US v. Daqua Ritter - Affirmation of Conviction

PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF AP PEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 24 - 4576 UNITED ST ATES OF AMER ICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. DAQUA LAME EK RITTER, a/k/a Quavo, Defendant – Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Cou rt for the District of South Carolina, at Aiken. Sherri A. Lydon, District Judge. (1:23−cr−00024−SAL −1) Argued: December 11, 2025 D ecided: February 18, 2026 Before KING, HARRI S, and RICHARDS ON, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Richar dson wrote the opini on, in which J udge King and Judge Harris joined. ARGUED: Lindsey S. Vann, JUSTICE 360, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. David N. Goldman, UNITED STATES DEPARTM ENT OF JU STICE, Was hington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Harmeet K. Dhillon, Assistant Attorn ey General, Jesus A. Osete, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorn ey General, Andrew G. Braniff, Brant S. Levine, Appellate Section, Civil Rights, Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Bryan P. Stirling, United States Attorney, Charleston, S outh Carolina, Benjamin N. Garn er, Assista nt United States Attorney, OFF ICE OF THE UNITED STA TES ATTORNEY, Col umbia, South Car olina, f or Appellee.

2 RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge: Appellate courts review; they do not retry. We owe juries — and presiding trial judge s— real deference on fact - bound calls and credibility determination s. That deference is dispositive here. A jury convicted Daqua Ritter of three charges related to Ritter’s murder of a transgender woman. On appeal, Ritter argues that a juror was biased, that a jury instruction was insufficient to cure the harm caused by an inadmissible hearsay statement, and that th e evidence was insufficient to convict. Giving d eference to the judge and jury, we reject Ritter’s challenges and affirm. I. BACKGROUND Defendant Daqua Ritter grew up in ru ral Allendale, South Carolina. 1 T hough he later moved away, he often returned there during summers. During his visits, he maintained a sexual relationship with victim Ernest “Dime” Doe — a “ biological male ” who “ presented as a female,” J.A. 26 3– 64. While Doe openly referred to Ritter as Doe’s “ man ” o r “ boyfriend, ” Ritter tried to keep the relationship secret. J.A. 606. H e often told Doe to delete their messages. And Ritter became angry whenever people brought up his relationship with Doe, stating on several occasions that he would beat Do e when others brought up their sexual relationship. Though Doe fe ared Ritter, their rel ationship continued. 1 Because Ritter was convicted at trial, we present the facts in the ligh t most favorable to the jury’s guilty verdict. See United Sta tes v. Perry, 92 F.4th 500, 514 (4t h Cir. 2024).

3 When Doe wa s found shot dead in a car beside a ru ral road, rumors implicating Ritter quickly surfaced. J ust hours earlier, Doe had be en pulled over for speeding while Ritter was in the passenger seat. That stop was the last time that Doe was seen alive. Hours later, Doe was dead. A nd Ritter then showed up at his un cle’s house — blocks away fro m the crime scene — asking for a ride into town. Before long, Ritter asked friend s to dispose of his gun and burned his clothes in a barrel. This initiated a year s- long investigation conduct ed by state and federal law enforcement. A federal grand jury eventually indicted Ritter for: (1) willfully causing bodily injury to Doe because of Do e’s gender identity, resulting in death, under 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2); (2) using a gun during a crime o f violence, under 1 8 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1); and (3) lying to investigators about Doe’s murder, under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3). A jury convicted Ritter on all counts, and the d istrict court sentenced him to life in prison. II. DISCUSSION Ritter challenges the jury’s guilty verdict on three grounds: juror bias, in admissible hearsay, and insufficient evidence. We reject those claims and affirm Ritter’s conv ictions. A. Alleged Juror Bia s Ritter first contends that Juror 71 ’ s alleged bias warranted a new trial. We review the district court’s den ial of a n ew trial deferentially, reversing only for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Council, 77 F.4th 240, 264 (4th Cir. 2023). Ritter claims that Juror 71 — a tran sgender woman — was biased against Ritter. The claim turns on what Juror 71 said and did after the verdict.

