Brittney Kennedy v. City of Arlington - Appeal of Constitutional Claims Dismissal

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ____________ No. 25-10259 ____________ Brittney Kennedy, Individually and as surviving spouse, on behalf of minor M.S.K. and as anticipated p ersonal representative of the estate of Marquis Kennedy, Plaintiff—Appellant, versus City of Arlington, Texas; Sh elly Bateman; Jonathan P. Bucek; Richard Coleman; Tyler Ferrell; Patrick Knight; David Kurbinsky; Michael Leonesio; Leonard Ray; Ronnie McCoy; Bobby Mu gueza; Officer Norwood; Connor Shanahan; Sean Wheatley; Jastin D. Williams; Bradley McNulty, Defendants—Appellees. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Cour t for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:24-CV-208 ______________________________ Before Haynes, Duncan, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges. Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge: Appellant Brittney Kennedy appeals the dismissal of constitutional claims she brought on be half of her deceased hu sband, Marquis Kennedy, who suffered a car diac arrest after a se lf-defense simulation for police-cadet United States Court of Appeals Fifth Cir cuit FILED February 4, 2026 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 25-10259 Document: 88-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/04/2026

No. 25-10259 2 training. She claims the district court erred by concluding that the training exercise involved no constitutional seizure and that the officers owed Marquis no constitutional duty of medical care. Marquis’s death is a tragedy, abov e a ll for his surviving wife and child. Like the district court, however, we ca nnot fin d any plausible allegation that the defendants violated the Co nstitution. Accordingly, we AFFIRM. I In 2022, Marquis Kennedy (“Marquis”) sought to become a police officer for Appellee City of Arlington (the “City”). After passing a pre-employment physical examination, he enrolled in the Arlington Police Academy. As part of his training program, M arquis had to complete a self-defense course called Gracie Survival Tactics (“ GST ”), which requires cadets to endure four consecutive fo u r-minute self-defense scenarios against Gracie-trained Arlington police officers. The GST course is mandatory for all cadets. Marquis participated in the self-defense simulation during his tenth week at the academy on Friday, Septemb er 23 around 10:00 a.m. Ac cording to Kennedy, the simulation required Marq uis to submit to various “jiu-jitsu submission holds, choke holds, compression holds, punches and wrestling.” Although Marquis complained repeat edly of lightheadedness, thirst, and fatigue, he was “denied water” an d was not “permitted any breaks.” Marquis continued to participate in the simulation, however, because he would f ail an d have to “ repea t the enti re physical training program” if he stopped. Marquis’s condition deteriorated as the simulation progressed. During the fourth and final self-def ense scenario, Kennedy alleges that Marquis dropped an “office r in distress” car d, sign aling that he was in trouble and could not continue. She claims the instructors ignored the card, Case: 25-10259 Document: 88-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/04/2026

No. 25-10259 3 continuing the simulation until it was clear that Marqui s could not continue. The instructors then stopped the simula tion and asked M arquis if he needed an ambulance. “Yes,” he replied. At that time, Marquis was about fifteen minutes into the simulation. Given Marquis’s fatigued state, tw o individuals helped “carry [him] out of the room.” They sat Marquis in the break room and gave hi m water. At 10:24 a.m., Officer Shelly Bateman called dispatch, requesting emergency medical services (“ EMS ”) for Marquis, who appe ared to be “a little overheated.” But then Marquis “stopped breathing, lost consciousness, and fell off the chair, landing on his head.” In response, Officer Bateman called dispatch at 10:28 a.m., stating that Ma rquis was “not breathing and that they ha[d] begun CPR and [we]re attemp ting to use the AED to revive him.” EMS arrived at 10:40 a.m. They immediately began lifesaving measures after determining Marquis “was suffering from respiratory failure.” Ultimately, the first responde rs resuscitated Marquis using oral intubation. They then transported him to a hospital. Sadly, Marq uis never regained consciousness and died two days later. The autopsy and death certificate list the cause of death as un known but note that Marquis suffered a “cardiac arrest” and that there wa s “ [n]o apparent trauma.” Th e death certificate suggests that “atherosclero tic cardiovascular disease” likely caused Marquis’s cardiac arrest. Kennedy sued the City and all officers present at Marquis’s training simulation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She claimed Marquis’s instructors—Appellee Officers Jastin D. Williams, Jonathan Bucek, David Kurbinsky, and Bradley McNulty—viol ated Marquis’s Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment righ ts. Kennedy also asserted Case: 25-10259 Document: 88-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/04/2026

