US v. Javon Jenkins - Affirmation of Conviction

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF AP PEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 25 - 4317 UNITED ST ATES OF AMER ICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JAVON EMORY JE NKINS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolin a, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior District Jud ge. (3:24 - cr - 00253 - JFA -1) Submitted: January 6, 2026 Decided: February 18, 2026 Before HARRIS, RICHARDSON, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. ON BRIEF: Suha Najjar, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL P UBLIC DEF ENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Bryan P. Stirling, United States Attorney, Ariyana N. Go re, Assistant U nited S tates Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITE D STATES ATT ORNEY, Columb ia, South Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding p recedent in this circuit.

2 PER CURIAM: Javon Emory Jenkins appeals his conviction, en tered pursuant to a conditional guilty plea, for possession o f a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), (e). On appeal, Jenkins challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the firearm seized during a search of his vehicle. Specifically, he contends that th e investigating officers lacked reason able articulable s uspicion to detain Jenkins ba sed on Jenki ns’s cowor ker ’s belief that Jenkins h ad stolen a firearm out of the coworker’s veh icle. Assuming that reasonable suspicion ex isted, Jenkins argues that the officers unlawfully exceeded the necessary scope and duration of the stop. Finally, Jenkins contends that his ultimate consent to the officers’ search o f his vehicle was involuntary. For the following reason s, we affirm. “When, as here, a district court denies a motion to suppress, we review the court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error, co nsidering the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” United Sta tes v. Turner, 122 F.4th 511, 516 (4th C ir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. C t. 1894 (2025) (citation modified). “A cou rt reviewing for clear error m ay not reverse a lower court’s find ing of fact simply because it would have decided the case differently. Rather, [it] .. . mu st ask whether, on the entire evidence, it is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Ferebee, 957 F.3d 40 6, 417 (4th Ci r. 2020) (cit ation modified). “If th e district court’s account of the eviden ce is plausible in light of the record v iewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it b een

3 sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.” Id. (citation modified). The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Warrantless search es and seizures “are per se un reasonable under the Fourth Ame ndment — subject only to a few specifically established and well - delineated exceptions.” California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1 991) (citation modified). In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), the Supreme Court recognized that the police may constitutionally “conduct a brief, investigatory stop when [an] officer has a reasonable, a rticulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlo w, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). When reviewing the constitutionality of an investigatory stop, we consider whether the totality of the circumstances gave the officer s a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Mayo, 361 F.3d 802, 805 (4th Cir. 2 004) (citation modified); see United States v. Mitchell, 963 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 202 0) (“Facts innocent in themselves may together amount to reasonable suspicion.”). Reasonable suspicion requires more than an “incho ate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’”; however, reasonable suspicion may b e based on inferences made on the basis of police experience. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. Indeed, “l aw enforcement officers. . . may draw on their own experience and specialized train ing to make inferences fro m and deductions about the cumulative information available t o them that might well elude an un trained person.” United States v. Johnson, 599 F.3d 339, 34 3 (4th Cir. 2010) (citation modified).

4 An informant’s tip alone, if supp orted by “enough indicia of reliability,” can justify a Terry stop. Adams v. William s, 407 U.S. 143, 14 7 (1972); see also United States v. Kehoe, 893 F.3d 232, 238 (4 th Cir. 2018) (“The degree to which the police may rely on a tip to establish reasonable suspicio n depends on the tipster’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge.”); United Sta tes v. Harris, 39 F.3d 1262, 1269 (4th Cir. 1994) (hol ding that “information of criminal activity given by a known reliable informant is enough to sustain a Terry stop” (citation modified)). “Where the informant is known. .. , an officer can judge the credibility of the tipster firsthand and thus confirm whether the tip is sufficiently reliable to support reason able suspicion.” United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 323 (4th Cir. 2004). Based on these principles and the totality of the circumstances, we discern no error in the district court’s determin ation that the officers here had re asonable suspicion to support Jenkins’s seizure. The officers r eceived their tip from an individual who made his report in person and provided the officers with all of his personal identify ing information. The basis of informant’s knowledge — his presence with Jenk ins throughout the day, knowledge of the firearm’s location, and awareness of the corrob orating timing of his suspicions — supported h is tip’s reliability. Finally, the officers corroborated several aspects of the tip before detainin g Jenkins. Jenkins further contends that the of ficers exceeded the lawful scop e and duration of the stop. Under T erry, an investigative detention can last no longer than reason ably necessary to carry out the “mission ” of the stop. See United States v. Perry, 92 F.4th 500, 510 (4th Cir. 2024). A stop’s primary mission is “ to verify or dispel [an] o fficer’s

5 suspicion.” Id. at 511 (citing United States v. Elsto n, 479 F.3d 3 14, 320 (4th C ir. 2007)). Accordingly, “officers may constitu tionally detain suspects until their suspicions shou ld be reasonably verified or dispelled.” Id. at 511. Here, the officers explained th e nature of their investigation, performed an initial frisk, and then reasonably attemp ted to verify or dispel the suspicion that the s tolen firearm could be in Jen kins’s vehicle. Based on the officers’ focus on d etermining the veracity of the tip throu ghout the encounter with Jenk ins and their reasonable belief that the stolen firearm co uld be either on Jenkins’s person or in his vehicle, we discern no erro r in the district court’s determination that the o fficers did not unr easona bly prol ong the st op. Finally, Jenkins contests the voluntariness of his ultimate consent to the search of his vehicle. V oluntar y consent is another exception to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 22 2 (1973). “The volun tariness of consent to search is a factual question,” and a reviewing court “ must affirm the determination of the district court unless its finding is clearly erro neous.” United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 650 (4th Cir. 19 96). To determine whether consen t was voluntar y, we examine the totality of the circumstances, including the characteristics of the individual who suppose dly consent ed — his age, maturity, in telligence, experience — and the con ditions under which he gave c onsent — including the officer’s conduct, the number of officers present, as well as the du ration, timing, and location of the search. Id. W hether an individ ual knows of his right to refuse consent is a relevant facto r, “ although the Government need not demon strate that the [individual] kn ew of his right to refuse consent to prove that the consent was volun tary.” Id.

6 The totality of the circumstances here suppo rted the district court’s conclu sion that Jenkins voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle. Jenkins knew of his right to refuse consent, as demonstrated by the fact that he initially declin ed consent to search h is car. Jenkins’ s personal characteristics further supported the con clusion that he underst ood his rights — Jenkins was 20 y ears old, gainfully employed, and had at least so me prior experience with the criminal justice system. Jenkins was also able to communicate clearly with the officers and demonstrated an und erstanding of the situation. Finally, the o fficers’ conduct did not suggest that Jenk ins’s consent resulted from undue coercion or threats. We therefore discern no error in the d istrict court’s denial of Jenkins’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm the d istrict court’s judgment. We dispense w ith oral argument because the facts and legal con tentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would no t aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED