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Cadence Bank v. Johnson - Appeal of Summary Judgment on Loan Guarantees

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Filed November 24th, 2025
Detected February 11th, 2026
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Summary

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a summary judgment against appellants Cole Wayne and Cord Henry Johnson, holding them liable as guarantors for loans made by Cadence Bank and Century Bank. The court found complete diversity existed, allowing the case to proceed, and upheld the district court's ruling that the Johnsons were personally liable for Bridgelink Engineering LLC's defaulted loans.

What changed

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed a district court's summary judgment ruling, holding Cole Wayne Johnson and Cord Henry Johnson personally liable as guarantors for loans totaling $34 million issued by Cadence Bank and Century Bank to Bridgelink Engineering LLC. The appellants argued that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction due to a lack of complete diversity between the parties, but the appellate court found that diversity did exist. The ruling confirms the enforceability of the personal guarantees, even after an amendment to the credit agreement, and upholds the banks' position in seeking repayment from the guarantors.

This decision has significant implications for guarantors of business loans. Compliance officers and legal teams should review existing guarantee agreements and ensure a thorough understanding of the conditions under which personal guarantees remain in effect, particularly concerning default clauses and release provisions. While this specific case involved a direct appeal of a summary judgment, the underlying principle reinforces the binding nature of personal guarantees in commercial lending. No specific compliance deadline is mentioned, but the ruling implies that entities and individuals who have provided guarantees should be prepared for potential enforcement actions if loan obligations are not met.

What to do next

  1. Review personal guarantee agreements for loan facilities.
  2. Assess current loan portfolio for potential guarantor liability.
  3. Consult legal counsel on the implications of this ruling for existing and future guarantees.

Source document (simplified)

United Sta tes Court of Appeals f or the Fifth Circuit ________ ____ No. 24 - 1 081 2 ________ ____ Cadenc e Ba nk, f ormerly kn own as Bancorp Sout h Bank; Cent ury B an k, Plaint iffs —Appellees, versus Cole W ayne J ohns on; Cord Henr y J ohnson, Defendant s — Appell ants, consolid ated w ith ________ ____ _ No. 25 -11078 ________ ____ _ Cadenc e Ba nk, f ormerly kn own as Bancorp Sout h Bank; Cent ury B an k, Plaint iffs —Appellees, versus Bridge link Eng in eering, L.L. C.; C ole Wayn e Joh nson; Cord Hen ry J ohns on; Bigh orn Con structi on an d Reclamation, L. L.C.; Bighorn Sand and Gravel, L. L.C.; Bighor n Investments and Properties, L.L.C., United S tates Court of A ppeals Fifth Circuit FILED November 24, 2 025 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 24-10812 Document: 128-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/24/2025

2 Defendant s — Appella nts. ________ ____ ___ _____ _______ ___ Appea l fr om the United State s District C ourt for the Norther n District of Texas USDC N os. 4:23 - CV - 60 9, 4:23 - CV - 609 ________ ____ ___ _____ _______ ___ Before Smith, Grave s, and Dun can, C ircuit Judges. Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circ uit Jud ge: Appell ants C ole Way ne Johnso n and C ord Henry J ohnson (the “Johnso ns”) appeal the summary judgment ho lding them liable as guarant ors for l oans ma de by Appell ees Cade nce Ba nk and C entury Bank (the “Banks”). The Johnso ns also claim the district cour t lacked s ubje ct - matter jurisd iction be cause the Jo hnsons and Cadence Ban k are not diver se parties. We conclude that c omplete diver sity exists and hold t hat t he district cou rt properly granted the Banks’ summary j udgm ent. AFFI RM ED. I In Aug ust 20 21, Bridgelink En ginee ring LLC (“Bridge link”) — an entity the Joh nsons ma nage — ente red into a cred it agreeme nt with the Ban ks. Under th e agree ment, Bridge link rece ived two loans: $20 milli on from Caden ce B ank and $14 million from Cent ury Bank. In exchange, Bridg elink promised t o repay t he l oan s with in terest and to comp ly with cer tain financial covenant s. Initially, Bridgelin k’s obligatio ns we re guar anteed by t hree LLCs the Johns ons ma nage: Bighorn Con struction and Reclam ation LL C; Bighorn Sand & Gravel LLC; and Bighorn Inv estm ents a nd Propert ies, LLC. A few months later, the John sons ex ecu ted a n agreeme nt personally guarante eing Bridge link’s obligation s. Th at guaran tee “r emain[e d] in full fo rce and effe ct until the Term ination Date” of Bridge link’s lo ans. Th e Johnsons ’ guaranty agreement also has an e arly - rele ase clause (Sectio n 9.3), which allow s the Joh nsons to be released from their o bligations Case: 24-10812 Document: 128-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/24/2025

