Garten Trucking LC v NLRB - Enforcement of Labor Order

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF AP PEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 24 - 1973 GARTEN T RUCKING LC, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELAT IONS BOARD, Respondent. ASSOCIAT ION OF WESTE RN PULP AND P APER WORKERS, Intervenor. No. 24 - 2102 NATIONAL LABOR RELAT IONS BOARD, Petitioner, v. GARTEN T RUCKING LC, Respondent. On Application for Enforcement of an O rder of the National L abor Relations Board. (10 - CA - 279843; 10 - CA - 280804; 10 - CA - 281786; 1 0 - CA - 282554; 10 - CA - 296060; 10 - RC - 279259)

2 Submitted: September 3 0, 2025 Decided: February 18, 2026 Before HARRIS, HEYTENS, and BE NJAMIN, Circuit Jud ges. Affirmed by un published opinion. Judge Benjamin wro te the opinion in which Judge Harris and Judge Heytens joined. ON BRIEF: Agnis C. Chakravorty, King F. Tower, WOODS ROGERS VANDEVENTER BLACK PLC, Roanoke, Virginia, for Petitioner/Cross - Respondent. William B. Cowen, Acting General Counsel, Stephanie Cahn, Acting Deputy General Counsel, Peter Sung Ohr, Deputy G eneral Counsel, R uth E. Burdi ck, Deput y Associate General Counsel, Meredith Jason, Assistant General Counsel, Elizabeth A. Heaney, Supervisory Attorney, Joel A. Heller, NAT IONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Washington, D.C., for Respondent/Cro ss - Petitioner. Unpublished opinions are not binding p recedent in this circuit.

3 D E ANDREA G IST BENJA MIN, Circuit Judge: Garten Trucking LC (“Garten”) petitions the court f or review of a National Labor Relations Board (“Board”) decision and order, which found that Garten had interfered with and discouraged labor organization in vi olati on of 29 U.S.C. § 15 8(a)(1), (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 - 169 (the “NLRA”). The Board specifically too k issue with Garten’s interference with its emp loyees’ efforts to elect the Association of Western Pulp and Paper Workers (the “Un ion”) as their bargaining representative. The Board imposed a Gissel b argaining order, requiring G arten to bargain with the Union, and a n otice - reading and cease - and - desist order. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 57 5 (1969). The Board now seeks enforcement of its o rder. For the foregoing reasons, we grant th e Board’s application for enforcement and deny Garten’s petiti on for review. I. A. Garten is a small family - run trucking business in Covington, Virginia, that transports paper for WestRock paper mill. Garten employees sought to elect the Union as their bargaining representative. At the time, Garten employed 109 employees, meaning the Union needed to collect 55 votes to succeed. But a s union organ izing began, Garten managers began questioning th eir employees about union activity an d making statements about the Union during company meetings.

4 For example, Georg e Rose, a Garten supervisor, brought Sh annon Morgan, one of his direct reports, into his office to discuss the ongoing union campaign. Rose told Morgan that he heard rumors about the U nion, that he believed he kn ew who started the campaign, that he heard the exact number of union authorization cards signed, and that he though t she might know who started the campaign. Morgan was unw illing to discuss union activity with him. The same day, Rose app roached Jeff Baker, another of his direct reports, and asked him about the union campaign, about which union was being considered, and about which employees contacted the U nion. Baker answered some questions but denied knowing who contacted the U nion, although he w as responsible for making contact. At a company meeting th e next day, Garten co - owner Tommy Garten told employees he heard that employees were talking with a union. H e said Garten’s contract with WestRock would expire in 14 months and it would not b e renewed if employees unionized, but that he would lik ely renew the contract if they voted against the U nion. At a subsequent company meeting a few weeks later, Tommy Garten again emphasized the time remaining on WestRock’s contract. He stated Garten would shut down if a union came in and told empl oyees tha t if they voted to unionize, another company would com e in, and they w ould be out of a job. Garten als o discipline d two employees for eng aging in union activity on the job in violation of the company’s employee hand book p olicy. G arten ’s policy provides th at

