Stokinger v. Armslist, LLC - Personal Jurisdiction in Online Marketplaces

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 24 - 1697 KURT STOKINGER; JANELLA STOKINGER, Plaintiff s, Appellants, v. ARMSLIST, LLC, Defendant, Appellee. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE [Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge ] Before Barron, Chief Judge, Rikelman, * Circuit Judge. Douglas N. Letter, with whom John D. Kimball, Robyn L. Michaelson, Reena Jain, Alexander D. Newman, Blank Rome LLP, Mark D. Morrissette, Brian J. Stankie wicz, McDowell & Morrissette PA, and Brady United Against Gun Violence were on brief, for appellants. * Judge Selya heard oral argument in this case and participated in the initial semble thereafter. His death on February 22, 2025, ended his involvement in this case. The remaining two panelists issued this opinion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).

Andrew R. Hamilton, with whom Mark C. Rouvalis; Joseph A. Foster; Min Ji (Stephanie) Nham; and M cLane Middleton, Professional Association were on brief, for appellee. February 5, 2026

B ARRON, Chief Judge. We once again must determine whether the owner of a website is subject to personal jurisdiction based on the design and operation of that webs ite. The website owner this time is Armslist, LLC ("A rmslist"), a Pennsylvania -based company that owns and operates Armsl ist.com, a n online marketplace for firearms and firearm-related products. The company was sued in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire under New Hampshire law for, among other things, negligence and public nuisance. The plaintiffs are Kurt Stokinger, a former Boston police officer, and h is wife, Janella Stokinger (together, the "Stokingers"). Their claims allege that Armslist -- through its website -- facilitated the sale of a firearm in New Hampshire in 2015 that was used in 2016 to shoot Officer Stokinger in Boston. The District Court denied the Stokingers' request for jurisdictional discovery and dismissed their claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. It based th e latter determination on Armslist not having "purposefully availed" itself of the protection s of New Hampshire's l aws. The Stokingers appeal the dismissal of their claims. We affirm in part and vacate in part. I. The Stokingers initially filed a separate suit on October 18, 2018, in the Massachusetts Superior Court against

Armslist and others not named as defendants in the suit that underlies this appeal. Those other parties included the person alleged to have shot Officer Stokinger in 2016 and the alleged firearm trafficker involved in a sale of the gun that was ultimately used in that shooting. The complaint set forth Massachusetts -law claims against Armslist for, among other things, negligence, aiding and abetting tortious conduct, and public nuisance. Armslist moved to dismiss the complaint in March 2019. It asserted in that motion that the company lacked sufficient ties to Massachusetts to be subject to personal jurisdiction there. Armslist also filed a second motion to dismiss the complaint. It as serted in that motion that the Stokingers' claims were barred by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (the "CDA"), 47 U.S.C. § 230, which shields online internet service providers from liability in some circumstances. One year later, in March 2020, the Massachusetts Superior Court granted Armslist' s second motion to dismiss based on the CDA. It did so without ruling on Armslist's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Armslist then moved for partial reconsideration, as it requested that the court rule on the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Massachusetts Superior Cour t denied the moti on for partial reconsideration without prejudice. It also granted the Stokingers ' request to take jurisdictional discovery. The

jurisdictional discovery primarily focused on Armslist's connections to Massachusetts, although several of the interrogatories and document request s sought information about Armslist's connections to New Hampshire. At the close of this discovery, Armslist renewed its earlier motion to dismiss the Stokingers' clai ms for lack of personal jurisdiction. In December 2021, the Massachusetts Superior Court granted the motion and dismissed the Stokingers' claims on that jurisdictional ground. The Stokingers brought the sui t that underlies this appeal nearly two years later, in September 2023. They filed the suit in the Unit ed States Distri ct Court for the District of New Hampshire. Th e complaint set s forth New Hampshire law - based claims against Armslist for negligence, aiding and abetting tortious and illegal conduct, public nuisance, loss of spousal consortium, and loss of support. The claims are based on allegations that Armslist " negligently and recklessly designed [its website] in such a way that it actively encourage[d], ass ist [ed], and profit [ed] from the illegal sale and purchase of firearms," which resulted in the sale of the firearm used to shoot Officer Stokinger in 2016. In November 2023, Armslist simultaneously filed two motions to dismiss. One motion a sserted that the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over Armslist because the company lacked sufficient ties to New Hampshire. T he othe r asserted that

the New Hampshire statute of limitations, the doctrine of res judicata, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and the CDA each independently barred the Stokingers' claims. The Stokingers opposed both motion s. In their opposition to the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, they argued that they did have sufficient ties to New Hampshire. In the alternative, however, they requested that the District Court defer ruling on personal jurisdiction to permit them to conduct jurisdictional discovery. The Stokingers supported that discovery request by asserting that Armslist's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction relied on "self - serving facts" that were "years out of date" and that the "relevant" evidence of Armslist's connections to New Hampshire was "solely with [in ] Armslist's control." The District Court denied the Stokingers' request for jurisdictional discovery and granted Armslist's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on the ground that Armslist had not purposefully availed itself of the protections of New Hampshire 's laws. Armslist's other motion to dismiss was denied as moot. The Stokingers timely appealed. 1 1 Armslist does not ask us to affir m on the alternative bases raised in their other motion to dismiss the Stokingers' claims. Cf. NCTA -- The Internet & Television Ass'n v. Frey, 7 F.4th 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2021) (" But, even if we were to reject the District Court's reasoning, there is an independent basis manifest in the

