Jackson v. Tarrant County - Redistricting Appeal

United Sta tes Court of Appeals f or the Fifth Circuit ________ ____ No. 25 -11055 ________ ____ Winnie Jackson; J arrett “Jay ” Jac kson; Celina Vas quez; Duane Braxt on; Nadia Bhular; A mjad Bhu lar; Ch eryl Mills Smith; Richard Can ada, Plaint iffs — App ellant s, versus Tarrant County, Texas; Tarrant Co unty Commission ers Court; Tim O’Hare, i n his of ficia l cap acit y a s Tarrant County Jud ge, Defendant s —Appellees. ________ ____ ___ _____ _______ ___ Appea l fr om the United State s Distri ct Court for the Northe rn District o f Tex as USDC N o. 4: 25 - CV - 587 ________ ____ ___ _____ _______ ___ Before Bar ksdale, Willet t, and D unc an, Circuit Ju dges. Don R. Wi llett, Circuit Judge: Admin isterin g free and fair e lect ions r equ ires so meone to set the rules of the electoral r oad. Under our Con stitution, that duty rests w ith the S tates and the ir politica l subd ivisions, wh ich enjoy “cons iderable discretio n in United S tates Court of A ppeals Fifth Circuit FILED October 29, 20 25 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk

No. 25 - 11055 2 establish ing rule s for th eir o wn ele ctions.” 1 That discretio n re aches its height in the redistrictin g proce ss, for redistricting — like the br oader e lectoral system —“ is prim arily the duty and resp onsibility o f the S tate thro ugh its legislature or other bo dy.” 2 Even so, that authority has limits. T he Constitution itse lf d raws them: the Fourte enth a nd Fif teent h Amend ments forbid racia l discriminatio n in the condu ct of e lection s. Withi n those bounds, howev er, t he power of S tates and localitie s t o f ix district lines is broad — and ours is nar row. U nless a plaintiff proves racial discrim ina tion, fe deral courts mu st stay their han d, m indful th at “[t]he task of re districti ng is be st left to. . . legislatur es, e lected by the peo ple and as capab le as the co urts, if n ot more so, in balancing th e my riad facto rs and traditio ns in legiti mate districtin g policie s.” 3 B ecaus e j udicial interventi on in this realm is fraugh t, our revi ew, whil e exacting, must also be restra ined. This case tests that b alance. * * * Here, Tar rant Cou nty chose to r edraw the precinct lines u sed to elect its County Commi ssioners — and t o do s o mid - cycle. The Ch all eng ers, a group of voter s reass igned fr om one dis trict to anoth er, contend that the County C ommissi oner s Court re drew t he lines to harm r acial mino rities. They further ar gue that, e ven if p artisan ship r ather th an race drove the decisio n, the County ’s staggere d ele ctions j u stify ou r inter ventio n de spite the ge neral rule against policing partis an maps. We hold that the facts do not ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 1 Vote. org v. Call anen, 89 F.4th 45 9, 480 (5 th Cir. 2023). 2 See Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975). 3 Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 101 (1997).

No. 25 - 11055 3 suppo rt the Challen gers’ first ar gume nt, and the law does not support the ir second. Accord ingly, w e AFFIRM the d istrict cour t’s de nial of a p reliminar y inju nction. I. Background Under the Te xas Constitution, each Count y Commi ssioners C ourt acts as the count y’s “principal gove rnin g body” — its nerve cen ter of local administr ation. 4 The Commissi oners C ourt consis ts of four Count y Commissi oners a nd a C ounty Judge. 5 Each Com missione r is ele cted by th e voters of one of the f our “com missi oners prec inct s,” 6 serv ing four - yea r sta gger ed term s so that e lectio ns occ ur in two p recin cts eve ry even - numbere d year. 7 The Cou nty Ju dge s erv es the sa me four - year term but is electe d countywid e. 8 In ad dition to its other “le gislative, exe cutive, administr ative, and j udicial fun ctions,” 9 the C ommissi oners Cou rt hol ds a ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 4 Co mm’rs Ct. of Titus Cnty. v. A gan, 9 40 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tex. 19 97); see Tex. Const. art. 5, § 18(b) (“[T ]he County Comm issioners Cou rt. . . shal l ex erci se such powers and jurisdic tion over a ll cou nty bu siness, as is c onfer red by this C onstitution a nd the laws of the State, or as may be hereafter presc ribed.”). 5 Tex. Const. art. 5, § 18(b). 6 Id. 7 See id. (p rovid ing tha t a County Commiss ioner “s hall hold his of fice fo r four y ears and u ntil his succ essor s hall be elec ted an d qu alified ”); Fa shing v. El Pa so Cnty. D emocratic Exec. Comm., 534 S.W.2d 886, 888 – 90 (Tex. 197 6) (de scrib ing t he adoptio n of a st aggered election s ys tem). 8 Tex. Const. art. 5, § 15. 9 Agan, 940 S.W.2d at 79.

No. 25 - 11055 4 power both fu ndamen tal and fate ful: the con stitut ional authority to draw — and redraw — the f our commi ssion ers preci nct s. 10 “The Texas Constitutio n does not req uire counties to reapportion commis sioners ’ precincts at any particular time, but only ‘from time to time, for the conv enience of the peopl e.’” 11 T o c omply with the fed era l “on e person, one v ote” pri nci ple announced i n Gray v. Sand ers, 12 states and their politica l subdiv isions must ge ner ally red istrict upon relea se of th e de cennial census “t o account for any chang es or shi fts in popul ati on.” 13 In 20 21, the Tarra nt County’ s Commi ssioners Court — home to Fort Worth and seve ral neigh borin g cities — retained a Texas - b ased law firm to assist with the redistr icting pro cess. The same firm had guided the County’s redistrict ing efforts after the 199 0, 2000, and 2010 censuses. The result s from the 2020 census sho wed tha t, alt hough Tar rant County’s no n -H ispanic whit e v oting - age po pulation h ad decr ease d by about 30,000 sin ce the 2010 c ensus, its o verall voting - age po pulation had in crease d by more t han 300, 000. That g rowth, h o wever, was distribute d roughly even ly ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 10 Article 5, Sec tion 18(b) o f the T exas Cons titution re quire s commiss ioners precincts to be created “in the manner provided f or justice of the peace and constable precincts.” Tex. Const. art. 5, § 18(b). Sect ion 18(a), in turn, pr ovides that “[a] divis ion or des igna tion” of ju stice of the peace a nd constab le prec incts “sh all be made by the Commi ssioners Co urt. ” Tex. Const. art. 5, § 18(a). 11 A bbott v. Mexican Am. Legis. Caucus, Tex. House of Representatives, 647 S.W.3d 681, 707 (T ex. 2022) (H echt, C.J., dis senting) (quoti ng Tex. Const. art. 5, § 18(a)). 12 372 U.S. 368, 381 (19 63) (“T he conc eption of politica l equ ality fr om the Decla ration o f Indepen dence, to Linc oln’s Getty sburg Ad dress, to the Fif teenth, Seventee nth, and Nineteent h Amendments c an mean o nly one thi ng — one pers on, one vote.”). 13 Georgia v. As h croft, 539 U.S. 461, 48 8 n.2 (2003), superseded by statute on other gr ou nd s, Fannie Lou Ham er, Ros a Pa rks, and C oretta Sc ott Kin g Votin g Rig hts Ac t Reauth oriza tion and Am endments Ac t of 2006, Pub. L. 109 - 246, 120 Stat. 577, a s r eco gn i zed in, Ala. Legis. Bla ck Caucus v. Al abama, 575 U.S. 254, 276 (2015).

No. 25 - 11055 5 across th e County’s four co mmissio n ers pre cincts. Accord ing to the law firm’s I nitial Asse ssment, continu ing to u se the e xisting p recin ct boundarie s would result in a m aximum populatio n deviatio n — d efined as “the sum of the per centage deviation s from pe rfect populatio n equ ality of th e most - and least - pop ulated district s” 14 — of just 1.97% — well belo w the 10% th reshold that “pre sumptively co mplies with th e on e - person, one - vot e rul e.” 15 Accord ingly, although the Commi ssion ers Co urt una nimously a dopt ed a s et of red istrictin g criteria, i t ultimately voted 4 – 1 to retain the sa me ma p adopte d after the 201 0 census. I n doing s o, the Court r ejec ted a n alternative map tha t propo nents claimed would be tter “accoun t[] for the gr owth of minor ity commu nities” w ithin th e C ounty. On Apr il 2, 2025, by a nar row 3 – 2 majori ty, the Commiss ioners Court approve d a legal - services co ntract w ith the Virgin ia - based Public Inter est Law Fou ndation (PILF) to m anage a m id - d ecade re districting in advan ce of the 2 026 electio n. Unlike its pred eces sor, PILF did not recom mend t hat the Comm issioners Court adop t criteria to guide the re districting proce ss. The County first posted five po tential maps on its w ebsite and held public hearin gs in e ach pre cinct. Af ter the hearin gs — and just fiv e days befo re the Commissi oners C ourt was scheduled t o vote on a new map — two additio nal maps, Maps 6 and 7, were post ed o n the Cou nt y ’s websit e. At a Commissi oners C ourt meeti ng on Jun e 3, 202 5, on e co mmissi oner m oved to adopt Map 7, while a not her moved t o post pone th e vote to allow the pu blic more ti me to r evie w th e pro posa l. T he moti on to p ostpon e failed, 3 – 2, and Map 7 was adopted by that same narro w mar gin. ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 14 Evenwel v. Abbott, 578 U.S. 54, 6 0 n.2 (2016). 15 Id. at 60; se e Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (19 83) (“Ou r dec isions hav e estab lished, as a gen eral ma tter, th at an apportion ment pla n with a m axim um deviatio n unde r 10% fa lls within th is ca tegory of minor devia tions.”).