No. 24 - 10812 c/w No. 25 - 11078 3 if thre e conditio ns are met. F irst, Brid gelink’ s loan had t o be in g ood standin g, i.e., n ot in defau lt. 1 S econd, Brid gelink had to prov ide ev idenc e of its com pliance w ith certain financia l coven ants for two conse cutive quarter s. Third, the B anks had to confirm Br idgeli nk ’s complian ce with any prepay ment requi rement s imposed b y Section 2. 7(b)(ii) for two consecutive quart ers. In practice, the last tw o conditio ns require d Bridgelin k to email complian ce package s to th e Ban ks ’ repr esent ati ves, who would then acknow ledge r eceipt, r eview the su bmission s, and con firm that Brid gelink had com plied with its obliga tions fo r the q uarter. Q1 20 22 i s the first r elevant q uarte r. In May 2022, Bridgelin k e mailed its financial - co mpliance docume nts to t he Banks. Abou t a month later, they confirm ed that Br idgelink had co mplied w ith its cov enants for th e quarter. But b y Jul y 2022, Bridgelink had defaulte d on its obligatio ns. So the partie s amend ed t he cr edi t ag reemen t. Through the amend ment, t he Bank s conditio nally waive d Bridgelink’ s even t s o f default if it met certain conditi ons. T wo are r el evant her e: (1) Bridgelink h ad to pay the Banks a waiv er fee of $1 70,0 00; a nd (2) the Johns ons had to ag ree that Q1 2 022 di d not co unt as a com pliant quar ter under the Johns ons’ early - rele ase clause. The Ban ks assert, an d Bridgeli nk does not c ont est, that it never p aid the $170,000 waiver fee. Soon after t he amendment, Bridgelink sent it s Q2 2022 co mpliance document s. The Banks acknowle dged receipt and confirmed they woul d revi ew Bridgelink’ s submission. N either party sub mitted e vidence showing the Banks had confirm ed Brid gelink complied with its o bligat ions fo r th e ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 1 Sec tion 8.1 of t he cr edit agreemen t defines events of d efault. Bridge link’s f ail ure to mak e interes t paym ents on its loans cons titutes default u nder Section 8.1(b). Case: 24-10812 Document: 128-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/24/2025

