Hinkley v. Roadway Express, Inc - Labor Dispute

This or der and judgment is not bi nding pr ecedent except under t he doct ri nes of * law of the ca se, res judica ta and collate ral esto ppe l. It may be cited, h ow ev er, for its pers uasi ve val ue consi st ent wit h Fed. R. A pp. P. 32.1 and 10t h Cir. R. 32. 1. FI LED Unite d State s Cour t of Appe als Tenth Ci rcuit September 13, 2007 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED S TATES COURT OF APPEALS TE NT H CIR CU IT RANDAL L R. HI NKLEY, Plain tiff - A p pellan t, v. ROADWAY E XPRE SS, INC.; L OCAL UNI ON #4 1 OF THE I NTERNAT I ONAL BRO THERH OOD OF TEAM STERS, D efendants - A ppell ees. No. 06-3097 (D. C t. No. 0 3 - CV - 2 6 2 0- C M) (D. K an.) ORDER AND J UDGM ENT * Before TAC HA, C hie f C ircu it Ju dg e, SEYMOUR, and HOLM ES, Circui t Judges. Plai ntiff- A ppel lant R andal l Hinkl ey fil ed suit purs uant t o sect ion 301 of the Labor M an age me nt R elation s A ct, 29 U.S.C. § 1 85, alle ging that h is em ployer term ina ted h im in vi olat ion of t he col lect ive bar gaini ng agreement bet w een hi s employ er and hi s union and t hat hi s uni on breac hed it s dut y of fai r r epres entat ion i n handli ng his gr ievanc e. The Dist ri ct Court concluded t hat M r. H i nkley had not pr esent ed any evidence t hat t he union bre ach ed its d uty and entere d su mm ary judg me nt in f avo r of D ef end ants-A p pellan ts Roadw ay Express, I nc. (“Roadw ay ”) and I nter nati onal Brot herhood of Teamst ers Local Appellate Case: 06-3097 Document: 010131995 Date Filed: 09/13/2007 Page: 1

Union 41 (“Union”). M r. Hinkl ey appeals t he court ’s deci sion. W e exer cis e jur is dict ion pu r su ant t o 2 8 U. S. C. § 12 91 a nd AFFI RM. I. BACKGROUND M r. H in kle y wo rk ed as a city dri ver f or R o ad w ay, a n atio nw id e tru ck ing co mp an y. He w as als o a mem ber of the Union, w hi ch served as his excl usi ve bargai ning agent un de r a c olle ctiv e b arg ain ing ag reem e nt (“ C BA ”) be tw een R oa dw ay a nd the U n ion. Under the CBA, M r. H i nkley m ay not be t erminat ed “wit hout j ust cause, ” al though “no warning or noti ce need be given .. . before he i s dis charged i f the ca use of such di scharge is proven di shones ty,” which i s i n fact Roadw ay ’s r eason for fir ing Mr. Hinkl ey. T he CB A als o est abli shes a gr ievanc e procedur e for empl oy ment di sputes, incl uding t he dis charge of a n employ ee. In additi on, under the CB A, Road way may not use “com puter t racking devices” fo r d iscip lina ry pu rpo ses ex cep t in a fe w lim ite d s itua tion s no t at is sue in th e p res en t cas e. Some R oadway trucks contai n a R oadway D i git al Dispat ch sy st em (“RD D”). The dri ver uses the RDD sy stem t o recor d del iver y and pick- up informat ion, and t he dis patcher uses the RD D syst em to send m essages t o the driver. The R D D sy stem also includes a tr acki ng sy stem cal led a gl obal posi tioni ng sy stem (“ G PS”), which t racks t he locat ion of Roadw ay tr ucks by satel li te. In handl ing M r. Hinkl ey ’s gri evance agai nst Roadway, t he Union argued t hat t he CB A prohi bit s Roadway fr om usi ng tracki ng data obt ai ned from Appellate Case: 06-3097 Document: 010131995 Date Filed: 09/13/2007 Page: 2

