Isaiah Wilkins et al. v. Pete Hegseth et al. - Court Opinion

PUBLISHED UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH C IRCUIT No. 24-2079 ISAIAH WILKINS; C AROL COE; NATALI E NOE; MINORITY V ETERANS OF AMERICA, Plaintiffs - Appell ee s, v. PETE HEGSETH, in h is official capacity as S ecretary of Defense; DANIEL DRISCO LL, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Ar my, Defendants - Appell ants. ----------------------------------------- CENTER FOR HIV L AW AND POLICY; N ATIONAL ALLIANC E OF STATE & TERRITORIAL AIDS DIRECTORS; AMERI CAN CIVIL LIBE RTIES UNION; AMERICAN CIVIL LI BERTIES UNION OF VIRGINIA; WHIT MAN-WALKER CLINIC, INC.; COM MUNITY RESOURC E INITIATIVE; SERO PROJECT; INSTITUTE FOR JUS TICE, Amici Supporting App ell ees. Appeal from the Unit ed States District Co urt for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:22- cv -01272-L MB-IDD) Argued: December 9, 2025 Decided: February 18, 2026 Before NIEMEYER, R ICHARDSON, an d RUSHING, Circuit J udges.

2 Reversed and remande d by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Judge Richardso n and Judge Rushing jo ined. ARGUED: Bradley Alan Hinshelwood, UNITED ST A TES DEP AR TME NT OF JUSTICE, W ashington, D.C., for Appellants. Scott A. Schoettes, Palm Springs, California; Linda T. Coberly, WINSTON & STRA WN LLP, Houston, T exas, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorn ey General, Charles W. Scarborough, Civil Division, UNITED ST A TES DEP AR TMENT OF JUSTICE, W ashi ngton, D.C.; Erik S. Siebert, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED S T A TES A TTORNEY, Alexandria, V irginia, for Appellants. Peter E. Perkowski, PERKOW SKI LEGAL, PC, Los Angeles, California; Bryce A. Cooper, Chicago, Illinois, Robert T. Vlasis, III, Hannah M. Shankman, W ashington, D.C., Thanh D. Ngu yen, WINST ON & ST RA WN LLP, Da llas, T exas; Gregory R. Nevins, Dec atur, Geo r gia, Nichola s J. Hite, LAMBDA LEG A L DEFENSE & EDUC A TION DE FENSE FUND, INC., Dallas, T exas, for Appel lees. Kara N. Inglehart, LGBTQI+ Rights Clinic, Bluhm Legal Clinic, NOR THWESTERN PRITZKER SCHOOL OF LA W, Chicago, Illinois, for Amici Center for HI V Law and Policy, National Allian ce of St ate & T erritorial AIDS Directors, Ame rican Civil Liberties Union, American Civ il Liberties Union of V ir ginia, W hitman - W alker Clinic, I nc., Community Resource Initiative, and Sero Pr oject. Andrew W ard, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, Arlington, V irginia, for Amicus Inst itute for Justice.

3 NIEMEYER, Circuit J udge: The U.S. Departme nt of Defense an d the U.S. Army (colle ctively, so metimes, “the Military”) have adopted and enforced policie s that den y induction into the military service of persons infected with HIV. See Dep artment of Defense Instructi on 6485.01, Human Immunodeficiency Viru s (HIV) in Military Service Mem bers § 3(a) (J une 7, 2013); Arm y Reg. 600 -110, Identification, S urveillance, and A dministr ation of Personnel I nfected with Human Immunodeficie ncy Virus 1–16 (A pril 22, 2014). HIV infe ction is on a list of hundreds of medical c onditions that the Military identifi e s as disqualifying, including, among others, autism and a history of sleep ap nea, heart valve surgery, inflammatory b owel disease, adult psoriasis, severe headaches, and acute allergic reac tions to foods such as f ish, peanuts, and tree nuts. The Military ha s explained th at it seeks to enroll only i ndividuals who present no health - related compl ications to the roles servicemem bers might perform, their deployment con ditions, their efficienc y, and the costs for their maintenance as servicemembers. The individual plaint iffs, who are HIV -infected but whose infection s are substantially controlled with daily medication, as well as Minority Veterans of America, a nonprofit organization supporting persons such as the individ ual plaintiffs, commenced this action against the Secretary of Defe nse and the Secretary of the Army, allegin g that the Mil itary’s policies violate the ir equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and are arbitrary and ca pricious, in v iolation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“ A PA ”). They rely heavi ly on our decision in Roe v. Department of Defense, 947 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 2020), where we he ld that the M ilitary’s inconsis tent and