5 “[e]mployees may not solicit. . . to other employees during their own work time, to other employees who are working, or [in ] areas where customers are present.” J.A. 2209. 1 Garten first disciplined driver Allen Pullin. During one of Pullin’s lunch break s, he asked two other employees if they knew about the U nion and aske d for their thou ghts on the U nion. One coworker said they were happy with what they had, and the other di d not respond. Pullin asked no oth er questions. General Manager Ben Strozier issued Pullin a written warning for soliciting emp loyees to s ign union car ds during wor k hours in violat ion of the company’s solicitation p olicy. Pullin said he was at lunch an d thus did not vi olate the policy. Second, driver Ray Humphries was disciplined for talking with a coworker while on a brea k and aski ng the c oworke r’s opini on on the U nion. The cow orker re sponded h e needed to discuss the U nion with his family and Humphries stated he had union cards if the coworker later became interested. Tommy Garten called Humphries on his personal cellphone and said he heard Humphries was soliciting for the U nion and that this was not allowed on WestRock property. Humphries was issued a written warning by S trozier simi larly for soliciting wh ile on duty in violation of Garten’s solicitation policy. At one point, t he U nion collected 61 union authorization cards (expressing support for the Union and intent to vo te to unionize). About a month after the alleged unfair labor 1 Citations to “J.A.” refer to th e joint appendix filed by the parties. The J.A. contains the record on appeal from the Board. Page numbers refer to th e “J.A. #” pagination.

6 practices, the U nion held a representation election. Union representation was ultimately rejected in a 65 - 30 vote against representation. B. The Union alleged multip le unfair labor practice s b y Garten in violation of § 15 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NL RA. The issues were heard before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The AL J found that G arten committed unfair labor practices in response to union activity and interfered with its emp loyees’ rights. The Board adopted the ALJ’s finding s and determined that Garten had violated employees’ rights in four distinct ways. First, it determin ed Rose’s questioning of Morgan and Baker constituted in terrogation and created an impression of surveillance in violation of § 158(a)(1). Second, the Board found that Tommy Garten’s statements at company meetings amounted to threats violating § 158(a)(1). Third, it d etermined that Garten disciplined its employees in violation of § 158(a)(3) because G arten lacked an honest belief that its emp loyees were engaged in misconduct. Fourth, th e Board found that Garten’s solicitation policy was overbroa d, a violation of § 158(a)(3). The Board then made separate fin dings to craft and impose proportional remedies. It determined that the effects o f Garten’s coercive conduct w ere so pervasive that employee s would be best protected by a Gissel bargaining order, requiring Garten to bargain with the Union. As oth er remedies, t he Board also imposed a notice - reading order and a cease - and - desist order. Garten petitioned th is co urt for review, and the Board cross - applied to enforce the order. T he Union was allowed to intervene in these proceedings in support of the Board.

7 We have jurisdiction to consider Garten’s petition and the Board’s cross - applicatio n pursuant t o 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) and (f). First, w e address the Board’s findings regarding Garten’s unfair labor practices. Seco nd, we consider the Gissel ord er and other remedies implemented by the Board. For the following reasons, w e grant the Board’s application for enforcement. II. Our review is confined to d etermining whether, considering the record as a w hole, the Board’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. In tertape Polymer Corp. v. NLRB, 801 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Ci r. 2015). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adeq uate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Medeco Sec. Locks, Inc. v. NLRB, 142 F.3d 7 33, 742 (4t h Cir. 1998)). “ It is ‘ more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. ’ ” Vance v. NLRB, 71 F.3d 486, 489 (4t h Cir. 199 5) (quoting NLRB v. Peninsual Gen. Hosp. Medical C tr., 36 F.3d 1262, 1269 (4th Cir. 1994)). “ [W] e must accept the Bo ard’s factual findings based on credibility d eterminations ‘absent extraordinary circumstances. Exceptional circumstances include those instan ces when a credibility determination is unreasonable, contradicts other finding s of fact, or is based on an inadequate reason o r no reason at all.’ ” Intertape, 801 F.3d at 231 (citation omitted). We do not “displace the Board’s choice between two fairly conflicting views of the evidence.” S.C. State Ports Auth. v. NLRB, 75 F. 4th 368, 378 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal alterations omitted) (quoting NLRB v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of Fayetteville, 258 F.3d