The D i str ict Court i denti fied t he G PS, rat her t han t he enti re RD D sy st em, as t he 1 com puter track ing device tha t t he U nion argued Ro adw ay cou ld not use fo r disciplinary purpos es under the CBA. In hi s bri ef, however, M r. H i nkley refers to bot h the RDD and the GPS in di scus sing t he computer t racking devi ce speci fi ed in t he CB A. Based on our review of the record, we agree w it h the D i stri ct Cou rt. During the gri evan ce heari ngs, M r. Hinkl ey ’s Union repr esent ati ve refer red to t he G PS as t he t racki ng device us ed by Roadw ay to i nit iat e dis cipl ine. W hen we refer to t racki ng data, w e ar e ther efore r eferr ing t o da t a o bt ai ne d f ro m t he GPS, r at he r t ha n t he en ti r e RDD s y st em. - 3 - the GP S for disci pli nary purposes. 1 On June 6, 2003, M r. H i nkley w orked fr om 4: 00 p.m. to 12: 30 a.m. He was schedul ed to make del iver ies to t wo H ome D epot stor es— one i n B anni st er, M iss ouri, and one i n Lee’s Summit, M is souri. Between t hese t w o del iver ies, Mr. Hinkl ey stopped at the H om e D epo t sto re in Ind ep en de nce, M iss ou ri. Th e follow ing M on day, Jun e 9, Darryl Ho ag, Ro adw ay ’s driver m anag er, revi ew ed Mr. Hinkl ey’ s RD D entr ies and not iced s igni fi cant t ime discr epancies and missing entr ies for his shi ft on June 6. He then review ed M r. H inkley ’s loading guides, dis patch s umm ar y sheet, del ivery recei pts, and t he G PS posi tioni ng report. Based on t he GPS re po r t, M r. Hoa g de t e r mi ne d t h at Mr. Hin kl e y ’s RDD e nt r i es wer e i nc or r ec t. He then as ked M r. Hinkley to r eport to hi s office wi th a Union r epres entat ive when he a rri ve d at w o rk th at d ay. M r. Hinkl ey and a U ni on repr esent at ive s ubsequent ly m et w i t h M r. H oag, w ho qu estion ed M r. H in kley abo ut his w h ereab ou ts the p revio us F riday, Jun e 6. D urin g this interview, M r. H inkley ad mitted he w as at the H om e D epot store in Ind epend ence w here he had no aut hori zed company business. When M r. H oag as ked him why he vi sit ed t he Appellate Case: 06-3097 Document: 010131995 Date Filed: 09/13/2007 Page: 3

Independe nce st ore, M r. H i nkley repli ed that he was “taki ng care of t he cust om er,” but w ou ld n ot g ive sp ecif ic d eta ils. H e a lso state d h e w as tak ing his lu nc h b rea k a t this tim e. T w o d ays la te r, o n Ju n e 1 1, R o ad w a y te rm i na te d M r. H in k le y fo r “ p ro v en d ish o n es ty” rel ated t o his acti ons on June 6. After Mr. Hinkley ’s dis charge, the Union fi led a gr ievance on hi s behalf, and on June 17, a joint labor- m anage m ent comm i tt ee cal led t he Kansas Cit y Local Cart age C omm it tee (“L ocal C artage C om mittee”) held a g ri ev ance hea ring. At the h earing, M r. Hinkley ’s U ni on repr esent ati ve, Vict or Terranel la, rai sed a point of order r egardi ng the CB A’s pr ovis ion pr ohibi ting t he use of computer tr acki ng devices (i.e., t he GPS) for dis cipl inary purposes. Mr. Terranel la ar gued that because M r. Hoag consul ted computer tr acki ng data af ter noti cing t ime gaps i n M r. H i nkley ’s RD D entr ies, Roadway had used a com puter track ing device f or disciplinary purpo ses in violation of th e CB A, and M r. Hinkley shoul d ther efore be r einst ated wit h full senior it y and back pay. The Local C artage C omm it tee dea dlocked on the p oint of orde r. In acc ordance wit h the gri evance procedur e under the CBA, the Uni on then purs ued M r. H i nkley ’s gr ievanc e befor e the Miss ouri -Kansas Two-Stat e C ommit tee (“M o-K an C om mittee”). On July 8, the M o-K an C om mittee held a hearing, at w hich M r. Terr anell a rais ed the s ame point of or der r egardi ng R oadway ’s use of t he G PS dat a. The M o- K an Commit tee uphe ld t he point of order and s ent t he grievanc e back t o the Local Cart age Com mi tt ee t o be heard on t he merit s wit hout t he use of a ny computer t racki ng da ta. O n July 22, the L oca l Carta ge C om m ittee he ld a h earing on the m erits an d up held Appellate Case: 06-3097 Document: 010131995 Date Filed: 09/13/2007 Page: 4