4 non- individualized trea tment of military perso nnel who had contrac ted HIV during their military service was lik ely arbitrary, capriciou s, and inconsistent with modern science. The district court applied Roe and iss ued a permanent injunction in t his case, prohibiting the M ilitary from enforcing its HIV policies related to joining the armed forces and mandating that it r eevaluate decisions tha t it had made based on those policies. In reviewing a judgment of the kind presented here, we recognize that the U.S. Military is “a specializ ed society separate from civilian society,” Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974), and that “in no ot her area has the [Supreme] Court accorded Congress greater deference,” Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983) (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 – 65 (1981)). M oreover, we layer this defe rence over the alr eady relaxed standard of rational basis review t hat otherwise applies to cases of the kind presented here. See He ller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (explaining that, when rational basis re view applies, the di fferent treatment of class es will be upheld “if there is a rational relationship between [that] t reatment and some legitimate governme ntal purpose”); Doe v. Uni v. of Md. Med. Sys. C orp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1267 (4t h Cir. 1995) (applying rational basis review to HIV status). Here, we are dealing with persons denied enlistment into the Military, and t herefore their claims ar e reviewed un der a relaxed application of civilian law. See R ostker, 453 U.S. at 67, 83 (recognizing that the “te sts and limitations” to be applied under the Due Process Clause “ differ be cause of the milit ary context” and holding that Congr ess’s decision to authorize the registration of men and not women fell “well withi n its constitutional auth ority”).

5 In this case, the M ilitary has articulated its need to have fit servicemembers who ca n fulfill its military mission without complic ations from me dical conditions that could compromise deployme nt functions, contribut e to conflicts with for eign nations during deployment, and add costs over tho se generally necessary to maintain fit servicemembers. Finding the M ilitary’s professiona l judgments in this case reasonably related to its military mission, we conclude that the plaintif fs’ claims fail as a matt er of law. In doing so, w e distinguish our dec ision in Roe, as that case dealt with the m anner in whic h the Milita ry treated military personnel who contrac ted HIV while in servic e and who could benefit from various a vailable waivers for assignm ents but were denied them and discharged arbitrarily. See Roe, 947 F.3d at 2 21–23. Accordingly, we revers e the district court’s judgment and r emand wi th instructions to enter judgment for t he Military. I Isaiah Wilkins, Carol Coe, and Natali e Noe have been diagnosed wit h HIV but are currently receiving medical treatme nt such that their disease is asymptomatic with “undetectable viral load [s],” meanin g that they have less than 50 vir us copies per milliliter of blood. See Roe, 947 F.3d at 21 3. All th r ee individual plaintiffs have sought to either enlist or reenlist in t he Army and have been denied that oppor tunity under the Military’s medical policies. Minority Veterans of Amer ica, a nonprofit organization whose missio n is to “create community, belonging, an d advance equity for minority veterans,” supports these individual plainti ffs’ efforts.

