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Feb. 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Shatosha Anderson v. Illinois Department of Employment Security

District Court, N.D. Illinois

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:23-cv-04097

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (24)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (18.2K)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

Shatosha Anderson,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:23-cv-04097

v.

Judge Mary M. Rowland

Illinois Department of Employment

Security,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Shatosa1 Anderson (“Anderson”) brings this action against Defendant
Illinois Department of Employment Security (“IDES”) for retaliating against her in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000 (e) et seq. (“Title
VII”) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. (the
“ADEA”). IDES has moved for summary judgement on all claims. For the reasons
stated below, IDES’ motion for summary judgment [56] is granted.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty

1The correct spelling of Anderson’s first name is “Shatosha.” [65-1].

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive law controls which facts are
material. Id. After a “properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the
adverse party ‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.’” Id. at 250 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

The Court “consider[s] all of the evidence in the record in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, and [ ] draw[s] all reasonable inferences from that evidence
in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Logan v. City of Chicago, 4 F.4th
529, 536 (7th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). The Court “must refrain from making
credibility determinations or weighing evidence.” Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 467 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). In ruling on

summary judgment, the Court gives the non-moving party “the benefit of reasonable
inferences from the evidence, but not speculative inferences in [its] favor.” White v.
City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). “The
controlling question is whether a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the
non-moving party on the evidence submitted in support of and opposition to the
motion for summary judgment.” Id. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background2

Anderson has been employed as an Auditor II with IDES since before 2021. [58] ¶
2. As an Auditor II, Anderson is responsible for conducting audits on Illinois

2The facts are taken from IDES’ Rule 56.1 statement [58] and are undisputed unless
otherwise noted.

employers that are assigned to her. Id. ¶ 3. Anderson reports to audit field manager
Nick Frega (“Frega”). Id. ¶ 7. Frega’s primary duty is to supervise the auditors on his
team and assign those auditors audits as he receives them. Id. Frega’s supervisor is

Alexander Hogdahl (“Hogdahl”). Id. ¶ 9. Hogdahl oversees the audit program for
IDES, supervises IDES field audit managers, and sets policies designed to ensure
that IDES can meet audit goals set by the Department of Labor. Id. Anderson is part
of IDES’ unionized workforce (“Union”), and thus the terms and conditions of her
employment are covered by a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). Id. ¶¶ 2, 14.

IDES requires Auditor IIs to meet three quantitative standard objectives: (1)
complete 76 audits per year (19 per quarter), (2) complete 95% of their assigned audits

within 120 days, and (3) have 10% or less of their submitted audits returned to them
for corrections. Id. ¶ 6. Though the parties disagree on whether these quantitative
standard objectives were properly promulgated under the CBA and whether
employees could be disciplined for failing to meet these objectives, [64] ¶ 6, it is
undisputed that the objectives are measured at the end of an employee’s 12-month
evaluation period, which commences on the anniversary of each employee’s date of

hire. [58] ¶ 6. As a result, not all Auditor IIs have the same annual evaluation period.
Id. Before 2025, Anderson’s annual review period ran from June 1 through May 31.
Id. ¶ 26.

If an Auditor II fails to meet their performance objectives, their supervisor can
initiate a corrective action plan (“CAP”). Id. ¶ 10. The CAP is implemented to assist
an employee and is not meant to be punitive. Id. In addition, a supervisor can utilize
quarterly evaluations with an auditor struggling with performance issues before
and/or during a CAP time period. Id. If after a CAP, or after poor quarterly or annual
evaluations, an auditor’s work performance does not improve, the supervisor can

refer the auditor to IDES’ Labor Relations Department (“Labor Relations”) for
discipline. Id. ¶¶ 11, 18.