No. 25 - 11055 6 Under the o ld map, tw o precincts w ere majo rity Repub lican an d two were m ajority D emocrat. U nder Map 7, by con trast, thre e precincts are majo rity Repub lican and only on e is majo rity Democr at. In ad dition, while the previ ous map had t wo majori ty - mi nority d is tricts and two majority - white districts, Map 7 alters that m ix to one majority - minor ity district and thre e majo rity - white districts. Becaus e County Com mission ers ser ve staggere d term s, the redistr icting reshuffled voter s a mong p recin cts with different ele ction cycle s. Some vo ters w ho pre viously reside d in precincts sche dule d to e lect a County Commissi oner in 202 6 were r eass ign ed to precincts that will no t hol d such electio n s until 2 028, while o ther s moved i n the opposi te direc tion. In total, approx imately 9.8% of Tar rant C ounty’s vot ing - age populatio n was shifted from preci nct s slated for 2026 electio ns to t hose that will not ho ld Commis s ion er election s until 2028. Democratic vo ters are disproport ionatel y represe nted amo ng thos e moved to precin cts that wil l not vote un til 20 28: Al though Vice Presi dent Kamala Harr is re corde d 46.7% of th e Tarran t Coun ty vote in the 202 4 presid ential ele ction, H arris vote rs make up 62. 7% of those tran sferre d to a precin ct that will n ot ho ld a Cou nty Commission er e lection until 2028. C omparab le patterns emerg e using re sults from the 2024 U.S. Senate race or the 2 022 guber natorial e lection instead. The vot ers shifted to precinct s without a 20 26 electio n also in clude dispro portio nate share s of Tarrant County’s b lack and Latin o votin g - age popu lations. Although b lack and L atino A mericans comprise 17.9% a nd 26.3% of Tarra nt Cou nty’s v oti ng - age popu lation, the y repr ese nt 31.2% and 31. 9%, respe ctively, of those transf erre d to pre cinct s not holdi ng a Count y Comm issioner e lection until 202 8.

No. 25 - 11055 7 Plaintiff s Winn ie Jackson, Jarre tt “Jay” Jackso n, Ce lina Vasq uez, Duane Braxton, Nad ia Bhu lar, Amj ad Bhular, Che ryl Mills - Smith, and Richard Can ada (co llective ly, “th e Challenger s”) su ed to p revent Map 7’s use in the 2026 el ecti on. They name d Tarra nt Count y, the Tarr ant County Commissi oners C ourt, a nd County Judg e Tim O’Har e, in his official capacity, (colle ctively, “the County”) as de fendants. Plaintif fs W innie Jackson, Jay J ackson, Braxton, an d Mills - Sm ith ar e black; V asqu ez and Nadia Bhular are Latin a; Amjad Bhular is S outh east A sian; an d Canada is white. Under the p rior m ap, each Challen ger resided in a pre cinct scheduled to ele ct a County Com missi oner in 20 26. Un der Map 7, h owev er, all have been re assigned to precin cts that w ill no t hold such e lection s until 2028. I n the d istrict co urt, t he Challe ngers alleged that Map 7 violate d § 2 of the Votin g Rights Act and the F irst, Four teenth, and F ifteenth Amendme nts. The Chal lengers mov ed for a p reli minary i njunction, and t he County m oved to di smi ss on jurisdictional and Rule 12(b)(6) grou nds. The district court gran ted the County’s moti on in part — dismissi ng the Challen gers’ First A mendmen t claims — but otherwi se deni ed both m oti ons. The Challe nger s appeale d the denial o f the prelimin ary inj unction. In light of the fast - appr oachin g candidate - filing period, whi ch beg ins on Novem ber 8, 2025, a m otion s pane l grante d the Challe ngers’ request to expe dite the ap peal. II. Standard of Review “We re view the distr ict cou rt’s gran t of [a] prelimin ary inj u nction f or abuse o f discre tion, reviewin g under lying factu al findin gs for cle ar error and legal conclu sions de novo.” 16 The framewor k gover ning pr elimina ry ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 16 Harrison v. Young, 48 F.4th 331, 339 (5th Cir. 2022).

No. 25 - 11055 8 injuncti ons “is l ong - standing and fam iliar.” 17 P laintiff s see king such relie f must sho w four thing s: (1) a likel ihood of succe ss on the merits; (2) a likel ihood of suffer ing irrepar able har m if an in jun ction is not gran ted; (3) that the balance of eq uities tips in the ir favor; and (4) that an injunctio n would s erve the public inte rest. 18 “Th e first fac tor — like lihood of su ccess on the mer its — is ‘the most important. ’” 19 III. Discussion On app eal, th e Challe nge rs raise three argu ments: (1) that Map 7 discrimin ate s on the ba sis of vie wpoint in violation of the First and Fourteent h Amend ments; (2) that Map 7 discriminate s on the basis of race in viol ation of t he Four teenth an d Fift eenth Amendme nts; a nd (3) that the County’s mi d - cycle redistr icting unlawf ully disenfranchises certain Tarrant County residents withou t adeq uate jus tification. We take each in tu rn. A. Viewpoint Discrimina tion First, th e Challe ngers argue that the Comm issioner s Court drew th e new distr ict maps bas ed on res idents’ p artisan affilia tions, intend ing to dimini sh the political str ength of Democrati c voter s. Th e y conten d this amoun ts to un constitu tional vie wpo int dis crimination. 20 The C ounty respon ds that th is claim merely rep ackages a p artisan - gerrymandering ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 17 United Stat es v. Abbott, 110 F.4th 700, 706 (5 th Cir. 20 24). 18 Winter v. N at. Res. Def. Counci l, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 19 Abbott, 110 F.4th at 706 (qu oting Mock v. Garland, 75 F.4th 563, 587 n.60 (5th Cir. 2023)). 20 Rosenberger v. Rector o f Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (19 95) (“Dis crimin ation against spee ch because o f its message i s pres umed to be unconst itu tio nal. ” (cita tion omitted)).

No. 25 - 11055 9 theory — o ne for ecl osed t o the feder al courts under Rucho v. Common Cause. 21 The d istrict cour t agre ed w ith the County, and so do we. Article III, which “vest[s]” fed eral cou rts with “[t]he jud icial pow er of the Unite d States,” 22 at once empo wers a nd “confines” th at power to certain cate gories of “Case s” and “Contr oversies.” 23 That limitation h elps “ens ur[e] th at th e F e deral Judiciar y re spects ‘th e pr ope r — and pr operly limited — role of the cour ts in a de mocratic s ociety.’” 24 One aspe ct of the case - or - contro vers y requi r ement is t he so - called “po litical que stion doctrin e.” 25 Altho ugh “it is emphatic ally the pro vince and du ty of th e ju dicial depar tment to say w hat the law is,” “[s ]ometim es. . . the law is that the judicial d epartm ent has no bu siness ente rtaining th e claim o f unlaw fulness — because the question is e ntrus ted to on e of the political br anche s or in volves no jud icially en force able righ ts.” 26 The political - que stion d octrin e embodi es that prin ciple. A federal co urt’s “ declin ation of jurisd iction u nder the doctrin e” is n ot abdica tion but ackno wle dgement — a re cognition that co urts ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 21 588 U.S. 684 (2 019). 22 U.S. C onst. art. III, § 1. 23 FDA v. All. for Hippocra t ic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 378 (2024); see U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. 24 Daimle rChrys ler Co rp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 3 41 (2006) (qu oting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 73 7, 750 (19 84)). 25 See Spectrum Sto res, Inc. v. Citg o Petro leum Corp., 6 32 F.3d 938, 948 (5th C ir. 2011) (“[T]h e concep t of ju stic iability, as em bodied in the poli tical q ues tion doc trine, expres ses the j uris dictiona l limitation s im posed upon fe deral c ourts by the case or controv ersy requirem ent of Article I II.” (c leaned u p)); see a lso Massa chusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (“ It is therefore familiar learning that n o j us ticiable ‘ controv ersy ’ exists wh en pa rties s eek adju dication of a p olitical q uestion. . ..”). 26 Vi eth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004) (p lurality op inion) (clea ned up) (quotin g Marbury v. Madiso n, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).