M r. H in kle y’s dis ch arg e. M r. Hinkl ey subsequent ly fil ed a cl aim agai nst both Roadway and the Union under sect ion 301 of t he Labor M anage ment Relat ions Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, al legi ng Roadw ay breac hed the CBA and t he U ni on breac hed it s duty of fair repr esent ati on. The Dist ri ct C ourt granted b oth def endan ts’ m oti on s for sum mary judg ment, con cluding that M r. H inkley ha d f ailed to prese nt an y e vide nce that the U n ion b reac hed its duty of f air represe ntation— a nec essary elemen t of M r. H inkley’s claim agains t both def endan ts. M r. H i nkley appeals the court’s order, argui ng that summ ary judgm ent was improper because mater ial iss ues of fact exist concerni ng the Union’ s repr esentat ion. I I. DI SCU SS I ON W e r evi ew t he D i st ri ct Court ’s grant of summ ar y j udgment de novo, apply ing the sa me sta nd ard s tha t the D istric t Co urt ap plie d. Young v. Unit ed Auto. W orker s- Labor Em pl oyment & Tr aini ng Corp., 95 F.3d 992, 996 (10th Cir. 1996). R oadway and the Union are ent it led t o sum mar y judgment if t he evi dence shows t hat “no genui ne iss ue as to any material fa ct” exists. F ed. R. C iv. P. 56(c). In mak ing this determ ination, “[w ]e view t he recor d and al l i nference s t herefr om in t he li ght most favor able t o” M r. Hinkl ey as the no nm ov ing pa rty. Nel son v. H ol m es Frei ght Lines, I nc., 37 F.3d 59 1, 59 4 (10 th C ir. 199 4). A. St an da r d Ap pl ic abl e t o Du t y of F ai r Rep r es en t at i on Cl ai ms M r. Hinkl ey ’s cl aim i s a hy brid act ion under s ect ion 301 of t he Labor Management Relat ions A ct. To prevai l agai nst eit her Roadw ay or t he U ni on, M r. Hinkl ey must prove: Appellate Case: 06-3097 Document: 010131995 Date Filed: 09/13/2007 Page: 5

