Pendarvis v. Wilson - Constitutional Rights Case

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF AP PEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 24 - 6654 JOHN TRENTON PEND ARVIS, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. ALAN M. WILSON, Attorney General; M ARK A. KEEL, Chief of S LED; HUGH E. WEATHERS, Commissioner of Sou th Carolina Department of Agriculture; L. C. KNIGHT, Sheriff of Dorchester County Sheriff ’ s Office; W. JEFFREY YOUNG, Chief Deputy of South Carolina A ttorney General ’ s Office; ROBERT D. COOK, Solicitor General; EMORY SMITH, JR., Deputy Solicitor General; DAVID S. JONES, Assistant Attorney General; T. STEPHEN LYNCH, Deputy Attorney General; HARLEY L. KIRKLAND, A ssistant Attorney General; WESLEY VOR BERGER, Assi stant Attorney General; ROBERT KITTLE, Communications Director of SCAG; ADAM L. WH ITSETT, General Counsel for SLED; FRA NK O ’ NEAL, Major for SLEDs Narcotics, A lcohol and Vice services; JASON WELLS, Captain for SLEDs Narcotics divisio n; GLENN WOOD, Lieutena nt for SLE D; JOHN NEALE, Agent/em ployee of SLED; RHETT HOLDEN, Agent/employee of SLED; ALDEN G. TERRY, General Counsel for DA G; DEREK M. UNDERWOOD, As sistant Commi ssioner of DA Gs Consumer Protection Division; J. CLINT LEACH, Assistant Co mmissioner of DAGs E xternal Affairs & Economic Development Division; AARON WOOD, Assistant Commissioner of DAGs Agency Operations Division; JOHN STOKES, Program Manager of DAGs Consumer Protection D ivision; VANESSA ELSALAH, Coordina tor of DAGs Hemp Pr ogram; B RITTANY J EFFCOA T, Coordina tor in DAGs Consumer Protection Division; EVA MOORE, Commu nications Director for DAG; RAY DIXSON, Captain for D CSO; FRANK THOMPSON, Lieutenant for DCSO; ROBERT KRUTAK, Deputy S heriff for DCSO; JONATHAN CALORE, Supervisory ag ent/employee; CHARLIE S CRUBBS, Agent/employee with the S.C. Forestry Commission; WAYNE EADDY, Agent/employee with the S.C. Forestry Commission, Defendant s - Appell ees.

2 Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolin a, at Charleston. Bruce H. Hendrick s, District Judge. (2:22 - cv - 03142 - BHH) Argued: December 12, 2025 D ecided: February 10, 2026 Before WILK I NSON, RICHAR DSON, and QUATTLEBA UM, Circuit Judges. Vacated and remanded by un published opinion. Judg e Quattlebaum wrote the opinion, in whi ch Judge Wilkinson and Judg e Richardson joined. Judge Wilkinson wrote a concurring opinion. ARGUED: Jason Scott Luck, Bennettsville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Daniel C. Plyler, SM ITH ROBI NSON HOLLER DUBOSE & M ORGAN, LLC, Colum bia, South Carolina, Eugene Matthews, RICHARDSON P LOWDEN & ROBINSON, PA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Patrick James McLaughlin, WUKELA LAW FIRM, Florence, South Carolina; Charles Brad ley Hutto, WILLIAMS AND WILLIAMS, Orangeburg, South Carolina, for Appellant. William Henry Davidson, II, DAVIDSON WREN AND DEMASTERS PA, Columbia, South Carolina, fo r Appelle es Hugh E. Weathers, Alden G. Terry, D erek M. Underwood, J. Clint Leach, A aron Wood, John Stokes, Vanessa Elsalah, Brittany Jeffcoat, and Eva Moore. Austin Tyler Reed, Frederick Newman Hanna, J r., SMITH ROBINSON HOLLER DUBOSE AND MORGAN, LL C, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees Mark A. Keel, Adam L. Whitsett, Frank O’Neal, Jason Wells, Glenn Wood, John Neale, and Rhett Holden. G. Wade Cooper, Jeffrey Herman Lappin, BUY CK LAW FIRM, LLC, Mt. Pleasant, South Carolina, for Appellees L.C. Knight, Ray Dixson, Fran k Thompson, and Robert Krutak. Mich ael Hart Montgomery, MONTGOMERY WILLARD, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees Jonathan Calore, Charlie Scrubbs, and Wayne Eaddy. Unpublished opinions are not binding p recedent in this circuit.

