Changeflow GovPing Federal Courts Supreme Court January 2026 Order List
Routine Notice Amended Final

Supreme Court January 2026 Order List

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Published January 20th, 2026
Detected February 11th, 2026
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Summary

The U.S. Supreme Court issued its January 20, 2026 order list, including grants, denials, and miscellaneous orders. Notably, the Court granted certiorari in Tennessee v. Kennedy, vacating the judgment and remanding with instructions to dismiss the case as moot.

What changed

The U.S. Supreme Court has released its January 20, 2026 order list, detailing decisions on petitions for writs of certiorari, applications for stay, and other miscellaneous orders. In one notable action, the Court granted certiorari in Tennessee v. Kennedy, vacating the lower court's judgment and remanding the case with instructions to dismiss it as moot, with Justice Jackson concurring. Numerous other petitions for certiorari were denied, and applications for stay were also denied.

This order list primarily serves as a procedural update for ongoing cases before the Supreme Court. For legal professionals involved in these cases, it signifies the Court's decisions on further review or interim relief. Petitioners whose requests were denied should proceed according to the lower court's rulings or the Court's instructions. Those granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis but denied docketing fee waivers have until February 10, 2026, to comply with Rule 38(a) and Rule 33.1.

What to do next

  1. Review case status for any matters listed on the January 20, 2026 order list.
  2. For petitioners granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis but denied docketing fee waivers, ensure payment of docketing fees and submission of petitions in compliance with court rules by February 10, 2026.

Source document (simplified)

(ORDER LIST: 607 U.S.) TUESDAY, JA NUARY 20, 20 26 CERTIORARI -- SUMMARY D ISPOSITION 25-162 TENNESSEE V. KENNEDY, SEC. OF H&HS, ET AL. The petitio n for a writ of certiorar i is granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is r emanded to t he United States Court of Appeals f or the Sixth Circuit with instruction s to dismiss t he case as mo ot. See United States v. Muns ingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950). Justice J ackson, concu rring: Although I w ould require that the par ty seeking va catur establish equi table entitlemen t to that remedy, I acce de to vacatur here based on th e Court’s est ablished prac tice when th e mootness occ urs through the unilatera l action of t he party tha t prevailed in the low er court. See Acheson Hotels, LL C v. Laufer, 601 U. S. 1 (2023) (Jack son, J., concurrin g in the judgment). ORDERS IN PE NDING CASE S 25A408 IN RE GREGOR Y A. J. VAN E TTEN The applica tion for stay addressed t o Justice Go rsuch and referred to the Court is denied. 25A568 JOYNER, LERO Y T. V. UNITE D STATES The applica tion for stay addressed t o Justice Ja ckson and referred to the Court is denied. 25A633 KANAYAMA, MA SAHIBE V. KOW AL, SCOTT, ET AL. The applica tion for stay addressed t o The Chief Justice and referred to the Court is denied. 1

25-5559 SEPEHRY-FARD, FAREED V. S UPERIOR COURT OF CA, ET A L. The motion of petitioner for reconsi deration of order denying leav e to proceed in forma paup eris is denied. 25-6097 GLYNN, SHANN A M. V. MARQU ETTE POLICE D EPT., ET AL. 25-6171 DiBELARDINO, ALDO V. MIYA RES, ATT'Y GE N., VA, ET A L. The motions of petitione rs for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are denied. Pet itioners are allowed unti l February 1 0, 2026, within which to pay the docketin g fees requi red by Rule 38(a) and to submit petit ions in compl iance with R ule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court. CERTIORARI DE NIED 24-7194 CARVER, NEIL A. V. TEXAS 24-7400 MAYFIELD, BR ANDON L. V. U NITED STATES 24-7508 MEDRANO, CUR TIS D. V. UNI TED STATES 25-269 ZHERKA, SELI M V. BONDI, A TT'Y GEN. 25-344 CROMWELL, ROBERT, ET A L. V. TACON, WILLIAM 25-349 AUDI AG V. L. W., ET AL. 25-425 DUARTE, STEVEN V. UNIT ED STATES 25-436 VOLKSWAGEN A KTIENGESELLSC HAFT V. HERNA NDEZ, BLANCA, ET AL. 25-439 TOBIEN, KARL V. NATIONWID E GEN. INS. C O. 25-458 COLLINS, WIL LIAM V. BONDI, ATT'Y GEN., ET AL. 25-462 CHINOOK LAND ING, LLC V. U NITED STATES 25-491 FILYAW, GILL IAN V. CORSI, STEVE, ET AL. 25-583 TOWE, RODNEY V. GEORGIA 25-584 ROSELLINI, K ENNETH J. V. WILCOX, JUDGE, ET AL. 25-589 MITCHELL, RO BERT B. V. GE NERAL MOTORS LLC 25-602 DíAZ SANTIAG O, RAY L. V. CáRRION MORAL ES, JOSé R., ET AL. 25-638 CHEN, ZHONGX IAO M. V. MI STATE UNIV. 2