(1) h is fo rme r em ployer, R oad wa y, vio lated th e C BA, an d (2) th e U nio n bre ache d its du ty of fa ir rep re sen tatio n. N el son, 37 F. 3d at 59 4 (“I n a h y br id ac ti on, an emp lo y ee ’ s cl ai ms are di rect ed agai nst bot h the for mer employ er and t he union, and all ege a vi olat ion of t he co llective barg aining agre em ent b y the emp loyer an d a b reac h of the d uty o f fair repr esent ati on by t he union. ”). T he s ole i ssue befor e us on appeal is whether the Uni on breached its duty of fair represent ation i n hand l ing M r. H i nkley’s grievance against R oa dw ay. A union repr esent ing an employ ee in a gr ievance or arbi tr at ion pr ocedure br eaches it s duty of fair repr esent at ion by acti ng “i n a dis cri minat ory, dis honest, ar bitr ary, or pe rfu nc tory f ash ion.” Int’ l Bhd. of Elec. W orker s v. Hechler, 4 81 U.S. 8 51, 86 4 n.6 (198 7) (quotation omitted); see al so Webb v. ABF F r eight Sys., Inc., 155 F.3d 1230, 1239 (10t h Cir. 1998) (not ing t hat t his Court has repeat edly descri bed t his s tandar d “as prohibit ing arbit rary, discri minatory, bad fait h, or perfunctory con duct”). In the case before us, M r. Hinkl ey argues t hat t he U ni on’s conduct w as arbi trar y and perfunct ory and th at it ac ted in b ad faith. The U ni on’s repr esentat ion of M r. Hinkl ey i s arbi tr ary “only if, in l ight of t he factual and legal l and scape at t he time of the un i on’s acti ons, the union’s behavior i s so fa r ou tsid e a w ide ra ng e o f re aso na ble ne ss, as to b e irra tio nal.” Air Line Pi lot s Ass’ n, Int’l v. O ’N eill, 49 9 U.S. 65, 67 (1 99 1) (citatio n an d qu otation om itted). F or the Un ion to act in a “pe rfunct ory ” fashi on, i t would have t o act “‘wit hout conce rn or sol ici tude, or [gi ve] a cl aim only cursor y att ent ion. ’” Webb, 155 F.3d at 1240 (quoti ng Beavers v. Appellate Case: 06-3097 Document: 010131995 Date Filed: 09/13/2007 Page: 6

United Paperworke rs I nt’ l Union, Local 1741, 72 F. 3d 9 7, 100 (8th Ci r. 199 5)). To establish arb it rary or pe rfunctory action, M r. Hink ley m ust dem onstrate that the U nion ’s act ions const it ute more than “mer e err ors i n judgment, ” H ines v. An cho r M otor F re ight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976), or “mere negl igence, ” U ni ted St eelworker s v. Raw s on, 495 U.S. 362, 372– 73 (1990). To establi sh that t he U nion acted in bad faith, he m ust pre se nt e vid en ce o f “ fra ud, dec eitf ul a ctio n o r dis ho nes t ac tion.” Moc k v. T. G. & Y. Stor es Co., 97 1 F.2d 5 22, 531 (10th C ir. 199 2). M or eover, even if t he Union breac hed it s duty of fair repr esent ati on, M r. Hinkl ey m us t sho w tha t the bre ach “s erio usly u nd erm in ed ” the gri eva nc e p roc eed ing s. W ebb, 155 F.3 d at 1 242; s ee als o VanD er Veer v. U PS, Inc., 25 F.3d 403, 405 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[T] he plai nti ff must meet the oner ous burden of pr oving t hat t he grievanc e proces s w as ser iousl y fl aw ed b y th e un ion’s b rea ch o f its du ty to repre sen t emp loyees h one stly an d in good fai th and wit hout i nvidi ous di scri m i nat ion or arbi tr ary conduct. ” (quotat ion om itted)). A s w e h ave prev iously no ted, jud icial re view of a un ion’s c ond uct is h ighly defer enti al. Y oung, 95 F.3d at 997 (holdi ng that this C ourt w i ll not second-guess a un ion’s “ go od f aith, no ndisc rimin atory judg m ent in a ssessin g an d p resentin g its m em be rs’ g rie van ce s”). B. Evidence that the Uni on B r eached I ts D ut y of Fai r Represent at ion M r. H i nkley argues that t he U nion breached its duty of fair represent ati on becau se his U ni on repres entat ive, M r. Terr anel la, acted i n an ar bit rar y and perfunct ory fashi on by fa ili ng to ob ject to one of the pan el m em bers h earin g his g rieva nce and failing to Appellate Case: 06-3097 Document: 010131995 Date Filed: 09/13/2007 Page: 7