4 During jury selection, Juro r 71 voluntarily disclosed to the court: “I am tran s. And I just didn ’ t want that to become an issue. I p ersonally don ’ t think it would affect my decision one way or the oth er, but I ’ ll leave that up to you.” J.A. 131; see also id. (answering “no” to the qu estion: “would your id entity as transgender prevent you from rendering a verdict in this case based solely on the evidence that you see in this courtroom and the law as I give it to you?”). Neither party asked any follow - up quest ions, and J uror 71 was eventually selected to serve as the ju ry’s foreperson. Shortly after returning the verdict, Juror 71 contacted the press about the trial. One newspape r quoted Juror 71 as saying, “I n my person al experience, it can be dangerous for transgender women to date,” and that transg ender people “are everywhere. If one of us goes down, there’ll be an other one of us on the jury.” J.A. 1306 – 0 7. Juror 71 told another newspaper, “ I wish I had this great angle to giv e you as a reporter, that my gender id entity weighed on this heavily and I saw myself in the victim, b ut honestly, it didn’t. I fo llowed the evidence and law and followed the judge’s instructio ns and did what was asked of me and came to that conclusion.” J.A. 1405. After these articles went liv e, the district court held an ev identiary hearing. The court asked many questions of Juro r 71, who affirmed that no past experience affected Juror 71’s ability to fairly consider the evidence. The cou rt found Juror 71 credible in the jury “questionnaire, during jury selection, at sidebar, and on numerous occasions at th e post - trial hearing.” J.A. 1474. The court found that Juror 71 ’ s statements to th e press did not contradict the juror ’ s oath of im partiality.

5 On appeal, Ritter argues that Juror 71’s post - trial actio ns suffice to show actual bias. 2 Actual bias exists only when a juror c annot or will not decide the case solely on the evidence. Porter, 23 F.4th at 327. The district court observ ed Juror 71 ’ s demeanor, p osed probing questions, and found the juror both credible and impartial. We reverse such credibility findings only for “ manifest error. ” United States v. Turner, 3 89 F.3d 111, 117 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 (1984)). None exists here. B. Hearsay Testimony Ritter next argues that the district co urt should have granted a mistrial because a curative instruction could not alleviate the prejudice caused by an inadmissible hearsay statement made at trial. At trial, the government called Kerria Mallory as a witness. When Doe was killed, Mallory was dating Ritter’s uncle, Kalv in Peeples. Mallory testified that she was at Peeples’s home when Ritter showed up ask ing Peeples for a ride into town. About half an hour later, Mallory drove p ast the murder scene, where she saw first responders surrounding Doe’s car. Mallory called Peeples to share what she saw. During h er direct examination, the government asked Mallory: “And what was [Peeples’s] reaction when you told him that information?” J.A. 911. The defense objected to the question on h earsay grounds. The government responded that i t sought to elicit only Mallory’s description of 2 Ritter’s claim of actual bias differs from a so - called McDonough claim. See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 555 (1984). Under McDonough, a litigant challeng es a juror’s failure to truthfully answer questions in jury selection. See Po rter v. White, 23 F.4th 322, 331 (4th Cir. 2022). Ritter does not raise a McDonough claim.

6 Peeples’s demeanor, so the district cou rt allowed M allory to answer. But Mallory responde d that Peeples told her that he had “heard that [Ritter] killed Dime Doe.” J.A. 912. Agreeing that the testimony was inadmissible, the parties discussed at sidebar how best to clea r things up. The government agreed to confront Mallory with her inconsistent grand jury testimony and t o clarify that she didn’t know from whom Peeples “heard” about the murde r. And d efense counsel subsequently cross - examined Mallory on th is discrepancy, confronting Mallory with her grand ju ry testimony that directly contradicted her claim at trial. Initially, Mallory doubled down on her new claim. But on red i rect, she eventually seemed to agree with the g overnment that during the phone call, Peeples “never said” that Ritter killed Doe. J.A. 9 21. After Mallory’s testimony, defense coun sel moved for a mistrial. The defense argued that Mallory’s statement essentially amounted to a confession, because other evidence showed that Peeples had been with Ritter shortly befor e the call. The judge denied the motion for a mistrial, b ut provided a strong, specific cu rative instruction th at the statement must be disregarded: Prior to lunch, the last witness on the stand was Ms. Mallory, and you heard her make a statement that was hearsay. Hearsay is an out - of - court statement, and our rules don’t allow hearsay evidence; our very important Rules of Evidence. She provi ded an out - of - court statement made by K alvin Peeples. I am advising you to disregard th is statement. She was asked, w hat reaction did Mr. Peeples have when you told him you saw a crime scene near his hou se? And she ga ve an out - of - court statement, a hearsay statement that he said he heard that [Ritter] killed Dime D oe.