No. 25 - 11055 10 are “in competen t to make fin al reso lution of certain m atters” w hich “anoth er br anch of gover nment is bo th capable and be tter suited for resolvi ng.” 27 In Rucho, the Supr eme Cour t held that “pa rtisan ge rrymander ing claims pre sen t political que stions beyond the reach of th e federal co urts.” 28 The C hal lenger s s eek t o si dest ep Ruc ho by characterizing their claims as ones of v iewpoi nt - based disenfran chisemen t rather th an view poin t - based vote dilution. They argue Ruch o gover ns only th e latter. But the Challengers use of “disen franch ise ment ” str etches the t erm beyo nd rec ogniti on. True, they cannot vote in the 20 26 C ounty C ommis sioner race, in w hich the y woul d have v ote d absent the redis tricting. Yet they wi ll vote i n a dif ferent election — the 2028 Count y Com miss ioner rac e — in which they would not ot herwise have partic ipated. The tradeoff is inherent in ever y redis tricting: s ome voters are shif ted o ut of o ne district and into anoth er, lo sing th e fran chise in one electio n while gaini ng it in the other. What th e Challen gers’ claim adds is not tru e disenfran chise ment but rather mere v ote pos tpone ment 29 — the n atural and unavoid able byproduct of redistr icting w ith in a s taggered electo ral system. Nothing in Ruc ho suggests that its co nclusio n would have bee n diff erent if th e distr icts at iss ue held staggere d (rath er than simultaneous) ele ctions. To the contrary, the Court has em phasized th at Ru cho ’s rule exte nd s broadly to all “ claims that a m ap is ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 27 Lane v. Hal l ib urto n, 529 F.3d 548, 557 (5t h Cir. 2008). 28 588 U.S. at 718; see Alexan der v. S.C. State C onf. o f the NAAC P, 602 U.S. 1, 21 (2024) (desc ribing Rucho a s “hold ing. . . that par tisan - gerryma ndering c laims are not jus ticiab le in fed eral c ourt”); Mi Familia Vota v. Abbott, 977 F.3d 461, 466 (5th Cir. 2020) (desc ribing Rucho as holding “ that c laims of excess ive pa rtisa nship in districtin g are n ot jus ticiab le” (cita tion omitted)). 29 We borr ow this ter minolo gy fro m Carr v. Brazori a Cnty., 341 F. Supp. 155, 160 (S.D. Tex.), aff’d 468 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1972) (mem.).

No. 25 - 11055 11 uncon stitution al becau se it was drawn to achieve a par tisan en d.” 30 But eve n assumi ng the added ele ment of vot e postp onement was sufficient to bring the Challen gers’ claim ou tside Rucho ’s precise ho lding, Rucho ’s reasoni ng s till governs. 31 The Ru cho C ourt re sted its decisio n on the absence of “a limite d and precise standard that is judicial ly discernibl e and manage able.” 32 As the C ourt ex plaine d, “ [p] artisan gerrym andering claims have prov ed far more difficult to adj udicate ” than m alapportionmen t or racial gerr ymande ring claims for one “basic reaso n”: “[W]hile it is illegal f or a ju risdictio n to de part from the one - pers on, one - vote rule, or to engage in racial d iscrim ination in dis tricting, ‘a jurisdiction may engage in constitution al political gerryman dering. ’” 33 Thus, “[t]he ‘central pro blem ’” in a po litical gerry manderin g case was “not dete rmining w hethe r a jurisdictio n has engage d in p artisan gerry mander ing,” bu t rather “d eter mining w hen polit ical g errymanderi ng has gone too fa r.” 34 Recogn izing that “the Constitu tion su pplies no o bjective measure for asse ssing whethe r a districtin g map treats a p olitical p arty fair ly,” the Cou rt conclude d t hat the ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 30 Alexander, 602 U.S. a t 6. 31 Cf. Ra mos v. Lo uisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 104 (2020) (plur ality op inion) (“ It is u sua lly a jud icial dec ision’s r easoning — its ratio decide ndi — that allows it to ha ve life and effec t in the dis position of futu re cases.” (cita tions omitted)). 32 Rucho, 588 U.S. at 710; see also Mi Familia Vota, 977 F.3d at 466 (“The [Ruch o ] Court c onclud ed that partis an ger rymande ring claim s c onstitute p olitical q ues tions beca use they lack jud icially d isco verable a nd mana geable sta nda rds for r esolving th em.” (cleane d up)). 33 Rucho, 588 U.S. at 701 (quoting Hunt v. C romartie (Croma rtie I), 526 U.S. 541, 551 (199 9)). 34 Id. (quoting V ieth, 541 U.S. at 29 6).

No. 25 - 11055 12 que stion o f “[h]ow much po litical motivat ion and eff ect is too m uch” i s one the Co nstitutio n commits to th e po litical pr ocess, not to the j udiciary. 35 The Chall engers have not provi ded any r eason to t hink t hat these impon derable s become an y mo re ponderable by dint o f a staggere d election cycle. Thus, even if Rucho ’s pre cise resu lt does not co ntrol, its reason ing clearly d oes. The Challenge rs’ view p oint - discrim ination clai m is n on justiciable. A ccordingly, th e district cour t lacke d jur isdiction 36 and did not e rr in declin ing to consider th e vi ewpoi nt - discriminatio n cla im as a basis for injunct i ve r elief. 37 B. Ra ce Discrimination We turn nex t to t he Challenge rs’ race - discriminatio n claim. As a thresh old issue, we r eject the Coun ty’s argume nt that this cla im, l ike the viewp oint - discrimin ation claim, pre sents a nonj usticiable p olitica l que stion. We agre e with the Co unty (and th e district co urt), however, th at th e Challen gers h ave no t shown in tention al race discrim ination. Thu s, the y are not like ly to su cceed on the m erits of this claim. ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 35 Id. at 708, 716 (quotin g Vieth, 541 U.S. at 296 – 9 7). 36 Id. at 696 (noting th at a p olitic al qu estion is “beyo nd the c ourts ’ ju risd iction” (citation omitted)). 37 The distric t court con cluded that R uch o barred the Challengers’ First Amendment claim but nevertheless purpor ted to dismiss that claim with preju dice. Although that d ismis sal is n ot before u s, we note tha t the polit ica l - questio n doc trine depriv es a court of j uris diction, see id. at 696 (notin g that a politic al q uestion is “be yond th e courts ’ juris diction”). Accord ingly, any dismissa l under the doctr ine “mus t be without prej udice to re filing in a for um of co mpetent j uris diction” — such as a st ate court. Carver v. Atwoo d, 18 F.4th 49 4, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (cita tion omitte d); see Rucho, 588 U.S. at 7 19 (“Pro visi ons i n state stat ute s and st ate co nst it utio ns can pro vide standards an d guidan ce for sta te cou rts to app ly.”); In re Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d 762, 76 8 n.10 (Tex. 2022) (reser ving the q ues tion of “whethe r claim s of politic al gerr yma ndering a re. . . within Texas cour ts’ sub ject - matter ju risdic tion”).

No. 25 - 11055 13 1. Justiciability In Rucho, the Court ack nowle dged that its “ca ses have h eld th at ther e is a role for the courts with re spect to at le ast so me is sues th at could arise from a S tate’s d rawing of con gressio nal districts” — namely, “ one - p erson, one - vote and rac ial ger ry manderin g.” 38 That recognit ion, we ha ve observed, “stron gly ind icates th at, by contras t [to po litical gerry mande ring claims], race discr iminatio n. . . claims, l ike those asserte d by the [Challe ngers], do not pr esent p olitical questions. ” 39 And while “ a le gislatur e may pur sue partisan e nds w hen it engages in red istrictin g” “as far as the Federal Constitu tion is co ncerne d,” 40 “[l]aw s that explicit ly discriminate o n the basis of race, as well as those th at are race neutr al on their face but are unex plainable on gr ounds o ther th an race, are. . . presumptive ly inv alid.” 41 Thus, we have held that sim ilar claim s “do not pr esent p olitical qu esti ons. ” 42 The Count y argu es, ho wever, tha t becau se the C ommi ssioner s Court’s true moti vat ion wa s political, r ather th an racial, Rucho bars the Challen gers’ race - disc rimination claims. B ut Rucho ’s reach turns on th e type of discrim ination alle ged — the inq uiry that d etermi nes whet her the applicable stand ards ar e “judicially dis cern ible an d manage able” 43 — not on the defenda nt ’s preferre d characte rizatio n of its motives. Where, as here, plaintiffs allege racial discrimin ation, but th e d efend ants re spond th at th eir actions w ere mer ely partisan, the tas k of “dis entan gl[ing] ” t he tw o may ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 38 Rucho, 588 U.S. at 69 9 (citation s om itted). 39 Mi Familia Vot a, 977 F.3d at 466. 40 Alexander, 602 U.S. a t 6. 41 Rucho, 588 U.S. at 700. 42 Mi Familia Vot a, 977 F.3d at 467. 43 See Rucho, 5 88 U.S. at 710.