25-642 PIERRE, LORE NZO G. V. UNI TED STATES 25-691 PARKER, LONNIE J. V. UNIT ED STATES 25-695 MATTHEW, MAX WELL A. V. UN ITED STATES 25-5009 WILLIS, JOSHUA V. UN ITED STATES 25-5220 HOWARD, JONATHA N R. V. UNITED STATES 25-5259 MARSHALL, ANTON IO V. UNITED STATES 25-5327 REESE, ANDREW R. V. U NITED STAT ES 25-5358 COMPTON, DEO NTAY T. V. UN ITED STATES 25-5382 OSBORNE, MEL EKE V. UNITED STATES 25-5388 CANTU, KEVIN P. V. UNITED STATES 25-5415 WILLIAMS, RO BERTO A. V. U NITED STATES 25-5417 MITCHELL, SHALI K R. V. UNITED STATES 25-5421 HERNANDEZ, J OSE A. V. UNI TED STATES 25-5424 KEARNEY, KIYEL T. V. U NITED STATES 25-5433 TERRY, JON J. V. UNIT ED STATES 25-5437 FOWLER, SEQUAN A. V. U NITED STATES 25-5438 FINNEY, TAMO NTE V. UNITED STATES 25-5439 GREENE, NAIM V. UNITED ST ATES 25-5441 PERRY, AZONTAY M. V. U NITED STATES 25-5443 CREWS, DONOV AN L. V. UNIT ED STATES 25-5459 WOODALL, ROB ERT K. V. KEN TUCKY 25-5467 ADAMS, PATRICK L. V. U NITED STATES 25-5477 THOMAS, CORN ELL V. UNITED STATES 25-5481 OLIVAS, ISAA C J. V. UNITE D STATES 25-5482 HAYNES, BRAN DON A. V. UNI TED STATES 25-5485 TRUEX, TAYLOR D. V. U NITED STAT ES 25-5503 SCOTT, BOBBY N. V. UNITED STATES 25-5510 BARRY, MONTE V. UNITED ST ATES 3

25-5514 BETANCOURT, JOS EPH L. V. UNITED STATES 25-5516 GARCIA, JOSHUA O. V. U NITED STATES 25-5522 MOORE, GARY C. V. UNIT ED STATES 25-5535 CARBAJAL, JA SON D. V. UNI TED STATES 25-5550 NELSON, JERMAIN E V. UNITED STATES 25-5565 BRANSON, MAR CUS D. V. UNI TED STATES 25-5566 ALVAREZ, ALE X V. UNITED S TATES 25-5597 BUSH, JOSEPH C. V. UNITED STATES 25-5599 SEWARD, RAYM OND L. V. UNI TED STATES 25-5601 MASON, JOHN E. V. UNIT ED STATES 25-5603 CAMPBELL, GERMA INE E. V. UNITED STATES 25-5607 GILBERT, DUS TIN D. V. UNI TED STATES 25-5614 COLEMAN, FRA NKLIN J. V. U NITED STATES 25-5624 BROWN, NATHA NIEL J. V. UN ITED STATES 25-5626 CHAFIN, ANDREW V. UN ITED STATES 25-5627 COLES, LENNIE E. V. U NITED STAT ES 25-5655 ALLEN, WALTER L. V. U NITED STAT ES 25-5656 STERNQUIST, KAR A V. UNITED STATES 25-5658 ROYAL, DEVON TAE L. V. UNI TED STATES 25-5667 TOWN, ANTONI O D. V. UNITE D STATES 25-5668 COLEMAN, MAT THEW C. V. UN ITED STATES 25-5678 SHOFFNER, THOMA S J. V. UNITED STATES 25-5707 ROBINSON, REGIN ALD V. UNITED STATES 25-5708 KETZNER, JAS ON V. UNITED STATES 25-5731 BROWN, DAVID A. V. UNITED STATES 25-5747 KIMBLE, SIDNEY D. V. U NITED STATES 25-5748 LEE, SHE L. Y. V. UNITED STA TES 25-5850 STALEY, TREMON V. UN ITED STATES 4