Upon receiving a referral, Labor Relations, if warranted, opens a case and
commences its own investigation. Id. ¶ 18. This includes collecting relevant
documents, such as performance documents or time sheets, and conducting a pre-
disciplinary meeting with a member of Labor Relations, the manager or supervisor of
the auditor, the auditor, and a Union representative. Id. ¶¶ 18–19. Labor Relations

then presents the case to Laron Cole (“Cole”), the Chief Labor Relations Manager for
IDES. Id. ¶¶ 17, 19. Cole thereafter evaluates based on the facts before him whether
discipline is warranted. Id. ¶¶ 19–20.

On May 19, 2021, Anderson filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (the “EEOC”) a charge of discrimination against IDES (the “May 2021
EEOC Charge”) alleging discrimination based on race, age, sex, and retaliation for

engaging in protected activity. Id. ¶ 22. On July 19, 2021, the EEOC dismissed
Anderson’s charge and issued a Notice of Right to Sue letter. Id. ¶ 23. No response to
the May 2021 EEOC Charge was ever required from IDES. Id.

Anderson did not meet the three quantitative standard objectives in her 2021
annual evaluation. Id. ¶27. As a result, Frega placed Anderson on a 90-day CAP that
commenced on July 14, 2021, id. ¶¶ 28, 29, and in October 2021 instituted quarterly,
rather annual, performance reviews. Id. ¶ 31. Despite the monitoring and CAP,
Anderson failed to meet any of the three quantitative standard objectives for Auditor
IIs during her 2022 annual evaluation period. Id. ¶ 32.

Around September of 2022, Frega and Hogdahl referred Anderson to Labor
Relations for discipline related to her poor performance. Id. ¶ 34. Labor Relations
held a pre-disciplinary meeting with Anderson, her Union representative, and Frega
on October 28, 2022. Id. ¶ 35. Anderson submitted a written rebuttal to the charges
against her. Id. ¶ 36. After reviewing all the information presented, Cole determined
that the referral to him for discipline was warranted. Id. IDES thereafter issued
discipline to Anderson in the form of a one-day suspension without pay that

commenced on November 29, 2022 (the “November 2022 Suspension”). Id. ¶ 38. At
the time of this suspension, neither Cole, Frega, nor Hogdahl knew that Anderson
had filed her May 2021 EEOC Charge. Id. ¶¶ 24, 37.

Anderson failed again to meet her performance objectives in the December 2022
to February 2023 quarter. Id. ¶ 49. As a result, on March 2, 2023, Frega and Hogdahl
again referred Anderson to Labor Relations for discipline Id. ¶ 45.

Four days later, on March 6, 2023, Anderson filed a second charge with the EEOC
(the “March 2023 EEOC Charge”) alleging that her November 2022 Suspension was
discriminatory and in retaliation for engaging in protected activity. Id. ¶ 40. IDES,
through its Employment Opportunity (“EO”) Officer, was notified of the March 2023
EEOC Charge on March 9, 2023. Id. Hogdahl was informed of the March 2023 EEOC
Charge that same day, and Cole was made aware of the March 2023 EEOC Charge
the next day. Id. ¶¶ 41, 42. Frega, however, did not learn of the March 2023 EEOC
Charge until the winter of 2024. Id. ¶ 43.

Following the March 2, 2023 referral of Anderson for possible discipline, a pre-

disciplinary meeting was held on March 27, 2023, at which Anderson, her Union
representative, and Frega were present. Id. ¶ 46. Anderson submitted a written
rebuttal to the charges against her, to which Frega responded. Id. After reviewing all
the information presented, Cole determined that a five-day suspension without pay
was appropriate. Id. ¶ 47. IDES thereafter issued discipline to Anderson in the form
of a five-day suspension without pay that commenced on April 20, 2023 (the “April
2023 Suspension”). Id. ¶ 48.

Anderson again failed to meet her performance objectives in her June 2023 to
August 2023 quarterly review. Id. ¶ 50. Instead of another disciplinary action, Labor
Relations recommended that Anderson be placed on a second 90-day CAP. Id. ¶ 52.
The second CAP commenced on September 5, 2023. Id.