6 As we have recognized, the human i mmunode ficiency virus (HIV) causes acquire d immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), fro m which thousands of Amer icans have died. Roe, 947 F.3d at 212. HIV can be transmitted when certain infected body fluids enc ounter damaged tissue, mucous membrane s, or the bloodstream. Id. at 213. By the 1990s, however, a one -tablet antiretrovi ral regime was develo ped, which, when fol lowed by taking the pill once a day, suppresses the “viral load” (the number of viral copies in the blood). Id. Th is antiretroviral t herapy has in creased the infected pe rson’s quality of life and decreased the cha nces of transmi tting HI V. Id. Even with that treatment, however, the infected person must be tested on a regular basis, and HIV infection, at whate ver level, precludes the infected person from donating b lood. Id. at 213–1 4. Acting under Congress ’s direction to enlist and appoint able- bodied and physically qualified persons to serve in the Military, see 10 U.S.C. §§ 505(a), 532(a) (3), the Department of Defense, as well as the individ ual military branches, i ncluding the Army, have adopted fitness policies for induction. In particular, D epartment of Def ense Instruction (DoDI) 61 30.03 sets out the physi cal and medical standards for appoin tment, enlistment, or inducti on into the Military, which are applicable to al l military branc hes. The policy i ncludes hundreds of medical co nditions that are considered disqualify ing, including medical conditions such as a utism and a history of sleep apnea, heart valve surgery, inflammatory bowel disease, adult ps oriasis, severe hea daches, and acute aller gic reactions to foods suc h as fish, peanuts, and tree nuts. Do DI 6130.03, Vol. 1, Medica l Standards for Military Service: Appointment, Enlistment, or In duction § 6 (Ma y 6, 2018). T he policy also in cludes, as disqualifying, communicabl e diseases, such as hepatitis, and

7 chronic conditions that can be managed t hrough medication, such as a sthma, hypertension, diabetes, and ADHD. Id. And more particularly, the policy lists a “history of disorders involving the immune mechanism, including immunode ficiencies ” as a disqualifying “systemic condition.” Id. § 6.23 (cleaned up). Thus, consistent with DoDI 6130.03, the Department of Defens e adopted a policy to “ [d] eny eligibility f or military servic e to persons with lab oratory evidence of HI V infection for appoin tment (other th an covere d personnel who are seeking t o commission while a Service membe r), enlistment, pre - appo intment, or initial entry training for milita ry service.” Do D I 6485.0 1, Human Immunod eficiency Virus (HIV) in Military Servic e Members § 3(a) (June 7, 2013). Similarly, the Army adopted a regulation provid ing that HIV is a disqualifying condition. The Army regulation incorporates DoDI 6 485.01 and specifically provide s that “HI V infected per sonnel are n ot eligible for a ppointment or enlistment into the Active Army, the ARNG [Army N ational Guard ], or the US AR [Army Reserve].” Army Regulation 600-110, Identi fication, Surveillance, and Administr ation of Personnel Infected wit h Human Immunodefici ency Virus 1–16 (A pril 22, 2014). The plaintiffs comme nced this action against the Mil itary, alleging that t he Military’s policies denying enlistment or appo intment to persons infe cted with HIV violate the equal p rotection c omponent of the Fift h Amendment’s Due Process Clause and, because they are therefore arbitrary and capr icious, the APA. On the plaintiffs’ mot ion, the district court granted summa ry judgment to th e plaintiffs, concluding that the Militar y’s policies are “irrational, arbi trary, and caprici ous,” in violation of both the Fifth Amendment and t he APA. Wilkins v. Austin, 745 F. Supp. 3d

8 375, 378, 38 7 (E.D. Va. 2024). In doing so, the court rejected the Military’s rationales f or the policies based on (1) medical and scien tific considerations, (2) higher costs, and (3) diplomatic deferenc e to foreign allies and partners. Id. at 388–97. The court entered a permanent injunction (1) enjoining defe ndants from denying the plaintiffs and other similarly situated asymptomatic HI V - positive individual s with undetectable viral loads accession into the Mil itary based on their HIV status; (2) enjoini ng defend ants from enforcing the HIV - spe cific provisions of thei r policies, including D oDI 6485.01, DoDI 6130.03, and AR 600 - 110; and (3) ordering the A rmy to “re evaluate the decisio ns to remove plaintiff Wil kins from hi s earned position at [the U.S. Military A cademy Preparatory School] in a manner consistent wi th [this] injunctive relie f.” Id. at 398. From the district court ’s final judgment dated August 20, 2024, th e Military filed this appeal, and on December 9, 2025, aft er hearing oral argument in this case, we issued an order staying enforc ement of the district court’s injunction and ju dgment pending this decision. II The single question p resented here is wh ether the Military’s pol icies denying induction into the military service of persons infected wit h HIV discriminate agai nst those persons in violation of the Fifth Amendment a nd are arbitrary and ca pricious in violation of the APA. To answe r this question, we begi n with the applicable st andard for reviewin g those policies.