25-5858 PECK, ROBERT V. UNITED ST ATES 25-5875 HEMPHILL, CHRIS TOPHER D. V. UNITED STA TES 25-5900 ANDERSON, LATIS HA V. UNITED STATES 25-5903 ROBINSON, JOSEP H V. V. UNITED STATES 25-5909 CONTRERAS, S TEVIE G. V. U NITED STATES 25-5912 EVERETTE, DA VID V. NEW YO RK 25-5916 ESPINAL, LUI S V. UNITED S TATES 25-5952 OWENS, THEO M. V. UNIT ED STATES 25-5976 MARROW, HENR Y L. V. UNITE D STATES 25-5999 PARKER, ERIC D. V. UNITED STATES 25-6054 MILLER, CLYD E V. UNITED S TATES 25-6062 MORGAN, CARL V. UNITED ST ATES 25-6064 STOKES, MARCUS G. V. U NITED STATES 25-6078 WHITAKER, TORRE NCE D. V. UNITED STATES 25-6080 SHELTON, WAR REN E. V. DOT SON, DIR., VA DOC 25-6081 JABR, TAREQ R. V. OH DEPT. OF TAXATION, ET AL. 25-6084 PERRY, PAUL G. V. VAN GOR DER, WARDEN 25-6091 SEALED APPEL LANT V. FORD, ATT'Y GEN. O F NV 25-6093 OLIVER, SHARI L. V. OL IVER, MATTHEW W. 25-6096 McCORMICK, M ARKUS O. V. M cLEOD, DEPUTY SHERIFF, ET AL. 25-6099 RAHAIM, CHRI STOPHER J. V. BURKE, KEN, ET AL. 25-6102 NELSON, JAME S D. V. ACEVE DO, ACTING WA RDEN 25-6104 HENDERSON, T ERENCE V. DEP T. OF ARMY, E T AL. 25-6106 GONZALEZ, RICO V. UN ITED STATES 25-6107 JOHNSON, DAVON A. V. U NITED STATES 25-6108 WILLIAMS, JO HNATHAN A. V. UNITED STATE S 25-6111 BULLS, DEWAY NE V. FBI, ET AL. 25-6112 ARABZADEGAN, LUKE M. V. T EXAS 5

25-6113 BOYKIN, MARSHAU N V. IL DOC, ET AL. 25-6117 JOHNSON, RON ALD V. KANSAS 25-6118 DOE, JANE V. UNIV. OF CHI CAGO, ET AL. 25-6121 HARRIS, JONATHA N A. V. SADLER, J., ET AL. 25-6122 GRANGER, JOS HUA C. V. UNI TED STATES 25-6129 WILLIAMS, PAUL V. UN ITED STATES 25-6130 DRAKE, ERIC V. TEXAS 25-6143 DILWORTH, RO DNEY J. V. GU ERRERO, DIR., TX DCJ 25-6146 ROBERSON, WILLI AM G. V. DART, SHERIFF 25-6148 SEMPER, JEHA N V. BESSENT, SEC. TREASUR Y, ET AL. 25-6149 JONES, BYRON V. MICHIGAN 25-6150 LANCRANJAN, CRISTINA M. V. SUPERIOR CO URT OF CA, E T AL. 25-6153 SANCHEZ, MARCO A. V. U NITED STATES 25-6154 KELLEY, KARY N M. V. FEENE Y, MARY, ET A L. 25-6164 JACKSON, SHA NNON B. V. TE XAS 25-6170 VICTOR, ERRO L V. LOUISIAN A, ET AL. 25-6177 PELLOW, JESS E D. V. PRESB YTERIAN HOMES, INC. 25-6187 WILSON, MAUR ICE V. UNITED STATES 25-6189 WILLIAMS, JAVON TE V. UNITED STATES 25-6243 HOWARD, RICH ARD B. V. UNI TED STATES 25-6279 WOLF, STEVEN M. V. FLORID A 25-6281 DUBOIS, ANDR E M. V. UNITE D STATES 25-6297 POLINSKI, PE TER J. V. UNI TED STATES 25-6298 POLINSKI, PE TER J. V. UNI TED STATES 25-6299 POLINSKI, PE TER J. V. UNI TED STATES 25-6307 RACE, CARL S. V. MT PRISO N INFIRMARY, ET AL. 25-6309 THAWNEY, MEL QUAN V. UNITE D STATES 25-6311 SMITH, CHRIS TOPHER V. UNI TED STATES 6