8 305, 310 (4th Cir. 20 01)). “We accord due deference to the reason able inferences that the Board draws from the evidence.” Grinnell Fire Prot. Sys. Co. v. NLRB, 236 F.3d 187, 195 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing NLRB v. Br own, 380 U.S. 278, 29 2 (1965)). This is “regardless of whether we might have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Id. at 195 (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951)). Garten asserts that n o substantial evidence supports the Board’s ruling that Garten interrogated its employees and created an impression of surv eillance in doing so, made threats at company meetin gs, unlawfully disciplined its employ ees, or maintained an unlawful solicitation policy. We disagree. A. The Board first adopted the AL J’s findings that Garten interrog at ed and created an impression of surv eillance among employees in v iolation of § 158(a)(1). We agree with the Board’s determination and hold there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Board’s finding that Garten’s action s coerced its employees. The NLRA provi des that it is an unfair labor practice for an emp loyer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed” in the Act, such as the right to organize. § 158 (a)(1). An employer violates § 158(a)(1) when an employer’s conduct “reasonably tend[s] to coerce or intimidate employees.” NL RB v. Grand Can yon Min. Co., 116 F.3d 1039, 1044 (4th Cir. 1997). The coerciveness of an employer’s conduct is a question “for the sp ecialized experience of the NLRB.” Id. An employer also violates § 15 8(a)(1) when it qu estions employees ab out union view s or activity, if t he questioning “had a reasonabl e tendency in the totality of the circum stances

9 to intimidate.” Standard - Coosa - Thatcher Carpet Yarn Div., Inc. v. NLRB, 691 F.2d 1133, 1137 (4th Cir. 1982) (quoting NLRB v. P. B. & S. Chemi cal Co., 567 F.2d 1263, 1267 (4th Cir. 1977)). To determine whether the questioning of employees is coercive, such that it amounts to interrogation, “we must consider a variety of factors including the history of employer hostility to the union, the nature of inform ation sought, the identity of the questioner, and the place and method of q uestioning.” Intertape, 801 F.3d at 231 (cleaned up). We also consider “whether the employee was reluctant to d iscuss unionization.” Id. Alternatively, t o determine whether an employer create d an impression of surveillance, we consider o bjectively if “the employer’s conduct, u nder the totality of the circumstances, was such as would tend to interfere with, restrain, or coerce emp loyees in the exercise of their rights.” Id. at 236 (cleaned up). Even one comment to on e employee is enough to establish an impression of surveillance. See Gr and Canyon, 1 16 F. 3d at 104 5. Conveyin g one kno ws the per son respo nsible f or bringi ng in a uni on is violative of § 158(a)(1). Dillingham Marine & Mfg. Co., 239 NLRB 904, 909 (1978), enforced, 610 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1980). T he Board determined G arten interrogated and created an impression of surveillance of its employees based on Rose’s conversations with Morgan and B aker. It found that Rose’s questioning amounted to coercive interrogation because both employee s were reluctant to discuss the union. A nd Baker, the Garten employee that contacted the U nion, deni ed knowing who made contact. The Boar d also found that Rose indicat ed that he knew who started the campaign and his mention of the exact number of union cards

10 signed so far (at a time when the union campaign was not public) constituted an impression of surveillance. Garten challenges only the credibility determination s of certain witness testimony made by the ALJ and the Board. Garten attacks Baker’s credibility as he was untruthful regarding unrelated matters. It asserts Rose’s comment s to Mor gan and Baker were a result of th ings he heard in the company “rumor mill,” not a bypr oduct of employee surveillance. Appellant’s Br. (ECF No. 26) at 28. These challenges present no exceptional circumstances requiring us to overturn the Board’s findings. Garten has not offered sufficient evidence that the Board’s credibility determination was unreasonable nor evidence that sufficiently contradicts th e Board’s findings of fact. But e ven without Baker’s testimony, there is sub stantial evidence in the record to support the Board’s finding that these unfair labor practices occurred. Specifically, the Board’s reasoning was grounded in Morgan’s testimony that Rose aske d questions that sh e was reluctant to answer, and that his discussion with her created an impression that he was surveill ing her. Accordingly, we agree with the Board that there is substantial evidence in the reco rd to support its finding that Garten in terrogated its employees. B. Second, the B oard found that Tommy Garten’s statements at co mpany meetings amounted to threats of job loss and plant closure in violation of § 158(a)(1). We also hold that there i s substantial evidence in the record to support the Board’s findin gs regarding threats.