9 A In the civilian context, we review claims un der the Fifth Amendme nt for unequal treatment of individual s with HIV on th e well understood rat ional basis revie w. See Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1267 (4t h Cir. 1995). Under rati onal basis scrutiny, the govern ment’s diffe ring treatment of certain class es of p eople will be uphel d “if there is a rational relationship between th e disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). Classifications under rational basis revie w are “accorded a strong presumption of vali dity” and must be upheld “ if there is any reasonably conceivable state of f acts that could provide a rational basis for the c lassification.” Id. at 319 –20 (emphasis added) (cleaned up). Thus, the rational basis standard of review is “a relatively relaxed standar d.” United States v. Skrmetti, 605 U.S. 49 5, 522 (2025) (cleane d up). Indeed, to satisfy the stand ard, the government has “no obligation to p roduce evidence” to su pport its policy classification, which “may be based on rational spec ulation u nsupported by evidenc e or empirical data.” Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 (cleaned up). But in this case, we are not in a civilian conte xt, but rather a military one, and our review in that context implicates the “ military deference doctrine ” that arises fro m the Constitution’s commit ment of military affairs to the political branc hes and the Military’s particular needs and purposes. Ar ticle I co mmits plenary and exclusive authorit y to Congress “ [t] o raise and support A r mies” and “[t] o make R ule s for the Governme nt and R egulation of the land and naval Forces.” U.S. Const. a rt. I, § 8, cl. 12, 14. Article II specifies that the President is the “Co mmander in Chief of the Ar my and Navy.” Id. art.

10 II, § 2, cl. 1. In turn, Congress has exercis ed its authori ty and authorized the President to “ prescribe regulations to carry out his funct ions, powers, and duties ” with respect to the armed f orces. 10 U.S.C. § 121. Thus, the “responsibili ty for deter mining how best our Armed Forces shall att end ” the task of maintaining national se curity and fighting wars “ rests with Congress a nd with the President. ” Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975) (citation omitte d). In this scheme, not only does the Co nstitution assign no responsibility over military matters to the judiciary, but the judiciary especially lacks competence in this area. As the Supreme Court noted i n Rostker v. Goldberg, [I] t is difficult to conce ive of an area of government al ac tivity in which th e courts have less competence. The com plex, subtle, and profe ssional decisions as to th e composition, training, equi pping, and c ontrol of a military force are essentially professional military j udgments, subject always to civilian control of the L egislative and Executive Branches. 453 U.S. 57, 65 –66 (1981) (quoting Gilliga n v. Morgan, 4 13 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)). As Alexander Hamilton explained it, the Executive “holds the sword of the community ”; “[t] he judiciary on the contrary has no influen ce over . . . the sw ord.” The Federali st No. 78, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (G eorge W. Carey & James Mc Clellan eds., 1990). In view of this consti tutional structure, the courts “have been relucta nt to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and nati onal security affairs.” Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (198 8). Accordingly, the judiciary has long recogn ized a “military deferen ce doctrine,” requiring courts to grant extra deference to mil itary actions, judgmen ts, and decisio ns. See John F. O’Connor, T he Origins and Ap plication of the Military Defe rence Doctrine, 35 Ga.

11 L. Rev. 161 (2000) (outlining the history of the Supreme Court’s practice of non - interference and defe rence to Congre ss and the President with regard to mil itary regulations). While the Supreme Court has not defined the exact shape of this deference, it has nonetheless described it as substantial. I t has e xplain ed, “ F or the reaso ns w hich differentiate military society from ci vilian society, we think Con gress is permitted to legislate both with greater breadth and wit h greater flexibility when prescribing the rules by which the former shall be governed t han it is when prescribing rules for the latter.” Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 756 (1974) (em phasis added); see also Rostker, 543 U.S. at 64–6 5 (noting that “pe rhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress gr eater deference ” than in the context of military affairs (emphasis added)); Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (s tating that it gives “ great deference to the professional judgment of military authoritie s concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest” (empha sis added) (quoting Goldman v. We inberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986))); Wei ss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 1 78 (199 4) (noting that judicial deference is “at its apogee” when reviewing congression al decisionmaking in the military context (emphasis added) (quoting Ros tker, 543 U.S. at 70))). And the fact that constitutional protectio ns are at issue does no t diminish the military deference d octrine. As the Supre me Cour t explained in Rostker, while “Congress remains subject to the limitations of the Due Process Clau se, . . . the tests and limitations to be applied may differ because of the military context. We of course d o not abdicate o ur ultimate responsibi lity to decide the constitutional questio n, but simply recognize that t he Constitution itself