II. In this Part, we will address t he Stokingers' challenge to the District Court's ruling on personal jurisdiction. I n Part III, we will address their challenge, in the alternative, to the District Court's denial of their motion for jurisdictional discovery. A. The plaintiff bears the "ultimat e burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that jurisdiction exists. " Vapotherm, Inc. v. Santiago, 38 F.4th 252, 257 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting Adams v. Adams, 601 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2010)). Here, the District Court was exercising diversity jurisdiction and so was acting "as 'the functional equivalent of a state court sitting in the forum sta te.'" Rosenthal v. Bloomingdales.com, LLC, 101 F.4th 90, 94 - 95 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting Astro - Med, Inc. v. Nihon Kohden Am., Inc., 591 F.3d 1, 8 (1 st Cir. 2009)). As a result, to meet their ultima te burden to est ablish personal jurisdiction over Armslist in New Hampshire, the Stokingers must satisfy the requirements of both New Hampshire's long - arm statute -- which defines the scope of personal jurisdiction over a defendant in record for affirming the District Court's ruling. "). We thus leave it to the District Court on remand to address any questions concerning those grounds for dismissal, including any potential issues of waiver that may bear on them.

that state's courts -- and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Negrón - Torres v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 478 F.3d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 2007). As it happens, "New Hampshire's long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction. . . to the extent permissible under the [f ]ederal Due Process [c]lause. " Cappello v. Rest. Depot, LLC, 89 F.4th 238, 243 (1st Cir. 2023) (alterations in original) (quoting In re Reddam, 180 A.3d 683, 687 -88 (2018)). The Stokingers therefore can meet their burden as to both New Hampshire 's long -arm statute and the Due Process Clause so long as they can show that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Armslist comports with what federal constitutional d ue p rocess requires. See Vapotherm, 38 F.4th at 258. To make that showing, the Stokingers must establish that Armslist ha d "certain minimum contacts with [New Hampshire] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substanti al justice.'" Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milli ken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). T hose contacts may be marshalled to support a theory of either general or specific jurisdiction. S ee Cappello, 89 F.4th at 244 (quoting Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 600 U.S. 122, 138 (2023)). T he Stokingers rely, however, solely on a theory of specific jurisdicti on. They thus must satisfy each prong of the specific - jurisdiction test: (1) relatedness,

(2) purposeful availment, and (3) rea s onableness. See Scottsdale Cap. Advisors Corp. v. The Deal, LLC, 887 F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 2018). The relatedness prong requires tha t each claim "directly arise[] out of or relate [] to " the defendant's contacts with the forum state. Id. T he purposef u l- availment prong require s that those contacts " represent a purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities in " the forum state. Id. T he reasonableness prong requires that " the exercise of jurisdiction" over each claim be " ultimately reasonable." Id. The District Cour t ruled on Arm slist's motion to dismiss the Stokingers' claims for lack of personal jurisdiction "at the inception of the litigation -- without the benefit of either pretrial discove ry or an evidentiary hearing. " Rosenthal, 101 F.4th at 94. Therefore, t o go forward on their claims at this juncture, the Stokingers need only make a prima facie showing of specific jurisdiction. See id. As a result, although the Stokingers need to "go beyond the pleadings and make affirmative proof" of "the existence of 'every fact required to satisfy '" their burden as to personal jurisdiction, we must accept their " properly supported proffers of evidence. .. as true. " Uni ted Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. (UE) v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 987 F.2d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Boit v. Gar - Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 675 (1st Cir. 1992)); see also Baskin -Robbins Franchising

LLC v. Alpenrose Dairy, Inc., 825 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 2016). Our review is de novo. Motus, L LC v. CarData Consultants, Inc., 23 F.4th 115, 121 (1st Cir. 2022). B. In ruling that the Stokingers failed to make a prima facie showing of specific jurisdiction, the District Court skipped over the relatedness requirement. It ruled that, even assuming that the Stokingers' claims were related to the contacts that the y relied on to establish specific jurisdiction, those contacts failed to make a prima facie case that Arms list had purposefully availed itself of the protections of New Ham p shire's laws. It then dismissed the Stokingers' claims solely on that basis. The purposeful- availment requirement ensures that a defendant's contacts with the forum state, from which the plaintiffs' clai ms "directly arise[] out of or relate [] to," Scottsdale, 887 F.3d at 20, show that the defendant "deliberately target[ed] its behavior toward the society or economy of [the] forum [such that] the forum shou ld have the powe r to subject the defendant to judgment regarding that behavior, " Baskin - Robbins, 825 F.3d at 36 (first and third alterations in original) (quoting Carreras v. PMG Collins, LLC, 660 F.3d 549, 555 (1st Cir. 2011)). The requirement seeks to ensu re that the def endant's related contacts with the forum state are not "random, fortuitous, or

attenuated." Carreras, 660 F.3d at 555 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). "The cornerstones of" the purposeful - availment requirement " are voluntariness and foreseeabilit y. " C.W. Downer & Co. v. Bioriginal Food & Sci. Corp., 771 F.3d 59, 66 (1st Cir. 2014). Voluntar iness concerns whether "the defendant's contacts with the forum result proximately from [the de fendant's] own actions." Motus, 23 F.4th at 12 4 (quoting Kuan Chen v. U.S. Sports Acad., Inc., 956 F.3d 45, 59 (1st Cir. 2020)). Foreseeability concerns whether "the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum [s] tate are such that [the defendant] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 47 4 (quoting World -Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). The Stokingers take aim at the District Court's purposeful - availment ru ling by d irect ing our attention to the allegations in their complaint and the evidence that they proffered regarding: (1) the design of Armslist.com, (2) the advertising revenue that Armslist generated from visitors to its website, and (3) the average of "16,000 listings per year for firearms for sale in New Hampshire" that were posted on Armslist.com from 2018 on. They contend that their allegations and evidence suffice to make a prima facie case that Armslist deliberately targeted its behavior toward New Hampshire.