25-6313 SIMONSON, OWEN Z. V. U NITED STATES 25-6323 HILL, DONALD I. V. UNITED STATES 25-6325 DeWITT, STEVEN R. V. H ANEY, CERESSA, ET AL. 25-6327 KIRBY, THELO NIOUS W. V. U NITED STATES 25-6347 LUNDI, JIM V. UNITED STAT ES 25-6348 MRABET, MOUNIR V. UN ITED STATES 25-6353 SOSNIAK, MAR CIN V. MIMS, WARDEN 25-6354 DAISE, OSRIC T. V. UNITED STATES 25-6359 TUGGLE, TRAVIS V. UN ITED STATES 25-6366 HOWARD, JARR ETT V. UNITED STATES 25-6367 FUENTES, LUI S D. V. UNITE D STATES 25-6368 GARZA-GOMEZ, LUIS V. UNIT ED STATES 25-6369 DURHAM, DONN ELL S. V. UNI TED STATES 25-6371 SIMMONS, BOBBY D. V. U NITED STATES 25-6373 SMITH, LATONIA V. UN ITED STATES 25-6375 WHITE, EDDIE V. UNITED ST ATES 25-6387 DIAZ GONZALEZ, JOA N V. UNITED STATES 25-6390 SEREAL, BUSC H V. UNITED S TATES 25-6405 KENT, JEREL D. V. DIXO N, SEC., FL DOC 25-6409 HOFFMAN, KRY STLE V. ILLIN OIS 25-6428 SOTTILE, JOS HUA A. V. POR TLAND, OR The petitio ns for writs of certiorar i are denied. 24-909 AGUDAS CHASI DEI CHABAD V. RUSSIAN FED' N, ET AL. The petitio n for a writ of certiorar i is denied. Justice Kavanaugh to ok no part in the consider ation or dec ision of thi s petition. Justic e Jackson took no part in t he consideration o r decision of this petitio n. See 28 U. S. C. §455 a nd Code of Conduct for Justices of the Supreme C ourt of the U nited States, 7

Canon 3B(2)(e) (prior ju dicial servic e). 25-5253 TUOPEH, STEVEN V. SO UTH DAKOTA The petitio n for a writ of certiorar i is denied. Justice Jackson woul d grant the p etition for a writ of cer tiorari. 25-5879 ALLEN, MICHAEL V. GU ZMAN, WARDEN 25-6100 SULLIVAN, LEIHI NAHINA V. UNITED STA TES The motions of petitione rs for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are denied, and the petitions for writs o f certiorari are dismisse d. See Rule 39.8. As the petitioners have repeatedly a bused this Co urt's process, the Clerk is directed not to accep t any further petitions in noncriminal matters fro m petitioners unless the do cketing fees required by Rule 38(a) a re paid and the petitions ar e submitted i n compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. Dist rict of Columbia Cou rt of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (199 2) (per curiam). Justi ce Jackson, d issenting: I respectfully dissent fro m the order b arring these incarcerated petitioners fr om filing future in forma paup eris petitions in noncrimin al matters. See Howell v. Circui t Court of Indiana, 607 U. S. ___ (2026) (Jackso n, J., dissen ting). 25-6114 DAVIS, LAWRE NCE A. V. USD C ND FL The petitio n for a writ of certiorar i before jud gment is denied. 25-6278 DIEHL, DAVID A. V. UNITED STATES The motion of petitioner for leave t o proceed in forma pauperis is denied, and t he petition f or a writ of certiorari is dismissed. See Rule 3 9.8. As the petitioner ha s repeatedly abused this Court's proce ss, the Clerk is directed not to acce pt any further petiti ons in noncrimina l matters from petit ioner 8