12 requires such deferenc e to c ongres sional choice.” 543 U.S. at 67. So must it be as we apply the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Am endment to the Militar y in this case. At bottom, while applying the civilia n rational basis review to de termine whether the Military’s policies are rationally supported, we must yet give even great er deference to the Military’s explanat ions and judgments. I ts policies must be pre sumed as valid, and they must be upheld if, under any reasonabl y conceived facts, they a re reasonably related to the classific ation. And in doing so, we must defer to the Military’s creation of the classification, its expla nations, and its military purposes. B In this case, the Military has described its mission and pu rpose, consistent with constitutional assignme nts: The Military’s primary purpose is to prepare f or and win milita ry conflicts. The Military cannot be ready to deploy, fi ght, and win our Na tion’s wars without recruiting an d retaining high qual ity, physically fit, m edically qualified soldiers w ho can depl oy, fight, and win decisively on any cur rent or future battlefield. In particu lar, the Milita ry is required to prepare for a range of possible co nflicts — not solely operations against l ow -level insurgencies, as in rece nt conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also a large - scale conflict with a ne ar-peer military, suc h as China. * * * In the event of such a conflict . .. the Militar y seeks to ensu re that soldiers can rapidly deploy to high - stress environme nts to combat operations with minimal complications or delays. That can i nclude deployment to f orward operating positions or other locations where resupply o r medical treat ment is unreliable or challenging because of ene my action, remote ness, or other reasons. (Cleaned up).

13 This miss ion and purp ose, we conclude, are legitimate ones for the Military. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300– 01 (1983); Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10 (“ The complex[,] subtle, and professiona l decisions as to the compo sition, training, equipping, and control of a milit ary force are essentia lly professional militar y judgments, sub ject always to civilian c ontrol of the Legislative and Executive Branche s”). In light of th is mission and purpose, w hich the plaintiffs do not challe nge, medical conditions of all kinds may become relevant a s they may limit a soldi er’s fitness to deploy and implicate other relevant consid erations. And both Congress a nd the Executive have demanded fitness. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 505(a), 532(a) (3); DoDI 6130. 03 § 1.2. A s to HIV- infect ed persons in particular, t he Military has concluded that HIV - infected persons, even under an effective antir etroviral regimen, present conditi ons that could limit or complicate the Military’s mission. It explains that, even while such persons ar e asymptomatic and their viral loads are und etectable, below 50 vira l copies per milliliter of blood, th eir medical condition, like many ot hers, still requires having medication availabl e, taking medication once a day, having reg ular testing, and limitin g aspects of their roles when deployed. The HIV infection is never eliminated and always pr esents risks t hat require additional attention, can cause co mplications, and does c ost money. The Military has applie d those medical facts to its military mission, explaining tha t necessary medicine m ay not always be available in particu lar deployed set tings, as “far forward positions close to front lines have minimal o r no access to mail - order pharmacy or other resupply, ” and, i t adds, even in more “established areas of operation,” the medici ne