Notably, although all the Stokingers' claims rest on Armslist having facilitated the 2015 purchase of the firearm used to shoot Officer Stokinger in 2016, 2 some of the ass erted contacts between Armslist and New Hampshire post - date both the firearm's sale in that state and Officer Stokinger's shooting. In particular, the evidence that an average of 16,000 "New Hampshire" listings appeared on Armslist.com per year from 2018 on concerns contacts that occurred after both the shooting and the sale in New Hampshire of the firearm allegedly used in it. In considering whether to account for th is evide nce of Armslist's post - 2016 contacts with New Hampshire, the District Court noted that our precedent indicat es that "in most cases, contacts coming into existence after the cause of action arose will not be relevant." Harlow v. Child. 's Hosp., 432 F.3d 50, 62 (1st Cir. 2005). The District Court observed, however, that the Stokingers asserted that one of their claims -- the claim for public nuisance -- alleged a "continuing tort. " It further observed that the Stokingers contended that feature s of that tort made the evidenc e of the post -2016 contacts rel evant to their 2 In their complai nt, the Stokingers assert that the shooting of Officer Stokinger occurred in January 2016 and that the sale of the firearm by the alleged shooter occurred in July 2016. This, however, appears to be an error that the District Court corrected in the decision below, and neither party makes note of it here on appeal.

attempt to estab lish specific jurisdiction over Armslist despite the "general rule" announced in Harlow, 432 F.3d at 62. Ultimately, the District Court declined to decide whether these post- 2016 contacts were relevant to the specific jurisdiction inquiry as to any of the Stokinger s' claims, including their claim of public nuisance. Instead, it concluded that, even assuming that those contacts were relevant to all the Stokingers' claims, "the ev idence the [Sto kingers] rel[ied] on [was] not sufficient to establish purposeful availment in any event." As we will explain, we conclude that the District Court was right to rule that the evidence of Armslist's contacts with New Hampshire as of 2015 -- the year that the company allegedly facilitate d the purchase of the firearm in question -- and 2016 -- the year that Officer Sto k inger was shot -- fail s to establish a prima facie case of purposeful availment. But, as we also will explain, we do not agree with the District Court that the evidence of Armslist's post - 201 6 co ntacts with New Hampshire -- namely, the evidence that there were thousands of "New Hampshire" listings on Armsli st.com from 2018 on -- similarly fail s to make such a showing when that evidence is considered alongside the other evidence that the Stokingers have put forward. Of course, there does remain a substantial qu estion about whether the Stokingers can show that all (or even any) of their claim s " directly arise[] out of or relate [] to " these

post - 2016 contacts that, when cons idered alongside the Stokin gers' other allegations and evidence, we conclude make a prima facie case of purposeful availment. Cappello, 89 F.4th at 244 (quoting Scottsdale, 887 F.3d at 20). I t is hardly evid ent that claims predicated on the sale of a firearm that occurred in 2015 and a shooting that occurred in 2016 are related to listings that appeared on Armslist.com years lat er. See Harlow, 432 F.3d at 62. Nevertheless, the D istrict Cour t did not purport to address the relatedness requirement in dismissing the Stokingers' claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the parties provide only cursory briefing about how the evidence of the post- 2016 contacts bears on that requirement. Accordingly, we decline to address that requirement in the first instance. Se e Yan v. ReWalk Robotics Ltd., 9 73 F.3d 22, 39 (1st Cir. 2020) ("[I]t is often appropriate to leave such a matter for the district court to address in the first instance on remand, especially when the grounds are not fully developed or fairly contested on appeal. . .."). Instead, like the District Court, we limit our analysis of personal jurisdiction to the purposeful- availment requirement. As we will explain, we see no basis for disturbing the District Court's purposeful - availment ruling insofar as it does not relate to the evidence from 2018 forward on which the Stokingers rely. Nevertheless, we conclude that the District Court

erred in ruling that the Stoking ers failed to ma ke a prima facie case as to purposeful availment once that evidence is taken into account. Our reasoning follows. 1. To show that they made a prima facie case that Arm s list deliberately targeted its behavior toward New Hampshire, t he Stokingers emphasize that the record supportab ly shows that Armslist designed its website specifically to facilitate what the website itself refers to as "local" transactions. I n that regard, the y contend that their evidence supportably sho ws that Armslist designed its website to do more than merely permit a would- be firearms seller to create a listin g "labeled with" the "geographic location" in which that seller, as well as the firearm to be sold, is "physically located." T hey argue that their evidence supportably show s that Armslist designed its website to advise prospective firearms sellers to create list ings with such geographic label s even when the sellers might otherwise have listed their product s as being offered for sale in a different state. 3 3 In their reply brief to us and at oral argument, the Stokingers appeared to suggest that the website was so designed because federal law "prohibits an unlicensed dea ler from selling to anyone who resides in a different state. " (Citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5).) That suggestion, however, plays n o role in our analysis. See Sparkle Hill, Inc. v. Interstate Mat Corp., 788 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2015) (" Our precedent is clear: we do not consider arguments for reversing a decision of a district court when the argument is not raised in a party's opening brief.").

