Brandon Case v. Officer Beasley - Opinion Vacated and Remanded

PUBLISHED UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH C IRCUIT No. 24-6953 BRANDON CASE, Plaintiff - Appellan t, v. OFFICER BEASLEY, a correctional officer; OFFICER URIETA, a correctional officer; KENNY C USTODIO, Defendants - Appell ees, and UNKNOWN EMPLO YEES OF THE STAT E OF NORTH CARO LINA Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dev er, III, District Judg e. (5:21- ct -031 57-D) Argued: October 22, 2 025 D ecided: February 17, 2026 Before QUATTLEBA UM, HEYTENS, and BERNER, Circuit Judges. Vacated and remanded with instructions by published opinion. Jud ge Berner wrote the opinion, in which Judg e Heytens joined. J udge Quattlebaum wrot e a dissenting opinio n. ARGUED: Alison R. Leff, LOEVY & LOEVY, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellant. John Locke Milholland, IV, NORTH CAROLIN A DEPARTMENT O F JUSTICE, Raleigh,

2 North Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Rosalind E. Dillon, LOEVY & LOEVY, Chicago, Illinois, for A ppellant. Jeff Jackson, Attorney Ge neral, Tanner J. Ray, Ass istant Attorney Ge neral, N ORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

3 BERNER, Circuit Judg e: The Eighth Amendment prohibits the impositi on of cruel and unusual punishments. This prohibition re quires pris on officials to take reaso nable measures to protect incarcerated individ uals from violence inf licted by others in prison custody. Farmer v. Brennan, 51 1 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). T his is because incarce rated individuals are deprived of “virtually every me ans of self-protect ion and . . . acce ss to outside aid.” Id. As such, prison officials v iolate the Eighth Amendment when they act with deliberate indifferenc e to a substantial risk of serious har m to an incarcerated indi vidual. Brandon Case was incarcerated in the general population at Central Prison in North Carolina when he was brutally attacked by a “safekeeper” — a desig nation given by the state prison system to certain individuals, including unusually violent pre-trial detainees. The safekeeper was able to assault Case bec ause prison correctional officers faile d to take reasonable action to protect him fr om the kno wn and sub stantial risk safekee pers pose to those in the general population — the very reason they are separated i n t he first place. Case sued three priso n correctiona l officers, Brandon Beasley, Eric Urieta, and Kenny Cu stodio, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, fo r deliberate indiffere nce in violation of his right to humane conditi ons of confinement. The district court granted summary judgment to the correctional o fficers, conclud ing that the record does not contain sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that the correctional offi cers violated Case’s rights under the Eighth Amendmen t. The district court also ruled that, even if genuine issues of material fact remain as to the correctional o fficers’ liability, th ey were nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity.

4 We conclude that genu ine disputes of material fact remain on both the issue of the correctional officers’ liability and whether qualified immunity is appr opriate. Accor dingly, we vacate the ruling of the district court an d remand for further pro ceedings. I. Background A. Relevant Facts Plaintiff-Appellant Brandon Case was incarcerated in the general population at Central Prison in North Carolina. North Carolina prison policy r equires incarcerated individuals to remain separated in two groups — thos e in the general population and pre-trial de tainees designated as “safekeeper s. ” The policy designates as safekeepers, among others, pre-trial detainees w ho have e xhibited “ violen tly aggressive behavior that cannot be contained and warrants a higher lev el of supervision ” or otherwise “ pose[] an imminent danger. . . to other prisone rs.” J.A. 22 (State of North Carolina Department of Public Safety, Prisons, Policy & Procedures, ch. C § .1601(b)(1)). 1 Some pre-trial detainees who “require[] medical or mental health treatment” are also designated as safekeepers. Id. The group of safekeepe rs and individual s incarcerated in the gene ral population are clot hed in different color ed uniforms, with the safekeepers clothed in bright yellow to allow t hem to be more easily id entified by the correctio nal officers. On the day of the attack, Defendant-Appell ants Officers Beasley, Urieta, and Custodio (collectively, the Officers) were res ponsible for monitorin g the m ovements of 1 Citations to J.A. refer t o the Joint Appendix fi led by the parties.