No. 25 - 11055 14 prove difficu lt. 44 Y et the applicable st andard s rem ain “[w ]ell - es tablished. ” 45 Thus, the Supreme Court has tr eated partisan mo tivation as a “ defen se, ” not a jurisdiction al bar. 46 We pause briefly to not e a separate j usticiabil ity issue. The Challen gers arg ue th at the Comm issione rs Court inte ntionally discr iminated against b l ack and Lat ino voter s. Howeve r, the Ch allengers ’ declaratio ns revea l that t wo of them a re neither b lack nor Latino: o ne (Richar d Canada) i s white, while an othe r (Amjad B hular) is S outh east As ian. B ecause a plain tiff gene rally canno t sue to enfor ce the righ ts of o thers, it is not cle ar that thes e plaintiffs h ave stan ding to challe nge discriminatio n against b l ack a nd Lati no voter s. 47 We need n ot res olve t hat quest ion today, however; eac h of the ot her C halleng ers is e ither black o r Latin a, and “[i]t is well s ettled that once we dete rmine th at at least on e plaintiff h as stan ding, we need not con sider whethe r the remaining plain tiffs ha ve standing to m aintain th e suit. ” 48 ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 44 See Alexander, 602 U.S. a t 9– 10. 45 Mi Familia Vot a, 977 F.3d at 466. 46 See A lexand er, 602 U.S. at 9– 10 (d escribin g a “p artisa n - gerrymandering defense”); id. at 25 – 26 (noting tha t the S tate ha d “ra ised a partis an - gerrymandering defen se” a t trial); id. at 35 (desc ribing “th e legisla ture ’s d efense tha t the dis trictin g lines were ‘based on a permissi ble, rather than a prohibit ed, g round’” (emph as is added) (quotin g Cooper v. Harris, 581 U.S. 285, 3 17 (2017)). 47 See Power s v. Ohio, 49 9 U.S. 400, 41 0 (19 91) (“In the ordin ary c ourse, a litigant must a ssert his or her ow n lega l rights and in terests, and c annot res t a cla im to relie f on the legal righ ts or interes ts of t hird p arties.”). 48 McAllen Grace Brethr en Church, 764 F. 3d 465, 471 (5 th Cir. 201 4) (cita tio n omitted).

No. 25 - 11055 15 2. Meri ts Becaus e the dis trict c ourt properly exer cis ed jurisdictio n over the Challen gers’ race - disc riminatio n claim, w e no w turn to whether it properly evaluate d the Challenge rs’ likelih ood of success o n the merits o f that c laim. “[T]he blight o f racial d iscrimin ation in voting” h as a long history. 49 Equally long standi ng is t he recognit ion that such discr iminatio n cannot coexist with democ ratic self - government. To bring ou r practice into clo ser alignme nt with our ide als, Congress propos ed and t he S tates ratifie d the Fiftee nt h Amendme nt, which provides that “ [t]he r ight of cit izens of the Unite d States to vo te shall no t be denie d or abridged. . . on account of race, color, or previous cond iti on of serv itude.” 50 The Fourte enth Amen dm ent — adopte d ju st a year and a half be fore the F ifteenth — l ik ewise s ecur es to every “citizen. . . a constitu tion ally pro tecte d right to participa te in e lections on an equ al basis with othe r citizen s.” 51 Apply ing the s e amen dments to the redis trictin g conte xt, the Supr eme Court h as reco gnized two “ analytically distin ct” for ms of unconstit utional race discr iminatio n. 52 The most common claim arises fr om the Court’ s 199 3 decisio n in Shaw v. Re no, which explaine d that “redistrictin g legisla tion that is so bizarre on its face that it is ‘unexp lainable o n grounds o ther th an race ’ demand s the same clo se scru tiny” as “other state laws that class ify citize ns by race.” 53 “ The essen c e of the eq ual pro tection claim r ecogn ized in Shaw is ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 49 See South Car olina v. Katze nbach, 383 U.S. 3 01, 308 (1966). 50 U.S. C onst. amend. XV, § 1. 51 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 3 36 (197 2). 52 Alexander, 602 U.S. a t 38 (qu oting Shaw v. Reno, 5 09 U.S. 630, 6 52 (1 993)). 53 Sh aw, 5 09 U.S. at 644 (qu oting Vill. of Arlin gton Heig hts v. Me tro. H ous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 26 6 (1977)).

No. 25 - 11055 16 that the State has used race as a basis for separ ating vo ters into dis tricts. ” 54 In other w ords, Sh aw recognize d that “the doctrine of ‘separate but eq ual’ has no place” in the redistrictin g proce ss. 55 To state a claim unde r Shaw, a plaintiff m ust s how either th at racial consid eration s “pred ominate[d]” the districti ng pr ocess — th at is, tha t “race was the criterio n that, in the State’s view, could n ot be compromise d” — or that race was used “as a proxy” f or oth er co nside rations. 56 However, because the grav amen of a Shaw claim is “the sortin g of pe rsons with an intent to divide by reason of race, ” 57 and this ho lds true “regardless of th e motiva tions ” of those doing t he sort ing, 58 p laintiffs ra ising such a clai m need not sh ow th at the le gislatu re either intend ed or su cce eded in d ilutin g a ny particular racia l group’s votin g stre ngth. Rath er, “[t]he racial clas sification itself is the r elevan t harm in that context.” 59 The seco nd type of claim — which we f or conv enienc e call an inten tional - discr iminati on claim — aris es wh en a S tate or po litical subdivision “enact[s] a p articular voting scheme as a purpose ful device ‘to min imize or ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 54 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 9 00, 911 (199 5). 55 Bro wn v. Bd. of Ed uc. o f To peka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); see Miller, 515 U.S. at 911 (“Jus t as the Sta te may not, absent extra ordin ary jus tifica tion, segr egate c itizens on the b asis of r ace i n its publi c park s, buse s, go lf co urse s, bea ches, and school s, so did w e recogn ize in Sha w tha t it m ay not sep ara te its c itizens into d ifferen t votin g d istric ts on the basis of ra ce.” (c itations omitted)); cf. Students for Fai r Admis sions, Inc. v. Pres ident of Ha rvard Col l., 6 00 U.S. 181, 203 (2023) (“By 19 50, th e inevitable tr uth of th e Four teenth Amendment had thus begun to reemerge: Separate cannot be equ al.”). 56 Alexander, 602 U.S. a t 7 & n.1 (q uotation s omitte d). 57 Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1029 (1994) (Kennedy, J., co ncu rri ng). 58 Shaw, 509 U.S. a t 645. 59 Alexander, 602 U.S. a t 38.

No. 25 - 11055 17 cancel o ut the voting pote ntial of r acial or ethn ic mino rities. ’” 60 “ Such theo ries are seldom pursu ed becau se, at le ast accordin g to con ventional wisdo m, they are mo re difficu lt to p rove th an are effe cts - only Sect ion 2 claims” un der the Votin g Rights A ct. 61 When they ar e rais ed, howev er, t hey requ ire a “diffe rent analysis. ” 62 Unlike a Shaw claim, an in tentio nal - discrimin ation claim requ ires a p laintiff to “sh ow that the State’s districting plan ‘has the purpose and ef fect’ of d iluting the m inority vo te.” 63 Additio nally, th e purpose inquiry works differe ntly fo r an intentio nal - discrimin ation claim than fo r a Shaw claim. Th ough a S haw claim can pre vail “regardl ess of t he motiva tions underlyi ng [the map’ s] adopti on,” 64 an inten tional - discr iminati on claim require s a legisla tive “purpose ” of “invidio usly. . . m inimiz[ing ] or can cel[lin g] o ut the voting po tential of racial or eth nic mino rities. ” 65 Importa ntly for our pu rposes, inte ntional discrimin ation claims al so differ from Shaw claims in how they h andle so - called “mixe d motives. ” I n ordinar y Fourt eenth Amen dment c ases, “[p]r oof that the d ecis ion. . . wa s motivate d in par t by a racia lly discr imina tory p urpose ” is suf ficient to “shift[] to the [d efend ant] t he burde n of es tabl ish ing that the sam e decisio n ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 60 Miller, 515 U.S. at 9 11 (qu oting City of Mobile v. Bol den, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (19 80)). 61 League of Unit ed Latin Am. Citiz ens v. Abbott (LULAC), 601 F. Supp. 3d 147, 160 (W.D. Tex. 2022) (three - j udg e panel) (c iting Harding v. C oun ty of Dallas, 948 F.3d 302, 313 n.47 (5th Cir. 20 20)). 62 Shaw, 509 U.S. a t 650. 63 Al exander, 602 U.S. at 39 (empha sis in original) (quotin g Shaw, 509 U.S. at 649). 64 Shaw, 509 U.S. a t 645. 65 Bo lde n, 446 U.S. at 66 (citations omitted).