To that point, the Stokingers note that Armslist.com hosts a Frequent ly Asked Questions ("FAQ") page that asks the question, "Can I post my listing in multiple locations?" and then answers, "No. You should create the listing in the location where you and your ite m are physically located." And, they point out, the next section of th at same FAQ page explains, "I f someone finds [the listing] in their home location, they assume they can go to your location and make a deal." (Emphasis added.) Additionally, t he Stokingers emphasize that, in designing the website to facilitat e " local" transactions, Armslist did not merely draft its FAQ page or implement a means by which a would - be seller could attach a geographic label to a listing that the seller post s. They also direct our attention to evidence in the record that supportably shows that Armslist included a geographic - filtering mechanism on the website so that would- be firearms purchasers could search Armslist.com for firearms being offered for sale where "they live." Thus, the Stokingers contend, through these thr ee website features -- the description on the FAQ page, the tool that allows sellers to create geographic labels, and the tool that allows buyers to filter listings by state -- Armslist sought to facilitate firearm sales not only "local[ly]" but in New Hampshire specifically. After all, the Stokingers emphasize, the company designed Armslist.com to permit

sellers to create "New Hampshire" listings and buyers to search specifically for listings with that geographic label. Armslist respond s by arguing that this evidence fails -- at least on its own -- to show th at the company deliberately targeted its behavior toward New Hamps hire. Armslist contends that nothing about Armsli st.com's design i n and of itself make s any transaction that the website facilitates more likely to happen "in New Hampshire than anywhere else." This is so, the company contends, precisely beca use the website is designed to permit sellers who access it to create firearms listings in each of the fifty states without the company doing anything to encourage those transactions to occur in New Hampshire specifically. The company adds that "[t]he alleged statements on Armslist's website that the website was designed for 'local transactions' " does not permit a different conclusion. The reason, the company argues, is that " these local transactions occur wherever the website is accessible, i.e., in every state." Armslist adds, as the District Court explained, that the same is true of the website's inclusion of a means by which potential firearm purchasers may filter l istings by state. The company explains that this is so because that filtering mechanism "is necessarily designed to benef it users regardless of their location " and, therefore, "does no t render the website more likely to solicit or serve customers in New Hampshire than anywhere else."

In other words, Armslist contends that the website's design shows at most that the company intended to facilitat e transactions that are "local" in the sense that they are between sellers and buyers who are in the same place at the time of sale. It thus contends that the design of the website does not -- at least on its ow n -- supportably show that Armslist intended to facilitate transaction s that are "local" in the sense that they are between sellers and buyers in New Hampshire (or any other specific geographic locale). Based on the reasoning in our most recent dec ision addressing purposeful availment based on the design and operation of a website, we agree with Armslist. In that case, Rosenthal v. Bloomingdales.com, LLC, the plaintiff sued a company that owned a department store chain for its u se of technology that allegedly unlawfully intercepted and used information about the plaintiff's behavior while he was visiting the company's website. See 101 F.4th at 93 -94. We acknowledged that the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had department stores in the forum and that the defendant "'knew that [the design and operation of its website] would directly result in collection of information from [forum] citizens while those citizens browsed' its website" because the "website allow[ed ] a user to search for nearby stores by providing the user's location." Id. at 97 -98 (emphasis added); see id. at

97 n.1. But we still concluded that the plaintiff could not make a prima facie showing of purposeful availment. We explained that "[a]lthough the allegations and evidence that the plaintiff. . . provide[d]. . . show[ed] that [the defendant website operator] intentionally targeted the plaintiff when he happened to be in [the forum], they [d id] not affirmatively prove that [the defendant website operator] knew that it was targeting him in [th e forum]. " Id. at 97. We added that "[e]ven assuming that [the website's design and operation] [d id] in fact in form [the defend ant website operator] about the location of a given user, there [wa s] not a shred of evidence in the. . . record that the plaint iff himself ente red his location into the website when he accessed it." Id. at 98. T here are, of course, differences between this case and Rosenthal. Unlike the plaintiff there, the Stokingers do not allege that the harm that the defendant caused resulted from their having accessed its website in the forum state. See id. at 93- 94. Instead, the Stokingers allege that the harm resulted from the defendant's website having facilitated a n offline transaction between two users in the forum state. Nonetheless, we find it significant that in Rosenthal the evidence that the defendant's website could track the plaintiffs in the forum state did not in and of itself suffice to make a prima facie showing that the defendant had deliberately

targeted its behavior toward that state. Id. at 9 7- 98. Instead, we concluded there that the plaintiff's failure to put forth any evidence that he had accessed the website while he was in the forum state was fatal to his bid to show purposeful availment because nothing in the record sufficed to indicate that the defendant engaged in the allegedly unlawful conduct in that state at that time. Based on our reasoning in Rosenthal, we conclude that the Stokingers need to do more than show that Armslist knew that its website had the capacity to f acilitate firearm sales in New Hampshire. It was evident in Rosenthal that, given the design of the website involved, the defendant -- a national department store chain with forum locations -- had reason to foresee that some of those accessing its website would be accessing it from the forum state. See id. at 97 n.1. Yet we determined th at the design of its website, which included a simila r geographic- filtering mechanism to Armlist.com, see id. at 98 ("[The defendant's] website allow[s] a user to search for nearby stores by providing the user's location. "), was not enough by itself to supportably show t hat the defendant had deliberately targeted users in the forum state, i d. at 97- 98; see also id., at 98 n.2 ("The plaintiff does not consider the obvious fact that there is nothing stopping a user located outside of [the forum state] from entering a location within the state on [the defendant's] website.").

