Erin Osmon v. United States - Civil Battery Claim Affirmed

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF AP PEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 25-1 276 ERIN OSMON, Plaintiff – Appellant, v. UNITED ST ATES OF AMER ICA, Defendant – Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Co urt for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, Chief District Judge. (1:2 1- cv -0 0353 -MR- WCM) A rgued: January 28, 2026 Decided: February 23, 2026 Before KING, AGEE, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judge s. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. ARGUED: Jonathan W. Corbett, CORBETT RIGHTS, P.C., Los Angeles, California, for Appellant. Gill Paul Beck, Sr., O FFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Ap pellee. ON BRIEF: Russ Ferguson, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding p recedent in this circuit.

2 PER CURIAM: This appeal from the Western D istrict of North Carolina fo llows a bench trial on plaintiff Erin Osmon’s civil battery claim, pursued a gainst the United States of America under the Federal Tort Claims Act (the “F TCA”). 1 Osmon’s battery claim arises from a July 2019 pat - down inspection that was con ducted by an officer of the Transportation Security Administration (the “TSA ”) at the Asheville Regional Airpor t. In its p ost - ben ch trial verdict of March 2025, the district court weighed and assessed the evidence, including witness testimony and video footage of the pat - down inspection, determined that the pat - down of Osmon was objectively reasonable, and ruled in favor of the United States. See Osmon v. United States, No. 1:21 - cv - 00353 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 12, 2025), ECF No. 56 (the “ Bench Verdict ”). On app eal, Osmon assails the Bench V erdict o n various grounds. As explained herein, we reject Osmon’s appellate con tentions and affirm the judgment. I. A. On July 27, 2019, Osmon arrived at the Asheville Regio nal Airport as a ticketed and confirmed passenger with a final destinatio n of Los Angele s. As Osmon proceeded 1 We recognize that, although the federal government is generally immune from lawsuits, the FTCA has waived the “sovereign immunity of the United States for certain torts committed by federal employees.” See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 47 5 (1994). Relevant here, the FTCA, as cod ified in Title 28, authorizes su its for “battery” arisin g out of “ acts or om issions of investigative or law enfo rcement officers of the Un ited States Government.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). All such claims “shall be tried by the cou rt without a jury.” Id. § 2402 (citation modified).

3 through the passenger security screening checkpoint, a scanner alerted the TSA officers to a possible prohibited item in th e area of Osmon’s groi n. To that end, the TSA ’s screening procedures mandate d that a pat - d own inspec tion be conducted in the event of such an alert. As a result, a female TSA Officer nam ed Robin son approached Osmon and informed her that a pat - down of Osmo n’s groin a rea was required. Robinso n also offered to conduct the screening in private, but Osmon declined the offer. Thus, the pa t - down inspection took place in the general passenger screenin g area. Video f ootage of the pat - down insp ection was captured from two different angles on the A irpo rt’s closed - circuit television system (the “ A irp ort video footage”). R elevant to this appeal, Officer Robinson conducted an “ anterior” — i.e., frontal — sweep o f Osmon’s groin area by p lacing one palm on Osmo n’s outer hi p and the other on Osmon’ s inner thi gh. Robins on then mov e d her hands up Osm on’s thigh to t he point where Osmon’s leg and torso met — which the TSA designates as the “p oint of resistance” — cau sing Osmon to flinch. See J.A. 239. 2 The pat - down was completed with no prohibited items being d iscovered. Osmon — who was visibly u pset and cr ying after the p at - down — contends in these proceedings t h at Robinson’ s pat - down inspection was a sexual assault. 2 Citatio ns herein to “J.A. ___” refer to the contents of the Joint A ppendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

4 B. 1. In December 2021, Osmon filed her operative complaint ag ainst the United States, pursuant t o the FTCA, alleging a single claim of civil battery under North Carolina law. 3 In September 2022, the district court adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation that Osmon’s complaint be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Osmon appealed to this Court, and a unanimous pa nel reversed. See Osmon v. United States, 66 F.4th 144 (4th Cir. 2023). That is, our Court ruled that “the FTCA permits people who allege they were assaulted by TSA screeners to sue the federal government.” Id. at 147. Osmon’s complaint was thus reinstated for further proceedings in the district court. The parties then engaged i n discover y, during which Osm on and Off icer Robi nson were deposed. 2. The bench trial on Osmon ’s battery claim was conducted in Ash eville on November 12, 2024. Duri ng th e trial, Osmon ’s lawyer called two witnesses — Osm on and Officer Robinson. Relevant portions of the Airport video footage were played before the district court during the testimony of both Osmon and Robinson, and each witn ess was questioned about the events captured. For her part, Osmon testified that the pat - down inspection was a sexu al assault under the guise of a security screening, asserting that Robin son had used her fingertips to touch 3 The FTCA incorporates the law of the place where the a ct occurred — in these proceedings, that is North Carolina. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).