unless the d ocketing fee required by R ule 38(a) is paid and th e petition is submitted in compliance wi th Rule 33.1. See Ma rtin v. District of Col umbia Court of Ap peals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). Justice Jacks on, dissenti ng: I respe ctfully dissent from the order b arring this i ncarcerated p etitioner fr om filing future in forma p auperis petitions in no ncriminal matters. Se e Howell v. Circuit Court of Indiana, 607 U. S. ___ (2026) (Jac kson, J., di ssenting). MANDAMUS DE NIED 25-571 IN RE RAYON PAYNE 25-6103 IN RE SANTOS HERNANDEZ 25-6128 IN RE JOSEPH CAMMARATA 25-6159 IN RE MOHAME D NGUIDA The petitio ns for writs of mandamus are denied. REHEARING DENIED 25-5523 IBRAHIM, MOH AMED A. V. LY NN, ALLISON L. The petitio n for reheari ng is denied. 9

1 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) J ACKSON, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNI TED STATES INDIANA, EX REL. DANNY W. HOWELL v. CIRCUIT COURT OF INDIANA, WELLS COUNTY, ET AL. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS TO THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA No. 25–5557. Decided January 20, 2026 The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is denied, and the petition for a writ of certiorari is dismissed. See Rule 39.8. As the petitioner has repeat- edly abused this Court's process, the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petition s in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). J USTICE J ACKSON, dissenting from denial of motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. To file a petition in this Court, litigants must pay a $300 fee, along with the (much higher) cost of printing 40 bound copies of their filing. Litigants who cannot afford the filing fee and the cost of printing can request to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court largely grants these requests, allowing those litigants to file for free, but our openness to indigent litigants has its limits. In fact, the Court sometimes im- poses blanket filing bars that prohibit litigants from filing any more in forma pauperis petitions in noncriminal mat- ters going forward, regardless of the merits of their claims. Today, the Court bars essentially all future filings from Danny Howell (an indigent inmate serving a 70-year sen- tence) because Howell previously submitted a handful of pe-

2 HOWELL v. CIRCUIT COURT OF INDIANA J ACKSON, J., dissenting titions we deemed “frivolous.” 1 Even if Howell were to iden- tify meritorious grounds for habeas relief or wanted to bring a justifiable challenge to his conditions of confinement, he will now be prevented from doing so unless he pays the fil- ing fee—no matter what. A cate gorical, forward-looking fil- ing bar is a questionable restriction as to any litigant who cannot afford to pay a filing fee. For me, it is an intolerable one as to incarcerated individuals. Accordingly, I respect- fully dissent. I The Court began imposing prospective filing bars on in forma pauperis litigants in 1989. First was Jessie McDon- ald. The Court’s decision to bar McDonald made intuitive sense: He had filed 73 p etitions over the preceding 18 years, several of which were collateral attacks on a state convic- tion for which he was no longer incarcerated. In re McDon- ald, 489 U. S. 180, 183 (per curiam). Over the dissent of four Justices, the Court barred McDonald from proceeding in forma pauperis when seeking extraordinary writs in the future. 2 Less than two years later, over the dissent of three Jus- tices, the Court imposed another filing bar, this time pre- venting Michael Sindram from proceeding in forma —————— 1 See this Court’s Rule 39.8 (“If satisf ied that a petition for a writ of certiorari, jurisd ictional statement, or peti tion for an extraordinary writ is frivolous or malicious, the Co urt may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis ”). 2 We emphasized that extraor dinary writs are “ ‘drastic and extraor di- nary remedies,’ to b e ‘reserved for really ext raordinary causes.’ ” In re McDonald, 489 U. S., at 185 (qu oting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U. S. 258, 259 – 260 (1947)). We further n oted that the Court had “not g ranted the sort of extraordinary writ relentlessly so ught by [McDonald] to an y litigant— paid or in forma pauperis —for at least a decade.” 489 U. S., at 184. The nature of extraordinary writs not only made McDonald’s repeated filings frivolous, but it also meant that the filing bar—w hich targeted only fu- ture requests for that particular form of relief—did not significantly bur- den McDonald’s access to the Court.