We explained in Rosenthal that, in the absence of any allegation supported by evidence that a person in the forum state had in fact used the website, "the plaintiff ha[d] not sufficiently established that [the defendant website operator ] purposefully availed itself of what [the forum state] ha[d] to offer. " I d. at 98. Indeed, as we explained in Chen, "[a]s a general matter, " while the defendant " perhaps could have anticipa ted that [forum] residents (like residents of any other state) might " use the website " from the [forum state]," "this broad and generic degree of foreseeability is insufficient, standing alone, to rise to the level of purposeful availment." 956 F.3d at 60. We see no basis for reaching a different conclusion here to the extent th at the Stokingers rely solely on the evidence of Armslist.com's design. That evid ence does show -- as the evidence in Rosenthal did -- that the def endant had reason to think that it s website 's design would result in the website impacting those in the forum state. See 101 F.4th at 97 n.1. But, we explained in Rosenthal that the mere fact that the website could be used to have such a forum- state impact was not enough to make a prima faci e case of purposeful availment. See id. at 98. Rather, we concluded that such a prima facie case c ould not be made absent more direct evidence th at the defendant knew that the website's capabilities were being so utilized. See id.

True, the Stokingers do at times refer to their allegations that t he firearm used to shoot Officer Stokinger was offered for sale on Armslist.com and that the firearm was purchased in New Hampshire by a person who saw it listed on the website. However, they do not contend in any clear way either below or on appeal that the listing of the firearm in questi on bore a "New Hampshire" geographic label. And even if they could be read to assert as much, they do not develop any argument that the website's design in combination with the existence of that single New Hampshire listing was enough to establish purposeful availment. Instead, t hey argue at most with respect to such a listing -- at least in any clear fashion -- t hat the design of the website established purpo seful availment and that the existence of the New Hampshire transaction established relatedness. Therefore, any purposeful - availment -based argument premised on both the website's design and the firearm in question having been listed on Armslist.com with a "New Hampshire " geographic labe l is waived for lack of develop ment. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). 2. The Stokingers also rely on their allegation and evidence that Armslist generated advertising revenue from those visiting its website. But that allegation and evidence does not

in and of itself bolster their case for having made a pri m a facie showing of purposeful availment. 4 The Stokingers' argument on this front suffers f r om the same defect as their argument concerning the website's design. It too does nothing to show what we deemed crucial in Rosenthal with respect to a website that is accessible in every state -- namely, that the defendant knew that its website's capacity to have an impact in the forum state w as in fact being operati onalized to have an impact in that forum state. See id. at 97 - 98. Thei r argument here is only that Armslist.com had the capacity to generate advertising revenue from New Hampshire users, not that any revenue was so generated -- at least if we set aside the evidence that from 2018 on there were thousands of listings with "New Hampshire" geographic tags on Armslist.com. Therefore, this 4 The Stokingers do note that Armslist received r evenue from subscription fees paid by New Hampshire -based "p remium vendors." The Stokingers, however, distinguish this from their allegations concerning advertising revenue and do not appear to be basing their challenge to the District Court's ruling on evidenc e of "premium user" subscription fees. In an y event, to the extent they are attempting to establish purposeful availment on a theory predicated on the revenue generated by premium vendors -- who, we note, do not include the seller of the firearm in question -- it is waived for lack of development. See Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17. Indeed, we note that in their opposition to Armslist's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction below, the Stokingers relied on the existence of these premium vendors to establish purposeful availment under a "str eam - of - commerce" t heory. They do not, however, make any argument on appeal based on that theory for their having made a prima facie case of specific jurisdiction.

argument, insofar as it rests solely on evidence other than the evidence of the post - 2016 contacts, fails as well. 3. There remains to address, then, only the Stokingers' allegation and evidence that, at least from 2018 on, Armslist.com hosted an average of "16,000 listings per year for firearms for sale in New Hampshire." As we have explained, this evidence concerns contacts that post - date, by years, both the sale of the firearm allegedly used to shoot Officer Stokinger and the shooting itself. It is therefore hardly clear how such e vidence could be related to the Sto k ingers' claims. See Harlow, 432 F.3d at 62. But, assuming (l ike the District Court) that th is evidence is related to any or all the Stokingers' claims, we conclude that it suffice s to make a prima facie c ase of purposefu l availment. Or at least we conclude that it does when it is considered alongside the allegations and evidence regarding the website's design and generation of advertising revenue. Th e evidence of the "New Hampshire" listings supplies what is otherwise lacking -- evidence that supportably shows that Armslist knew that "it was intentionally operating its website" for the purpose of facilitating firearm sales in New Hampshire. Rosenthal, 101 F.4th at 97. It supportably does so because it shows that, from 2018 on, thousands of people each year w ere