M r. H ink ley argue s that th e D istrict C ourt m isap plied th e stan dard app licab le to 2 summary judgment moti ons by improper ly weighi ng evidence and not cons ider ing t he rec ord in the ligh t mo st fav orab le to h im a s the n onm ov ing p arty. T o su ppo rt this argument, he ci tes empl oy ment di scr iminat ion cases, in which we note t hat, once a plai nti ff pres ents evidence that an employ er’ s st at ed reas on is a pret ext for discr iminat ion, a ju ry sh ou ld d eterm in e w h eth er th e e mp loyer a ctu ally h ad a dis crim in ato ry mo tive. See, e. g., Randle v. Cit y of Au rora, 69 F.3d 441, 453 (10t h C i r. 1995). We fai l t o see how thes e cas es appl y, as M r. H i nkley has not all eged that the Union’ s conduct was dis cri minat ory. To the ext ent he i s argui ng that a jury should deci de w het her t he U ni on acted in bad fait h, he must present some evidence o f “fraud, decei tful act ion or dishonest ac tion.” M ock, 971 F.2d at 531. As w e not e below, he has fail ed to do s o. - 8 - int roduce evi dence of Roadway’ s i mproper us e of infor mati on obtai ned from the co mp uter tra cking dev ice. H e also co ntend s tha t certain rem arks m ad e by M r. T erran ella indicate tha t t h e U nion acted in bad fa it h. B ased o n our rev iew of th e record, ho wev er, the Uni on did not act in bad fai th or i n an arbit rary or per functor y m anner in i ts handl ing of M r. Hinkl ey’ s gr ievanc e. As we explai n below, none of t he conduct that M r. Hinkley ident ifi es sugges ts that the Union breac hed it s duty of fair repr esent ation. 2 First, M r. H inkley arg ue s that M r. T erran ella ac ted a rbitrarily in fa ili ng to ob ject to one o f the pan el mem bers w ho heard h is grievance. O n July 8, 2003, the day of M r. Hinkley ’s heari ng before t he M o-Kan Com mi tt ee, Yellow Corporat ion (“Yel low”) announced i ts int ent to acqui re Roadw ay. The l abor r elat ions manager for Yell ow Transpor tat ion, John Graves, w as a member of bot h the Local Cart age and the Mo-Kan C om mittee s that h eard M r. Hin kley’s grie van ce. M r. H ink ley argue s that M r. T erra nella shoul d have obj ected t o M r. Graves’ s ser ving on t hese commit tees beca use, in l ight of t he pendi ng m er ger, a Y el low employ ee would not be an impar ti al ar bitr at or. In suppor t of Appellate Case: 06-3097 Document: 010131995 Date Filed: 09/13/2007 Page: 8

thi s requi rement of impart ial it y, Mr. Hinkl ey not es that the CB A’s procedur al r ules do not al low repr esent ati ves of employ ers who are par ti es to t he gri evance to s erve on t he co m mitte es he arin g th e g riev anc e. T he g rievan ce p roce dure s un der th e C BA do not, ho w eve r, ensu re the com plete impar ti ali ty of gri evance comm i ttees. Ins tead, the CBA di rect s that employ ers and uni ons appoi nt an equa l number of commit tee member s. Potent ial bias i s ther efore an i nherent part of the sel ecti on proces s; some mem ber s repr esent employ ers and s om e r epresent un io ns. See U ni ted St eelworker s of Am. Local 1913 v. U ni on R.R. C o., 648 F. 2d 905, 913 (3d Cir. 1981) (charact eri zing a publ ic l aw boar d consis ti ng of a car ri er r epres entat ive and a uni on repr esent ati ve as “bipar tis an rat her than i m par tial and dis int eres ted”). Indeed, even t hough the CBA ’ s procedur al r ules als o prohi bit repr esent ati ves of the l ocal uni on from ser ving on gr ievanc e committ ees, members of M r. Hinkl ey ’s union, Local 41, sit on gri evance pane ls beca use Local 41 is the onl y l ocal in t he ar ea. Moreover, t he Union had not not ifi ed M r. T er ranel la of a ny change i n poli cy regar ding t he incl usi on of Yell ow employ ees on panel s heari ng gri evances invol ving Roadway, and al though Yell ow had announced i ts int ent ion t o acqui re Roadway, the acqui si ti on was not compl ete unt il aft er M r. Hinkl ey ’s gri evance w as res olved. G i ven the nat ure of j oint labor- management co mm ittees a nd th e fac t that M r. G rav es w as m ere ly a repre sentativ e of an e ntity intendi ng to acquire Road way, M r. T err anella’s decis ion not to object t o M r. G raves as a panel member is not arbit rary or per functor y. I t does not fal l out side t he “w i de range of re aso na ble nes s” a cco rd ed unio n rep rese nta tive s, see O’N eill, 499 U.S. at 67, or indi cate a Appellate Case: 06-3097 Document: 010131995 Date Filed: 09/13/2007 Page: 9