No. 24 - 10812 c/w No. 25 - 11078 4 quart er. But the Banks concede d Bridgelin k’s com pliance at the summary - judg ment he aring. For Q3 2022, Bridgelink again emaile d its com pliance d ocumen ts shortly after the qua rt er’s end. T he Banks acknowle dge d rec eip t. A gain, n eithe r party s upplied pr oof o f the B anks ’ confirmati on. But unlike the previo us quar ter, the Banks contest ed Bridgelink’s Q3 comp liance at the summary - judg ment he aring. By Q4 2022, Bridgelin k had defaulted. Bridge link re mained in d efault by failing to make p ayments in Q1 2023 too. N one of Bri dgel ink’s guaranto rs —t he Johns ons and the Bi ghorn LL Cs — ever made any payme nts toward t hose loans. As a res ult, the Ba nks sued Bridg elink, the Joh nsons, and t he Bigh orn LLCs for br each o f contract in the North ern Distric t of Te xas. Be cause the Banks as sert ed only state - law claims, th e distric t court reli ed on its diversity jurisd iction. About ten m onths later, t he Banks moved f or summa ry judgm ent. In re sponse, t he Johnso ns argued there were disput es of fact abo ut wheth er t hey had b ee n released from their guaran ty obligation s before Bridge link ’s Dec emb er 20 22 defau lt. In support, t he Johnsons su bmit ted email t hreads pur porte dly showi ng the Banks’ co nfirmatio n of B ridgelink’s complian ce with the financial co venants and prepayment r equireme nts for Q1, Q2, and Q3 2022 to c ount towar d the Joh nsons earl y - release clau se. The district cou rt granted s ummary judgment, dis agree i ng that the Joh nsons’ submissions showed they had m et t he early - relea se condi tions. Only the Joh nsons ap pealed. Af ter t he app eal wa s br iefed, the Johnso ns moved the district cour t to dismiss the case for lack of subjec t - matter jurisdictio n. According to the Johns ons, Cadence was a citizen of both Texa s and M ississippi when the co mplaint w as file d. See Cadence B ank v. Br idgelink Eng ’g LLC, No. 4:23 - CV - 609, 2025 WL 26990 44, Case: 24-10812 Document: 128-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/24/2025

No. 24 - 10812 c/w No. 25 - 11078 5 at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2025). T he district cour t defe rred rulin g on the motion until th is appeal was re solved. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a); In re F t. Wor. Chamber of Com., 100 F.4t h 528, 536 (5th Ci r. 20 24). The Johnso ns then submitte d evide nce p urporting to show the lack of diversity an d, shortl y before oral argument in our c ourt, they fi led an oppos ed moti on to supple ment the appellate r ecord. We hea rd oral argum ent in A pril 20 25 and remanded the case to the district court “fo r the lim ited pu rpose of de terminin g whether subject - matter jurisd iction e xists.” C aden ce Bank v. J ohnso n, No. 24 - 1 081 2, 20 25 WL 257 6237, at *1 (5t h Cir. Ma y 19, 20 25). T he district cour t found complete diversity and denied the Joh nson s ’ mot ion. Cadence Bank, 2025 WL 26990 44, at * 15. The case has now been resubmitted, a nd the Jo hnsons appeal both th e district co urt’s finding th at it had subject - matter jurisdictio n and it s grant of summar y judgme nt. II “An appe llate fe deral court m ust satisfy itself n ot on ly of its own jurisd iction, bu t also o f that o f the [distric t] cou rt[] in a cause unde r review.” Mitch ell v. Maur er, 29 3 U.S. 23 7, 244 (1 934). W e revi ew su bjec t - matter jurisd iction d e novo as a question of law. See Harvey v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 542 F. 3d 1077, 1079 (5th Cir. 2 008) (citin g Gand y Nur sery, Inc. v. U nited States, 318 F.3d 631, 63 6 (5th Cir. 2003)). W e a lso review summar y - ju dgment grants de novo. B agley v. Albe rts ons, Inc., 492 F.3d 3 28, 3 30 (5th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is ap propr iate when “ th e movant shows that ther e is no genu ine dispute as to an y mate rial fact and the mo vant is en titled to jud gment as a matte r of law. ” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Case: 24-10812 Document: 128-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/24/2025