5 incarcerated individuals and prison staff, including maintaining the separation between the safekeepers and the ge neral population. At C entral Prison, the two gr oups were housed on separate floors of U nit 2, with saf ekeepers on the second floor and the general population on the first. The Officers were tasked with ensuring that two sets of sliding double doors — called “sallyport” doors — remained closed and locke d. These doors separa ted the h allways on the first and second floor s from the stairwe ll between the f loors. The Offic ers were to o pen the doors to allow individuals to pass through o nly after the Officers determin ed that it was safe to do so. The Officers would ma ke this determination through visual observation from where the y sat in the c ontrol booths as well as through radio communications from other correctional officers sta tioned elsewhere in the prison. That day, Case and several others in the general popula tion went fro m the first floor of Unit 2 to the second floor to get their hair cut. Going up stairs re quired that they pass through several hallw ays, the two sallyport d oors, and the stairwell between the floors. Officer Custodio was assigned to the control booth on the second floo r; Officer Urie ta was assigned to staff the co ntrol booth on the first floor; and Offic er Beas ley was assign ed to patrol the housing un it. When Case and the other individuals in th e general population initially went upstai rs, the safekeepers were out side for recreation. Rather than deter mining that it was safe to pass before open ing the sallyport door between the second floor and the stairwell and then closing it each time, Officer Custo dio decided to leave the door ope n to avoid having t o keep o pening and closing the door as the general population indi viduals passed through.

6 Officer Urieta als o left the door separating the stairwell and t he first- floor hallway open rather than keeping it closed and l ocked and opening it only upo n determining that it was safe to do so. Like Officer Cus todio, Of ficer Urieta di d not wa nt the annoyance of having to open and close the door each time to allow the individuals from general population to mo ve between the floors to go to the barbe r. At some point, Officer Urieta needed to u se the re stroom, so he asked Officer Beasley to cover his post in the first -floor control booth. Officer Beasley agreed and assumed Officer Urieta’s position in the control booth. Offic er Beasley too left the door open, rather than keeping it closed and locked as required by prison poli cy. Shortly after Officer Urieta left for the restroom while Office Bea sley was operating the first-floor control booth, a group of safekeepers began ret urning to the housing u nit from their recreation ti me. They entered the first-floor hallway on their way to their cells on the secon d floor. A correctional officer stationed el sewhere in Unit 2 radi oed th e Officers to let them kn ow that the safekeepers were on their way bac k. 2 At the same time, Case was finishing his haircut. He then walk ed through the open sallyport door o n the second floor t o enter the stairwel l, proceeded down the stair s betwee n the second and f irst floors, passed throu gh the o pen sallyport do or on the first f loor, and walked into the first -floor hallway. As he did so, Case pas sed a group of safekee pers, one of who m 2 Officers Beasley, Urieta, and Custodio claim to have no recollect ion of these radio communications. Because this case comes to us on summary judgment, however, we view the facts in the light most favorable to Case, the non -moving party. Anderson v. Liber ty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 2 42, 255 (1986).

7 violently att acked hi m, striking hi m repeatedly in his face. Other correctional officers quickly rushed to the s cene and separated C ase from his a ttacker. Case suffered serious injur ies, i ncluding multiple fra ctur ed facial bones. He underwent emergenc y surgery tha t includ ed the insertio n of me tal implants se cured by screws in his face. He is expected to suffer from chronic pain for the rest of h is life as a result of the attack. Three days after the attack, the Officers’ supervisor, Unit 2 manager John Juehrs, sent a memorandum to all of the correcti onal officers working in the unit. In his memorandum, Juehrs stressed the importa nce of keeping safekeep ers separate d from the general population at all times, noting that “staff [had] be come complacent ” a bout the “security and controlle d movement” of incarc erated individuals livin g in the unit. J.A. 40. Ju ehrs said that t he safekeepers and general population had “ com [e ] in contact too ma ny times when they shouldn’t.” Id. Juehrs also reminded his staff that he had “told everyone over and over ” about “door s being left open ” and the importance of keeping the doors closed to ensure controlled move ment. J.A. 39. B. Procedural History Case filed suit a gainst Officers Beasley, Urieta, and Custodio in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Case alleg es that each Offi cer violat ed his Eigh th Amendment rig hts by failing to protect him from a significant risk of substantial harm in the form of violence by safekeepers.