No. 25 - 11055 18 would hav e resulted e ven had [ra ce] not bee n consid ered.” 66 Shaw and its progeny, however, r equi re something more: “The plai ntiff ’s burden i s to show. . . that race was the predo minant factor.” 67 If race is o nly o ne facto r among many, the claim fails. 68 T he purp ose r equi rement f or an i ntent ional - discrimin ation claim, by contras t, “is simp ly on e aspect o f the basi c principle ” that the Eq ual Protection C lause is viol ated “o nly if the re is purpo seful discr iminatio n.” 69 Accordingly, we apply the ordinary Fourteent h Ame ndme nt mix ed - motive analysis to inte ntion al - discrim ination claims, me aning that “racial dis criminat ion need only be o ne purpose, and not e ven a primar y purpo se, o f an off icial act f or a vio lation to occu r.” 70 Here, the Challe nge rs raise on ly an in tentional - discrim ina tion claim. Accord ingly, the primary q u estion is whethe r Map 7’ s adoption “w as motivate d in part by a racia lly dis criminatory p urpose.” 71 If it w as, th e b urden shifts to the Co unty to p rove th at race was n ot the but - for ca use of t he decisio n. 72 In conducting that an alysis, w e are mindful th at “de termining th e ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 66 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270 n.21; see also H unter v. Under wood, 471 U.S. 222, 232 (19 85). 67 Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 (emph asis add ed); see al so Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 9 52, 1001 – 02 (1996) (Thomas, J., c oncurrin g in the j udgmen t) (noting this d iff erenc e between the predominanc e standard and ordinary equal - prote ction a naly sis). 68 See T heriot v. Par. of Jeffe rson, 185 F.3d 477, 484 n.1 6 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The releva nce or conside ration of rac e does not manda te a findin g that r ace p redomin ated.”). 69 Bo lde n, 446 U.S. at 66 (citations omitted). 70 Fusilier v. La ndry, 963 F.3d 447, 463 (5th Cir. 2020) (cl eaned up). 71 Arlington Hei ghts, 429 U.S. a t 270 n.21. 72 Id.

No. 25 - 11055 19 subje ctive intent of le gislators is a p erilou s e nter prise.” 73 “[T]he co mplex interp lay of fo rces that ente r a legislatu re’s redistrict ing calcu lus” m ake s it espe cially hard in this co ntext. 74 But “th ere are conte xts in which dete rmination o f legislative motive must be un derta ken.” 75 And u nder the Supreme Co urt’s preced ents, thi s is one of t he m. T he fra me work s et out in Village of Arlingt on Hei ghts v. Metropo litan Housing Development C orp. guide s our an alysis. 76 Under Arl ing ton Heigh ts, “[d]etermi ning whethe r invi dious discriminato ry pur pose was a m otivatin g factor de mand s a sensitive inq uiry into such circumstan tial and dire ct evide nce of in tent as may be avail able.” 77 Co nsisten t with th at comm and, we consid er bo th direct an d circums tantial in dicia of in tent. “F ive non - exhaustive factors gu ide co urts in d eter minin g wheth er a par ticular decisio n was mad e with a discrim inatory inten t: (1) the discriminato ry im pact of the official actio n; (2) the histo rical backg rou nd o f the d ecisio n; (3) the speci fic seque nce of ev ents leading u p to the ch allenged action; (4) substantive an d pro cedur al depar tures f rom the normal de cision - making ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 73 Edward s v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 6 38 (1987) (S cal ia, J., diss enting) (citation s omitte d); see also Hunt er, 471 U.S. at 228 (“Provin g the m otivation b ehind officia l ac tion is of ten a p roblema tic u ndertakin g.” (cita tion om itted)). 74 Alexand er, 602 U.S. at 43 (Thom as, J., concur ring in pa rt) (qu oting Miller, 515 U.S. at 9 15 – 16). 75 Churc h of the Lu kumi Babal u Aye, Inc. v. Ci ty of Hi aleah, 508 U.S. 520, 558 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in pa rt and concur ring in the jud gment) (cita tion om itted). 76 429 U.S. at 26 6 – 68; see Vea sey v. Abbott, 83 0 F.3d 216, 230 (5 th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“We ap ply the f ramework a rticula ted in [Arlington Hei ghts ] to determine whether SB 14 was pass ed with a discrim inator y purp ose.”). 77 Arlington Heigh ts, 429 U.S. at 2 66.

No. 25 - 11055 20 process; a nd (5) co ntempor aneous v iewpoi nts expr essed by t he decisio nmake rs.” 78 The d istrict cour t found that the Challe nger s ha d not shown t hat the Commissi oners C ourt acted with race as a motivat ing facto r when it adopted Map 7. B ecause “[l]egisla tive mo tivation or inte nt is a paradigma tic fact questi on, ” 79 we revie w that dete rmination for cle ar erro r. 80 “Under t hat standard o f review, we affirm the court’s finding so long as it is ‘plausible ’; we reve rse only when ‘left with the definite and firm convictio n that a mistake h as bee n committe d.’” 81 “This is a de mandin g test, b ut it is not a rubber stamp.” 82 The Ch allengers argue that the d istrict court applied th e wro ng t est — using t he predom inance stan dard ap plicable to Shaw claims rather t han the Arlingto n Heights framewo rk applicable to inten tional - discr iminatio n claims. If that is so, the n the district court’ s “find ing o f fact [was] b ased o n the appli cation of a n incorrect burden of proof ” and t hus “ca nnot stand.” 83 Howeve r, we do not agre e with the Challen gers’ reading o f the district court’s opinion. To be sure, th e district co urt did con clude that one count in the Ch allengers ’ complaint raise d a Shaw claim, and it ap plied the pred ominance test to that count. But it also unde rstood two othe r counts as raising inte ntional - discrim ination claim s and applie d the Arlingto n Heights ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 78 Fusilier, 963 F.3d at 463 (citations omitted). 79 Prejean v. Foster, 227 F.3 d 504, 509 (5th Cir. 2000) (c iting Cromartie I, 5 26 U. S. at 549). 80 See Abbott v. Perez, 5 85 U.S. 57 9, 607 (2 018) (“[A] dis tric t cou rt’s fin ding of fac t on the q uestion of dis crim inatory in tent is re viewed f or c lear er ror.” (c itation om itted)). 81 Cooper, 58 1 U.S. at 30 9. 82 Alexander, 602 U.S. a t 18. 83 Abbott, 585 U.S. at 607 (cita tion omitted).

No. 25 - 11055 21 framewor k to t hose count s. That dual ap proach — performi ng both a nal yses in the face of the Challeng ers’ le ss - than - crystal - clear framin g o f their claims — re flects caut ion, not con fusio n. The fact th at the d istrict court, faced w ith ambig uous ple adings, p erfo rmed both t he Arli ngton Height s analysis and the racial - pre dominance analysis is n o reason to discoun t its factual fin dings under Arlington H eight s. I n short, i ts bel t - a nd - suspenders prudence was commendable, n ot re versible. Nor do the Challenge r s’ argumen ts leave us with “the definite and firm con viction th at a mistake has be en committed. ” 84 The Chal leng ers base their claim primar ily o n com ments th at Count y Judge O’Ha re ma de in a n intervie w w ith NBC 5 N ews. In th e int ervi ew, Judge O’Ha re stated: The policie s of Democrats co ntinue to fail Black pe ople o ver and over a nd over, but many of them ke ep voti ng them in. It ’s time fo r people of all races to un derstand the Demo crats are a lost party, th ey are a radical party, it’s time for th em to get on boa rd with us and we’ ll welco m e them w ith open ar ms. As the Challe ngers se e it, these comments are “as d irect of evide nce of inte ntion al racial d iscrimination as can be im agine d.” U nder Arlington Heigh ts, “contemp ora ry stat ements by me mbers of t he decis ionma king body” “ma y be hi ghly relevant.” 85 In t his cas e, ho wever, we a gree wit h th e district c ourt that Ju dge O’Hare’s “statem ent is not the smo king gun [the Challen gers] think it is. ” For on e thin g, the recor d doe s not disclo se the context of J udge O’Hare’s remark. The Ch alleng ers co nten d that J udge O ’Hare made this stateme nt “in the co ntex t of exp laining h is vo te in favo r of Map 7,” but th ey ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 84 Cooper, 58 1 U.S. at 309. 85 Arlington Hei ghts, 429 U.S. a t 268.