No. 24 - 10812 c/w No. 25 - 11078 6 III A The district co urt pro perly exer cis e d ju risdiction over th is matter because Caden ce is a Miss issippi citizen and the Johns ons a re Texas citizens. Feder al courts h ave diversity j urisdictio n over civi l action s in wh ich the amou nt in co ntrov ersy exc eeds $7 5,000 and t he action is be tween citizens of differen t states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Challenge s to dive rsity of citiz en ship depen d on “the state o f facts that e xisted at th e time o f filing. ” Grup o Datafl ux v. At las Glo b. Grp., 541 U.S. 567, 57 1 (20 04). T o meet the divers ity requir em ent, “the citize nship of each plain tiff ” m ust be “ di vers e fro m th e citizensh ip of e ach defen dant.” Cate rpill ar Inc. v. Lew is, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). This case involves thre e type s of par ties: in dividuals, LL Cs, an d corpora tions. “ For i ndividuals, ‘citizen ship has the same meaning as domicile,’ and ‘the place of residen ce is prima facie the dom icile.’” MidC ap Media Fin., L.L.C. v. Pat hway Dat a, Inc., 929 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Sti ne v. Moore, 213 F.2d 44 6, 44 8 (5th Cir. 1954)). F or LLCs, citizensh ip is b ased on “the citizensh ip of all of its members.” Harvey, 542 F.3d at 10 80. And fo r corporatio ns, citizen ship is based on a c orpor at ion’s state of in corpo ration and p rincipal place of busine ss. 28 U.S.C. § 133 2(c)(1). While the state of in corporation is straightfo rw ard, prin cipal place o f business is less so. The Supreme Court provi ded s ome guidance in Her tz Corp. v. Frie nd, resolvin g a circuit spl it in favor of the “ nerv e c ente r” tes t. 559 U.S. 77, 92 – 93 (2010). Und er that test, a c orporatio n’s prin cipal place o f busine ss is the place “ whe re a cor poration’s of ficers dir ect, con trol, and coord inate the co rporation ’s activitie s. ” Ibid. T hat place is usually “ where the co rporatio n maintain s its h eadqu arters — provid ed that th e he adquarter s is the actu al cen ter of dire ction, co ntrol, an d coor dination. ” Id. at 93. Case: 24-10812 Document: 128-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/24/2025

No. 24 - 10812 c/w No. 25 - 11078 7 Before discussing Cadence’s contest ed citizenship, we affirm the district cou rt’s finding s on th e other parties’ citizen ships. T he Jo hnsons admitted they “are citizens of Texas.” Caden ce B ank, 202 5 WL 2 699 044, a t *5. And a f ter tra cing the o wnershi p of the Bi ghorn LLC s throug h sever al layers of LLCs, 2 it turns o ut the Johnso ns ma nage them a ll, making th ose LLCs Texas citize ns too. Ha rvey, 542 F.3 d a t 1080. Finally, Cent ury Ba nk — a corpo ration — su bmitted pro of that it is “a Ne w Mex ico state - ch artered bank that maint ains i ts prin cipal p lace of busine ss in San ta Fe, New M exico. ” Cadenc e Bank, 2025 W L 26990 44, a t *7. So fa r so good. Turning t o Cad ence ’s citizenship, the Johnso ns do n’t co ntest it was incorp orated in Mississip pi. See i bid. The ir d isa greement centers on Caden ce’s princip al place of busine ss. I n th e Johns ons’ view, th at place is in Houston, T exas, because (1) Cadence’s executive officers reside in Houston and ma k e d ecis ions fro m ther e; (2) its SEC filings supp ort that clai m; and (3) other publication s and com pany actio ns sugge st Caden ce’s “ corporate head quart ers” is in H oust on. I bid. T he Joh nsons also s uggest Cad ence is estopp ed from cla iming its principa l place of bus iness is in Tupelo, Mississipp i, becaus e it h as “repe atedly claimed to be head quartered. . . in Housto n, Tex as[,] fo r the p urpose o f creating diver sity jur isdictio n in fede ral court. ” Id. at *8. Taken togeth er, t he Johnso ns submit Caden ce ’s princip al place of business is i n Houston, T exas, making it a Texas citizen. Id. at *7 –8. ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 2 Defendant Bighorn Sand & Gravel LLC’s sole mem ber is Defendant Bi ghorn Cons truction a nd Reclama tion LLC; whose sole member is Defendant Bridgelink Engine ering LLC; whose sole me mber is Bridge link Power O pera ting LLC; whose sole member is Bridgelink Pow er, LLC; whose sole m ember is Bridgelink Power Holdings, LLC; whose sole members are the Johnsons. Cadence Bank, 2025 WL 2699 044, at *5 – 6. And Defendant Bighorn Investm ents and Properties, LLC’s sole members are the Johnson s. Id. at *6. Case: 24-10812 Document: 128-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 11/24/2025