14 may not always be available. Moreov er, if an HIV - infected ser viceme mber were to attem pt to carry his medication during military operati ons, it could be lost or destroyed. In view of the fact that HIV - infecte d persons must als o be tested on a regular basis, the addit ional “time, en ergy, and resources to collect, transport for testing at an appropriate facility and by appropriate trained p ersonnel, and [have] re sults [returned] in a timel y manner” will burden th e Military. Inde ed, at forward positions, testing might not eve n be possible. Moreover, the Military notes that “deployed soldiers must be prepa red to donate blood directly to other soldiers through an em ergency blood collection system know n as the ‘walking blood ban k,’” yet all agree that H IV-infected persons ca nnot donate bloo d as even a low level of viral copies c ould infect the recipient. The Mili tary recited how this Military need was e xemplified during the op erations in Iraq and Afghanistan, when “over 6,000 such transfusions were performed.” The Military thus argues that “the com bined effect of these considera tions is to put the [M]ilitary to cho ices it does no t face with healthy individu als. Deploying individuals with HIV to certain postings would require the [M] ilitary to accept risks of mission degradation or transmis sion.” In addition to these deployment con siderations, the Military has also show n that the cost of maintaining a n HIV - infected s oldier is sub stantially higher than th e cost of maintaining an otherwise medically fit sol dier. The government presented de tailed evidence showing that antiretroviral therapy c osts approximately $10,000 to $20,000 per person on an annual ba sis.

15 Finally, the governmen t notes that HIV implic ates unique foreign aff airs concerns, as U.S. forces are often dependent on the consent or inv itation of a host natio n for their continued presence. It points out that “many of those host nations ha ve their own laws o n a range of issues — s uch as alcohol, pornog raphy, and other matters — that are more restrictive than U.S. law, and the [M] ilitary generally respects these laws to pr eserve amicable relations. ” Among these laws are laws that restrict or prohibit the entry or presence of individual s with HIV, such as was the case with respect to U.S. f orces in Kuwait. This complication, accordi ng to the Military, not only puts the HIV -positiv e members at risk of dep ortation, but it also “t hreaten [s] the U.S. m ilitary’s future pr esence and operations in that c ountry.” Of course, under the rational basi s standard of review, the re need be only one rational relationship b etween the disparate t reatment of a class o f individuals and a legitimate purpose. Heller, 509 U.S. at 320. Thus, even if we were to consider, for example, only the fina ncial burden that an HIV - infected soldie r would place upon joini ng the Military, the rejecti on of additional costs f ulfills a le gitimate government pu rpose, as needed to pass rational basis review. See Armour v. City of Indian apolis, 566 U.S. 673, 682– 84 (2012) (“pos sibly spend[ing] hun dreds of thousands o f dollars keeping a computerized dead - tracking system c urrent” provides a rati onal basis for a tax -re lated classification). But all of the consi derations advanced by t he Military are r easonable military judgments related to the Military’s legitimate mission, and because they are rational ly related to its legitimate military mission, its p olicies are valid.

16 The plaintiffs argue no netheless that “well - managed HIV doe s not affect a person’s ability to perform all the duties of military service and that people wit h well - managed HIV present no real risk to themselves or ot hers.” Ruling otherwi se, they argue, could be inconsistent with our d ecision in Roe. Much of what the plai ntiffs argue is, indeed, supporte d by Roe. Pl aintiffs’ HIV infections are well managed, and they can p erform most of the d uties of military service. Also, the risk they pos e for tra nsmission of the disease is very low. Roe, 947 F.3d at 213 – 14. As Roe concluded, “Those who are timel y diagnosed and treate d experience few, if any, noticeable effects on their physical health and enjoy a life e xpectancy approachi ng that of those who do not have HIV.” Id. at 214 (internal quotation mar ks omitted). We do not question these findi ngs. But Roe also acknowle dged that to attain that degree of fitness, the soldier must take the antiretroviral pill daily and must be tested regularly, and he or she may not donate blood. 947 F.3d at 213 – 14. And it is these aspects of the condition that prompt the Military to deny enlistment. Roe ’s findings re lating to HIV - infected persons do not contradict the Military’s concerns. The Military point s o ut that during forward deployments, the risk of supplying medication i s sign ificant, as is the burden of testing, and it is concerned that HIV -infecte d persons cannot serve as part of the “walki ng blood bank.” In addition to these deployme nt issues, the Military identifies the conflict HIV - infecte d persons might create wh en deploy ed to certain other nations. And finally, it points to the additional cost to the Military