Despite the second CAP, Anderson did not meet her CAP objectives nor two of the
three quantitative standard objectives in her September 2023 to November 2023

quarterly review. Id. ¶¶ 67–68. In January 2024, Anderson was again referred to
Labor Relations for unsatisfactory work performance. Id. ¶ 63. Labor Relations held
a pre-disciplinary meeting on January 22, 2024, that Anderson, her Union
representative, and Frega attended. Id. Anderson submitted a written rebuttal to the
charges against her, to which Frega responded. Id. ¶ 64. After reviewing all the
information presented, Cole determined a ten-day suspension without pay was
warranted. Id. ¶ 65. IDES thereafter issued discipline to Anderson in the form of a
ten-day suspension without pay that commenced on February 14, 2024 (the
“February 2024 Suspension”). Id. ¶ 66.

Anderson failed to meet any of the three quantitative standard objectives in her
December 2023 to February 2024 quarterly review and 2024 annual review, id. ¶¶
70, 73, 79, and two of the three objectives in her March 2024 to May 2024 quarterly
review. Id. ¶ 72. After Anderson again failed to meet the objectives in her June 2024
to August 2024 quarterly review, Anderson was referred to Labor Relations for
unsatisfactory work performance. Id. ¶ 75. Labor Relations held a pre-disciplinary
meeting on August 22, 2024, at which Anderson, her Union representative, and Frega

were present. Id. ¶ 76. After a review of all information presented, Cole determined
that a twelve-day suspension without pay was warranted. Id. ¶¶ 77–78. IDES
thereafter issued discipline to Anderson in the form of a twelve-day suspension
without pay that commenced on September 30, 2024 (the “September 2024
Suspension”). Id. ¶ 78.

B. Procedural Background

Anderson filed her original complaint in this matter on June 26, 2023. [1]. In
response to IDES’ motion to dismiss the original complaint [9], Anderson filed her
operative First Amended Complaint on October 5, 2023. [14]. The First Amended
Complaint alleges age discrimination in violation of the ADEA (Count I), retaliation
for filing EEOC charges in violation of the ADEA (Count II), race discrimination in
violation of Title VII (Count III), gender discrimination in violation of Title VII (Count
IV), and retaliation for filing EEOC charges in violation of Title VII (Count V). Id. ¶¶
22–55. The First Amended Complaint identifies only the November 2022 and April
2023 Suspensions as a basis for Anderson’s retaliation claims. Id. ¶¶ 12, 16, 30, 50,

1. 
   On November 9, 2023, IDES moved to dismiss all counts in the First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), and in the alternative, to dismiss the retaliation claims under Rule 12(c) for failure to exhaust. [20]. This Court partially granted IDES’ motion on September 10, 2024, dismissing Anderson’s discrimination claims (Counts I, III, and IV) but allowing her retaliation claims to proceed (Counts II and V). [27] [28].
   

Fact discovery closed on May 16, 2025. [45]. Six days later, Anderson filed a motion
to reopen discovery and compel IDES to produce certain documents, including the
unredacted names of Auditor IIs supervised by Hogdahl as well as quality and
timeliness metrics for those Auditor IIs on a quarterly and annual basis. [46] at 6.
Anderson maintained in her motion to compel that Hogdahl was the ultimate
“decision maker” regarding her suspensions, so consequently all the Auditor II’s

under his supervision were similarly situated individuals for purposes of a
comparison analysis. Id.

On May 22, 2025, the Court denied Anderson’s motion to compel as to the quality
and timeliness metrics. [47]. The Court, however, allowed the parties to submit
information for the Court to determine whether Hogdahl was indeed the ultimate
decision-maker with respect to Anderson’s discipline. Id.

On June 20, 2025, the parties submitted a status report with relevant deposition
transcripts attached. [49] [50] [51] [52]. Upon reviewing the transcripts provided, the
Court was unable to find evidence that the ultimate decision to refer Anderson to

Labor Relations for discipline was Hoghdal’s alone. [55] at 3. Instead, it appeared to
have been a mutual decision between both Hoghdal and Frega. Id. For this reason,
the Court denied Anderson’s motion to compel the redacted names of all Auditor IIs
under Hoghdal’s supervision, agreeing with IDES that appropriate comparators are
Auditor IIs that also have Frega as their supervisor. Id.

