, 2019) (quoting Shutte, 431 F.2d at 25) (emph asis and alt eration in original) (internal q uotation marks omitted). 3. The parties do not dispute that t his action could have been brought in t he District of Massach uset ts. 1 (D.I. 49 at 7–8; D.I. 53.) 4. T urning to the Jumara factors, I’ve considered each one and find that, on balance, they weigh against t ransfer. Factor [1] weighs against transfer. 1 Plaintiff does not addr ess this st ep at all in her response.
3 5. Factor [2] I c onsider neutral, as Defend ant L VNV seeks transf er, Defendan t Barclay s do es not consent t o transfer, and t he remaining defendants either don’ t oppose or app ear to take no position. 2 Fact or [3] is neutral at best, as the claim s arise with the business practices of each defen dant, an d each defendan t is al leged to be or ganized under the laws of either Delaware or anoth er state t hat’ s not Mas sachuset ts. (Se e D.I. 1 ¶¶ 20–43.) Factor [4] slightly fav ors transfer; i t’ s undeniable Massachusetts is a more convenient forum for Plaintiff beca use she r esid es th ere. The conven ience o f th e defend ants, how ever, is ne utral because they would have to expend roughly the sam e amount of reso urces to litigate in Massach usetts as they w ould in Delaware — with the exceptio n of B arclay s, who would arguably have to expend more to litigate in Massachus etts t han it would to litigate in Delaware. 6. Factor s [5], [6 ], [7 ], and [8] are all n eutr al, as neith er p arty h as ident ified wit ness es or discovery that would not be availa ble in Delaware; the enforceability of the judgment would b e the same regardless of forum; and the only pr actical considerations Defendant points to ar e that of hypothetical witness es and records i t argues are l ocat ed in Mas sachu setts. 3 7. While F actor s [9] and [10] do favor transfer, Factor [1 1] is neutral. L astly, Factor [12] is inapplicable and therefore neutral. 8. W ith onl y three of the Jumara factors pot entially favoring trans fer, I find that Defend ant has f ailed to meet its heavy burden of establishing that t he balance o f conv eni ence is “strongly” in favor of transfer. The motion to tr ansfer is therefore DENIE D. 2 Ac cording to L VNV, Defendants Experian, Synchrony, Citi bank, Credit One, and Portfolio Recovery Asso ciates do not oppose transfer, and Defendants Equifax and T ransUnion have not stated their position. 3 L V NV avers, in somewhat conclusory fashion, that witnesses like ly to have infor mation releva nt to Plaintif f ’ s claims for da mages are likely to reside in Massachusetts and w ould therefore be beyond the subpoena power of th is Court, favoring transfer. Even if true, th e majority of witnesses are likely to b e emp loyees o f the d efendan t comp anies.
4 9. The motion to stay pending disposition of the motion to transfer is DENIED as moot. Dated: February 25, 2026 _________________________________ T he H onor a bl e J e nni f e r L. H a l l UNI T E D S T A T E S DI S T R I C T J UDGE
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