lac k o f c on cern fo r M r. H in kle y’s g riev an ce, see W ebb, 1 55 F.3 d a t 12 40. Secon d, M r. H i nkley contends that M r. T err anella should have introduced the fi rst page of an i nter- offi ce mem or andum duri ng the fi nal gri evance heari ng. In t hat m emoran dum, M r. H oag ex plained that h is i nterview w it h M r. H inkley occ urred after M r. H oag no ted disc repa ncies in M r. H ink ley’s RD D entries and con sulted G PS trackin g da ta f or t he da y i n q ue st i on. Acc or di n g t o Mr. Hi nk l ey, t hi s pa r t of t he memo r a nd um s h ows tha t his disc harg e w as b ased on h is em ployer’s u se o f a co mp uter tra ckin g de vice in viol ati on of the CBA. M r. Terranel la had made t his very argument i n the fi rst heari ng before t he Local Cart age Comm i tt ee and then aga in befor e the M o- K an Comm i tt ee, urgi ng both commit tees t o order t hat Mr. H i nkley be rei nstat ed because hi s di schar ge w as based on Roadway ’s i m pr oper use of c omputer t racki ng data. T he Mo-Kan C ommit tee agreed t hat t he t racki ng data s hould be excl uded from t he gri evance pr oceedi ngs, but dir ect ed that the cas e nevert heless be hear d on “it s meri ts on dis cussi on w i th employ ee. ” M r. Terr anell a unders tood t he M o- K an Committ ee’s deci sion as a dir ect ive t hat t he Local C artag e C om mittee hear th e case base d o n w hat tran spire d in M r. H ink ley’s me eting with M r. Ho ag. Relying on his understan ding of th e M o-K an C omm ittee’s decision, M r. Terr anell a did not argue agai n that Roadw ay ter minated Mr. H i nkley based on improper use of comput er t racki ng data. In ot her words, he made a r ati onal deci si on not t o rear gue an i ssue he t hought had al ready been deci ded. Hence, his deci sion not to i ntr oduce t he Appellate Case: 06-3097 Document: 010131995 Date Filed: 09/13/2007 Page: 10