11 Employers may discuss views on union activity generally, “so long as the communications do not contain a th reat of reprisal or force or pro mise of benefit.” Gissel, 395 U.S. at 619 (cleaned up). An employer may “p redict the precise effect of Unionization” but “when coupled with th e threat of plant closure, the Board is j ustified in concludin g. . . t hat an unfair labor practice occurred.” W eis Markets, Inc. v. NLRB, 265 F.3d 239, 2 44 (4th Ci r. 2001). T he Board concluded that Tommy G arten’s statements at company meetings constituted threats of job loss and plant closure. The Board relied on m ultiple witnesses that corroborated the statements made at the meeting s. The Board specifically noted that Garten failed to offer contradictory evid ence of what was said at each of th ose meetings. Garten contends the ALJ and the Board flatl y disregarded the testim ony of Garten management, which, in sum, included broad, categorical denials of the events alleged (such as the interrogations or company meetings) with out specific testimony contrary to the allegations. It argues instead that com ments by leadership were ultimately misconstrued, and without a recording, it could not clear u p those discrepancies. We hold th ere are no exceptional circum stances requiring we overturn the Board’s credibility determinations of witn ess testimony. Garten did not present evidence contradicting the Board’s findings. Instead, Garten asks the court to accept its blanket denials of the veracity o f certain statements, and to view those denials as exceptio nal circumstance s warranting o ur disregard of the facts i n the record. Several witnesses testified about the statements mad e by Garten management in different meeting s. Thus, we defer to such statements as substantial evidence that supports the Board’s findings.

12 C. Th ird, th e Board found Garten unlawfully disciplined its employees in violation of § 158(a)(3). We hold there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Board’s finding s. It is an unfair labor practice for an employer “by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of emp loyment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor o rganization.” § 158(a)(3). An employer violates § 158 (a)(3) when it discharges an emp loyee for engaging in protected activity when, in fact, the employee was not guilty of that misconduct. NLRB v. Bur nup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964). The burden rests on th e employer to show “that it held an honest belief that the discharged emp loyee engaged in misconduct. If the employer meets its b urden, the burden shifts to the [g]eneral [c] ounsel [of the NLRB] to show that the employee did not, in fact, engage in the asserted misconduct.” Roadway Expres s, Inc, 355 NLRB 19 7, 204 (201 0), enforced 427 F. App’ x 838 (11th Cir. 20 11). First, the Board determin ed Garten did not have an honest belief that Pullin and Humphries were engaged in misconduct when talking to other employees about the Union. It determined that the relevant con versations took place during breaks, no t working hours, meaning neither employee violated the company ’s solicitation policy. Garten argues that Pullin and Humph ries were guilty of misconduct and thus disciplinary action was lawful. It asserts that Stro zier’s warnings and the relevant timecards indicate Pullin and Humph ries solicited during working hours. Garten further

13 argues its policy is lawful because G arten does not enforce the policy when someone is not working. We agree with the Board ’s f inding that Garten ha s not met its burden. As relied on by the Board, Garten only offered Strozier’s warnings and the relevant timecards at issue to support its claim. But Garten did not offer employee testimony from those who complained of the misconduct to Strozier. It offered only S trozier’s notes, which stated the complainant - employees indicated they were on duty when each of the alleged conversations occurred. The timecards also do not specify when Garten employees take b reaks, nor do Garten employees have an assigned lunch or break time. Considering Pullin and Humphries testified they only spoke t o fello w employees during lunch breaks an d never solicited union card signatures, the Board appropriately found Garten had not met its burden. D. Fourth, the Board found Garten maintained an unlawful company solicitation policy in violation of § 158(a)(3). We hold there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the Board’s finding s. Employees may solicit coworkers on company property so long as they d o so outside of wor king hours and a company rule to the contrary is presumptively prohibited. NLRB v. Lexington Chair C o., 361 F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 19 66). T he Board took issue with Garten’s solicitation policy at larg e which states that “[e]mployees may not solicit. . . to other employees during their own wo rk time, to other employees who are working, o r [in] areas where customers are present.” J.A. 2209. It found the phrase “or [in] areas where

