Erick Pollard Criminal Appeal Affirmed, Dismissed, Remanded

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF AP PEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 25 - 4362 UNITED ST ATES OF AMER ICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. ERICK L EMAR POLL ARD, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Co urt for the Middle District of No rth Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, Chief District Jud ge. (1:24 - cr - 00352 - CCE -6) Submitted: February 19, 202 6 Decided: February 23, 2026 Before WYNN and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed in part, affirmed in p art, and remanded by un publishe d per curiam opinion. ON BRIEF: Eugene Ernest Lester III, LESTER LAW, Greensboro, North Carolin a, for Appellant. Ju lie Carol Niem e ier, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolin a, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding p recedent in this circuit.

2 PER CURIAM: Erick Lemar Pollard pled g uilty, pursuant to a written plea agreemen t, to conspiracy to distribute 40 grams or more of fentanyl, 50 g rams or more of methamphetamine, and a quantity of cocaine hydrochloride, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B), 846. The district court sentenced him to 180 months’ imp risonment. On appeal, Pollard’s counsel has filed a b rief pursuant to Anders v. Californ ia, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating th at there are no meritorious grounds fo r appeal but questioning whether Pollard’s guilty plea was knowing ly and voluntarily entered, and whether his sentence is reasonable. Although n otified o f h is right to do so, Pollard has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. The Government has moved to dismiss the appeal as barred by Pollard’s waiver of the right to appeal included in the plea agreement. W e dismiss in part, affirm in part, and remand with instructions to amend the written judgment. Initially, Pollard’s appeal waiver does not prev ent him from raising a colorable challenge to the validity of his guilty plea. See United States v. McCoy, 895 F.3d 358, 364 (4th Cir. 2018) (a nalyzing validity of Fed. R. C rim. P. 11 hearing despite waiver). Before accepting a guilty plea, the district co urt must conduct a colloqu y in which it informs the defendant of, and determines that he understands, the nature of the charges to which he is pleading guilty, any mandatory minimum penalty, the max imum penalty he faces, and th e rights he is relinquish ing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. C rim. P. 11(b)(1); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 11 4, 116 (4th C ir. 1991). The court also must ensure tha t the defendant’s plea is volu ntary and supported by an independent factual basis. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), (3). Because Pollard did not move to withdraw his p lea or otherwise object

3 during the plea hearing, we review th e validity of his plea for plain error. Un ited States v. Sanya, 774 F. 3d 812, 815 (4t h Cir. 2014). Based on our review of th e record, we conclude that Pollard’s guilty plea w as knowing, voluntar y, and sup ported by an a dequate factual basis. We therefore conclude that Po llard’s guilty plea is valid. Next, “w e review an appellate waiver de novo to determine its enforceability” an d “will enforce the waiver if it is valid and if the issue being appealed falls within its scope.” United States v. Carter, 87 F.4th 217, 223 - 24 (4th Cir. 202 3) (citation modified). “An appellate waiver is valid if the defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed to it.” Id. at 224 (citation modified). To determin e whether a waiver is know ing and voluntary, “we look to the totality of the circumstances, including th e defendant’s experience, conduct, educational background and kno wledge of his plea agreemen t and its terms.” Id. “When a district court questions a defen dant during a Rule 11 hearing regarding an appeal waiver and the record shows that the defendant understood the import of his concessions, we generally will hold that the waiver is valid.” United States v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603, 608 (4th Cir. 2021). Our review of the record confirms that Pollard knowingly a nd voluntar ily waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, with limited exceptions not applicable here. In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case. The sentencing challenges raised by A nders counsel fall squarely within the valid w aiver’s scope, and we have found no meritorious grounds for appeal outside the waiver’s scope. We therefore grant the Government’s mo tion to dismiss in part and dismiss the appeal as to all issues covered by the waiver. We otherwise affirm. However, w e remand with

4 instructions to amend the written judgment to reflect that Pollard pled guilty to conspiring to distribute 40 grams or more of fen tanyl, 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, and a quantity of cocaine hydrochloride. * This court requires that counsel inform Pollard, in writing, of th e right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Pollard requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that su ch a petition would be frivolous, th en counsel may move in this court for l eave to withdraw from representatio n. Counsel’s motion must st ate that a copy thereof was served on Po llard. We dispense with oral argumen t because th e facts and legal contentions are adeq uately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the d ecisional process. DISMISSED IN P ART, AFFIRMED IN PART, AND REMAND ED * Presently, the written judgment lists on ly two of the three charged objects of th e conspiracy, fentanyl and methamphetamin e.