M r. H ink ley also claim s th at M r. Te rrane lla w ithheld the f irst pag e of this 3 memorandum from him unti l hi s gri evance pr oceedi ngs were fi nis hed. He argues that M r. T erran ella inten tiona lly (i.e., in b ad fa ith) w ithhe ld this in form ation to co nce al his poor r epres entat ion, but he offer s no evidence that w oul d support his al l egati ons of improper m oti ve. C onsequentl y, w e fi nd this argument meritl ess. - 11 - f irs t p a ge o f t he m e m or an d u m is n o t a rb it ra ry. 3 In a related argu me nt, M r. H inkley cla ims th at M r. T erran ella acted arb itrarily in not obj ecti ng to Roadway ’s i ntr oduct ion of evi dence based on hi s meeti ng w i th Mr. Hoag becaus e the meet ing would not have occurr ed if Mr. H oag had not revi ewed the computer trac king data a nd u sed it for disc iplina ry pu rpo ses in v iolation of th e C BA. H is the ory is ba sed o n an evid entiary ru le app lied in crimin al case s: that is, b ecau se the CB A pro hibits use of a comput er t racking devi ce for di sci pli nary purpos es, the s tat ements M r. H oag obtai ned duri ng his i ntervi ew wit h M r. H i nkley w er e the “fr uit of the poi sonous t ree” and, as s uch, coul d not be used for disci pli nary purpos es. B ut thi s doct ri ne— int ended t o deter unlawful government al act ion— does not apply in thi s context. See Jenki ns v. Ci ty of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 91 n.16 (2d Ci r. 2007) (“[T]he doct ri ne is an evi denti ary rul e that op erates in the con text of crim inal pro ced ure a nd h as g enera lly be en h eld to app ly o nly in cri m i nal t rial s.” (quotat ion omit ted)). Fur ther more, t he fact t hat M r. Ter ranel la did not pres ent a par ti cular argument does not est abli sh a breach of dut y under secti on 301 w hen, as i n the i nstant case, the uni on repres entat ive pres ent ed other argument s i n support of t he em p loyee. Young, 95 F.3d at 99 8 (“[T]h e failu re to pre sent a p articu lar arg um ent is ins uffici ent t o creat e a genuine i ssue of mat eri al fac t i n light of the ot her effor ts made by [the u nion represe ntatives].”); see al so M ock, 971 F. 2d at 531 (“Si m pl y s how i ng that t he Appellate Case: 06-3097 Document: 010131995 Date Filed: 09/13/2007 Page: 11

Union did not repres ent [t he former employ ees] as vi gorousl y as it coul d have does not establish a se cti on 301 v iolati o n.”). Fin ally, M r. Hin kley claim s that th e U nion acted in b ad fa ith by disc ussin g his gri evance i n advance of the gr ievance hea ri ngs. H e cl aims t hat Mr. Ter ranel la indi cated that the Union members of t he grievanc e committ ees were “on t he same page” and t hat the Uni on rout inel y works out deals in advanc e of gri evance hea ri ngs. M r. H i nkley suppor ts hi s all egat ion of bad f ait h by dr aw i ng our at tent ion t o a bri ef exchange he had with Mr. Ter ranel la. W hen as ked by M r. Hinkl ey whether the Union members of the g rie v an c e c o m m itt ee w e re al l “o n th e sa m e p a ge,” M r. T e rr an e lla re p lie d af fi rm a tiv e ly, remar king t hat “we di scuss thes e thi ngs.” Even i f thi s w er e t rue, the r ecord cont ains no ev ide nc e th at th e U nio n in ten tion ally p rov ide d M r. H in kle y w ith po or re pre sen tatio n, see Young, 9 5 F.3 d at 9 97 n.1, or en gag ed in frau dulen t, dec eitfu l, or dish one st beh avio r in its re pre sen tatio n o f M r. H in kley, id. In other w ords, even i f U ni on m embers dis cussed t he case, no thing in the rec ord sugg ests that M r. T erranella or other U nion mem bers w ere act ing i n bad fai th i n connecti on with Mr. Hinkl ey’ s gr ievance. I II. CONCL US I ON Because no genui ne iss ue of mater ial fact exi st s as t o w het her t he Union breac hed it s d u ty o f f a ir r ep re s en ta tio n, w e A F F IR M t he D is tr ic t C o ur t’s g ra nt of s um m a ry Appellate Case: 06-3097 Document: 010131995 Date Filed: 09/13/2007 Page: 12

ju d gm e nt in fa v or o f t he U n io n a n d R oa d w ay. ENTERED FOR TH E COURT, Deanell Reece Tacha Chief Cir cui t Judge Appellate Case: 06-3097 Document: 010131995 Date Filed: 09/13/2007 Page: 13