3 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) J ACKSON, J., dissenting pauperis when seeking extraordinary writs in the future. Sindram had filed 43 separate petitions over the prior three years, the majority of which related to a speeding ticket he had received years earlier. In re Sindram, 498 U. S. 177, 177–178 (1991) (per curiam). The following year, the Court significantly expanded the reach of its filing bar. Over the course of a decade, peti- tioner James Martin had filed 54 in forma pauperis peti- tions requesting writs of certiorari in connection with a va- riety of civil disputes. With two Justices dissenting, the Court barred Martin from filing any future petitions for cer- tiorari in noncriminal cases; unlike McDonald and Sin- dram, this bar was not limited to requests for extraordinary writs. Martin v. Dis tr ic t of Co l um b ia Co ur t o f Ap pe al s, 506 U. S. 1, 2–3 (1992) (per curiam). Martin’s circumstances lent this Court a useful shorthand: When we bar indigent litigants from filing any future in forma pauperis petitions, we now say that we are “ Martin izing” them. The Court’s exasperation with McDonald, Sin dram, and Martin was understandable. Each of those litigants had flooded the Court with dozens of frivolous filings, causing significant administrative burdens. In the Court’s view, a prospective filing bar was necessary to “curb serious abuses” of its docket and to ensure that the Court could al- locate its resources “in a way that promotes the interests of justice.” McDonald, 489 U. S., at 184. Even so, its decision to pe rmanently restrict a n indigent litigant’s access to this Court was hotly contested. The dis- senters in McDonald worried that, in the Court’s “fervor [to] ensur[e] that rights granted to the poor are not abused,” it had “embark[ed] on [an] unp recedented and dangerous course.” Id., at 185–187 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Simi- larly, to the dissenters in Sindram, even though prolific lit- igants do cause a “minimal annoyance,” preserving their ac- cess was “well worth the cost” given t he Court’s “longstanding tradition of leaving [its] door open to all

4 HOWELL v. CIRCUIT COURT OF INDIANA J ACKSON, J., dissenting classes of litigants.” 498 U. S., at 182 (Marshall, J., dissent- ing). The dissenters feared that in forma pauperis filing bars abandoned that “proud and decent” tradition. Ibid. They also predicted that what started as a rare step would turn out to be “merely the prelude” to a more habitual shut- ting of the courthouse doors. Mc Donald, 489 U. S., at 187 (Brennan, J., dissenting). II The dissenters were right. The Court has steadily ex- panded the reach of Martin, transforming what was once an extraordinary measure into a routine order. Howell’s case is a prime example. He has fi led only six petitions over the span of 14 years—hardly a flood. Before this one, Howell’s last petition was in 2018, eight years ago. Moreover, quite unlike McDonald, Sindram, or Martin, Howell is in state custody and serving a long prison sen- tence; all six of his petitions have raised claims challengin g aspects of his conviction. Howell’s case is not an out lier. By my count, the Court has now invoked Martin hundreds of times to prospectively bar indigent litigants from filing in forma pauperis. We no longer wait for a petitioner to inundate the Court with fri v- olous filings. Instead, we reflexively Martin ize petitioners after only a few petitions. See, e.g., In re Nelson, 607 U. S. ___ (2025) (Martin ized after five petitions); Navarro Martin v. Florida, 607 U. S. ___ (2025) (Martin ized after six peti- tions). Even more troubling, though the Court did not have oc- casion to consider in McDonald, Sindram, or Martin whether filing bars were necessary or appropriate for incar- cerated litigants, we now routinely impose filing bars on prisoners. See, e.g., Cros by v. Starr, 607 U. S. ___ (2025) (Martin ized after filing a petition for certiorari arising fro m habeas proceedings raising claims under the First Step Act); Brunson v. He rring, 604 U. S. ___ (2024) (Martin ized