No. 25-10259 4 bystander-liability claims agains t eleven other Appellee officers 1 who were present for, but did not participate in, the simulation. On top of that, Kennedy claimed that all officers violated Marquis’s Fourteenth Amendment rights by acti ng “with subjective deliberate indifference to [Marquis’s] serious medical needs.” Finally, Kennedy contended the City was liable for failing to train its officers to not use excessive force and to recognize when cadets are in medical distress. The City and the individual office rs moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The City also submitted a video recording of the training simulation, which Kennedy viewed and relied on in drafting a supporting affidavit for her claims. The distri ct court referred the motions to a magistrate judge, who concluded that the complaint failed to (1) plausibly allege a Fourth Amendment seizure; (2) state a Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-process viol ation; or (3) establish any constitutional duty to provide medical care in an em ploy ment setting. The magistrate judge therefore held that qualified immunity applied and recommended dismissing all claims against the officers and the City. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s findings and conclusions in full. 2 Kennedy appeals. II The dismissal of Kennedy’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo. Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 743 (5th Cir. 2023). To surviv e a motion to _____________________ 1 Those officers include Shelly Bateman, Richard Coleman, Tyler Ferrell, Patrick Knight, Michael Leonesio, Leonard Ray, Ronnie McCoy, Bobby Mugueza, Officer Norwood, Connor Shanaha n, and Sean Wheatley. 2 Future references to the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations will therefore be a ttributed to the district court. Case: 25-10259 Document: 88-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/04/2026

No. 25-10259 5 dismiss, the complaint must contain “s ufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). We “accept all well-pled fa cts as true, construing all reasonable inferences in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” White v. U.S. Corr., L.L.C., 996 F.3d 302, 306–07 (5th Ci r. 2021). But we need not “presume true a number of categories of statements, including legal conclusions; mere labels; threadbare reci tals of the elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and naked as sertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159, 1162–63 (5th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). III A We begin by addressing whether the district court properly considered the City’s video recording when ru ling on the motions to dismiss. When evaluating a motion to dismiss, courts are us ually confined to the complaint and its attachments. Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008). But “[w]hen a defendant attaches documents to its motion that are referenced in the comp laint and are central to the plaintiff’s claims,” then “the court can also properly consider those documents.” Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 900 (5th Cir. 2019). This principle applies equally to videos: When a plaintiff relies on and references video evidence “in their complaint and brief,” Fifth Circuit “caselaw supports our cons ideration of the video.” Winder v. Gallardo, 118 F.4th 638, 643 (5th Cir. 2024) (per curiam). Kennedy cites the City’s recording of Marquis’s trai ning simulation in the operative complaint. And beca use Kennedy did not witness Marquis’s training simulation, her claims against th e officers rely heavily on an affidavit Case: 25-10259 Document: 88-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/04/2026