5 Osmon’s genital area through and beneath her clothing, and also that Robinson had improperly touched Osmon’s bare skin. Osmon fur ther said that Rob inson had m ade inappropriate comments about Osm on’s clothing, and that Rob inson asserted that the pat - down would be repeated if Osmon resisted. 4 Osmon also testified that she had no previous opinions abo ut the TSA, and that she had never made social media posts concernin g the TSA b efore the July 2019 inci dent in Asheville. On cross - examination, h owever, Osmon was confronted with a 2013 social media post she had ma de, which contained critical remarks about the TSA. Specifically, the post read: “My favorite p art of Thanksgiving travel? Being publicly felt u p by TSA due to cough medicine and my vaguely foreign sounding last name.” S ee Bench Verdict 10. Although Osmon conceded that the picture and u sername on the social media post were her own, she related she could no t remember making the post. Officer Robins on w as then called to testify. Robinson explained that the TSA ’s mandated pat - down i nspection is v ery methodical, and that the pat - down she performed on Osmon was entirely consistent with the TSA protocol. Robinson also denied making a ny threatening or inappropriate comments to Osmon. In its d efense, the g overnment called three w itnesses, each employed b y the T SA: Training Specialist Sanchez, who gave expert testimony about TSA pat - down inspection procedures; Officer Diller, Rob inson’s supervisor; and Officer Atchison, who was present 4 During the pat - down events, Osmon was wearing shorts with ab out a 3- to -4- inch inseam. See Bench Verdict 7. Osmon testified at th e bench trial that her shorts were not skin - tight, but “belled ou t at the bottom a little bit.” See J.A. 125.

6 at the TSA checkpoint during the pat - down. 5 Following th e testimony of the g overnment’s witnesses, Osmon w as re called in rebuttal. When the evidence had been completed, the district court adjourned the p roceedings and requested “post - trial briefs in the form of closing arguments” from the parties. See J.A. 31 0. Those post - trial briefs w ere then submitted. C. On March 12, 2025, the district court filed its Bench V erdict, ruling in favor of the United States. T hat is, the Bench Verdict conclud ed that Osmon had not proven her battery claim by a preponderance of the e vidence. In that regard, t he B ench Verdict weighed and assessed the A irport video footage and the evidence of the trial w itnesses. The Bench Verdict accord ed little weight to Osmon’s testimony, ruling th at Osmon’s “attempts to deny” her 2013 social media post “ revealed h er bias against TSA and substantially undermined her credibility.” See Bench V erdict 10 - 11. By contrast, the district court found Officer Robinson ’s testimony to be “credible” and “persuasive.” See Bench Verdict 11, 12. In so ruling, the Bench Verdict described Robinson as a “wom an of rather small statu re and relatively meek in app earance and 5 During the bench trial, Osmon ob jected to and moved to strike Atchison’s testimony, arguing that it had no t been adequately disclosed. Atchison had been identified in pre - trial disclosures as being present at the TSA checkpoint at the time, but her last name was misspelled in the disclosures and her contact information was not provided. The court denied a motion to strike Atchison’s testimony, ruling that multiple disclosures had “obliquely but sufficiently” identified Atchison as a person with relevant knowledge, and observing that Osmon had failed to track Atchison down or take her deposition. See J.A. 304 - 05.

7 demeanor.” Id. at 11. The Bench Verdict observed that Robinson “ appeared on the vide o and in court as one taking her responsibilities as a LT SO very seriously.” Id. 6 A s a result, the B ench Verdict credited Robinson’s t estimony and found that Robins on had no t threatened Osmon, that Robinson had not made any comments about Osmon’s clothing, and that Robins on had not touched Osmon in appropriately or in a man ner inconsistent with the TSA protocol s. Id. at 15 (reciting that “ [t] here is no credible evidence that LTSO Robinson intended to touch [O smon’s] genitals, that she did so in reality, or th at she intended to sexually assault [Osmon ] under the guise of routine screening”). Finally, the Bench Verdict conducted a “careful examination ” of the A irport video footage and conclude d that Osmon’s accoun t of the events — th at is, that Officer Robinson had inappropriately touched O smon’s bare skin and genital area du ring the pat - down inspection — was “ unsupporte d ” by the trial evidence. See Bench Verdict 13 - 14. T he Bench Verdict also determined that “any alleged incidental and brief tou ching of a passenger’s thigh during a req uired groin pat - down would n ot constit ute batt ery under North Carolina law.” I d. at 13; see also i d. at 1 3- 14 (confi rming that o bservation as also relevant to “incidental and brief tou ching of a passenger’s pelvic area”). Based on the totality o f the district court’s evaluation, the Ben ch Verdict ruled that “[t]he evidence presented at trial . .. conclusively d emonstrated that the pat - down of [Osmon] was objectively reasonable and p roper” and entered judg ment for the government. 6 The acronym “LTSO” stands for a “ Lead Transportation Security Officer ” of the TSA. See Bench Verdict 1.