No. 25 - 11055 22 cite no evide nce fo r that assertion — and we ha ve found no ne in th e record. The NB C 5 bro adcast sh ows Jud ge O’Har e making th e qu oted remark, bu t beyon d that Judge O’Hare doe s not appe ar on the br oadcast, n or doe s the broadcast o therwise d isclose th e context of his state men t. In its brie f on appeal, th e County cites a You Tube vide o that allege dly add s conte xt to t he remark. Howe ver, th is video w as not p art of th e rec ord befor e the district court, an d so w e cannot co nside r it. 86 That miss ing co ntex t matters: i f Jud ge O’ Hare m ade h is rem ark in respon se to a q u estion that d id no t men tion race an d simp ly asked why he intended to vote f or Map 7— as the Challen gers im ply — then his remark might be probative of a d iscriminato ry pu rpose. If, howev er, Judg e O’Ha re made h is rem ark in re spon se to a q uestio n tha t itself raised th e race i ssue — as the d istrict cour t sugges ts — then h is brief mention of race (and immediate pivot away from it) wo uld have little or no probative valu e. At this st age, w e canno t tell wh ich is so. And gi ven (1) the presum ption of le gislative good faith, 87 and (2) the clear - error s tandard of review, we can not sim ply assume the worst. Even takin g the statemen t in isolatio n, i t do esn’t cle arly sug gest a discrimin atory p urpo se. It’s n o se cret that r ace and party affil iatio n are oft en highly corre lated. The Supreme C ourt has ackn owledged as mu ch, 88 a nd ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 86 United States v. M uhammad, 14 F.4th 352, 363 n.4 (5th Cir. 2021) (“T his c ourt generally does not cons ider evidence outside the rec ord on appeal.” (cita tion omitt ed)). 87 Alex ander, 602 U.S. at 6 (“[I]n asse ssin g a le gisl ature ’s wo rk, we start with a pres umption th at the leg islatu re ac ted in good faith.”). 88 See, e.g., Coo per, 5 81 U.S. at 308 (“[O ]f cou rse, ‘rac ial iden tifica tion is high ly correla ted with politica l affilia tion.’” (quotin g Easley v. C romartie, 532 U.S. 234, 243 (2001)).

No. 25 - 11055 23 courts in this circu it have too. 89 Ind eed, the C hallenge rs’ own alle gation s and evid ence undersc ore the same point. 90 A legislato r’s pu blic acknow ledgemen t of t hat bas ic fact d oes not, stan ding alone, demonstrate discrimin atory p urpo se. To be sure, as the Challen gers o bserve, d istricting decisio ns that r ely on ster eoty pes abou t racial voting ar e con stitutio nally suspect. 91 But that fact c annot save th e Challe ngers’ claim. Th at’s tru e for two re asons. First, th at sort o f stere otyp ing argument s ound s in a Shaw claim, which the Ch allenger s disclaim r aising. 92 Second, and mo re fundamentally, the Ch allenge rs have not pre sented any eviden ce that J udge O’Hare was in any w ay motivated by such stereotyping. Taken as a w hole, the rest of the statement reflects ordinary par tisan politics. It’s hardly s urpris ing that a Republic an officeho lder would criticize Democratic p olicie s — or vic e vers a. Nor is it su rprisin g that a Rep ublican would urge voters “of all races” to vote Repu blican. We th eref or e a re un persuad ed that J udge O’Hare’s state men t demo nstrate s a discrim inatory purpose. ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 89 See, e.g., Perez v. Abbott, 390 F. Su pp. 3d 803, 820 (W.D. Tex. 2019) (“The existenc e of hig h levels of racially polarized voting ac ross Texas cannot b e disputed, nor is there a ny ind ication tha t the lev els of r acia lly pola rized votin g are d ecreas ing.” (footnote omitted)). 90 Because the Challengers’ claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is not before us, we express n o view on whether these allegations or this evid ence are suffic ient to show th at a ny m inority gr oup in T arr ant C ounty is “p olitic ally c ohes ive” or whether “the white m aj ority vote s su ffic iently as a bloc to e nable it.. . to defea t the mi nority ’s preferred cand idate.” Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1, 18 (2 023) (qu oting Tho rnburg v. Gi ngles, 478 U.S. 30, 51 (1986)). 91 See Bush, 517 U.S. at 96 8 (plu rality op inion) (“[T]o the extent that r ace is us ed as a proxy for polit ica l chara cteris tics, a rac ial ste reotyp e requ iring s trict sc rutiny is in opera tion. We ca nnot ag ree with the dis sen ters that r acial s tereotyp ing. . . can pas s w ithout jus tification in the c ontext of voting.” (citat ions om itted)). 92 See Miller, 515 U.S. at 912 – 13.

No. 25 - 11055 24 The Challe nger s also poin t to additio nal evidence that, in the ir view, suggests a discriminato ry inten t. First, th ey highlig ht the disp roportionate number of b lack and Latin o vote rs wh o will h ave their Co unty Commissio ner votes pos tponed t o 202 8. Under Arlingto n Heights, “[t]he impa ct of the official action ” — specifical ly, “whe ther it ‘bears more heavily on one race than anot her’” — “provide[s] an important star ting po int” f or th e legislat ive - purpose inquiry. 93 I n an ex treme c ase, wher e the ev iden ce s hows “a clear p atter n, un explainable on gr oun ds oth er than race,” the an alysis is “relative ly eas y.” 94 However, “ such case s are rare,” an d abse nt an e xtreme disparity, “the Court m ust loo k to oth er e vidence.” 95 Although we acknowled ge that th e disproportio nate e ffect o f the County ’s redistricting o n b lack and Latin o vote rs is releva nt, we think its probative value is quite limited in th is case. A n obv ious expl anat ion for the disparit y exists: r ace an d partisansh ip are h ighly correlated in Tar rant County, and district ing decisions d riven by partisansh ip will often have disparate racial effe cts. B ut “a ju risdictio n may e ngage in cons titutional politica l gerry mand ering, even if it so h appens that the m ost loy al Democ rats happen to be b lack De mocrats and e ven if th e State we re cons cious of that fact.” 96 The Challeng ers ’ burden i s to show t hat the Commiss ioners Cour t adopted Map 7 “ ‘because of,’ n ot merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects” ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 93 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. a t 266 (q uoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)). 94 Id. (citations omitted). 95 Id. (citations omitted) 96 Cromar tie I, 526 U.S. a t 551 (emph asis in o riginal).

No. 25 - 11055 25 on min orit y voters. 97 Gi ven th e recor d b efor e us, the d isprop ortionate effect of the Coun ty’s red istricting offers only margi nal s upport for that conclus ion. Second, the Ch allengers rely on “[t]he hi storic al backg round of the [red istricting] decisio n.” 98 T hey n ote th at “fed eral cou rts have held that Texas vio lated” th e Voting Righ ts Act “[i]n every decade since th e statute was passed in 1965.” 99 They place particular relian ce on a 2012 d ecision that foun d that the Texas L egislature inten tionally discr iminate d in bre aking up a state se nate dis trict “l ocated entire ly within Tarrant Co unty.” 100 But the weigh t of this evidence is limited. “The all ocation of t he burd en of pro of and the pr esumptio n of legis lative go od faith are not ch anged by a fin ding of past discrimin ation. ” 101 An d past discrim inatio n by the Texas Le gislatu re i s one step rem oved fro m discr imina tion by t he Tarra nt County C ommis si oners Cour t— a distinct legis lative b ody. 102 Finally, the Challe nge rs suggest th at various “ [d]ep artures from the norm al proce dural seq uence” indicate a discrimin atory purpos e. 103 In particular, the y rely on th e Commissio ners Court’ s decision to redistrict mid - cycle des pite the ab sence of any legal requir emen t to do so, the abs ence of for mal redistrictin g crite ria, the speed o f the redistric ting pro cess, th e County’s hiri ng of PILF to rep lace the law firm that had previo usly ove rseen ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 97 Pers. Adm’ r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 25 6, 279 (1979) (f ootnote omitted). 98 Arlington Hei ghts, 429 U.S. a t 267. 99 LULAC, 601 F. Supp. 3d at 170 (citing Veasey, 830 F.3d at 240). 100 See Texas v. Unit ed States, 887 F. Supp. 2 d 133, 1 62 – 66 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated and reman d ed, 570 U.S. 928 (2013). 101 Abbot t v. Pere z, 585 U.S. at 603. 102 Cf. V easey, 830 F.3d at 232 (plurality opinion) (fin ding that a ctions by off icials in one c ounty are not “ proba tive of th e intent of leg islator s in the Texas Legisla ture”). 103 See Arlington Height s, 429 U.S. at 267.