8 From the outse t, the Officers ’ counsel neglect ed the litigation and ro utinely miss ed cou rt-established deadlines. Relevant here, t he Officers’ counsel failed to respond to Ca se’s requests for admission to Officer Cus todio. C ase then moved for summ ary judgment on his claim against Off icer Custodio, argu ing that Officer Custodio ’s fail ure to respond meant that he had conceded any defense. The Officers ’ counsel filed a motion for summary judgment on th e Office rs’ behalf but missed the deadline to oppose Case’s motion. In their mot ion, the Off icers argued that Case fai led to establish a genu ine dispute of materia l fact as to his Eighth Amendment clai ms, and alternatively, t hat the Officers were entitled to qualified immunity. After the deadline for responsive filings had p assed, a new attorney took over the Officers’ defen se. The new attorney sought a n extension of time to file a response to Case’s motion and to deem the motion timely filed, explaining that prior counsel had missed t he court’s deadline because he was busy preparing to leave his position at the North Carolina Department of Justice f or a new job. Case opposed both requests. He argued tha t the Officers failed to s et forth facts sufficient to establish “ excusable neglect ” as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), which governs re quests for exte nsions o f time. The district court granted both of the Officers ’ request s. The district court deemed the Officers’ motion timely filed, permit ted the Officers ’ belated filing of an oppositio n to Case’s partial m otion for summary judgment, and clarified that the parties’ motions for summary judgmen t re mained pending. After the motions were fully briefed, t he distri ct court grant ed the Officers’ m otion for summary judgment in its entirety and denied Case’s moti on for summary judg ment

9 against Officer Custodi o. The district court co ncluded that, based on the undisputed facts, Case could not succeed on the merits of his Eighth Amendme nt claims. It also ruled in the alternative that, even if Case had succeeded in demonstrating ma terial facts in genuine dispute with respect to his claims of cruel and unusual punishment, the O fficer s were each entitled to qualified immunity. C ase timely appealed. II. Analy sis We review the district court’s grant of sum mary judg ment de nov o. A leman v. City of Charlotte, 8 0 F.4th 264, 283 (4th Cir. 2023). The court view s all the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id. at 283 – 84. Summary judgment is ap propriate only if a party shows that there is no genuine dispute of any ma terial fact and t he movant is entitled t o judgment a s a matter of law. Id. at 283 (citing Fed. R. C iv. P. 56(a)). We first address the m erits of Case’s Eighth Amendment claim s. W e conclude tha t genuine disputes of material fact preclude e ntry of su mmary judgment in favor of the Officers. We then turn the issue of qualifie d immunity, and conclude by addressing whether the district co urt abused its discretion when it granted the Officers’ motion for extension of time without referen ce to the applicable le gal standard. A. Eighth Amendment The Const itution does not mandate “comfortable prisons” but nor “ does it per mit inhumane ones.” Farm er, 511 U.S. at 832 (citation omitted). Through its prohibition of

10 cruel and unusual punishments, the Eighth Amend ment “ places restraints on priso n officials” and imposes an obligation upon the m to “take reason able measures t o guarantee the safety of ” incarcerated individuals Id. (quo ting Hudson v. Pal mer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 – 27 (198 4)). Prison officials have a particular du ty “to protect prisoners from vi olence at t he hands of other prisoner s.” Id. at 833 (quoting Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1s t Cir. 1988)). To prevail on an Eig hth Ame ndment claim f or failure to prot ect, a n incarce rated individual must satisfy two requirements: first, he must s how that the deprivati on he suffered was objectiv ely sufficiently seriou s; and second, he mu st establish that the defendant had a sufficiently culpable subjective state of mind. Cox v. Quinn, 828 F.3d 227, 235 – 36 (4th Cir. 2016). The parties agree tha t Case readil y satisfied the first requ irement. He suffered grievous physical injuries as a re sult of b eing attack ed. Such injuries readily constitute a sufficiently serious deprivation. Thus, we focus our in quiry on the sec ond requirement — deliberat e indifference. Case need not demonstrate that th e Officers acted with the purpose of causing harm or even with the knowledge that harm would result. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 83 5. To defeat summary judgment, Case need only proffe r sufficient evidence fro m which a reasonable jury could find that the Officers acted with deliberate indifferen ce. Deliberate indifference entails more than simpl e negligence but less than intentional harm. M akdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 2015). Case must sho w that genuine issues of mat erial fact remain as to whether the Offi cers subjectively knew of “a substantial risk of serious harm” but

11 “disregard[ed] that risk by failing to take reas onable me asures to ab ate it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 84 7; see also C ox, 828 F.3d at 23 6. He met this burden. 1. Knowledge of Risk We begi n with the Officers ’ knowled ge. “ A priso n official’s su bjective actual knowledge can be proven throu gh cir cumstantial evidence” s uggesting, for example, that a particular risk was “longstandi ng, pervasiv e, well -documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past.” Makdessi, 789 F.3d at 133 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). Also releva nt are “circ umstances suggest [ing] that the defendant-offi cial being sued had been exposed to infor mation concerning the risk and thus must have known about it.” Farmer, 511 U. S. at 842 (internal quotation marks omitted). It mat ters not “whether a prisoner face [d] an ex cessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situatio n face such a risk.” I d. at 843. There is am ple evidenc e in the record from which a reasonable ju ry could find that Officers Beasley, Urieta, and Custodio wer e subjectively awa re of the significant risk of serious harm resulting from safekeepers coming into contact with individuals incarcerated in the general population, including Case. Although not dispositive, it is relevant that official pri son p olicy required that the safe keepers be kept separate from the general population. See Makdessi, 789 F.3d at 135. In their depositions, all three O fficers testified