7 I am instructing you to disregard that statement as evidence. You are to wi pe it from your minds as if it was never said. It is n ot evidence. You cannot treat it as evidence. And you ha ve taken an oath to fol low my instructions, so I expect you not to treat it as evid ence in any way. J.A. 932; see United States v. Martin, 756 F.2d 323, 328 (4th Cir. 19 85) (holding tha t b efore granting a mistrial, “the cou rt should always consider whether the giv ing of a curative instruction or some alternative less d rastic than a mistrial is approp riate.”). On appeal, Ritter argues that the curative instruction failed to cure the prejudice caused by Mallory’s inadmissible testimony. 3 In his view, the district court judge w as required to grant a mistrial based on the testimon y’s p rejudicial effect. We find no abuse of discretion. United States v. Hart, 91 F.4th 732, 745 (4th Cir. 2024). When a district court issues a curative instruction, courts p resume that the jury follow s it. See Samia v. United States, 599 U. S. 635, 64 6 – 47 (2023). This pres umption is “almost invariable.” Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987). I t yields o nly in the “exceptional” case where inadmissible evidence makes so strong an im pression that its prejudicial effect cannot realistically be erased by an instruction to disregard. Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 438 (1887). Evidence of this sort would need to be uniquely prejud icial — the type of vivid evidence that a ju ry couldn’t be expected to d isregard. For example, s om e confessions made by a non - testifying defendant that directly implicate a co - defendant will 3 Ritter d oes not argue that the curative instruction ’s content was ambiguous or ill - worded. See United States v. Ince, 21 F.3d 576, 583 – 84 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a vague curative instruction failed to remedy erroneous ly adm itting a highly prejudicial confession).

8 meet that standard. See Samia, 599 U.S. at 647 – 53; see also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 – 37 (1968). 4 After the brief te stimony was accidentally elicited, b oth parties impeach ed Mallory. Before Mallory left the stand, she seemed to acknowledge that she h ad made a mistake in her trial testimony — or, at the very least, that her trial testimo ny conflicted with her sworn grand jur y testimony. So t he hearsay testimo ny was already und ermined before the district court issued its clear, direct, and comprehensive instruction. Moreover, the testimony was far from the sort of vivid evi dence that mi ght be incurably prejudicial. Ritter arg ues that the hearsay testimony amounted to an incurable confession. But the testimony didn’t amount to a confession at all. Mallory’s testimony suggested o nly t h at Peeples had “heard” that Ritter killed Doe. Although Peeples had been with Ritter shortly b efore making this comment — and so the jury might view this testimony as an implicit confession — the jury also h eard throughout trial that the lo cal “rumor mill” had quickly implicated Ritter as th e killer. J.A. 376. So the jury could just as plausibly have concl uded that Peeples “heard” this inform ation from somebody other th an Ritter. W e decline to characterize the testimony as a con fession. What remains is a vague repo rt — without a source, without details, and later walked back — that Peeples heard that Ritter killed Doe. The d istrict court acted well within its 4 A non - testifying defendant’s confession is admissible against him as a statement of a party opponent. F ed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). But it is not admissible in a jo int trial as evidence against a co - defendant, at least o n that basis. C f. United States v. Dargan, 738 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 2013). The Bru ton line of cases recognize s that when a confession directly implicates a co - defendant, a limiting instruction directing the jury to con sider it only against the confessor cannot cure th e Confrontation Clause violation.