On July 18, 2025, IDES moved for summary judgment on Anderson’s remaining
claims. [56].

                       ANALYSIS                                      

To survive summary judgment on a retaliation claim under Title VII or the
ADEA3, a plaintiff must produce evidence from which a reasonable juror could find
that (1) she engaged in a statutorily protected activity, (2) her employer took a
materially adverse action against her, and (3) there was a causal connection between
the two. Adebiyi v. S. Suburban Coll., 98 F.4th 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2024). The evidence

presented must be considered “as a whole” to determine if a causal link exists. Lesiv
v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 39 F.4th 903, 911 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing Ortiz v. Werner
Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016)). “Ultimately, the inquiry comes
down to one question: ‘Does the record contain sufficient evidence to permit a

3The analysis for retaliation claims under Title VII and the ADEA is the same. Kuhn
v. United Airlines, 63 F. Supp. 3d 796, 801 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (citing cases).
reasonable fact finder to conclude that retaliatory motive caused’ the materially
adverse action?” Id. (quoting Lord v. High Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2016)).

IDES does not dispute the first two elements of Anderson’s retaliation claims. [57]
at 7. IDES instead focuses on causation, contending that Anderson cannot show any
causal link between her EEOC charge filings (the “protected activities”) and any of
her suspensions (the “adverse actions”). Id. IDES maintains that the overwhelming
evidence shows that it was Anderson’s poor performance that led to her suspensions. Id. at 7–11. Anderson does not dispute that she continually failed to meet her
performance goals from 2021 through her 2024 suspensions. [64] ¶ 27 (annual review

ending in May 2021); ¶ 32 (annual review ending in May 2022); ¶ 39 (quarter ending
in August 2022); ¶ 49 (quarter ending in February 2023); ¶ 50 (quarter ending August
2023); ¶ 51 (quarter ending November 2023); ¶ 70 (quarter ending in February 2024);
¶ 72 (quarter ending in May 2024); ¶ 73 (annual review ending in May 2024); and ¶
75 (quarter ending August 2024). Anderson instead spotlights other evidence she
believes permits a reasonable inference that she was suspended due to her EEOC

charge filings. As will be explained below, the Court disagrees that Anderson’s
proffered evidence, individually or as a whole, supports a reasonable inference of a
retaliatory motive by IDES.

Before proceeding, however, the Court addresses upfront an important and
potentially dispositive point. The operative First Amended Complaint only contains
allegations related to Anderson’s November 2022 and April 2023 Suspensions. [14].
Anderson’s February and September 2024 Suspensions are not mentioned. On
summary judgment, Anderson cannot add new factual bases to support her
retaliation claims that were not presented in her complaint. Whitaker v. Milwaukee

Cty., Wisc., 732 F.3d 802, 808 (7th Cir. 2014). Because Anderson only opposes
summary judgment on her February 2024 and September 2024 Suspensions, [66] at
9–13, summary judgment appears4 appropriate based on Anderson’s non-opposition
alone.

Nevertheless, because the parties included the February and September 2024
Suspensions within the scope of their discovery and summary judgment briefing, and
because deciding summary judgment on the February and September 2024

Suspensions will inform whether amendment to Anderson’s First Amendment
Complaint would be futile, the Court addresses those suspensions in its analysis.
I. Deviation from Policy

Anderson first posits that IDES’ failure to follow its own policies gives rise to an
inference that her EEOC charges were a motivating factor for her suspensions. [66]
at 10. “Significant, unexplained or systematic deviations from established policies or
practices can no doubt be relative and probative circumstantial evidence of unlawful
intent.” Hobgood v. Illinois Gaming Bd., 731 F.3d 635, 645 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing
Hanners v. Trent, 674 F.3d 683, 694 (7th Cir. 2012). An employer, however, is not