14 customers are present” problematic, determining the policy implied that, during nonworking times, employees may not solicit. The B oard determine d the policy was overbroa d in viola tion of § 158(a)(3). W e agree with the Board’s d etermination that G arten’s em ployee handbook policy is unlawfu l ly broa d. It leaves open whether employ ees may solicit, even outside of working hours, when in an area a customer co uld b e present. Further, Garten h as offered no evidence that it only enforces the policy when employees solicit during w orking hours. And ultimately, this argument does not resolve the Board’s primary concern that the policy could ap ply during nonworki ng hours i n violati on of § 158(a)(3). III. T he Board imposed a G issel order, requiring Garten to bargain with the Un ion, and other remedies, such as n otice - reading and cease - and - d esist orders. We hold the Bo ard acted within its discretion in imposing these remedies. The Board maintains broad discretion to craft orders that remedy unfair labor practices. NLRB v. Williams E nters., Inc., 50 F.3d 12 80, 1289 (4th Cir. 1995). Generally, “[i] n fashioning its remedies. . . the Board draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise all its own, and its choice of remedy must therefore be given special respect by reviewing courts.” Gissel, 395 U.S. at 612 n.32. We enforce the Board’s choice o f remedy “ ‘ unless it can be shown that the order is a p atent attempt to achieve ends other than those wh ich can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the NLRA. ’ ” Fibreboar d Paper Pro ds.

15 Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964) (citing Virg inia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943)). A. The Board may ord er an employer to bargain with a unio n in one of two circumstances: (1) “exceptional cases m arked by outrageous and pervasive unfair labo r practices, ” and (2) in “less extraordinary cases marked by less pervasive practices which nonetheless still have the tend ency to undermine majority strength and impede the election processes.” Gissel, 395 U.S. at 613 – 14. The Board applied the second category, which requires (1) the union on ce had majority status, (2) the employer committed un fair labor practices that caused majority status to dissipate, (3) the p ossibility of erasing the effects of past practices to ensure a fair election through traditional remedies is sligh t, and (4) employees’ sentiments expressed in union cards would be better protected by a bargain ing order than a new election. Id. at 614. A G issel or der is justified “unless [there is] a very strong show ing negat[ing] the inference o f lasting effects. ” Standard - Coos a - Thatche r, 691 F.2d at 1144. T he employer’s violations alone do not establish a future election will b e unfair, as mitigating circumstances may exist and alter the seriousness of the conduct at issue. NLRB v. So - Lo Foods, Inc., 985 F.2d 123, 126 n. 5 (4th Cir. 19 92). The Board must make specific and detailed findings about “the likelihood of recurring misconduct, the resid ual impact of unfair labor practices, con sidering whether that effect has been or w ill be dissipated by the passage of time, and the efficacy of [ordinary] remedies ” befo re implementing a Gissel order. Evergreen Am. Corp. v. NLRB, 531 F.3d 321, 329 – 30 (4th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up);

16 J.A. 2214 n.21. But hallmark violations such as “[t]hreat of plant closure .. . sta nding alone, may support a bargaining order.” So - Lo Foods, Inc., 985 F.2 d at 127 (citation omitted). Such violation s “are so coercive that their presence will su pport the issuance of a bargaining order unless some sig nificant mitigating circumstance exists.” Id. (cit ation omitted). T o establish factors one and two, the Board fou nd the Union once had majority status whe n 61 of 10 9 employe es, or 56%, signed uni on cards. It d etermined that, a fter the union campaign began, Garten committed several unfair labor practices, including interrogation, surveillance, un lawful discipline, and the most flagrant, threats of jo b loss, such that the majority was undermined and the ability of a fair future election was significantly impeded. T he Board then considered its previou s decision against Garten where it found an unfair labor practice occ urred, 2 and taken together with the present hallmark violation of threatening job loss, found factors three and fo ur to be met — that it was highly unlikely that the effects of Garten ’s coercive conduct would be easily era sed. Accordingly, the Board found that emp loyee sentiments would be best protected by a Gissel bargaining order. 2 This court enforced the order against Garten after one of the curren t co - owners, Robert “Dizzy” Garten, blamed the Union for employees not receiving raises through an employee messaging bo ard in violation of § 158(a)(1). Garten Trucking LC v. NL RB, 139 F.4th 26 9 (4th Cir. 2025) (emphasis added). The Board cites the court’s decision in its petition for enforcement here; however, that case was no t decided at the time the Board issued its o rder.