9 discretion in decid in g that any p rejudice from that testimony could be cure d by a strong, specific instruction telling th e jury to disregard it. C. Sufficiency Of The Evidence Finally, Ritter challenges the sufficiency o f the evidence on two charges. Defendants raising a sufficiency ch allenge bear a “heavy burden.” United S tates v. Huskey, 90 F.4th 651, 6 6 2 (4th C ir. 2024) (quotation omitted). Th e Court v iew s the evidence in the light “most favorable to the pro secution” and assume s “ the jury reso lved all credibility disputes or judgment calls in the gov ernment ’ s favor.” Id. (quotation omitted). A lthough we review the district court de novo, w e must uphold the jury’s verdict if “ any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime b eyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Millender, 970 F.3d 523, 528 (4t h Cir. 202 0) (emph asis in original). 1. “ Because of . . . gender identity ” Ritter first challenges his conv iction under 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2) for willfully causing bodily injury to D oe because of Doe’s gender identity, resulting in death. Ritter focuses on the motive element, arg uing that the evid ence was insufficient to pro ve that he killed Doe “because of” Doe’s “actual o r perceived ... gender identity.” § 249(a)(2)(A). B ut b efore addressing the evidence presented at trial, we try to clarify what the statute requires. First, what does it mean for somebody to act “because of” a given trait? This C ourt recently addressed this very qu estion in United States v. Hudak, which interpreted iden tical language in 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 3631(a). See 156 F.4th 405, 4 10 – 11 (4th Cir. 2025). Following a lo ng line of Supreme Court cases, we h e ld that “because of”

10 incorporates “the tradition al but - for causation standard.” 5 Id. at 410 (collecting cases). We apply that same standard here. So the government had to show that Ritter would not have killed Doe but fo r Doe’s “actual or perceived ... gender identity.” The statute defines “gender identity” as “ actual or perceived gender - related characteristics.” 6 § 249(c)(4). Inserting this definition into the operative provision yields the requirement that the go vernment prove Ritter killed Doe because of Doe’s “actual or perceived” “actual or perceived gender - related characteristics.” That’s not a typo — at least not on our part. But repeating th e “actual or perceived” modifier makes for awkward repetition, if not statutory gibberish. What, for instance, are “perceived perceived” or “actual actual” — or “actual perceived” — gender - related characteristics? But because Ritter has not argued that this textual ambiguity creates any problems, we do not address those potential concerns. Nor is it c lear wh at the term “g ender - related characteristics” encompasses. 7 But we need not define the outer limits of “gender identity ” to resolve this appeal. Instead, we need only ensure that sufficient evid ence supported the jury ’ s finding that Ritter killed Doe 5 T his standard does not require the g overnment to sho w that a g iven trait was a defendant’s sole (or even prim ary) motive. See, e.g., Burrage v. U nited States, 571 U.S. 204, 211 (2014). 6 T his d efinition does not require pro of that the victim iden tifi ed as transgender. S ee J.A. 1 165 (“The United States need not prove w hat gender iden tity Dime Doe was or that Dime Doe was a transgender female.”). 7 The phrase is potentially quite capacious. I t mig ht even swallow the statute’s earlier enumeration of “gender” as a protected characteristic. Because gender might itself be a “gender - related characteristic,” an assault motivated by a v ictim’s gender might fall within the statute’s definition of an assault motivated by “gender identity.”