4Even though Anderson does not oppose summary judgment based on her November
2022 and April 2023 Suspensions, the Court recognizes that IDES, as the movant,
still must show that it is entitled to summary judgment given the undisputed facts.
Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021).

required to “rigidly adhere to procedural guidelines in order to avoid an inference of
retaliation.” Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 969 (7th Cir. 2012). Instead, “we
look for pretext in the form of ‘a dishonest explanation, a lie rather than an oddity or

an error.’” Id. (quoting Kulumani v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass’n, 224 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir.2000)). “[W]hen independent surrounding circumstances indicate that the
employee’s performance was seriously deficient and worthy of disciplinary action, a
procedural abnormality will not suffice to establish a retaliatory motive.” Id. Anderson points to two policies that IDES purportedly deviated from. The first is
a requirement in the CBA and IDES’ Procedures Manual related to “reasonable
workload standards.” [65-3]; [65-1] at Ex. A. Both documents state that “where such

standards of productivity measurements exist, they shall be reduced in writing, with
copies to the employees and the Union.” Id. The creation of or any changes to such
standards, the documents explain, must be “discussed with the Union prior to
implementation.” Id. Anderson maintains that IDES never had a written workload
standard that was discussed with and sent to the Union. [65-1] ¶ 5. As a result,
Anderson argues, IDES was never permitted, under its policies, to take disciplinary

actions against her for failing to meet workload standards. Id.; [66] at 10. IDES
contests this, asserting that it was not required to obtain Union authorization for the
three quantitative standard objectives that Anderson continually failed to meet. [68-
1] ¶¶ 6–7.

While there is certainly a factual dispute as to whether the three quantitative
standard objectives are considered “reasonable workload standards” under the CBA
and IDES’ Procedures Manual, the Court agrees with IDES: why is this relevant?
Even if the authorization process required by the CBA and Procedures Manual were
applicable here, Anderson fails to explain why failing to follow that process leads to

an inference that IDES suspended her in retaliation for her filing EEOC charges. See
Smith v. Chicago Transit Auth., 806 F.3d 900, 907 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Smith hasn’t
explained why these [procedural] infirmities … support an inference of
discriminatory intent.”). The procedural deviation she presents—failing to negotiate
with the Union and issue workload standards in writing—would affect every Auditor
II at IDES equally. In other words, even if the three quantitative standard objectives
were improperly issued, they were uniformly improper, as Anderson admits that all

Auditor IIs were subject to these same objectives. [64] ¶ 6. Anderson provides no
evidence that she was somehow singled out under these purportedly improperly
promulgated objectives. A procedural violation that uniformly affects all Auditor IIs,
without anything more, is not enough to permit a reasonable jury to infer any
retaliatory intent by IDES. See Walker v. Abbott Laboratories, 416 F.3d 641, 644 (7th
Cir.2005) (“A plaintiff cannot be permitted to manufacture a case merely by showing

that the employer does not follow its employment rules with Prussian rigidity.”).
Anderson also points to the CBA’s requirement related to employee absences. [65-
1] ¶ 45; [65-4]. Specifically, the CBA provides that “an employee’s authorized absence
shall not be detrimental in any way to the employee’s record, nor will the employee
be disciplined or counseled for work unable to be completed based on the employee’s
authorized absence.” [65-4]. Anderson maintains that under this policy, she was not
permitted to be disciplined for work that she was unable to complete during leave.
[66] at 10. Anderson contends that, despite this policy, IDES considered employer-
contact gaps5 that occurred when she was on leave. [65] ¶ 22. IDES counters that it

appropriately considers leave when issuing discipline. [68-1] ¶ 9.