accessing Armslist.com and seeking to sell their firearm s in New Hampshire specifi cally. And so, based on this addi tional evidence concerning the volume of "New Hampshire" listing s, we find that Armslist had reason to know not merely that its website was capable of being used to facilitate firearm sales in New Hampshire but that it was, in fact, being so used. Additionally, we conclude that A rmslist was not merely a passive bystander to the website being so used. See Motus, 23 F.4th at 12 4 (" [A] finding of purposeful availment necessarily requires more than the unilateral activities of third parties." (quoting Chen, 956 F.3d at 59)). It had " voluntarily " taken an affirmative step to increase the likelihood that a firearm being offered f or sale in New Hampshire would be purchased in that same state. It had implemented its geographic- filtering mechanism to enable would - be buyer s to find firearm s being offered for sale in the state and thus make a deal there and not in some other place. In fact, as discussed above, the Stokingers' evidence about the FAQ page on Armslist.com supportably shows that Arm slist expressly advised would - be sellers to use the geographic label that matched where they, and the firearm that they were offering for sale, were "physically located." True, the existence of the "N ew Hampshire" listings on Armslist.com does not by itself show that the firearms listed for sale in New Hampshire were ultimately purchased in that state.

The purchase wou ld only occur there if someone sought out one of the " New Hampshire " listings and then consummated the deal in New Hampshire. But the evidence of those listings d o es make a prima facie showing that Armslist knew that there were thousands of "New Hampshire " listings on its website each year, starting in 2018. And so, those listings, when considered alongside the features of the website's design that the Stokingers highlight, make a prima facie case that Armslist intention ally facilitate d the culmination of sales in New Hampshire as opposed to any other place that t he sellers, if left wholly to their own devices, ma y have chosen to close the deal. We note, too, that through the thousands of "New Hampshire" listings posted on Armslist.com, Armslist was directly profiting from the advertising that it permitted on the website. By including the geographic - filtering mechanism described above, "it could be inferred," as the District Court found, that Armslist was thereby generating "at least some amount of. . . advertising revenue from the New Hampshire listings," which were posted by sellers looking to transact with New Hampshire buyers. In other words, we agree with the Stokingers that they have made a prima facie case, based on the evidence of the volume of "New Hampshire" listings from 2018 on, that Armslist was not merely intent on facilitating "loc al" transactions in the abstract but that it was knowingly intent on facil itating firearm

transactions in New Hampshire. And while those transactions would only occur there if other parties took action, Armslist cannot be considered a mere passive bystander given the affirmative step that it had taken with the express aim of increasing the likelihood that a firearm listing made by a person who, alongside their firearm, was located in New Hampshire would result in a firearm being sold in New Hampshire rather than anywhere else. See Plixer Int'l, Inc. v. Scrutinizer GmbH, 905 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2018) (stating that the defendant "knew that it was serving U.S. customers and took no steps to limit its website's reach or block its use by U.S. customers" such that it could not "now claim that its contact with the United States was involuntary"); cf. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 286 (201 4) (" To be sure, a defendant's contacts with the forum [s] tate may be intertwined with his transactions or interactions with the plaintiff or other parties."). None of this is to say that Armslist was trying, at any time, to facilitate firearms sales only in New Hampshire. But a defendant who deliberately targets its behavior toward one state does not cease doing so just because it also chooses to deliberately target its behavior toward other states. Cf. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 (" But to the extent tha t a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. ").

Thus, we conclude that the Stokingers have made a prima facie case that Armslist deliberately target ed its behavior toward New Hampshire once the evidence that there were thousands of listings sporting "New Hampshire" geographic tags from 2018 on is taken into account. 4. Armslist does insist otherwise because, in its view, "[the First Circuit] and its fello w circuit courts have repeatedly denied specific jurisdiction b ased on similar (and even mor e robust) geographic filtering functions, ubiquitous in modern websites." But the cases on which Armsli st relies are distinguishable given that it, based on the evidence of the "New Hampshire" listi ngs from 2018 on, reasonably should have known that its website was being used to list guns for sale in New Hampshire specifically. Armslist primarily relies on Fidrych v. Marriott International, Inc., 952 F.3d 124 (4th Cir. 2020). There, two South Carolina residents sued an international hotel chain in South Carolina over injuries sustained at one of the chain's affiliated hotel s in Milan, Italy. Id. at 128. The couple as serted that t he court had specific jurisdiction over the defenda nt because the plaintiffs booked their hotel reservation through the defendant's booking website while they were in South Carolina and because they

used that website's "drop - down menu to select the place of their residence" (South Carolina). Id. at 129, 140. The Fourth Circuit concluded tha t "the fact that the website include[d] South Carolina as an option i n the drop-down menu used by customers to select their state of residence when making reservations" did not suffice to demonstrate purposeful availment in South Carolina. Id. at 142- 43. It explained that "the list of options confirm [ed] that the website was accessible to all but targeted at no one in particular" and that, as a result, "the drop -down menus that include [d] South Carolina simply [d id] nothing to strengthen the jurisdictionally relevant connections between [the hotel chain] and South Carolina." Id. at 143 (emphasis added). Rather, the court held, the drop -down menu merely demonstrated "that [the hotel chain] was willing to accept reservations from South Carolina residents, " not that it " was targeting South Carolina residents through its website. " Id. at 142 - 43. Unlike the plaintiffs in Fidrych, however, the Stokingers, insofar as they rely on the evidence of the "New Hampshire" listings from 2018 on, do not rely solely on evidence that the website was accessible to prospective purchasers in the forum state or that the website was merely "willing to accept" listings from New Hampshire residents. Id. Therefore, Fidrych did not confron t evidence that comparably indicates -- as the