No. 25 - 11055 26 the re districtin g proce ss in Tarran t County w ithou t cond ucting an open bidding process, and P ILF ’s failure to en gage in a pu blic - input process or t o give subs tantive legal presen tations to the Commissione rs Cour t, as its predece ssor had done. But again, th ese alle ged departur es are only minim ally probative of dis crimin atory intent. To start, the fact that PILF went about its task dif fere ntly fr om its pr ede cessor is n ot surpris ing; law yers — and the learnin g mod els incr easingly ass isting the m — often r each the s a me end b y diff erent m eans. The oth er de partures are ju st as e asily ex plain ed by a partisan m otive as a r acial mo tive; p artisan gerry mande ring is un likely to be popu lar, so it is u nde rstandable that a legisl ature engagin g in it w ould wan t to avoid an e xtensive, pub lic proce ss. W hile th at may not b e con sistent w ith the best pr actices of good gove rnment, it is hardly suggestive of r acial motivatio n. Similarly, the choice to red istrict m id - cycle is e asily explain ed by a desir e to reap par tisan be nefits in th e 2026, 2 0 28, and 2030 elections rather than waiting u ntil 2 030 (when Repu blicans m ay or m ay no t control t he Commissi oners C ourt). So too, th e sp eed of the re districting proce ss is e asily explain ed by the tight tim eline betwe en the start o f the p roce ss and th e electio n. (Indeed, that is pres umably why the Challe nger s asked b oth th e district c ourt an d this c ourt to put th is case o n the fast track.) Taken as a whole, th e Challen gers’ evide nce doe s not leave us w ith a “defin ite and firm co nviction ” that the d istrict court err ed in findin g that th e Comm issioners Court was n ot mo tivated b y racia l consid eration s. 104 Under Arlingto n Heights, the discrim inatory - purpose i nquiry is not a m echanical box - checking exercis e that can be fulfille d merely b y profferi ng any ev i dence that arguab ly fits withi n each of the factors. Rather, we m ust remain mindful of “the ultimate que stion, ” which is “whe th er a discr iminatory in ten t has ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 104 Cooper, 58 1 U.S. at 309.

No. 25 - 11055 27 been p roved.” 105 W e do n ot thin k the dis trict court cle arly erre d in conclud ing that it ha s not been. Accordin gly, the C hallen gers are not likely to succe ed on th e mer its of the ir race - discrimin ation claim. C. V ote P ostp onem ent Finally, we turn to the Challe nger s’ argument that the adoption of Map 7 un lawfully disenfran chise s Tarrant Cou nty re sid ents an d lacks adeq uate justif ication. As discusse d above, the C hallen gers are incorrect to claim that the y — or anyone els e — we r e disenf ranchi sed by the Co unty’s redistr icting: W h ile they are ineligible to vote for a Co unty Comm issione r in their o ld pre cinct, th ey re main eligible to vo te f or a Co unty Commissio ner in their new on e. In tru th, their claim s are about vote pos tponement; the ele ction in wh ich they ar e now eligible to vote will no t occur until 2 028, wherea s the electio n in w hich the y would have been eligibl e to vo te w ill occur in 202 6. Howeve r, the re is no constitutional r ight to vote “on a p articu lar schedule.” 106 T his pri nciple fol lows from t h e Supreme Court’s sum mary affirman ce in Pate v. El P aso Co unty. 107 In Pat e, the plain tiffs raise d claim s almost ide ntical to the Challe ngers’: a rgu ing that “the realig nment of th e four com missione rs precincts” in El Paso Co unty cause d “certain voters” to be “shifted ” from one p recinct to anoth er an d, as a result, post poned their votes fr om 1970 to 1972. 108 A three - judge district court rejecte d this clai m, 109 ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 105 Abbot t v. Pere z, 585 U.S. at 603 (quotin g Bold en, 446 U.S. at 74). 106 Republican Party of Or. v. Ke isling, 959 F.2d 144, 145 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curia m). 107 337 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Tex.) (per cur iam), summar ily aff’d 400 U.S. 806 (1970). 108 Id. at 96. 109 Id. at 1 00.

No. 25 - 11055 28 and the Su preme C ourt summar ily a ffirmed. 110 Beca use Pat e was a summary affirman ce, it is “no t of the same prece dential value as. . . an opinion of [the Suprem e] Cour t treating th e que stion on the me rits.” 111 We cannot, for examp le, re ad the summ ary affirm ance “ as an adoptio n of the reason ing supporti ng” the t hree - judge co urt’s judgment. 112 Nevert heless, we ar e “bound b y [Pate ] u ntil s uch ti me as the Cour t infor ms [us] tha t [we] ar e not.” 113 That binding effect “prevent[s]” us “from c oming to opp osite conclus ions o n the pre cise issue s presented and ne c essarily de cided” in Pate. 114 Thu s, we can not conc lude that a j urisdicti on violates the C onstitution merely by redrawing its d istrict s in a way that, under a stagge red e lectio n system, res ults i n some voters ’ votes b eing pos tponed. Rather th an argu ing that th ey h ave a constitu tion al right to vote “on a particular sch edu le,” 115 the Challenger s contend that t he vote post ponement at issue h ere is discrim inatory and thu s subj ect to he ighten e d scrutin y. It is not cle ar, howe ver, what axis of dis criminatio n they inv oke. T o the exten t they allege discrimin ation b ased on view p oint or r ace, th ose arg uments ar e duplicati ve of their pre vious v iewpoi nt - and race - dis criminatio n claims, which we have alre ady reje cted. It app ears, ho wever, that the Ch allenge rs instead conte nd the d iscrimin ation is sim ply betwee n those voter s who will wait onl y two or four years between Cou nty Commiss ioner elect ions and those who w ill have to wait six ye ars. If that is th e Challe nger s’ argum ent, it ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 110 400 U.S. 806. 111 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 6 71 (1974). 112 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64 n.13 (1982). 113 Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 3 32, 344 – 45 (1975) (clea ned u p). 114 Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (per curia m). 115 Keisling, 959 F.2d at 145.

No. 25 - 11055 29 borders on friv olous. Every redistrictin g in a s tagger ed sy stem produces that effect; treating i t as a con stitution al viola tion would conve rt eve ry routin e redistr icting in a stagge red system into a matter of strict scrutin y. In the alternative, the Challenge rs contend that w e shou ld subject redistr icting de cisio ns in jurisdictions with sta ggered ele ction sy stem s to t h e framewo rk laid out in Anderson v. C elebrezze 116 and Burdick v. Ta kushi. 117 Under th e so - called A nderson - Burdick fr am ework, w e woul d “ exa mine t wo aspects” of a ju risdicti on’ s redistrict ing choices: (1) whether [t hey] p ose[] a ‘seve re’ or instead a ‘reason able, nondiscrim inatory’ restriction on the right to vote a nd (2) wheth er the st ate’s inter est ju sti fies the res triction. ” 118 As t he Challen gers se e it, a State’s distric ting de cision s survive scrutiny under this framewo rk if the y are req uired by the one - person one - vote principle. Howeve r, a State’ s district ing decisions are un constitu tional if th ey ar e motivate d by “a d esire to engage in partis an gerr yman dering. ” We reje ct the Challe nge rs’ prop osed frame work. Firs t, it would lure us on ce again in to po licing p artisan gerryman derin g. But, as Rucho mad e clear, that sort of in quir y i s “beyond t he compet ence of t he federal courts.” 119 Second, An derson - Burdick applie s to l aws that “ burde n a relevan t constitu tional righ t.” 120 As we hav e exp lai ned, th ere is no cons titutional right to vote “on a p articu lar schedu le.” 121 Th ird, we are a ware of no ca ses ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 116 460 U.S. 780 (19 83). 117 504 U.S. 428 (199 2). 118 Richardson v. Tex. Sec ’y of State, 978 F.3d 220, 235 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. a t 434). 119 See Rucho, 5 88 U.S. at 7 07 (cita tion omitted). 120 Mazo v. N.J. Se c’y of S tate, 54 F.4th 124, 138 (3 d Cir. 2 022). 121 Keisling, 959 F.2d at 145.