Again, while there is a factual dispute as to whether IDES appropriately
considered Anderson’s leave when determining the number of employer-contact gaps,
Anderson fails to explain how one can infer from this that IDES suspended her in
retaliation for her filing EEOC charges. Smith, 806 F.3d at 907 Even if IDES
mistakenly calculated one of various factors when deciding to suspend her, Anderson
offers no evidence to suggest that IDES lied about the number of her employer-contact

gaps. And Anderson openly admits that she did not meet the other, non-employer-
contact objectives (i.e., the three quantitative standard objectives) that led to her
suspensions. Id. ¶¶ 38-39, 48-49, 67-68, 74, 78-79. Because the “independent
surrounding circumstances indicate that [Anderson’s] performance was seriously
deficient and worthy of disciplinary action” a “procedural abnormality will not suffice
to establish a retaliatory motive.” Kidwell, 679 F.3d at 969.

II. More Favorable Treatment of Similarly Situated Individuals

Anderson next points to purported evidence that other Auditor II’s were treated
more favorably than her. [66] at 12. Evidence that a similarly situated employee who
did not engage in protected conduct was treated differently can create an inference of

5In addition to the three quantitative standard objectives, IDES requires auditors to
contact employers under audit every 15 business days while an audit is active. [58] ¶
48.

retaliatory intent. Lesiv, 39 F.4th at 918. Although proper comparators need not be
identically positioned, “similarly situated employees must be ‘directly comparable’ to
the plaintiff ‘in all material respects.’” Igasaki v. Illinois Dep’t of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 948, 958 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Patterson v. Indiana Newspapers, Inc., 589
F.3d 357, 365–66 (7th Cir. 2009)). “In a case challenging disciplinary action, the
plaintiff and comparator ordinarily must have dealt with the same supervisor, been
subject to the same standards, and have engaged in similar conduct without such
differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the
employer’s treatment of them.’” Lesiv, 39 F.4th at 919 (cleaned up).

Anderson’s assertions on this point are a rehash of the arguments she presented

on her motion to compel. [66] at n.1. As noted, in denying that motion, this Court
explained that the record did not provide evidence that the ultimate decision to refer
Anderson to Labor Relations was Hogdahl’s alone [55] at 3. The evidence instead
showed that it was a mutual decision between both Frega and Hoghdal. Id. Anderson provides no new evidence warranting reconsideration of this Court’s
previous determination. The facts still demonstrate that Frega was Anderson’s direct

supervisor and was intimately involved in her review and disciplinary processes. [64]
¶¶ 7, 12, 13, 27–31, 34–35, 45–46, 50–52, 54–58, 62–64, 69, 75, 76. The relevant
comparators, therefore, would be Auditor II’s that were under Frega’s supervision.
Yet Anderson has not pointed to any specific Auditor II under Frega’s supervision
that was treated more favorably than her.

Even if the Court expanded the universe of similarly situated employees to all
Auditor IIs, Anderson’s evidence is lacking. Anderson relies exclusively on
spreadsheets indicating that certain Auditor IIs completed fewer than 19 quarterly

or 76 annual audits, and often considerably less audits than her. [65] ¶¶ 12–14 (citing
[52]). But quarterly comparisons across Auditor IIs in the spreadsheets are
meaningless because annual completion totals are what drive performance reviews.
[64] ¶ 59. And annual comparisons across Auditor IIs in the spreadsheets are
similarly flawed as review periods are staggered by start date, and Anderson provides
no evidence that any of the auditors in the spreadsheets shared her start date. Id. ¶
6. Moreover, the spreadsheets only show variances in one of the three quantitative

standard objectives on which Anderson was reviewed—the number of audits
completed. [52]. Anderson provides no evidence that the Auditor IIs in the
spreadsheets also failed to meet the other two quantitative standard objectives that
Anderson repeatedly failed to meet.

In sum, without a valid comparator, no reasonable jury could infer that a
retaliatory motive caused Anderson’s suspensions.