11 because of some characteristic related to gender. And although t he parties have not wrestled with the statutory d efinitions, the evidence — viewed in th e light most favorable to the g overnme nt — was sufficient to lead a rational juror to conclude that Ritter killed Doe because of one o f Doe’s perceived gender - related characteristics: Doe’s biological sex. 8 The evidence showed that the broader Allen dale community knew that Doe was a biological male who presented as a woman. Ritter was very sensitive about people finding out that he was in a rel ationship with Doe, because Ritte r didn’t want peop le questioning his sexuality. So Ritter pressured Doe to keep their relationship secret, including by asking Doe to delete the messages they ex changed. Despite Ritter’s sec recy, several people eventually found out about their relation ship. As a result, one person cal led Ritter a “faggot,” J.A. 631, while another thought that Ritter “must be” gay. J.A. 762. When ot hers brought up their relationship, Ritter repeatedly became angry and said that he would “beat” Doe. J.A. 617, 761. Thus, Ritter treated his r elationship with Doe very differently th an his relationships with biological women, which h e openly discussed. T he evidence here wa s sufficient for a ration al juror to find th at Ritter killed Doe because Doe was a biological male. The evidence su ggests that Ritter was motivated in large part by Doe’s desire to publicize their relation ship. In other words, one but - for cause of Ritter’s decision to murder Doe was Do e’s indiscretion. But the evidence also supports a jury finding that Ritter would not hav e killed a biological female who was similarly public 8 Regardless of h ow one might interpret the term “g ender - related characteristics,” biological sex neatly fits within the category. W hatever distinction s one might wish to draw between sex and gender, sex is rel ated to gender.

12 about their relationship. Whereas Ritter was open about his prior relationships with biological females, he was secretiv e about his relationship with Doe. And Ritter expressed anger with Doe when Doe wasn’t sufficient ly discr e et. From this evidence, a reasonable juror could conclude t hat Ritter wouldn’t have killed Do e “but for” the fact that Doe was a biological male. Because biological sex is a “gender - related characteristic,” there was sufficient evidence to find that Ritter killed Doe “because of” Doe’s “gender identity.” § 249(a), (c). 2. Nexus to federal law enforcement Ritter also argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him unde r 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) for lying to investigators about Doe’s murder. This charge was based on several lies that Ritter told to S outh Carolina Law Enforcement Division agents when he was interviewed the day Doe w as mu rder ed. Among other things, Ritter lied about: (1) being with Doe earlier that d ay when Doe was pulled o ver for speeding and (2) getting a ride from Ritter’s uncle less than a mile from where Doe was killed. To prove witness tampering under § 1512(b)(3), the government h ad to establish three elements: (1) Ritter knowingly engaged in misleading conduct toward another person; (2) Ritter acted with the intent to hinder, delay, or p revent communication of information to a federal law enforcement o fficer; and (3) the in formation related to the commission or possible commission of a federal offense. While the first and third elemen ts present no difficulty, the intent element warrants closer examination. H ow can a defend ant form the intent to “hinder, delay, or p revent”

13 communication to a federal law e nforcement officer without co ntemplating any specific federal officer? T he Supreme Court addressed this questio n in Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668 (2011), which in terpreted § 1512(a)(1)(C) — a subsection of the same statute that prohibits killing somebody “with intent to. . . prevent the communication by any person to a law enforcement officer. . . of the United States” of “information relating to the. . . possible commission of a Federal offense.” § 15 12(a)(1)(C). The Court held that a defendant acts with the requ isite intent to “prevent” such a commun ication whenever it is reasonably likely that the information would hav e been communicated to a federal officer but for the defendant ’s condu ct. 9 Fowler, 563 U.S. at 678. Fowler ’s reasoning applies here. Section 1512(b) (3) prohibits kn owingly “engag[ing] in misleading conduct 10 toward another person, with intent to. . . hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer. . . of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense.” Although the prohibi ted conduct differs between th e two subsections — “misleading 9 Taken in isolation, one could reasonably read § 1512(a)(1)(C) to require th e defendant to kill the victim with th e subjective intent to prevent a communication from reaching federal o fficers — i.e., that the defendant must have in mind the officer’s federal status. But § 1512(g)(2) states that “ no state of min d need be pr oved with respect to” the officer’s federal status. In Fow ler, t he Supreme Court resolved this apparent tension by requiring two things: (1) the d efendant must at least have the (subjective) “ intent to prevent communications to law enforcement officers in g eneral” and (2) it must be (objectively) reasonably likely that “at least one relevan t communication would have been mad e to a federal law enforcement officer. ” 563 U.S. at 674 – 78. 10 “Misleading conduct” is statuto rily defined to include “knowingly making a false statement.” 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(3)(A).