No. 24 - 10812 c/w No. 25 - 11078 8 Caden ce counters that its “prin cipal p la ce of busin ess is, and always has been, [in] Tupelo, Mississippi.” Id. at *7 (alteration in origin al). W hile it maintains a corpor ate he adquarte rs in Housto n, Texas, its bank head quarte rs is in Tupelo, Mississippi, w hich “is its pr incipal pla ce of bu siness un der Hertz.” Ibid. In suppor t, Cadence notes th at Tupelo, Mississip pi, i s where (1) it “regular ly cond ucts Boar d, exe cutive, an d share holde r meetings”; (2) m ost of “ its executive off icers prim arily office out of ”; (3) its principal execu tive office is acco rding to its SEC filings; a nd wher e (4) most o f “ its decisio n - making an d ope rations take s place.” Ibid. And cont rary to the Johnso ns’ assert ions, it has neve r pled anyth ing inco nsisten t with its jurisd iction - based claim s her e. Ibid. Finally, Cadenc e assert s the Jo hnsons have faile d to “mee t their b urden to warr ant app lication of ju dicial e stoppe l.” Id. at *8. We agree with the district court’s co mpreh ensive analysis und er Hertz that Cadence’ s principal pl ace of b usiness is in Tupelo, Mississ ippi. We be gin with judicial esto ppel. At th e ou tset, it is dou btful whether this circui t considers judicial e stoppe l for i ssues conc erni ng su bjec t - matter jurisd iction. See, e.g., Haverkamp v. Linthicum, 6 F. 4th 66 2, 671 n.8 (5t h Cir. 2021) (collecting c ases). But assum ing arguendo that it does, the Johns ons had to show (1) C adenc e “ has asserte d a legal p osition w hich is p lainly incon sistent w ith a prio r po sition; (2) a court a ccepte d the p rior pos ition; an d (3) the party did no t act inad verten tly. ” Reed v. City of Arlington, 65 0 F.3d 571, 574 (5t h Cir. 2011) (en banc). T he Johns ons fa il prong one. The district cou rt ide ntifie d two re levant pleadin gs with allegedly incon sistent state ments. Caden ce Bank, 20 25 WL 26990 44, at * 9. The first states Cade nce h as its “prin cipal place o f busine ss in Tupe lo, Mississip pi” and its “corpo rate headqu arters. .. in Hous ton, Texas.” Ibid. T he sec ond is an answe r in which Cadence clarifies th at its Case: 24-10812 Document: 128-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 11/24/2025