12 that they knew of the policy and were aware that one reason for the policy was to maintain the safety of the ind ividuals incarcerated in the general po pulation. The safety risk of allowing safekeepers to come into contact with individuals in the general population was also expressly noted by prison officials and c ommunicated to the O fficers. In Cox v. Quinn, this court reasoned that “ a reasonable jury could . . . decide that [] correctional officers knew” an incarcerated individual faced a substantial risk of danger based o n a supervisor’s testimony that “he spe cifically told” the officers to abate the risk. See 828 F.3d at 2 37. So to o here. After the attack, the O fficers’ superv isor, Juehrs, circulated a memorandum reiterating the urge ncy of keeping safekeepers separate from the general population. Ju ehrs reminded the Offi cers that safekeepers and individuals in the general populati on had “com[e ] in contact t oo many tim es when they shouldn’t, ” and admonished that he had “told everyo ne over and over ” about “ door s being left open” and the importance of ensuring that movement through the hallways be controlled. J.A. 39 – 40. Evidence in the record also supports an infere nce that, a t the time of the attack, the O fficers und erstood th e safekeepe rs were likely to encounter indivi duals in the general population. Officers Urieta and Custodio were aware that the safekeepers had left Unit 2 for their recreation period on the morning of the attack. They knew the s afe keepers’ recreation period typically lasted one hour. They also knew that indi viduals in the general population were movin g between the two floor s at the same time. Accordingly, a jury could reasonably infer that Officers Urie ta and Custodio would ha ve know n that t he two grou ps were likely to encount er one another when the safekee pers returned to Unit 2. It could further be reasonably be inferred that all three O fficer s would ha ve v isually observed the

13 safekeepers coming d own the hall toward the individuals from the general population, particularly because e ach group wore d ifferent colored uniform s. Finall y, the re was evidence upon whi ch a reasonable jury could find that each Officer heard over the radio that the safekeepers ’ r eturn was imminent. The Officers point t o evidence in the record supporting a findin g that they may not have fully appreciated the risk of violence resulting fr om interacti on between the two groups. T hey em phasize that no t every safekeeper is designated as such because of a proclivity toward violent behavior. So me indi viduals are designated as safekeep ers due to medical o r men tal he alth related reasons. Furthermore, Officers Beasley and Urieta recalled only one other attack by a safekeeper of an individual in the general p opu lation. T hese facts do not preclude liabili ty for the Officers. Th e parties do not disput e that at least some safekeepers posed a heightened risk of viole nce. As the Supreme Court made cl ear in Farmer, so long as the risk of violence is obvious and substantial, it is “irrelevant to liability” that an officer “could not guess beforehand precisely who would at tack whom.” 511 U.S. at 843 (citati on omitted). So too here. The record contai ns ample evidence to support a conclu sion that the Officers were aware at the time Case was attacked that mixin g between the genera l population and safekeepers could c reate a substa ntial risk of harm to individuals in the general population. The Officers also dispute whether they were aware of the safekeepers’ return on the day in question. Oth er correctional offic ers testi fi ed that they communicated t he safekee p ers ’ return to Unit 2. The Officers, however, state that no such call was received. Th ese arguments are unavailing. A t summary judgment, we must vie w the fa cts and draw

14 all infere nces in favor of Case, the non- moving party. Aleman, 80 F.4th at 283 – 84. These examples of record ev idence supporti ng conflicting conclusions regarding the Officers’ state of mind merely se rve to illustrate that genuine i ssues of material fact remain. A jury must resolve these issues. 2. Abatement of Risk We next addres s the measures taken by the Officers to abate the substantial risk of serious harm. Prison officials are deliberately indiffere nt if they “ co uld aver t the danger easily yet they fail to do so.” Cox, 828 F.3d at 236 (quotin g Brown v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 612 F.3d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 2010)). “[T]he Eighth Amendmen t requires more than some action: It requires reasonable action. ” Id. at 237 (emphasi s omitted). Based on the evidence in the record, a jury could reasonably concl ude that each Officer coul d have abated the risk of safekeep ers and the general population co ming in to contact with one another, yet failed to do so. The Officers were requ ired to keep the doors closed an d loc ked, and to open them only after determining that it was safe. The risk would have been abate d had they done so. More over, once the Of ficers wer e put on notice that the safekeepers we re re turning to Unit 2, they could have simply push ed a button to clos e the sallyport doors. They quite literally on ly needed to lift a finger. The Officer s argue that they responded reason ably becau se, once the attack began, they immediately called for other correctio nal officers t o co me to Case’s ai d. This argument misun derstands the relevant inq uiry. The question before u s is whether there is evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the Officers failed