No. 25-10259 6 in which she describes what sh e saw on the recording. As a result, the recording is “central to [Kennedy’s] claims.” Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 920 F.3d at 900. The district court therefor e did not err in considering the video. Winder, 118 F.4th at 643. B Next, we consider whether the dist rict court erred by holding that qualified immunity bars Kennedy’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the four instructors. Qualified immunity “protects all bu t the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (internal quotations omitted). To overcome the defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must “plead specif ic facts that both allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm he has alleged and that defeat a qualified immu nity defense with equal specificity.” Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2012)). Qualified-immunity defenses are an alyzed under a t wo-prong inquiry. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). Courts may address the prongs “in either order” and may “re solve the case on a single prong.” Cloud v. Stone, 993 F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Garcia v. Blevins, 957 F.3d 596, 600 (5th Cir. 2020)). Under the fi rst prong, the plaintiff must plausibly allege that “[the officers] violated a fe deral statutory or constitutional right.” Ibid. (internal quotations omitted). Th e second prong requires that the unlawfulness of the conduct be “clearly established at the time” of the alleged misconduct. Ibid. (citation omitted). Case: 25-10259 Document: 88-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/04/2026

No. 25-10259 7 1 We begin with Kennedy’s claim that the instructors violated Marquis’s Fourth Amendmen t rights by seizing him through excessive force. A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person wo uld believe he was not free to leave. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). The Supreme Court has long made clear that “a Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur whenever there is a governmentally caused termination of an individual’s freedom of movement”; rather, a seiz ure occurs only when there is a termination of freedom of movement “through means intentionally applied.” Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596–97 (1989) (emphasis omitted). Put differently, a seizure requir es the “detention or taking itself” be “willful.” Gorman v. Sharp, 892 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 2018) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Brower, 489 U.S. at 596). The district court held that Kennedy did not plausibly all ege a seizure because the complaint lacked non concl usory allegations suggesting that the instructors “intended to seize Marquis Kennedy.” On appeal, Kennedy argues the district court erred in tw o ways. First, she disagrees with the court’s reading of seizure la w, claiming that a seizur e requires only that the instructors “intended to commit the acts that resulted in the harm.” In her view, because the officers intended to apply force to Marquis during the simulation, and because that force was ex cessive, the instructors violated his Fourth Amendment right “to be free from excessive force.” Second, Kennedy argues that the instructors se ized Marquis when they “continued to assault him” after he withdrew his consent. According to Ke nnedy, “Marquis revoked his consent when he dropped his ‘officer in distress’ card, which was designed for that very purpose.” Case: 25-10259 Document: 88-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/04/2026

No. 25-10259 8 We agree with the district cour t that Kennedy has not plausibly alleged a Fourth Amendment seizure. As a threshold matter, there is no “generic ‘right’ to be free from e xcessive force.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 (1989). Kennedy’s conclu sory suggestion to the contrary is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. Similarly unavailing are Kennedy’s intent- and consent-based arguments. Starting with intent, Kennedy does not plausibly allege that the instructors willfully intended to restrain Marquis duri ng his training exercise. Our precedent makes this point clear. In Gorman v. Sharp, we reversed the denial of qualified immuni ty when an officer accident ally shot a co-instructor during a training exercise after forgetti ng to replace his real firearm with a dummy weapon. 892 F.3d at 175. Althou gh the incident was “unquestionably tragic,” id. at 173, we held that no se izure occurred because the shooting “was not ‘willful[ly] performed,’” id. at 175 (alteration in original) (quoting Brower, 489 U.S. at 596). Indeed, the offi cer believed he was using a dummy firearm and pulled the trigger solely “to educate his audience as a firearms training instructor.” Ibid. Gorman thus shows that mere intent to perform the act is not enough to effect a Fourth Amendment seizure. That analysis controls here. Like the inst ructor in Gorman, the instructors running Marquis’s training si mulation did not intend to restrain or harm him. They applied force t o Ma rquis for instructional purposes during a structured self-defense simulation. The compl aint lacks nonconclusory facts suggesting otherwise. Gorman also squarely rejects Kennedy’s contention that a seizure requires only an intent to “commit the act that resulted in the harm.” Otherwise, Gorman would have come out the other way because the instructor there intend ed to pull the trigger. The complaint therefore fails to plausibly allege th e willfulness necessary to establish a Fourth Amendment seizure. Case: 25-10259 Document: 88-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/04/2026