17 For factors one and two, Garten challenges the Board’s in terpretation of the record. Garten raised the same argument be fore the B oard, that some of the authorization cards should not cou nt because some employees wan ted their cards back after initially submitting them. But as the Board fo und, Garten has not offered any evidence that the employees that requested their union cards back did so prior to the unfair labor practices. It is clear to the court that the Union maintained majority status wh en 61 of 109 employees, or 56%, signed union authorization car ds prior to Garten’s multiple unfair labor practices as discussed in Part II.A -D. The threats made by Garten management at company meetings took place both during the union authorization card collection period and leading up to the union election. Employees were also discip lined after the collection period closed. If anything, evidence that an em ployee wanted their union authorization card returned after submission actually supports a finding that the Union’s majority status dissipated due to Garten’s un fair labor practices. W e agree with the Board’s find ings on factors one and two — that the Union had m ajority status and that Garten committed unfair labor practices resulting in th e Union’s majority status dissipating. Next, Garten challenges the Board’s an alysis of factors three and four. It ar gues that the Board failed to independently consider employee turnover and passage of time. Garten relies on Overnite Tran sp ortation Co. v. NLRB, 280 F.3d 41 7 (4th Ci r. 2002), a case in which th e court overturn ed a Gissel o rder holding that the Bo ard ignored mitigating circumstances th at su ggested against imposing such a remedy. The re, the court determined the lasting effects of unfair labor practices had subsid ed as the owners settled nearly all the

18 unfair labor practices complained of, subsequent fair elections had been held, and many executives involved in the unfair labo r practices had since left. Id. at 438. But Overnite is dissimilar to Garten’s circumstances. No settlements have been entered, nor fair election s held. No evidence was offered to show significant employee or management turnover. In fact, this is n ot Garten’s first set of unfair labo r practice violations. The court recently enforced a separate Board order against Garten for separate unfair labor practices. See Garten Trucking LC v. NL RB, 139 F. 4th 269 (4t h Cir. 20 25). Further, Garten has no t made a very strong showing n egating the inference of lasting effects. The Board considered the evidence before it, made specific and detailed findings, and reasonably found that fair ele ctions would be ensured and employee sentimen ts would be best protected by a bargaining order. We a g ree with the Board’ s findings and hold it properly imposed a Gissel order. B. The Board additionally impo sed both notice and cease - and - desist orders. It specifically selected t hese remedies “in light o f [Garten’s] extensive and serious unfair labor practices” while weighing the “numerosity and egregiousness” of Garten’s violations. J.A. 221 5–1 6. The notice order requ ires Garten management to publicly read a notice attached to the order, J.A. 2217 – 18, that reiterates employee protections under the NLRA. The cease - and - desist order instructs that Garten must “cease and d esist in any other manner from interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees” in exercising their rights. J.A. 2216.

19 Garten asserts the Board improperly imposed these remedies because substantial evidence in the record does no t support the need for these remedies. We en force the Board’s choice of remedy “unless it can b e shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the po licies of the NLRA.” Gissel, 395 U. S. at 612 n. 32 (internal quotations omitted). Garten has offered no evidence that the Board abused its discretion by imposing these remed ies. Therefore, w e defer to the knowledge and expertise o f the Board and hold it acted within its discretion in imposing both th e notice order and cease - and - desist order. IV. For the reasons abov e, we deny Garten’s petition for review and grant the Board’s application for en forcement. PETITION FO R REVIEW DENIED; CROSS - AP PLI CATION FOR ENFORCEME NT GRANTED