3 QUATTLEBAU M, Circuit Judge: John Penda rvis, a hemp farmer, sued over 30 officials in various agencies in the South Car olina gover nment, alleging they consp ired to violate his constitutional rights b y unlawfully arresting him and destroying his crop. But after extensive motion practice and amendments, his operative complaint failed to adequately plead Article III standing. So, we vacate and remand with instructions fo r the district court to dismiss without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. I. Pendarvis ’ original complaint was 92 pag es and alleged 4 causes of action ag ainst 33 defendants. It in cluded embedded exhibits, screenshots fro m the internet, emails and letters. D efendants filed 7 motions, arguing that the court should either dismiss the complaint or require Pendarv is to file a new complaint complying with the requirements of Rule 8. 1 In response, Pendarvis argu ed that his complaint was proper but requested leave to amend, rather than dismissal, in the ev ent the magistrate judge found any deficiencies. T he magistrate judge ordered Pendarvis to file an am ended complaint. She “note[d ] that while more than 18 p aragraphs in the Complaint detail the m inutia of discovery disputes between counsel in a state civil action, the Comp laint’s factual allegations regarding certain Defendants are confined to only one sentence, notwithstanding that two causes of action are alleg ed against all 33 Defend ants.” J.A. 105. S he determined that “the 1 R ule 8 requires that a pleading state “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” and “a sho rt and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. C iv. P. 8(a) (1) – (2).

4 most feasible course of action [was] to grant P [endarvis’] requ est for leave to file an amended complaint” pursuant to Rule 15. J.A. 107. Thus, she ordered Pendarvis to file an amended complaint that would com pl y w ith Rule 8 and whi ch could not exceed 45 pa ges in length a nd could not include embedde d evidenc e. Pendarvis then filed a n amended complaint. I n t his 44 - page v ersion, he asserted 6 causes of action against 32 d efendants. D efendants again moved for d ismissal, and some defendants alternatively mo ved for an order that Pendarvis amend his complaint again under Rule 12(e). Once again, the magistrate judg e found Pendarvis’ pleading was inadequate, a nd she ordered that Pendarvis do it o ver. Pendarvis then filed his second amend ed complaint, which made this pleading his operative complaint. In this version, Pendarvis maintained 6 causes of actio n under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging defendants violated his rights under th e Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Bu t th is complaint contained only conclusory statements alleging defendants violated each element of those causes of acti on. D efendants, once again, moved to d ismiss Pendarvis’ second amended complaint. This time, rather than ordering Pendarvis to file a new complaint, the magistrate judge issued a report and recomm endation that the district court dism iss Pendarvis’ second amende d complaint without prejudice. She explained that, by stripping out all factual allegations, Pendarvis rendered his secon d amended complaint deficient under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqba l, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), b ecause the o nly allegations remaining were conclusory statements that d id n ot give any indication of the facts. Moreover, the magistrate judge no ted that, to the extent

5 the second amended complaint reference d allegations in Pendarvis’ prior pleadings, those prior pleadings we re null. Pendarvis objected to the magistrate judge’s R&R. He urged the district court to adopt the magistrate ju dge’s alternative recommend ation that he be allowed to amend his complaint again. And Pendarvis attached a p roposed third amended complaint to his objection.. The district court adopted the mag istrate judge’s R&R and dismissed Pendarvis’ second amended complaint without prejudice. T he court outlined the history of Pendarvis’ prior pleadings and ultimately foun d that his latest pleading “fail[ed] to co mply with R ules 8 and 12 of the Federal Ru les of Civil Procedu re; fail[ed] to adhere to the standards set forth in [Twombly ] a nd I qbal; and fail[ed] to follow the clear directives provided to P[endarvis] in prior orders.” J.A. 395. And it found that dismissal withou t prejudice was appropriate under these circumstances. Pendarvis noticed a timely appeal of th e district court’s ord er. 2 Despite swin ging and missing three times, he argues on appeal that the d istrict court should have afford ed him a fourth swing of the bat. 2 B ecause the district court did not provide Pendarvis leave to amend when it dismissed his second amended complaint without prejudice, the district cou rt’s decision was final and appealable. See Britt v. D eJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 796 (4th Cir. 2022) (e n banc) (“[W]hen a district court dismisses a com plaint or all claims without p roviding leave to amend,. . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable.”). Thus, w e hav e appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s final ord er pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