No. 24 - 10812 c/w No. 25 - 11078 9 “princip al corpo rate off ice is in Housto n, Harris Co unty, Texas. ” Ibid. Neithe r stateme nt is inconsisten t with Cade nce’s p osition he re, which is th at its corpo rate he adquarte rs is in Hou ston and th at its bank he adqu arters is in Tupelo. Judicial esto ppel the refore does not app ly. Next, we r evie w the parties’ compe ting submis sions on the l ocat ion of Ca dence ’s nerv e c ent er. We agree with the district court th at t he evidence shows Cadence maintains tw o he adquarter s: one in H oust on, Tex as, the othe r in Tupelo, M ississippi. I bi d. But the b ulk of th e eviden ce supports Tupe lo as its ne rve cente r, not Houst on. Take its co rporate office rs. The most import ant offic er — Cad ence’ s CEO — has h is primary office in Mississ ippi. Id. a t *10. And of the twen ty - t wo corpo rate offic ers who “d irect, con trol, and co ordinate Cadence Bank’s activitie s,” eight have their primary office in Mississip pi and o nly six have their p rimary o ffice in Te xas. Ibid. Simply put, “a majorit y of Cadenc e Bank’s executive office rs. . . offic[e ] outsid e of Texas w ith a con centratio n in Mississ ippi.” Id. a t *1 0. The location of Cad ence ’s executives th us suppo rts a princip al place of busin ess in M ississippi. The lo cation of Cad ence’s boar d of directo rs and man agement committ ees only r einf orc es that conclusio n. The Management Com mittee “set[s] importan t policies and make [s] key de cisions fo r Cadence” and is compris ed of only ce rtain “name d exe cutive o fficers (‘ NEOs ’)” chosen by Caden ce’s board of director s. Id. at *13. Cadence submitted evid ence — uncont este d by the Johns ons — that “(1) a major ity of the NEO s on the committe e maintain pr imary o ffices in T upelo, (2) a major ity of t he committe e atten d weekly in - perso n me etings, and (3) the bo ard of dire ctors hold th eir mee tings in Tu pelo, which a maj ority atten d in pe rson.” Ibid. On balan ce, the evi denc e sho ws Cad ence’s principal place of busin ess is Tupe lo, Missis sippi. As a re sult, Cade nce is a ci tizen of Mississipp i. And Case: 24-10812 Document: 128-1 Page: 9 Date Filed: 11/24/2025

No. 24 - 10812 c/w No. 25 - 11078 10 as discusse d above, Centu ry is a c itizen o f New M exico. The Johnso ns and the Bighorn LLCs, by contrast, are citizens of T exas. So com plete diversity exists among the partie s. The district court the refo re did not e rr in denyin g the Johns ons’ mot ion t o dismi ss for l ack of jurisdi ction. B Nor did th e district c ourt er r by gran ting summary judgment in favor of the Bank s on their br each - of - contr act claims. Under Texas la w, a claim f or bre ach of contract req uires “(1) the existen ce of a valid contract; (2) perform anc e or t ender ed p erfor ma nce by the plain tiff; (3) breac h of the contrac t by the defend ant; and (4) damages sustaine d by the p laintiff as a re sult of th e breach.” Smit h Int ’ l v. Egle Grp., 490 F.3 d 380, 387 (5 th Cir. 2007) (quoting Valero Mk tg. & Supp ly Co. v. Kalama Int’l, 51 S.W.3 d 345, 351 (Tex. App. 200 1)). Breach “ occurs when a party fails to pe rform a duty req uired b y the contract. ” Id. As the dis trict court co rrectly concluded, neither party dispute s “ther e were valid con tracts, Def endan ts have failed to p erform under th ose contracts, [or that] Plain tiffs h ave susta ined d amages as a re sult o f the Defend ants’ bre ach. ” Cadence Bank v. B ridgelink E ng’g, LL C, N o. 4:23 - CV - 609, 20 24 W L 27 8691 4, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 30, 202 4). All t he Johnso ns argue on appeal is th at they met the condition s for early rele ase from their guaran ty obli gations b efore Bridgelin k ’s Dec ember 202 2 d efaul t. They did not. R ecall the t hree releas e condit ions: (1) Bridgelink’ s loan could n ot be in default; (2) Bridge link had to subm it eviden ce of its complian ce with certain finan cial covenant s for tw o consecutive quarters; and (3) the Ban ks had to co nfirm Bridg elink com plied w ith cer tain prepa yme nt re quir ement s f or two consecutive q uarters. The Johnso ns argument fails becaus e they can ’t even show they me t the first con dition, let alone the latter two. Case: 24-10812 Document: 128-1 Page: 10 Date Filed: 11/24/2025