14 conduct” instead of murder — the language relating to the defendant ’s intent is materially the same. 11 Fowler ’s reasonable - likelihood stand ard therefore governs our interpretation of § 1512(b)(3). Fowler ’ s reasonable - likelihood standard isn ’ t onerous. It just requires that the likelihood of communication to a federal officer at the time of the misleading conduct be “more than remote, outlandish, o r simply hypothetical.” Fowler, 563 U.S. at 6 78. Th is likelihood “ may be inferred by the jury from the fact that the offense w as federal in nature, plus additional appropriate evidence.” United States v. Ramos - Cruz, 667 F.3d 487, 497 (4th Cir. 2012) (quotation om itted). And collaboration between federal an d state law enforcement can be a factor supporting a reason able likelihood finding. See United States v. Smith, 723 F.3d 51 0, 518 (4th Cir. 2013). We hold that a reasonable juror could have found that it was reasonably likely that information — here, Ritter’s statements to state agen ts — would hav e been communicated to federal officers. Recall that we conduct this li kelihood inquiry in the cou nterfactual world where Ritter did not engage in the deceitful condu ct. In other words, we ask whether it is reasonably likely that stat e agents would have co mmunicated Ritter’s statements to federal 11 Though it doesn’t u ltimately change our analysis, one difference between th e statutory subsections is worth not ing: Whereas the statute in Fow ler only used the verb “prevent,” the statute here uses the set of verbs, “hinder, delay, or prevent.” § 1512(b)(3). Fowler relied in part on a specific dictionary definition of “prevent.” 563 U.S. at 675 – 76. While “hinder” and “delay” don’t share the s ame definition, they get at similar con cepts. And Fowl er ’s core rea soning applies with equal force to th ese verbs. That is, it would be odd to speak of an inten t to delay or hinder a future act that has no chance of occurring. See id. at 674 – 75. So we apply Fowler ’s reasonable likelihood standard despite the presence of “hinder” and “delay” in § 1512(b)(3).

15 officers if Ritter had been h onest with state agents about his whereabouts on the day of the murder. For starters, the information that Ritter was trying to conceal was “ information relating to the commission. . . of a Federal offense ”: Ritter violated § 249(a)(2), as his subsequent conviction demonstrates. And a reasonable juror co uld consid er the fact that Ritter’s underlying conduct con stituted a federal offense in drawing th e inference that an honest statement to state agents would have been communicated to federal officers. Ramos - Cruz, 667 F.3d at 497. 12 What’s more, “additional appropriate evidence” permitted a reasonable juro r to find that the reasonable likelihood standard was met. Id. The jury heard evidence that South Carolina Law Enforcement Division agents “sh are information all the time” with federal officers. 13 J.A. 255. And al though the investigation into Doe’s murder began as a state investigation, state agents eventually did involve federal law en forcement. See Ramos - Cruz, 667 F.3d at 497 (considering actual federal involvement as probative o f the likelihood of communication to federal of ficers). From that eviden ce, a juror could reasonably conclude that truthful statements fro m Ritter would likely have been shared. 12 Though we assess the likelihoo d of communication at the time of the misleading conduct, later events are ev idence from which that likelih ood may be inferred. See Ramos - Cruz, 667 F.3d at 497 –9 8. 13 Given the limited law - enforcement resources in Allendal e, the Sou th Carolina Law Enforcement Division — th e statewide law enforcement agency — handled the investigation from the earliest stages.

16 This evidence is not o verwhelming. But “overwhelming lik elihood” is not the standard. W e ask only whet her the re was enough evidence to permit a reasonable juror to conclude that had Ritter b een truthful with state agents, his statements would likely have reached federal officers. Under this deferential standard, we affirm the jury’s v erdict. * * * The district court acted within its discretion in denying Ritter’s motio n s for a new trial based on inadmissible hearsay or an allegedly biased juror. And there was enough evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdict. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.