17 to maintain an HIV - infected person. All of the se considerations are rational concerns wh en deciding whom to adm it into the Military. Although we con sidered similar deploy ment and diplomatic issues in Roe, that decision addressed material ly distingu ishable circumstances. There, among other issues, w e considered a cate gorical ban on deployment of c urrent servicemembers, rather t han the rationales undergirding forward - looking policies related to initial entr y that are presented here. As the district court here recognized, “th e validity” of the prohibition o n the induction of “asymptomatic HI V - positive individuals with undetectable v iral loads was no t presented” in Roe. Wilkins, 745 F. Supp. 3 d at 386. Moreover, Roe ’s holding on the categorical ban on deployment wa s based on a scant evidentiar y record, in which the military “offered no rationale fo r its policy of non - deployment for HIV - positive servicemembers, nor [did] it identif[y] t he evidence it considered in formulating t he policy.” Roe, 947 F.3d at 225. Unlike in Roe, however, the Military here has provided substantial evidence ex plaining its rationa les in light of its mission. The plaintiffs also argue that the addition al -cost aspect does not pass a rational basis standard, citing various lower court opinion s decided in the civilian context. But doing so hardly defers to the mi litary judgment that co sts are a legitimate concern in rais ing and maintaining an army, a nd the plaintiffs simply do not address this obv ious concern, stating only that the Militar y’s evidence was unimpres sive. Yet, under the rat ional basis sta ndard, the Military was not re quired to provide impressive evi dence of cost. Rather, its con cern of additional cost must be assessed as rat ional in relation to raising and maintain ing an

18 army. And it can hardly be deemed u nreasonable for t he Military to r efuse to admit a clas s of persons who will co st the Military mor e money than will pers ons outside of that clas s. While the Milita ry successfully d emonstrates the reasona bleness of its classification under the rational basis standard, in this mili tary context, we must also defer to its military judgments. Of course, when the Military acts in the context of mili tary affairs, it “remains subject to the limitations of the Due Process Clause, ” but “the tests and limitations to be applied may differ because of the milita ry context.” Rostker, 453 U.S. at 67; see also Weiss, 510 U.S. at 176. We conclude that th e Military, acting in furtherance of its mission to raise and maintain the arm ed forces, did not run afoul of the Due Proc ess Clause applied in the military context when adopting and enforcing its HIV policies. C The plaintiffs’ APA cl aims fail under the sa me reasoning as d o their constitutio nal claims. The APA authorizes courts to “hol d unlawful and set aside age ncy action, findings, and conclusions” that are determined to be “arbitrary, capric ious, an abuse of discretion, o r otherwise not in accordance with law. ” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Agenc y actions are arbitrar y and capricious if the agency “relied on fact ors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely fail ed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its deci sion that runs counter to the evi dence before the agency, or is so implausible that it coul d not be ascribed to a difference in view or t he product of agency

19 expertise.” Motor Vehicle M frs. Ass’ n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mutu al Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). T he district court reasoned that “rational- basis review of an equal pro tection claim in the context of a gency action is similar to t hat under the APA,” and in t hose cases “the equal- protection argum ent is folded int o the APA ar gument . . . and the only question is whether [the Military’ s classification of plai ntiffs] was ration al (i.e., not arbitrary and capricious).” Wilkins, 745 F. Supp. 3d at 388 (cleaned up) (quoting Cooper Ho sp./Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Burwe ll, 179 F. Su pp. 3d 31, 47 (D.D.C. 2016)). On appeal, the parties likewise combine ra tiona l- basis and arbitrary - capricious review, an d the plaintiffs present a single set of argumen ts aimed almost exclusi vely at the former. In this circumstance, since the Mili tary’s categorical prohibition on the entry of HIV- positive individua ls into the Military pas ses rational basis review in several respects, such agency action is n ot arbitrary and caprici ous so as to violate the APA. T he Military’s policy to deny HIV - inf ected persons fro m joining the Military well satisfie s the ration al basis review under the equal protecti on component of the Due Process C lause, particularly in the military context, when the Milit ary is making a judgment about raising an d supporting armies. Th e same considerations r ender the plaintiffs’ APA claims untenable. * * * Accordingly, we rever se the district court’s judgment dated August 20, 2024, and remand with instructio ns to enter judgment fo r the Military. REVERSED AND RE MANDED