No. 24 - 10812 c/w No. 25 - 11078 11 Bridge link ’s lo an has be en in de fault since Q1 20 22. U nder the cre dit agreeme nt, Brid gelink’ s failure to make its fi rst l oan inter est payment constitu ted de fault under Section 8.1(b) of the credit agre ement. The Johnso ns don’t cont est this defa ult. To be sur e, the Banks agre ed to waive that def ault if ce rtain c ond itions wer e met, such as Bridgelink ’s pa ying the Banks a $170,000 waive r fee. But accord ing to t he Banks, Bridgelink neve r paid th at fee. And b ecause t he Johnso ns pro vide not hing to c ount er tha t assertio n, the re is no dispu te that Br idgelink was in defau lt since at le ast Q1 2022. The distr ict cou rt the refor e pro perly grante d sum mary jud gment in th e Banks’ f avor. Our concl usion r emai ns the sa me ev en i f we were t o set aside Bridge link’s pr ior def ault and consider Bridgelin k’s argum ents fo r the latte r two rel ease conditio ns. To be gin with, the p arties ’ amend ment in July 2022 elimin ated Q1 2022 from co unting tow ard the releas e - clause ’s conse cutive - quarter r equi re ment. So that means Bridgelin k had to meet both conditi ons — submission o f compliance document s for financial covenan ts and the Banks’ con firmation o f compliance with ce rtain prepayment requir em ents — f or Q 2 and Q3 20 22. True enoug h, the Bank s c onceded a t the summa ry - judg ment hearing that Brid gelink h ad met th e latter two c onditio ns for Q 2 2022. But they made no such co ncessi on for Q3 2022. Rathe r, the Banks ex pressly co ntested Bridge link’s co mpliance for that q uarter. T he Johnso ns point to the Bank s ’ confirm ation - of - re ceipt email for Q3 20 22 a s ev idenc e that the Ba nks confirmed Br idg elink ’s compliance with th e pre payment re quireme nts imposed by Section 2.7(b)(i i). The y are in correct: confirmatio n of r eceipt i s not the same as confir m ation of co mpliance. The p arties’ o rdinary practice sh ows w hy. For Q1 2022, the Banks acknow ledged re ceipt and th en separate ly confirmed a month lat er t hat Case: 24-10812 Document: 128-1 Page: 11 Date Filed: 11/24/2025

No. 24 - 10812 c/w No. 25 - 11078 12 Bridge link had co mplied w ith its cove nants for th e qu arter. Or consider Q2 2022, whe n the Ba nk s aga in only acknowledge d receipt of Bridgelink’s complian ce do cuments. T he court re lied on the Banks ’ express concessio n at the su mmary - judgment hearing — not this ackno wledg ment email — as proo f of Brid gelink’s com pliance for that q uarter. So against th at backdr op, we con clude the Ban ks neve r confirmed Bridge link’s co mpliance with th e prepay ment req uirements im posed by Section 2.7(b)(ii) f or Q3 2022. And w ithout two co nsecutive quarters of Bridge link’s co mpliance with th e latter tw o conditio ns, the Johnso ns cannot prove t hey wer e rel eased fro m the g ua rant y ag reement b efor e Bridgelink’ s Decemb er 20 22 defa ul t. T hey are t heref or e lia bl e for brea c hing their guaranty agreem ent. IV The d istrict court’ s jud gment is AFFIRMED. 3 ________ ____ ___ _____ _ 3 All pend ing motion s are DENIED. Case: 24-10812 Document: 128-1 Page: 12 Date Filed: 11/24/2025

Source

Analysis generated by AI. Source diff and links are from the original.

Classification

Agency
Federal and State Courts
Filed
November 24th, 2025
Instrument
Enforcement
Legal weight
Binding
Stage
Final
Change scope
Substantive

Who this affects

Applies to
Banks Construction firms
Geographic scope
National (US)

Taxonomy

Primary area
Banking
Operational domain
Legal
Topics
Contract Law Appellate Procedure

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