15 to take reas onable steps to abate the substantial risk of attack, not whether the Officers respon ded reasonably a fter the attack was already underw ay. Because we find that genuine disputes of material fact remain as to the Officers’ liability for violat ion of Case’s rights under the Eighth Amendment, we proceed to the question of w hether the Officers should be entitled t o qual ified immunity from liability. We conclude that they are not. B. Qualified Immunity The Officers argue, and the district court agreed, that even if they could be found to have violated Case’s right t o humane conditions of confineme nt under the Eighth Amendment, they should nonetheless be shielded by the doctrine of qualified im munity. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defen se to liability where a defendant “ makes a decision that, even if constitutional ly defic ient, reasonably m isapprehends the law governing the circumstances she confronted.” Taylor v. Riojas, 5 92 U.S. 7, 8 (2020) (quoting Brosseau v. H augen, 543 U.S. 1 94, 198 (2004) (per curia m)). To determine whether the Officers are entitle d to qualified immunity at summary judgment, we apply a two-step inquiry. At the first step, we must determine whether a reasonable jury could find that a constitu tional violati on occurred. Thorpe v. Clark, 37 F.4th 926, 933 (4th Cir. 2022). If no violation c ould be found, there is no need for immunity and our inquir y comes to an e nd. A s we concl uded above, h owever, whether the Officers violated Case’s Eighth Amendmen t right remains in dispute. Accord ingly, we proceed to the second step, which requires us to determi ne whether the right asserted by Case was

16 clearly establis hed at the time of the alleged violation. 3 Id. If the right was not clearly established, the n the Of ficers are entitled to im munity from liability. Id. Our anal ysis of whether a right is clea rly esta blished is guided by de cisions of the United States Supreme Court and o ur own court. Booke r v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir. 2017). Where no such decisions exi st, “we may lo ok to a conse nsus of cases of persuasive authority from other jurisdictions.” Id. at 538 – 39 (internal citations and emphasis omitted). A right is “ clearly esta blished ” if it is “ sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that righ t.” Co x, 828 F.3d at 238 (quoting Henry v. Pur nell, 652 F.3d 524, 534 (4th C ir. 2011) (en ban c)). A right need not have b een recognized “on i dentical facts for it t o be deemed clearly established.” Quinn v. Zerkle, 111 F.4th 281, 294 (4th Cir. 2024). I ndeed, “our analysis must take into consideration not only alread y specifically adjudica ted rights, but those manifestly included wi thin mor e general applications of the core constitutional principle invoked.” Cox, 82 8 F.3d at 238 (quoting Odom v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 349 F. 3d 765, 773 (4th Cir. 2003) (interna l quotation marks omitt ed)). The right at issue here was clearly es tablished. Id. at 239 (ci ting Farmer, 511 U. S. at 833). This court’s decision in Cox v. Q uinn is on all fours. In Cox, the actions of the 3 In certain cases where a violation of the Eighth Amendment is alle ged, the two qualified immunity ste ps collapse into one. This occurs when “de liberate indifference would, if established, n ecessarily inclu de an awareness of the illega lity of the defendant ’s actions.” Pfaller v. Amonette, 55 F. 4th 436, 448 (4th Cir. 2022). The circumstances in this case, howe ver, arguably call for an assessme nt of bot h steps becau se there is “ attenuation between th e risk of h arm” and whether the Officers’ knew that their “conduct [was] constitutionally deficient.” Id. at 4 46 (emphasis omitted).

