US v. Michael Brandon - Criminal Appeal

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH C IRCUIT No. 24-4422 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. MICHAEL BRANDO N, Defendant – Appellant. Appeal from the Unite d States District Court for the District of Ma ryland, at Baltimore. Ellen Lipton Hollander, Senior District J udge. (1:22- cr -00239-EL H-1) Argued: December 11, 2025 Decided: February 20, 2026 Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublish ed per curiam opini on. ARGUED: Cullen Oakes Macbeth, OF FICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. David Christian Bornstein, OFFICE OF THE UNITED ST A TES A T TORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James W yda, Federal P ublic Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, for Appellant. Erek L. Barron, Un ited States Attorney, Brandon K. Moore, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFIC E OF THE UNITED S T A TES A TTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryl and, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding prec edent in this circuit.

2 PER CURIAM: Michael Brandon appe als his conviction, ente red pursuant to a conditional guilty plea, for possession of a firearm in further ance of a drug traffic king crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 9 24(c)(1)(A). On appeal, Brando n challenges the district court’s den ial of his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle following an investigative stop. For the following reaso ns, we affirm. While on patrol, De tective Kaiv on Stewart of t he Baltimore City Police Department identified a vehicle, which Brandon w as driving, that he believ ed violated Maryland’s window tint statute, Md. Code Ann., Tran sp. § 22 -406(i). Stewart pulled behind the vehicle, recognized tha t it bore a Pennsylvani a dealer’s plate, and in itiated a traffic stop. After a series of events, includi ng a physical struggle, Brandon attempted to avoid arrest by brief ly dragging Stewart with his vehicle until it wrec ked into a nearby pole. At that point, Stewart, with the assistance of respondi ng officers, restrained Brandon and seized a firearm with an extended magazine from Brandon’s waistb and, along with various drugs from inside the vehicle. Brandon moved to sup press the evidence, arg uing that, under this C ourt’s decision in United States v. Joh nson, 256 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 2001), Stewart did not have reasonable suspicion to initiat e the traffic stop. The district court denied the m otion, concluding that Stewart had reasonable suspicion and, even if he did not: (1) the good - faith except ion for relying on “binding a ppellate precedent” applied given the Maryland Court of Special Appeals decision in Baez v. Maryland, 19 2 A.3d 945 (Md. Ct. Spe c. App. 2018); and (2) Brandon’s subsequent illegal conduct — the ph ysical struggle and flight—vitiate d any taint.

3 United States v. Brandon, No. ELH - 22- 0239, 2023 WL 6961937, at *21 – 25, *31 –33 (D. Md. Oct. 19, 2023). Brandon then entered a co nditional guilty plea, ex pressly reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of h is motion to suppress and he now appeals. Even assuming Stewa rt lacked reasonable s uspicion, we conclude that the good-faith exception to the exc lusionary rule app lies and t herefore af firm the dist rict court’s decision. “When, as here, a distr ict court denies a moti on to suppress, we revi ew the court’s legal conclusions de no vo and its factual findi ngs for clear error, considering the evide nce in the light most favorable to the gover nment.” United States v. Turner, 122 F.4th 511, 51 6 (4th Cir. 2024), cert. d enied, 145 S. Ct. 1894 (2025) (cleaned up). The Fourth Amendm ent provi des: “T he ri ght of the peo ple to be s ecure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable se arches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. ame nd. IV. In or der “to safegua rd against future violations of Fourth Amendment rights through the r ule's general deterrent effect, ” Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (19 95), the exclus ionary rule prevent s the g ove rnment from using il legally obtained evidence agai nst the victim of a n illegal search, see Davis v. United S tates, 564 U.S. 229, 231 – 32 (2011). Ho wever, “exclusion of evidence has ‘a lways been [t he] last resort, not [the] first impulse,’” United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 335 (4th Cir. 2014) (alterations in original) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 58 6, 591 (2006)), because it creates “substantial s ocial costs,” United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 907 (1984). In that vein, the exclusionary rule is subject to exceptions, including t he good -faith doctrine. Davis, 564 U.S. at 232, 23 8– 40. Because “[t]he [exclusio nary] rule ’ s sole purpose. . . is to deter future Fourth Amendment v iolations,” id. at 236 – 37, in order “[t]o trigger

4 the exclusionary rule, police conduc t must be sufficiently deliberat e that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such det errence is worth the price paid by the justice system [,] ” Herring v. United Sta tes, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009). “[W]he n the police act with an obje ctively reasonable good - faith belief th at their conduct is lawful, or when their conduct involves on ly simple, isola ted negligence, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force, and exclusion cannot pay its way.” Davis, 564 U.S. at 238 (cleaned up). Law enforcement action taken “in objective ly reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent” at the ti me of t he search or se izure is protect ed by the good - f aith doctrine because suppressing e vidence obtained fr om a search or seizure previously approved by precedent would “do nothing to deter police misconduct . . . [and] would come at a high cost to both the truth a nd public safety[.] ” Id. at 232. We agree with the distr ict court that, regardles s of whether Stewart h ad reasonable suspicion, the good-faith excepti on under Da vis applies, thus for eclosing th e application of the exclusiona ry rule. That is, Stewart ac ted in “objectively rea sonable reliance o n binding appellate precedent[.]” Davis, 564 U.S. at 2 49–50. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals held in Baez that “[a] police officer, suspecting a tint win dow violation, may lawfully stop a vehicl e to investigate furthe r and ask to see the vehicle registration to determine origin of regi stration. That the veh icle may be registered in a foreign jurisdiction does not vitiate the law fulness of the stop. ” 1 192 A.3d at 951. 1 As a reported deci sion from the Maryl and Court of Special Appeals, Bae z “constitutes binding pr ecedent.” Johnson v. Maryland, 115 A.3d 6 68, 683 n.5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015).

5 That is precisely what occurred here. Stewart identified Brandon’s vehicle while on patrol and, using his training and experie nce, concluded that the ve hicle’s tint “was so dark that it did not comply with Maryla nd law.” Brandon, 2023 WL 69 61937, at *17. At that point, Ba ez per mitted him to stop the vehicl e to determine its p lace of registration. We therefore conclude that the good-faith exception to the exclusiona ry rule applies and bars suppression of any evidence taint ed by any con stitutional defect in the search of the vehicle after the traffic stop. 2 Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying Brando n’s motion to suppress. AFFIRMED 2 In addition, f or the reasons stated by the distri ct court, we conclude that Brandon’ s intervening illegal conduct vitiates any pot ential illegality of the tra ffic stop and renders the seized evidence ad missible. See Bran don, 2023 WL 696193 7, at *31–33.