No. 25-10259 9 Nor does the complaint plausibly a llege that Marquis withdrew his consent during the simu lation. Kennedy’s main theory—that Marquis dropped an officer-in-distress card—is co ntradicted by the vi deo recording. And as we noted in Harmon v. City of Arlington, when a video recording is “included in the pleadings” and “‘bl atantly contradict[s]’” the “factual allegations in the complaint,” this court adopts the video’s depiction of events, “viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” 16 F.4th at 1163 (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). Even through that favorable lens, Kennedy’s theory is implausible. Although the audio is not perfect, the video clearly shows how Marquis’s final self-defense scenario proceed ed. The simulation begins, and the observing officers prompt Marquis to ask the approaching instructor for identification. Marquis does so. The instru ctor replies, “ ID, sure man it’s right here,” offering an orange card. The instructor then begins punching Marquis as part of the simula tion, and Marquis drops the ID to defend himself. Nothing in the video suggests—let alone supports—that Marquis withdrew his consent by dr opping the ID. And nothing else in the complaint supports that Marquis withdrew his consent. The D.C. Circuit has persuasive ly rejected Kennedy’s other rationales for why Marquis “was not freely able to leave the training exercise.” In Feirson v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Circuit held that a police officer was not seized during mandator y baton-training exercises, even though a reasonable person might have felt unable to diso bey orders without jeopardizing their career. 506 F.3d 1063, 1067–68 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The court rejected the theory that the officer wa s “‘seized’ during the attack exercise because he could not stop it,” em ph asizing that the officer had “submitted to the exercise” and that nothing sugge sted the instructors would not have stopped had he as ked. Id. at 1068. Case: 25-10259 Document: 88-1 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/04/2026

No. 25-10259 10 So too here. Marquis voluntarily subm itted to the training simulation. And Kennedy does not plausibly allege that the instructors would have refused to stop the simulation if asked. In fact, the record shows the opposite: the instructors did stop the simulation when Marquis could not continue. Like Feirson, Marquis consented to the si mulation through voluntary submission. The complaint itself confirms Marq uis’s voluntary participation. The City’s website states that cadets shoul d expect to undergo “Scenario Training” and “Physical Tr aining and De fensive Tactics”—trainings that plainly encompass the simulation at issue. Marquis thus consented to instructional force as a condition of cadet training and prospective employment. Any limitation on Marquis’s freedom of movement thus stemmed from his knowing an d voluntary consent to be part of the training. Because the complaint does not plau sibly allege that the instructors willfully restrained Marquis’s liberty duri ng the simulation, it fails to state a claim for a Fourth Amendment seizure. The district court therefore properly dismissed Kennedy’s Fourth Amen dment excessive-force claims. 2 We turn to Kennedy’s claim that the instructors violated M arquis’s substantive-due-process right to bodily integrity. “[T]he touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.” Co unty of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (citation omitte d). In “a constitutional sense,” “‘[a]rbitrary action’ . . . encompasse s ‘only the most egregious official conduct,’ namely that which ‘sh ocks the conscience.’” Slaughter v. Mayo r & City Council, 682 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846). That bar is exceedingly high, re quiring “conduct intended to injure” that is “unjustifiable by any government interest.” Ibid. (quoting Lewis, 523 Case: 25-10259 Document: 88-1 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/04/2026