III. Suspicious Timing

Anderson lastly asserts that the suspicious timing between her EEOC charges
and suspensions creates an inference of retaliatory intent. [66] at 11. “Temporal
proximity between protected activity and an adverse employment action can support
an inference of causation between the two.” Jokich v. Rush Univ. Med. Cent., 42 F.4th
626, 634 (7th Cir. 2022). “Suspicious timing alone, however, is generally insufficient
to establish a retaliatory motivation.” Id. “[F]or a suspicious-timing argument alone
to give rise to an inference of causation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that ‘an
adverse employment action follows close on the heels of protected expression, and the

plaintiff must show that the person who decided to impose the adverse action knew
of the protected conduct.’” Kidwell, 679 F.3d at 966 (citing Lalvani v. Cook Cnty., 269
F.3d 785, 790 (7th Cir.2001)).

Anderson was first suspended in November 2022. The only EEOC charge that
occurred before that suspension was her May 2021 EEOC Charge. But IDES
employees involved in Anderson’s discipline—Frega, Hogdahl, and Cole—had no
knowledge of the May 2021 EEOC Charge before the November 2022 Suspension.

[64] ¶¶ 24, 37. Without such knowledge, no reasonable jury can infer retaliatory
intent. Lesiv, 39 F.4th at 915 (“Knowledge of the protected activity is necessary to
show causation for a retaliation claim.”).

Anderson’s next suspension occurred in April 2023. Her May 2021 and March
2023 EEOC Charges both occurred before that suspension. The nearly two-year gap
between Anderson’s May 2021 EEOC Charge and the April 2023 Suspension is too

attenuated to infer any retaliatory intent. Igasaki, 988 F.3d at 959 (“[f]or an inference
of causation to be drawn solely on the basis of a suspicious-timing argument, we
typically allow no more than a few days to elapse between the protected activity and
the adverse action.”) (citing Kidwell, 679 F.3d at 966). The March 2023 EEOC Charge
is certainly temporally closer to the April 2023 Suspension. But Frega had no
knowledge of the March 2023 EEOC Charge before the April 2023 Suspension. [58] ¶
43. And although Hogdahl and Cole knew of the charge, the disciplinary proceedings
underlying the April 2023 Suspension were initiated prior to the filing of the March
2023 EEOC Charge. Id. ¶¶ 40, 45. Given this timing, no reasonable jury could find

that Anderson’s March 2023 EEOC Charge was the “but for” cause of her April 2023
Suspension. See Howell v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Illinois, No. 00 C 3402, 2001 WL
740513, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2001) (finding no casual connection where “the
disciplinary proceedings leading to the suspension decision began before Howell filed
her discrimination charges.”) (emphasis in the original).

Anderson’s final two suspensions occurred in February and September of 2024.
Her May 2021 and March 2023 EEOC Charges both occurred before these

suspensions. The roughly three-year gaps between the May 2021 EEOC Charge and
the February and September 2024 Suspensions are too attenuated for a reasonable
jury infer retaliatory intent. Igasaki, 988 F.3d at 959. The 11- and 18-month gaps
between the March 2023 EEOC Charge and February and September 2024
Suspension are likewise too attenuated. Id.

Anderson nevertheless attempts to explain away these large time gaps by

claiming that, beginning after the March 2023 EEOC Charge, IDES “sandbagged”
her “with a flurry of complex audits to ensure that she would not be able to meet her
quantity quota.” [66] at 11. Anderson further posits that, once she started to catch up
to her workload, IDES forced her “to slow her progress by dictating to her that she
only schedule one audit per day” and prevented her “from completing audits that were
nearly finished so that she could [not] meet her quotas by forcing her to first work on
new, more complex audits.” Id. at 12. Even if true, the Court agrees with IDES that
this would not lead to an inference of retaliatory intent. The supervisor who assigned
Anderson audits and who interfaced with her performance goals was Frega. [64] ¶¶