6 II. We have an indepe ndent obli gation t o ensure we have jurisd iction. Design Gaps, Inc. v. Shelter, LLC, 130 F.4th 143, 14 6 (4th Cir. 2025). O ur obligation includes determining whether the plaintiff h as standing und er Article III of the United States Constitution. See Lujan v. Defs. o f Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); see also Benham v. City of Charlotte, 635 F.3d 129, 134 (4 th Cir. 2011) (“When a question of standing is apparent, but was not raised or add ressed in the lower court, it is our responsibility to raise and decide the issue sua sponte.”). To satisfy this requ irement at the pleading stage, Pendarvis must allege facts that give rise to the inference that he has standing. See Lu jan, 504 U.S. at 561. This means his factual allegations must support a finding that (1) he suffered an injury in fact (2) that is fairly traceable to defendants ’ unlawful conduct and (3) for which the co urt can likely provide some redress. Id. at 560 – 61. And much like when we assess whether a plaintiff h as stated a claim under Ru le 12(b)(6), we examine wh ether a plaintiff has alleged stan ding by disregarding “allegation s in the complaint labeled as fact but that constitute nothing more than ‘legal conclusions’ or ‘naked assertions.’” D avid v. Alphin, 704 F.3d 3 27, 333 (4t h Cir. 20 13) (quoti ng Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Pendarvis ’ second amended complaint d id not allege facts sup porting standing. 3 It contain ed only conclusory allegations that he suffered an in jury in fact fairly traceable to 3 Pendarvis seems to believe we can consider th e factual allegations he put forward in his original complaint or his fi r st amended complaint. But that would be inconsistent with precedent. Once a plaintiff amends his complaint, the previous version o f that pleading is dead and “no longer performs an y function in the case.” Roya l Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 3 5 (2025) (quoting 6 C. Wrigh t, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federa l Practice and Procedure § 1476, pp. 636 – 637 (3d ed. 2010)).

7 defendants ’ un lawful conduct for which th e court c ould prov ide redress. Because Pen darvis failed to plead the elements of standing, the district court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss on the merits. Thus, we must vacate the district court’s ord er and remand for the district court to dismiss without prejudice fo r lack of jurisdiction. See Ada ms Outdo or Adver t. Ltd. P’ship v. Beaufort Cnty., 105 F.4th 554, 566 (4th Cir. 2024) (“A dismissal fo r lack of standing — or any other defect in subject matter jurisdiction — must be one without prejudice, because a court that lac ks jurisdiction has no pow er to adjudicate and dispose of a claim on the merits. ” (qu oting S. Walk at Broadland s Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadl ands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir. 2013))); Benham, 635 F.3d at 134 (“If an appellate court determines that the district court lacked jurisdiction, vacatur o f the district court’s ruling, along with a remand w ith instructions to dismiss, is the appropriate disposition.”). III. For the reasons described above, the order and judgment of the district court are vacated, and we remand with instructions for the district court to dismiss without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. VACATED A ND REMA NDED

8 WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, concurring: I agree with the majority’s dismissal o f this case for want of ju risdiction. I would also note that the district court acted well within its discretion in concluding at each juncture that the case was not properly p led. The claims against the South Carolina Attorney General were especially ill - founded. It cannot be that the mere issuance of an advisory opinion in the course of an Attorney General’s ordinary responsibilities justifies drag ging the Attorney General into a law suit. All the elements of Article III standing (the need for injury; causation; and red ressability) are manifestly missing with respect to the Attorney General. Wh ether one views this absence as a matter of standing or a lack of ultimate merit in the action will mak e no difference. The complaint promises only to impair indefen sibly the discharge of an Attorney General’s routine tasks.