5 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) J ACKSON, J., dissenting after filing a petition for certiorari arising from habeas pro- ceedings raising claims of actual innocence); Kaetz v. United States, 602 U. S. ___ (2024) (Martin ized after filing a petition for certiorari arising from proceedings under 28 U. S. C. §2255 raising ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims). According to our Clerk’s Office, more than half of the petitioners whose filings we have categorically rejected per Martin in the past 22 years were prisoners. III Applying Mart in routinely to bar the filings of indigent incarcerated petitioners goes too far. In my view, such a restriction foolishly trades a pound of values for an ounce of convenience. That is, the Court now blocks indigent incar- cerated individuals from ever more accessing our court- house, just to avoid a minor administrative burden. To be clear: Martin ized petitioners are totally barred from ever filing in forma pauperis noncriminal petitions in the future—even to raise new claims based on favorable changes in the law (which sometimes happen), or to chal- lenge the ongoing conditions of their confinement (which, in our society, prisoners are allowed to do). The future is fa- mously hard to predict. So th e justification for a permanent filing bar—even one related to the Court’s administrative convenience—is murky at best. Changes in the law can give rise to meritorious chal- lenges that a prisoner might be able to raise b y filing a civil habeas petition. Consider, for instance, the pro se peti- tioner in Welch v. Uni ted States, 578 U. S. 120 (2016), who filed an in forma pauperis petition raising a collateral chal- lenge to his sentence in light of our prior decision in John- son v. United States, 576 U. S. 591 (2015). Welch’s filing ultimately resulted in the Court applying Johnson retroac- tively. 578 U. S., at 130. But if Welch had been Martin ized, he would have been unable to seek relief in this Court.

6 HOWELL v. CIRCUIT COURT OF INDIANA J ACKSON, J., dissenting Similarly, the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement may give rise to new consti tutional claims. In Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U. S. 34 (2010) (per curiam), for example, we held th at a pro se petitioner proceeding in forma pauperis had stated an Eighth Amendment claim based on an assault by prison officials. Had Wilkins been Martin ized, he would have been barred from obtaining the relief to which he was due under our Constitution. Unfortunately, poor conditions in prisons across the country continue to pose potential constitutional problems. 3 Indigent prisoners who are Martin ized are un- able to come to this Court to challenge these unsafe condi- tions and vindicate their constitutional rights. In short, because time moves on after a person is impris- oned and things happen, we simply do not and cannot know whether indigent prisoners who have filed multiple “frivo- lous” petitions in the past might have a meritorious claim in the future. When lib erty, bodily integrity, or fundamen- tal fairness is at stake, preven ting such litigants from ever again accessing our review imperils our ability to provide equal justice for all. Meanwhile, the administrative burden involved in re- viewing repeated (even frivolous) petitions filed by prison- ers is minimal. It is the rare incarcerated person who has the wherewithal to flood the Court with filings, at least in the way that Martin, Sindram, a nd McDonald had done. Practicalities ordinarily do not allow for this, since prison- ers often lack regular access to paper, pens, envelopes, and stamps. Pro se prisoners also usually handwrite their fil- ings—a time-intensive process. And, regardless, it is not —————— 3 See, e.g., Dept. of Justice, Investigat ion of Alabama’s State Prisons for Men 5–6 (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/crt /case-document/ file/1149971/dl?inline= (detailing Al abama’s failure to prov ide safe con- ditions for its prisoners); Dept. of Ju stice, Investigation of Geo rgia Pris- ons 3 (Oct. 1, 2024), http s://www.justice.g ov/d9/2024-09 / findingsreport-investigationof georgiaprisons.pdf (describing Georgia’s failure to protect inca rcerated people from violence).

7 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026) J ACKSON, J., dissenting difficult for Court staff to sort out in forma pauperis filings that raise new, potentially meritorious claims from repeti- tive, meritless petitions. I believe that when balancing prisoners’ access to judicial review, on the one hand, and reducing our administrative burden, on the other, we should err on the side of keeping our courthouse doors open. For a system designed to ad- minister justice, reflexively re jecting (potentially meritori- ous) petitions from incarcerated litigants has a cost that is much too high when compared to the (meager) administra- tive efficiency gains. Nor shou ld we forget the role that in- digent incarcerated litigants have played in the develop- ment of important constitu tional doctrines—and through habeas proceedings no less. See, e. g., Gideon v. Wai n- wright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963); see also Sindram, 498 U. S., at 181 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Accordingly, I would not ap ply the filing bar that the Court imposes for frequent “fri volous” filers to prisoners who, like Howell, seek to proceed in forma pauperis.

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Federal and State Courts
Published
January 20th, 2026
Compliance deadline
February 10th, 2026 (32 days ago)
Instrument
Notice
Legal weight
Non-binding
Stage
Final
Change scope
Minor

Who this affects

Applies to
Courts Legal professionals
Geographic scope
National (US)

Taxonomy

Primary area
Judicial Administration
Operational domain
Legal
Topics
Appellate Procedure Civil Procedure

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