17 correctional officers exacerbated a known and substantial risk that the plaintiff would be attacked by other incarcerated indiv iduals. Id. The plaintiff infor med the correctional officers that other men incarcerated in the prison had robbed h im and threatened violenc e. Id. at 232, 237. The plaintiff asked the correctional officers to keep his reports confidential because he was concerned that the other men were more likely to attac k him if they knew he had com plained ab out them. I d. at 233, 237. The correctiona l officers ignored this request and tol d the other incarcerated men that the plaintiff had complained. Id. at 237, 239. As the plaintiff feared, the men attacked the plaintiff after learni ng of the complaints. Id. This cou rt held t hat the correctional officers ’ actio ns violated the plaintiff’s rights under the Eigh th Amendme nt and further concl uded that the correctio nal officers we re not entitled to qualified immunity because they had been on notice that their actions violated the constitution. Id. at 239. Similarly here, the Officers were on notice th at their actions were li kely to increase a known and substantial risk o f serious harm of violence by other inca rcerated individual s. The Officers’ supervis or, Juehrs, had repeat edly admonished the Officers to keep the sallyport doors closed to prevent safekeepers from coming into contact with individuals in the general population. J.A. 39 (memora ndum reprimanding officers for repeatedly leaving the sallyport doors o pen). Yet the Officers aggravated the risk of harm to individua ls in the general population — ra ther than abating it — when they purpos efully le ft the sallyport doors open and then failed to close them even when t hey learned the safekeepers were returning to Unit 2. In s o doing, the Officers failed to fulfill their constitutio nal obligatio n to take reasonable action to protect the incarcerated individuals unde r their watch. “[A]n

18 objectively reasonable correctional offic er . . . would have known that [such] actions were unreasonable, ran afoul of clearly establish ed law” and violated the “duty to prot ect [incarcerated i ndividuals] from a su bstantial and known r isk of harm. ” Cox, 828 F.3d at 239. Thus, like the correctional officers in Cox who exacerbated rather than abated a known and substantial risk of harm, the O fficers are not entitled to qualified immunity. The Officers r ely on this court’s decision in King v. Riley, 76 F.4 th 259 (4th Cir. 2023), to support their qualified immunity arg ument. This reliance is misplaced. The facts in King differ from the facts in this case in numero us material ways. In King, two incarcerated men who were working as janitors for the prison lured a third incarcerated man into an u nlocked cell where they strangle d him a nd “st uffed his body underneath the bed.” Id. at 263. The correctional officer on duty at the time conducted routi ne security checks in the unit every half hour but did not notice anything ami ss un til several hours after the attack because he did not look inside each cell during the checks. Id. The correcti onal officer in King could not reasonably hav e been expected to know that the janitors woul d attack another incarcerated individ ual or tha t the victim lay under a bed in a closed cell. See id. at 266 n.7. The court in King concluded that the correctional officer was entitled to qualified immunity because he had taken substantial acti on to protect the incarcerate d individuals in his care, including the victim. See id. at 264 – 68. “Qualified immunity f undamentally concerns itself with ‘fa ir noti ce.’” Thorpe, 37 F.4th at 934 (quotin g Hope, 536 U.S. at 739). That is because “ there is no so cietal interest in protecting those uses of a prison guard’s discretion that amount to reckles s or callous indifference to the rights and safety of ” incarcerated individuals. Id. (quoting Smith v.

19 Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 55 (1983)). T he Officers had fair noti ce that failing to take r easonable action to protec t the individuals in t he general population from encountering safekeepe rs would violate the Eight h Amendment. C. Extension of Time Finally, Case argues that the d istrict court abused its discretion when, without applying the relevant standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), it granted the Officers’ motion for e xtension of time to oppose Case’s partial motion for sum mary judgment against Officer Custodio. We agree. A court may gra nt a motion for exte nsion of time that is made after a filing deadline has passed only if the movant “failed t o act because of excusable ne glect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). In r uling on the Off icers’ motion for extension of time, the district court did not consider w hether the Officers’ prior coun sel’s conduct constitute d “excusable neglect.” Id. The district co urt abused its discretion because it failed to apply the req uisite legal standard. Abdelhalim v. Lewis, 90 F.4th 265, 267, 272 (4t h Cir. 202 4) (explaining that a dis trict court’s failure to apply the correct le gal standard constitutes an abuse of discretion). Accordingly, w e vacat e the district court’s grant of leave to Officer Custodio to oppose Ca se’s m otion for partial summary judgment. We remand with instructions to reconsider, this time applying the correct Rule 6(b) standard.