No. 25 - 11055 30 applyin g Anderson - Bur dick to redistricting dec isions. Nor ar e we aw are of any decisio n exte n ding that f ramew ork to the p roces s by w hich a j urisdictio n modifie s the rules o f the ele ctoral ro ad — such as the cho ice to redistrict — rather than to the ru les the mselves — such as the map. Finally, the an alysis the Ch allenge rs envisio n would require “the judiciary to d ecide whether any given e lection law is n ecess ary,” thus “ allow [ing] a political q uestio n — whethe r a rule is beneficia l, on b alance — to be treated as a con stitutio nal que stion to be re solved by the cou rts rathe r than by le gislators.” 122 As a result, “d oggedly empl oying Anderson - B urdick ” wher e it “has no applicatio n” wou ld be nothing but “a camou flaged inter est in asserting ‘will’ rather than ‘judgme nt.’” 123 The Cha llen ger s seek ref uge in Dunn v. B lums tein, w hich they r ead for the pr oposition that “clo se scru tiny ” “applies. . . to outrigh t disenfra nchise ment (even whe n it is ‘tempor ary’).” I n Dun n, t he Sup reme Court in validated T enn essee’s duration al - reside ncy requirement, w hich limited th e franchise to thos e who had resided in the State fo r at least one year. 124 The Court hel d that strict sc rutin y was approp riate be cause “[d]urat ional residence requ iremen ts comple tely bar from voting all reside nts not me eting the fixed durational stan dards. ” 125 But this case is worlds awa y from Dun n. Here, the Ch alleng ers w ill not c ast a vote f or County ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 122 Luft v. Evers, 963 F.3d 66 5, 671 (7th C ir. 2020). 123 Daunt v. Benson, 9 99 F.3d 299, 32 7 (6t h C ir. 2021) (Readler, J., concu rri ng) (quotin g The Federalist No. 78, at 46 5 (Alexander Ham ilton) (Clinton Ros siter ed., 1961)). 124 See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 331 – 33. 125 Id. at 33 6; see S.A. Indep. Sch. Di st. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 – 38 (19 73) (c iting Dunn a s a n examp le of a c as e applyin g stric t sc rutiny). Sep ara tely, th e Cou rt held th at heighten ed sc rutiny was appropria te beca use durationa l - residency requirements burden the right t o trav el. Dunn, 4 05 U.S. at 33 8. Th at hold ing is not at is su e here.

No. 25 - 11055 31 Commissi oner i n 2026 —b u t in 202 8, they will be able to vote for Commissi oner w hen t hey other wise w ould not have. B y contra st, the would - b e v oter i n Dunn was barred from vo tin g in the 1970 e lection 126 a nd receive d no compensating add itional vo te t hereaf ter; he could vote in later electio ns on th e same term s as if the re had ne ver been a d uration al - resi dency requir em ent. As one of our siste r circuits has e xplain ed, plaintiffs in vote - postpo nemen t cases are unlike the p laintiff in Dunn becaus e they are n ot “den ied the ir right t o vote in any regu larly sche duled. . . election.” 127 Rather, “[t]h ey were able to vote in the regular ly sche duled pre - reapport ionme nt. . . elections in their old districts, and th ey will be able to vote in the ne xt regularly sche duled general ele ction f or their new district.” 128 The Challengers’ real conce rn is not that th ey ar e being denie d the righ t to vote in one of the ir precinct’ s ele ctions — it is th at the election will occu r later than us ua l. But i f we wer e to s ubjec t su ch timing adju stmen ts to strict scrutiny, the re w ould be no limiting pr inciple. Cou ld the same reason ing invalidate a d ecision to h old e lection s in od d ye ars inste ad o f eve n? In Decem ber in stead of Nove mber? A wee k late r than u sual? A d ay? Could it be use d to ch allenge o penin g the polls an h our later, t aking a day longer to count th e ballots, or e xten ding the lame - duck pe riod? T he Ch alleng ers give us know wa y of kno wing. ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 126 Dunn, 405 U.S. at 331. 127 Donatelli v. Mi tchell, 2 F.3d 508, 514 – 15 (3 d Cir. 199 3). 128 Id. at 51 5.

No. 25 - 11055 32 Finally, to the exte nt the Challen gers urge us to apply t he rational - bas is test, 129 M ap 7 easily passes it. To be sure, rat ional - b asis r eview is somethi ng of a misn omer: i t is s eldom r ational, rests on little basis, and scarcely qualifies as re view. Our c ourt ha s aptly calle d it “a notorious ly defe rential stan dard” 130 — if “standar d” is e ven the right wo rd. Und er rational - basis rev iew, we up hold a classificat ion “ so long as there is ‘any reason ably conceivable state of facts tha t cou ld p rovide a ratio nal b asis for th e classifica tion.’” 131 And there ca n be no seri ous d oubt tha t st aggered legislat ive term s are r ational — indeed, the Constitution itself ad opts th at desig n. 132 T he only remaining q uestion, then, is whethe r any con ceivable rational bas is cou ld sup port Tar rant Coun ty’s decisio n to redistrict mid - cycle. The most obvious rea son for mid - cycle redistricting, of cou rse, is partisan gain. 133 But eve n assuming the Chal lenge rs are corre ct that p artisan advantage is no t a legiti mate go vern ment inte r est, 134 ther e are ot her rea s ons ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 129 See id. at 514 (“C ourts that hav e addre ssed equa l protec tion cla ims b rought by voters who were temp orarily disen franc hised a fter a r eapp ortionm ent have c ons istently app lied ra tional - bas is rev iew.” (collec ting ca ses)). 130 Reyes v. N. T ex. Tollway Auth., 86 1 F.3d 558, 561 – 62 (5th Cir. 2017). 131 United St ates v. Skrmetti, 605 U.S. 495, 522 (2025) (qu oting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1 993)). 132 See U. S. Con st. ar t. I, § 3, cl. 2 (e stablis hing a staggered e lection s ystem f or the Senate). 133 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 3 99, 457 – 58 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurr ing in par t and dissen ting in pa rt). 134 But see id. at 416 – 17 (maj ority op inion) (re jec ting the a rgument th at “[a ] decis ion. . . to effect m id - dec ennia l redis trictin g, when s olely motiv ated by partis an objec tives, v iolates equal prote ction a nd the Fir st Amendm ent becaus e it serves no legi timate pub lic pur pose and bur dens o ne gro up becau se of it s poli tical op inion s and affilia tion”); Alexa nder, 6 02 U.S. a t 6 (“[A ]s far as the Fede ral Cons titution is conc erned, a legisla ture m ay pursue partis an en ds wh en it engages in red istric ting.”).

No. 25 - 11055 33 a jurisd iction m ay decide to re district mid - dec ade. The district court identif ied one: the Cou nty’s conc ern t hat the prior map had been r ender ed “cons titutionally suspect” by the previous law firm’s advice to maintain a “coalition distri ct.” W e expre ss no view on whe ther that co nstitution al concern was wel l fou nd ed. We not e onl y that (1) the legal standar d governing the per missible role of race in redistricting has lo ng pe rplexe d legislatu res, 135 (2) under ration al - basis revie w, it does no t matter wheth er thes e constitu tional co ncern s we re the ac tual reason for adop ting Ma p 7, so long a s such a re ason is concei vab le, 136 and (3) although plaintif fs in ratio nal - basis cases may “ne gate a se emingly plausible basis. . . b y addu cing evid ence o f irrational ity,” 137 the Chal leng ers ha ve identified no su ch irra tionality h ere. Becaus e the adop tion of Map 7 satisf ies even t he most char itable conce ption of rational - basis revi ew, we ne ed not decide whe ther the decision to ado pt new distr ict maps is subject to th at standard at al l. In sum: Nothing in th e Constitution forb ids a juris diction f rom adoptin g a staggere d electio n system. Nothin g in the Constitutio n forbids a jurisd iction fr om red istrictin g mid - cycle. And nothing i n the C onsti tution forbids a j urisdict ion f rom co mbinin g the two — even w he n th e practical result is th at some voters mu st wait a bit longe r to cast th eir ba llots. The Constitu tion pr otects th e right to vote, not the right to vo te on a particular ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 135 See Louisia na v. Callais, 145 S. C t. 2608, 26 10 (2025) (Thomas, J., dis sentin g) (“[D]u e to our Ja nus - like ele ction - la w juris prudenc e, States do not k now how t o dr aw ma ps that s urviv e both co nstitutio nal a nd VRA sc rutiny.” (clean ed up)). 136 Reyes, 861 F.3d at 563 (quoting FM Props. Op erati ng Co. v. City of Au stin, 93 F.3d 167, 175 (5th Cir. 1996)). 137 Hines v. Quillivan, 982 F.3d 266, 273 (5th Cir. 2020) (qu oting St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 223 (5th Cir. 2013)).

No. 25 - 11055 34 timetable. Acc ordin gly, the Ch allenge rs are unlikely to p revai l on th e me rits of their v ote - postponeme nt claim. * * * Becaus e we conc lude that the C hallen gers are unlike ly to succeed on the mer its of any o f their claims, we do no t address the remainin g prelim inary - in junction factors. Nor do we decide wh ether we are, at this point, already too clo se to an e lection for a fe d eral cou rt to inte rven e. 138 IV. Concl usio n W e AFF IRM the district cour t’s de nial of a p reliminary in junction. ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 138 See Purcell v. Go nzalez, 5 49 U.S. 1, 5 –6 (2006) (per c uriam).