evidence of the "New Hampshire listings" does when considered in conjunction with the website -design and advertising evidence -- that the defendant was specifically intent on its website leading to forum - state activity. Id. at 129. Armslist's reliance on NexLearn, LLC v. Allen Interactions, Inc, 859 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017), is also unpersuasive. In that case, a Kansas plaintiff, alleging, among other things, patent infringement, sued a Minnesota company in the District of Kansas. Id. at 1373 - 74. The plaintiff asserted that the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in Kansas, in part, because the defendant- company's website "specifically targeted Kansas residents by including Kansas in the address selector's dropdown menu on its. . . website." Id. at 1374. The Federal Circuit disagreed, however, because, although the defendant - company's "address selector may [have] indicate[d] its amenability to selling [software] to Kansas residents,. . . it [d id] not establish minimum contacts arising out of or related to the infringement claim." Id. at 137 8. T he court then went on to note that " [w] hile a Kansas resident could purchase [software] from [the defen dant's] website, what [wa s] mis sing [was] any evidence that such a sale [had] taken place . . . . [The plaintiff] [did] not even alleg e that any Kans as resident has accessed [the defendant's] website." Id.

Here, by contrast, once the evidence that there were thousands of "New Hampshire" listings is considered, it cannot be said that there is "missing . .. evidence" that the website was being used by New Hampshire residents to facilitate sale s in that state. Indeed, t he evidence from 2018 on speaks to more than Armslist being "amenab [l e]," id., to serving New Hampshire residents who wished to complete s ales there. It s uffices to make the prima facie case that Armslist knew that its website so served them. Therefore, n othing in NexLearn's analysis is at odds with our conclusion about purposeful availment here. See id. As such, we do not see how NexLearn supports Armslist's position that the Stokingers have not established purposeful availment once we account for the evidence that there were thousands of "New Hampshire" listings on Armslist.com each year from 2018 on. See id. (noting that "t here [was] no evidence that [the defendant's] website facilita ted the making, using, offering, or selling of [software ] in Kansas in order to connect [the defendant's] website with [the plaintiff's] patent infringement claim." (emphasis added)). Finally, neither Rosenthal, 101 F.4th 90, nor Chen, 956 F.3d 45, from our own circuit bolsters Armslist 's argument. In those cases, we held merely that a "broad and generic degree of foreseeability" predicated on the possibility that a user might

access the defendant's website in the forum state is "insufficient, standing alone, to rise to the level of purposeful availment with respect to [the plaintiff's] claims." Chen, 956 F.3d at 60 (emphasis added); see Rosenthal, 101 F.4th at 97 (relying on Chen in holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the defendant had " intentionally ta rget[ed] users in [the forum state]"). Here by contrast, the evidence of the "New Hampshire" listings from 2018 on, when considered alongside the rest of the Stokingers' evidence, demonstrates that there was s omething "more" than mere access. Motus, 23 F.4th at 125. It demonstrates that Armslist "knew that it was targeting" New Hampshire. Rosenthal, 101 F.4th at 97. 5 C. For these reasons, although we agree with the Di strict Court that the S tokingers failed to make a prima facie case that 5 Armslist also relies on Hasson v. Full S tory, Inc., 114 F.4th 181 (3rd Cir. 20 24), which like Rosenthal, involved a defendant that was allegedly tracking user conduct on its website in an impermissible manner. In relevant part, Hasson determined that the plaintiff the re had not estab lished purposeful availment under the Calder "effects test," s ee i d. at 192, which the Third Circuit determined had "distinct requirements" from the "traditional test," id. at 189. No party contends that the Calder "effects test " applies here, however, and Hasson made clear that under the "traditional tes t " "there is no doubt that [the defendant] purposefully ava iled itself of the [forum state's] market," in part, because t he defendant "conducts business with [forum] residents to sell pizza and other products via its website." Id. at 193 (citation modified). We thus do not see how Hasson supports Armslist's position.

Armslist purpose fully availed it self of the protections of New Hampshire's laws based on their evidence of contacts up to 2016, we disagree with the District Court that they also failed to do so when we take account of their evidence of the thousands of "New Hampshire " listings from 2018 on. That said, our conclusion on that score does not necessaril y help the Stok ingers in their broader effort to establish spec ific jurisdiction. They s till must succeed in showing that the contacts that establish purposef ul availment are related to their claims. S ee Cappello, 89 F.4th at 244. And it is not evident how New Hampshire-based firearm listings posted on Armslist.com years after the sale of the weapon alleged to have been used to shoot Officer Stokinger could suffice to satisfy the relatedness requirement. See Harlow, 432 F.3d at 62. Nonetheless, as we have explained, the District Court did not address the relatedness question. It instead determined that, even when considered alongside the Stokingers' other evidence, the evidence of the "New Hampshire" listings from 2018 on w as "not sufficient to establish purposeful availment in any event." We thus leave the questions concerning the relatedness require m ent for the District Court to address on remand in the first instance, s ee Yan, 973 F.3d at 39, just as we also leave the questions concerning the final prong of the test for specific jurisdiction, the reasonableness requirement.