20 III. Conclusion For the reasons set for th above, we vacate th e order of the district court granti ng summary judg ment to the Officers, vacate the order granting the Officers’ motion for extension of time, and r emand with in structions for further proceedings consistent with t his opinion. VACAT ED AND REM ANDED WITH INSTRUCTION S

21 QUATTLEBAUM, Cir cuit Judge, dissenting: I would affirm the district court’s order granting the defendants summary judgment based on qualified immunity. “To ove rcome qualified immunity, a pl aintiff must typically show (1) that the gover nment official violated a statutor y or const itutional right a nd (2) that right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” King v. Riley, 76 F.4th 259, 265 (4th Cir. 20 23). Even if Ca se has established a ge nuine issue of material fact on prong one, he has not shown a clear ly established right tha t the ch allenged conduct violates. Case insists that he sa tisfied prong two. He first points to the Supreme Court’s decision in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), and argues that, since that decisi on, “the Supreme Court ha s been clear that ‘pris on officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other p risoners’” under the Eig hth Amendment. Op. Br. at 34 (quoting Farmer, 51 1 U.S. at 825). And he argues that, in case s like Cox v. Q uinn, 828 F.3d 2 27 (4th Cir. 201 6), and Danser v. St ansberry, 772 F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 20 14), we similarly defi ned the right at issue as that of a prisoner “to be prot ected from violence committed b y other prisoners.” Op. Br. at 34 (quoting Da nser, 772 F.3d at 346). For its part, the majority largely echoes this approach. While the majority does not overtly sa y what clea rly establishe d right defendants violated, it reaso ns that this case is factuall y similar to Cox an d points out that we found t he defendants violated a clearly established right in that case to be free from vio lence from othe r prisoners. I am n ot convinced. The error in both Case’s and the majorit y’s r easoning is that they read the right at issue too broadly. First, under both Supreme Court precedent and our own preceden t, the right to be free from violence from other prisoners is too general to b e clearly es tablished.

22 Thus, we cannot rely on Farmer for id entifying the right at issue for purposes of qualified immunity, as Case wou ld have us do. While Farmer tells us how a deliberate indiffere nce claim ge nerally works under the Eighth Amen dment, i t “pro vides no guidance about how the Eighth Amendmen t applies to this case’s ‘specific context.’” K ing, 76 F.4th at 267 (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)). Rat her, the Supreme Court has emphasized repeatedly that, for a right to be clearly established, it must not be defined at a high lev el of generality. E.g., City of Escondido v. Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 42 (2019); Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (20 18). “And while it’s true that we re quire less specificity when defining the right in the Eighth Amendment context than when the Fourth Amendment is implicated, the unlawfulness must still be app arent based on pre -existing law.” King, 76 F.4th at 266 (cleaned up). Illustrating this requir ed approach, King involved two inmates who murdere d several other inmates. Id. at 263. W hile they were committi ng these murders, a guard was patrolling. Id. The guard was trained to do security checks every 30 minutes and to look inside eac h cell. Id. He did the security checks but did not look inside. Id. A s a result, the undeterred murderer s were able to complete their killings. Id. In pressing a delibe rate indifference claim, a murdered inmate’s estate argue d that the gua rd was no t entitled to qualified immunity because, though he conduc ted his security checks, he did not look into each cell. Id. at 265. We found that the guard was entitled to qua lified immunity because there was no clearly established rig ht “to ha ve a correctional offic er look into the cell window while conducting a security check — given a known and substa ntial risk of inmate- on-i nmate violence in the Unit.” Id. at 266, 268. Note the particul arity of the right we

23 required in King. Case must define his right with the same degree of particularity. He didn’t. Second, Case’s reliance on Danser and Cox is misplaced. In Danser, we said that “[t]he constitutional rig ht at issue [was the] Ei ghth Amendment right to be protected from violence committed by other prisone rs.” 772 F.3d at 346 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 – 35). B ut we said that in the context of identify ing wh ether there had been a constitutiona l violation. Id. And because we ulti mately f ound that the p laintiff had not shown a constitutional violation, his claim faile d without our even considering whether the rig ht at issue was clearly established. Id. at 346 –50. Thus, contrar y to Case’s argument, Danse r does not give license to define the right so broadly for purposes of the second qualified immunity prong. And Case’s and the majority’s reliance on our decision in Cox is misplaced for similar reasons. It is true that in Cox, we stated that “[i]t has long been established that jail officials have a duty to protect inmates from substantial and known risk of harm, including harm inflic ted by other prisoners. ” Cox, 828 F.3d at 239. But right after saying that, we followed with, “[m]oreover, by 2011, we had made it clear that ‘a prison official acts wi th deliberate i ndifference when he ignores repeat ed request s fro m a vulnerable inmate to be separated from a fellow inmate w ho has issu ed violent threats which the aggressor will likely carry out in the absence of official intervention.’” Id. (quoting Odom v S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 349 F.3d 770, 773 (4th Cir. 2003)). Thus, read in its entirety, Cox recog nizes, consistent with Supreme Court precedent, that a more specific right is needed to be clearly established than the generalized right to be protected from harm by a fellow prisoner.