No. 25-10259 11 U.S. at 849). Deliberate indifferen ce ma y suffice in custod ial settings with “pretrial detainees,” but it is insu fficient for “persons in an employment relationship with the government.” Ibid. As the Supreme Court has explained, “Neither the text nor the history of the Due Process Clause” su ggests that a governmental employer has a “duty to provide its employees with a safe worki ng environment.” C o l l i n s v. C i t y o f H a r k e r H e i g h t s, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992). Consistent with Collins, the Fourth Circuit a ffirmed a dismissal of claims brought by the estate of a firefighter recruit who di ed in a live-burn training exercise. Slaughter, 682 F.3d at 323. “[B]ecause th e complaint does not purport to allege that the Fire Department stag ed the live burn training exercise with the purpose of causing harm to [the decedent] or to any other recruit, it falls short of alleging a substantive du e process violation in th e context of the facts alleged.” Id. at 319. Likewise, in Carty v. Rodriguez, we held that qualified immunity shielded state-trooper trai ners when a trainee died following defensive-tactics drills, underscoring th at the Constitution does not impose a duty to provide a safe tr aining environment. 470 F. App’x 234, 236 n.5 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). Taken together, these precedents te ach that, to state a due pro cess claim, Kennedy had to allege more than an unsafe training environment. She had to plausibly allege that the instruct ors intended to harm Marquis. As we have already conclude d, however, the complaint does not do that. Furthermore, Kennedy argues only that various instructor actions demonstrate deliberate indifference. The complaint alleges the same. But because Marquis was a City employee vo luntarily participating in workplace training, not a police suspect in cust ody, pleading deliberate indifference alone is insufficient. Slaughter, 682 F.3d at 321 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846). At most, the allegations sound in negligence—a claim rooted in state Case: 25-10259 Document: 88-1 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/04/2026

No. 25-10259 12 tort law, not constitu tional due process. Collins, 503 U.S. at 127 n.10, 128; see also Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849. The district court therefore properly dismissed Kennedy’s bodily-integrity claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 Finally, we consider Kennedy’s other Fourteenth Amendment claim—that all the Appellee officers were deliberately indifferent toward Marquis’s medical needs. The Due Process Clause imposes a constitutional duty on the government to provide medical care only when it has restrained an individual’s liberty such that they cannot care for t hemselves—typically through incarceration, detention, or institutionalization. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198–200 (1989). Kennedy’s medical-care claim relies predominately on her seizure theory, asserting that Marquis “enjoyed a constitutional right to medical care” when the instructors seized him. Given that asserted right, Kennedy alleges the officers failed to respon d ade quately to Marquis’s medical distress, including by delaying the call for emergency medical services. We have already rejected Kennedy’s seizure theory above, however. And Marquis was not otherwise a detainee or in state custody. To the contrary, he was a police-academy ca det participating in a voluntary workplace training exercise. As Collins makes clear, government employees injured in the course of employment ar e not in custody or deprive d of their liberty for Fourteenth Amendment purp oses. 503 U.S. at 127–28. Absent a custodial arrangement or some other sp ecial relationship, allegations of delayed or inadequate medical response sound in state-tort law and negligence, not in subs tantive due process. Ibid. Case: 25-10259 Document: 88-1 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/04/2026

No. 25-10259 13 Kennedy’s deliberate-indifference claims therefore fail, and the district court properly dismissed them. C Finally, we turn to Kennedy’s de rivative claims, which include (1) bystander liability against the observ ing officers for failing to intervene; and (2) municipal liability against the City for failing to train its officers to not use excessive force or to recognize wh en a cadet is in medical distress. Bystander liability attaches only wh en an officer “(1) knew a fellow officer was violating an individual’s cons titutional rights, (2) was present at the scene of the constitutional violatio n, (3) h ad a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm but neverthe less, (4) chose not to act.” Jo se ph ex r el. E st. o f Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 343 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 646 (5th Cir. 2013)). Be cause Kennedy has not plausibly alleged any constitutional violation, the eleven officers cannot be liable for failing to intervene. These claims necessarily fail. The same is true for Kennedy’s cl aims against the City because municipal liability also requires a predicate constitutional injury. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (“If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point.”). But even if that weren’t the case, Kennedy’s clai ms would still fail because the Collins Court rejected Monell liability for workplace-safety -related harms. 503 U.S. at 128–29 (explaining that decisions like employee training should be made by “locally elected representatives, rather than by federal judges interpreting the basic charter of Government for the entire country”). Case: 25-10259 Document: 88-1 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/04/2026

No. 25-10259 14 Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Kennedy’s derivative § 1983 claims. IV The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. Case: 25-10259 Document: 88-1 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/04/2026