I II. There is one loose end to tie up. The Stokingers challenge, in the alternative, the District Court's judgment of dismissa l of the Stokingers' claims for lack of pers onal jurisdiction on the ground that the District Court erred in denying their request f or jurisdictional discovery. T hat ground for challenging the dismissal of the claims could be relevant to the case's disposition on remand if the District Court were to conclude that, in the end, the Stokingers have not made out a prima facie showing of specific jurisdiction even though they have made a prima facie case of purposeful availment based on the evidence of the "New Hampshire" listings from 2018 on. So, we m ust address this alternative ground for overturning the District Court's judgment of dismissal. Nonetheless, we conclude, for the reasons set forth below, that ther e is no merit to this ground for disturbing that judgment. A. We review a den ial of a req uest for jurisdictional discovery for abuse of discretion. See Motus, 23 F.4th at 128. "This standard is deferential, and an order denying jurisdictional discovery will be overturned 'only upon a clear showing' that 'the lower court's discovery order was plainly wrong and resulted in substantial prejudice to the aggrieved party.'" Id. (quoting

United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 626 (1st Cir. 2001)). The District Court denied the Stokingers' request for jurisdictional discovery for several reasons, including that "[t]he [Stokingers'] request for jurisdictional discovery. . . [did] not identify the discovery they [sought] [nor ] explain how it would confer jurisdiction." I t emphasized, as to this reason for denying the request, that the Stokingers filed no motion for jurisdictional discovery, styled as such, and instead merely included a request for such discovery in their opposition to Armslist's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. It then added that, in so requesting, the Stokingers provided no deta il as to why they need ed that d iscovery. They instead merely asserted that they "should be 'entitled to probe Armslist's assertions and obtain updated evidence'" without specification. The District Court acknowledge d that, at the hearing on the motion to di smis s, the Stokingers "provided. . . some additional substance to their request. . . where they clarified that they were seeking discovery on Armslist's post - tort contacts with New Hampshire." But it nevertheless explained that it found the request, even as clarified, devoid of "'factual allegations suggesting with reasonable particularity the possib le existence of contacts' sufficient to confer j urisdiction." (Quoting Eurofins

Pharma U.S. Holdings v. BioAlliance Pharma SA, 623 F.3d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 2010).) B. T he Stokingers do not dispute that they first set forth their request for jurisdictional discovery in their opposition to Armslist's motio n to dismiss for lack of perso nal jurisdiction and, so, not in any independent motion seeking such discovery. Nor do they suggest that the portion of that filing containing the request itself identified the specific facts sought to be unearthed through jurisdictional discovery. We also do not see how they could so suggest, given that, in that portion of that filing, the Stokingers, instead of presenting facts which would support a finding of jurisdiction, merely took issue with the facts presented by Armslist. Negr ón - Torres, 478 F.3d at 27 ("I t is also incumbent upon the plaintiff to present facts to the court which show why jurisdiction would be found if discovery were permitted. " (citation modified)). We note as well that the Stokingers do not suggest that when they clarified their request for jurisdictional discovery at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, as the District Court highlighted, they provide d the missing detail. And, again, given what the record shows, we do not see how the Stokingers could make such a suggestion.

Therefore, the Stokingers stake their challenge to the District Court's denial of their re q uest entirely on two distinct exchanges that also occurred at that hearing but were otherwise unconnected to the clarification that the District Court referenced. Specifically, the Stokingers point out that when the District Court asked their attorney whether the geographic - filtering drop -down menu "was used in connection with this particular sale," t he ir counsel replied that it was "one of the things [they would] like to find out from discovery." They also point out that when the District Court asked their attorney if the Stokingers had "data about how many New Hampshire firearm sellers had. . . listings on the site to sell weapons in the. . . year of [the allegedly tortious conduct] and the year prior," counsel replied, "It's certainly something [they would] like to know." The District Cou rt, however, did not understand ei ther of those responses to be attempts to flesh out the Stokingers ' otherwise bare -bones request for jurisdictional discovery. And w e cannot see how it was an abuse of discretion, s ee Motus, 23 F.4th at 128, for the District Court to have understood those responses as it did. The Stokingers chose not to proceed by filing a motion spelling out their request for jurisdictional discovery. They instead chose to make their request in their opposition to the

motion to dismiss. T hey further chose to proceed by making their request in a most skeletal manner. Moreover, elsewhere at the hearing on that motion, they chose to emphasize their interest in obtaining discovery regarding what the District Court understandably thought were actions Armslist and others had taken after 2016. 6 We thus cannot say that the District Court acted in any way improperly in denying the Stokinger s' request for jurisdictional discovery. IV. For the foregoi ng reasons, we affirm the Di strict Court's grant of the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in part, vacate that decision in part, a ffirm the District Court's denial of the motion for jurisdictional discovery, and re mand for further proceedings consi stent with this opinion. The parties shall bear their own costs. 6 Even if counsel's statements at the hearing on the motion to dismiss constituted a permissible oral motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1)(A), the D istrict Court did not abuse its discretion in denying such a motion because, for the reasons we have ex p lained, we conclude that counsel did not "state with particularity the grounds for seeking the order," Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1)(B).