24 But rather than heeding the Supreme Court’ s and our admonitions against defining the right at too high a l evel of generality, Case doubles down. He argues Cox tells us it is clearly established that jail officials m ust protect prisoners fr om in jury from other inmates. And he says we must apply that right here. He even asserts that King is inconsistent with our prior precedent and must be ignored. 1 In a sense, I admire Case’s boldness. He correctly recognizes that King dooms his case. His only option is to ur ge us to disregard it. But we can’t do that. As already explained, King does not contradict our precedent. And more importantly, it follows Supreme Court decisions. Cf. Payne v. Taslimi, 998 F.3d 648, 653 – 55, 655 n.4 (4th Cir. 2021) (fin ding that each panel is genera lly bound to f ollow decisions of a prior panel except, inter alia, “where subsequent Supreme Co urt decisions ‘clearly undermine[]’ a panel precedent” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Willi ams, 155 F.3d 418, 421 (4th Cir. 1998))). Unwilling to go that far, the majority tries a different tack. It contends that the facts of King are distinguishable from those here, which are, instead, more like those in Cox. Factual similarities or dissimilarities may be r elevant to determi ning whether a prior case 1 In his opening brief, Case argues King is distinguishable because, unlike the guard in that case, “[d]efend ants mad e no effort whatsoever to mitigate the substa ntial risk o f harm they created by choosing to leave the sallyport doors open, not even after being alerted to the imminent arrival of saf ekeepers.” Op. Br. at 38. But this characterization is not entirely accurate. The record does not reflect that defendants did nothing in the face of possible danger. For instance, th ere is no dispute that defenda nts manned the contr ol booths, even if they did not foll ow prison polic y on when to keep the sallyport doors open ed or closed. This is simil ar to the guard in Ki ng who did his required patrols, ther eby ta king steps to mitigate the risk of danger, even if he did not look into each cell, thereby violating prison po licy. See 76 F.4th at 265 – 68. When pressed on this at o ral argume nt, Case conceded that he can only prevail if we disregard King. Oral Argume nt at 19:00 – 20:20.

25 clearly establishes a particular right when we define rights with the appropriate level of generality. But that is not why King is rel evant for our present purposes. Instead, King is relevant because of the legal principle it recognizes — that the right to be free fro m vio lence at the hand of other i nmates is too broad to be clearly establish ed under the Eighth Amendment. See 76 F.4th at 266. And neither Case nor the majority offer any version of the right at issue ot her than the overly gener alized right we r ejected in King. If our slate were clean, we could have an interesting debate on how broadly to define the right. But our slate isn’t clean. The S upreme Court ha s told us we mus t define rights narrowly. E.g., Emmons, 586 U.S. at 42 (“This Court has repeatedly told courts. . . not to define clearly established law at a hi gh level of generality.” (alteration in original) (quoting Kisela, 584 U.S. a t 104)); Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12; Ashcroft v. al -Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011). And it has explained why na rrowly defined rights are requir ed. According to the Supreme Court, “qualified immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (quoting Mall ey v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1 986)). As a result, we must provide sufficiently narrow de finitions of rights t o

26 provide fair notice of what is requir ed. Because the majorit y defies this obligat ion, I respectfully dissent. 2 2 The majority also fin ds that the district court abused its discretio n by granting Custodio ad ditional ti me to oppose Case’s motion for partial sum mary judgment. And it remands with instructi ons for the district cou rt to re consider. It is certainly tr ue th at the district court had amp le grounds for denyin g Custodio additiona l ti me to make this filing. But the district cour t fo und that was not appropriate. I would not second guess this decision that lies within t he traditional province of the district cou rt’ s discreti on. Beyond that, I am not sure what the majority is reman ding for t he district court to reconsider. Is th e district court supposed to reco nsider its denial of Ca se’s motion for summ ary judgment? If so, could the district court grant summary judgm ent in Case’s favor? I doubt it because the majority found elsew here that there are genuin e issues of material fact that will need to be resolved by a jury. A nd it is not as if the district court could have granted summary judgment in Case’s favor just bec ause Custodio failed t o respond if there were genuine issues of material f act in the record. See Custer v. Pan A m. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 416 (4th Cir. 1993) (“Although the failure of a party to respond to a summary judgment motion may leave unc ontroverted those facts e stablished by the motion, the moving part y must still show that the unc ontroverted facts entitl e[d] the party to ‘a jud gment as a matter of law.’ The failure to res pond to the motion does not automat ically accomplish thi s.”). Or is the majority saying the district court needs to reconsider wheth er to grant Custodio additional time to respond? In that case, the re mand would be fu tile because, again, the district court could not now grant summary ju dgment.