7, 8; [65-1] ¶¶ 22–24, 27–28, 30, 34, 36. But Frega could not have had a retaliatory
intent since he did not learn of Anderson’s EEOC charges until the winter of 2024,
well after the February and September 2024 Suspensions occurred. [64] ¶ 24; Lesiv,
39 F.4th at 915–16 (“A supervisor simply cannot retaliate against an employee for
engaging in protected activity if the supervisor was not aware of the protected activity
in the first place.”). And while Anderson attempts to resist this conclusion through
self-serving6 testimony that Hogdahl (who did know of the March 2023 EEOC

Charge) directed Frega to mandate that she complete specific audits, [65-1] ¶ 9,
missing from this is any indication on when Hogdahl’s instructions occurred or the
specific audits were assigned. Without such details, the bridge from Hogdahl’s ability
to tell Frega which audits to assign to Anderson to a scheme by Hogdahl to rig all
audits that Frega assigned to Anderson so as to cause Anderson’s performance to
suffer because she filed the March 2023 EEOC Charge is far too speculative. Flowers

6“Self-serving statements contained in an affidavit will not defeat a motion for
summary judgment when those statements are without factual support in the
record.” Buie v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., 366 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir.2004) (cleaned up).
Additionally, a party cannot “create an issue of fact by submitting an affidavit whose
conclusions contradict prior deposition or other sworn testimony.” Holloway v. Del.
Cnty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1075 (7th Cir.2012). The notion that Hogdahl could force
Frega to assign more complex audits to Anderson is contradicted by Anderson’s own
statement that it is impossible to know before an audit is undertaken whether it will
be complex or simple. [58-3] at 76:1-3 (“So the nature of auditing is that you don’t
know what type of audit it is until you actually start the audit.”).

v. Kia Motors Fin., 105 F.4th 939, 946 (7th Cir. 2024) (“Speculation cannot create a
genuine issue of fact that defeats summary judgment.”).

In sum, none of the suspensions that Anderson identifies followed close on the

heels of her EEOC charges so as to create an inference of retaliatory intent.
IV. Evidence as a Whole

Stepping back and viewing the evidence as a whole in the light most favorable to
Anderson, there are no facts or inferences that would permit a reasonable jury to find
that Anderson was suspended in retaliation for her filing EEOC charges. Again,
Anderson admits that she continuously failed to meet her performance objectives
from 2021 through her 2024 suspensions. [64] ¶¶ 27, 32, 39, 49, 50, 51, 70, 72, 73, 75.
This includes specific performance deficiencies underlying her November 2022
Suspension, id. ¶¶ 38-39, her April 2023 Suspension, id. ¶¶ 48-49, her February 2024
Suspension, id. ¶¶ 67-68, and her September 2024 Suspension. Id. ¶¶ 74, 78-79.
Anderson presents no evidence suggesting any lie behind IDES’ determination that
these performance failings warranted discipline. Nor can any retaliatory animus be
inferred from IDES’ alleged deviations from its policies, similarly situated employees

who were treated more favorably, or the timing between the EEOC charges and her
suspensions. Supra §§ I–III.

While the Court acknowledges Anderson’s belief that she was treated unfairly by
IDES during her disciplinary processes, the legal question that must be addressed “is
not whether [IDES’] stated reason was inaccurate or unfair, but whether [IDES]
honestly believed the reason it has offered to explain the discharge.” O’Leary v.
Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 635 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Adebiyi, 98 F.4th at
893 (“it is not the court’s concern that an employer may be wrong about its employee’s
performance, or be too hard on its employee. Rather, the only question is whether the
employer’s proffered reason was ... a lie.”) (citation omitted). And here, Anderson has
provided no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that IDES’ true motive
for suspending her was in retribution for her filing EEOC charges.
CONCLUSION
For the stated reasons, IDES’ motion for summary judgment [56] is granted. The
Clerk is directed change the case caption to reflect that Anderson’s first name is
spelled “Shatosha,” enter judgment in IDES’ favor and against Anderson, and
terminate the case.

                                    ENTER: 

Dated: February 13, 2026 Marg [Vi bo L/
“MARYM.ROWLAND
United States District Judge

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