8 See Bench Verdict 20. Osmon then timely noted her app eal from the Bench Verdict, and w e possess jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. II. A n a ppeal from a judgment entered after a bench trial is “subject to a mixed standard of review, pursuant to which we review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error.” See Va. Elec. & Pow er Co. v. Bransen Energy, Inc., 850 F.3d 645, 654 (4th Cir. 2017). Importantly, “we may not rev erse the district court’s findings simply because we would have decided the case d ifferently.” See Provident Life & A ccident Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 423 F.3d 413, 4 18 (4th Cir. 2005). Rather, f inding s o f fact can only be clearly erroneous if “the reviewing co urt on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been co mmitted.” See HSBC Bank USA v. F& M Bank N. Va., 246 F.3d 335, 338 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation modified). F inally, we review evidentiary ruling s fo r abuse of discretion, and we “ will no t overturn ” such a “ ruling unless th e decision was arbitrary and irrational.” See Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. W. Pocahontas Props. Ltd. P’ship, 918 F.3d 353, 362 (4th Cir. 20 19) (citation modified). III. Osmon raises various issues on appeal, including (1) that th e Bench Verdict misstated and misapplied North Carolina law; (2) that the Bench Verdict made biased and unsupported factual findings; and (3) th at district court improperly admitted evid ence during the trial. As explain ed herein, w e reject each of Osmon’s contentions and are

9 satisfied they do not undermine the Bench Verdict’s controlling conclusion — th at is, that the TSA pat - down of Osmon was objectively reasonable and proper. A. In th e Old North State, the elements of civil battery are “intent, h armful or offensive contact, causation, and lack of privilege.” See Ha wkins v. Hawkins, 400 S.E.2d 472, 475 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992). As to the intent element, the required “intent with which tort liability is concerned is not necessarily a hostile intent, or a desire to do any harm. R ather it is an intent to bring about a result which will invade the interests of ano ther in a way that the law forbids.” See Andrews v. Peters, 330 S.E. 2d 638, 6 40 (N.C. Ct. App. 19 85) (citation modified). In resolving Osmon’s battery claim, the Bench Verdict concluded, inter alia, as follows: • “ The evidence presented at trial — includi ng LTSO Robi nson’s testimony, the video evidence, and the testimony from other TSA witnesses — conclusively d emonstrated that the pat - down of the Plaintiff was objectively reasonable and proper ”; • “ LTSO Robins on did no t have the subjective intent to touch the Plaintiff in a harmful or offensive manner”; and • “ Because LTSO Robinson did not intentionally touch the Plaintiff i n an objectively offensive manner without her consent, the Plaintiff’s battery claim fails. ” See Bench Verd ict 20 (citation modified). In other words, based on its assessment of the evidence, the Bench Verdict ruled that Osmon ’s battery cl aim failed for lack of an objectively harmful o r offensive contact.

10 Osmon resists t his straightfo rward application of law by arguing that the Bench Verdict “appeared to hold th at North Carolina battery law requ ires intent to offend as an element.” See Br. of A ppellant 16. But Osmon overstates the import of the Ben ch Verdict’s observations con cerning Robinson’s subjective intent because, as recited abo ve, the Bench Verdict explicitly ruled that Osmon’s “battery claim fails” because “ Robinson did not i ntentiona lly touc h [Osmon] in an objectively offensive manner [.] ” See B en ch Verdict 20. And that ruling forecloses any viable battery claim under North Carolina law, as well as Osmon’s argument that reversible leg al error occurred in that respect. 7 B. To the extent Osmon challenges the Bench Verdict’s factual findings on t he objective reasonableness of the pat - down inspection, th ere was no error in the district court’s decision to credit Officer Robinson’s testimony o ver that of Osmon. As t he Supreme Court has made clear, “where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice betw een them cannot be clearly erroneou s.” See Anderson v. C ity of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). In these circumstances, Robinson’s credited testimony w as buttressed by t he A irport video fo otage, witn ess testimony, and the court’s perception that Osmon was biased ag ainst the TSA. See also U.S. Fire Ins. C o. v. Allied 7 We also reject Osmo n’s contention that the district c ourt committed reversible error by allowing Officer Rob inson to testify abou t how she was impacted by Osmon’s allegations. See Schultz v. Butche r, 24 F. 3d 6 26, 632 (4th Cir. 1994) (“For a bench trial, we are confident that the d istrict court can hear relevant ev idence, weigh its prob ative value and reject any improper inferences.”).

11 Towing Corp., 966 F. 2d 820, 824 (4th Cir. 1992) (“Because this determination by the district court was based upon assessments of witness credibility, it is deserving of the highest degree of appellate deference.”). And on our assessmen t o f the trial record, those factual determinations were not clearly erroneous. 8 IV. Pursuant to the foregoing, we are satisfied to reject Osmon’s appellate conten tions. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. AFFIRMED 8 Finally, we reject Osmon’s claim that Atch ison’s testimony should have been stricken because she was a “surprise witness.” See Br. of Appellant 27. The district court reasonably considered the parties’ arguments, including the fact that Atch ison was identified in multiple of th e government’s disclosures, an d properly exercised its discretion to allow Atchison to testify. And, in any even t, Osmon conceded in her post - bench trial briefing that “Atchison adds nothing of v alue to this case.” S ee J.A. 383 (citation modified).