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April 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In The Matter Of The Parental Rights To I.c.m.m.

Court of Appeals of Washington

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 87655-4

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (20)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (96.2K)

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Lead Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Parental Rights to No. 87655-4-I
I.C.M.M.
DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

DÍAZ, J. — A superior court terminated Mr. M.’s parental rights as to his

biological daughter, I.C.M.M., in December 2024. He claims the court’s decision

improperly relied on his race and ethnicity and that the court erred by concluding

the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF) had provided services as

required by RCW 13.34.180(1). Disagreeing, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts from the court’s termination order and the parties’ briefs

are not contested.

I.C.M.M.’s biological father, Mr. M., was born in rural Honduras and he

primarily communicates in Spanish. His own father left the family when he was a

young child and his mother also could not care for him, so he was raised by his

grandparents in a rural area. He immigrated to the United States as a teenager in
No. 87655-4-I/2

approximately 2008.

Mr. M. met I.C.M.M.’s biological mother, Ms. C., around 2012, and they co-

parented several children until they separated after I.C.M.M. was born in 2016.

I.C.M.M. has three older half-siblings born to Ms. C. and they all lived together for

a period.

In March of 2019, the children were removed from the custody of Mr. M.

and Ms. C., both of whom the State criminally charged for abuse. Ms. C pled

guilty to one count of assault in the second degree and two in the third degree, all

designated as domestic violence offenses. Mr. M. pleaded guilty to three counts

of assault in the third degree, admitting to acting with criminal negligence and

causing bodily harm to the three older children.

Then, in June of 2019, the court entered agreed orders of dependency for,

inter alia, I.C.M.M., under RCW 13.34.030(6)(c)—as to both parents. 1

DCYF first petitioned for the termination of Mr. M.’s parental rights in August

1. In its third amended petition, filed in July 2024, DCYF alleged the following

parental deficiencies: “Ongoing risk of physical abuse and failure to protect, all of

which impair the father’s ability to safely parent. Inadequate parenting skills to

provide for the child’s emotional, mental, and developmental needs.” DCYF

claimed I.C.M.M. “expressed having seen her father hurt her siblings and being

afraid he would kill her mother or her siblings.” It also alleged she said that “her

father allowed his friends to come into the home and these men would sexually

1 Not a party to this appeal, Ms. C.’s parental rights were terminated in January

2024.
2
No. 87655-4-I/3

abuse her” and she “expressed being abused by men while they were having sex

with her mother.” Mr. M.’s visitation with I.C.M.M. was suspended in April 2022

because she experienced “ongoing extreme trauma reactions related to visiting

with [him].”

Mr. M. underwent three examinations over the course of the dependency

after the court ordered DCYF to refer him for a psychological evaluation, and he

ultimately took part in a neuropsychological evaluation, which was conducted in

Spanish. Mr. M. also participated in parenting and family preservation services,

as well as individual psychotherapy.

The court held a bench trial on the State’s termination petition over eight

days in October and November 2024. It heard testimony from Mr. M. and I.C.M.M.,

as well as from mental health counselors, DCYF social workers, a court-appointed

special advocate (CASA), case managers, psychologists, and neuropsychologists.

On the date of the termination order, I.C.M.M. was eight years old. She had

lived in a foster home since 2020, with multiple significant and ongoing special

needs regarding her mental and emotional health.

At the conclusion of the 2024 trial, the court’s termination order identified

Mr. M.’s parental deficiencies as follows: an inability to protect I.C.M.M. from

abusive situations, engaging in inappropriate physical discipline, and an inability

to provide for her social, physical, mental, educational, and emotional needs. It

ultimately concluded he could not correct those deficiencies within the foreseeable

future, or even reinitiate contact with her within such a period without jeopardizing

her mental health. In explaining its termination decision, the court reasoned:

3
No. 87655-4-I/4

Even though the father has received and extensively participated in
services, the Court finds that the father is not prepared or able to
handle [I.C.M.M.]’s very challenging behaviors and trauma-triggered
responses. His inability to acknowledge his role in the abuse of
[I.C.M.M.] and her siblings, and his inability even to recognize that
[I.C.M.M.]’s mental health and behavior have been impacted by that
abuse, renders him unable to meet her substantial needs.

It found Mr. M. unfit to parent I.C.M.M. and terminated his rights. He timely

appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Alleged Racial Bias

Mr. M. argues the court disregarded our Supreme Court’s declaration in

Henderson v. Thompson, 200 Wn.2d 417, 422, 518 P.3d 1011 (2022), that “racial

bias has no place in a system of justice.” He avers that racial bias was a factor in

the court’s decision because he claims the court “expressly” concluded his cultural

background “made it impossible to remedy his parental deficiencies.”

In Henderson, our Supreme Court set out a two-part test for addressing

claims of racial bias raised in a civil trial. It held, “upon a motion for a new civil trial,

courts must ascertain whether an objective observer[—]who is aware that implicit,

institutional, and unconscious biases . . . have influenced jury verdicts in

Washington State[—]could view race as a factor in the verdict.” Id. at 435 (citing

State v. Berhe, 193 Wn.2d 647, 665, 444 P.3d 1172 (2019)) (emphasis added). If

a civil litigant makes “a prima facie showing sufficient to draw an inference of racial

bias” under that standard, then a trial court must grant an evidentiary hearing to

determine its effect on the verdict and decide whether to order a new trial under

4
No. 87655-4-I/5

CR 59. 2 Id.

However, this court has since declined to review claims based in Henderson

where an appellant did not assert a claim of racial bias before the trial court. See,

e.g., Aiken v. Sanchez, No. 84876-3-I, slip op. at 22 (Wash. Ct. App. May. 28,

2024) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/841157.pdf; Kindt v.

Cunningham, No. 87169-2-I, slip op. at 14-15 (Wash. Ct. App. June. 16, 2025)

(unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/871692.pdf; 3 see also RAP

2.5(a) (an “appellate court may refuse to review any claim of error which was not

raised in the trial court.”)

Even more specifically, we have held the same in several appeals from

termination orders when the party did not raise such a claim at trial or sought a

new trial on that basis. See, e.g., In the Matter of the Dependency of N.M.L.H, No.

84876-3-I, slip op. at 22 (Wash. Ct. App. June. 24, 2024) (unpublished),

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/848763.pdf.

Our opinion in Matter of Dependency of Aa.D.Y., No. 83410-0-I, slip op. at

25-27 (Wash. Ct. App. May 30, 2023) (unpublished),

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/834100%20Order%20and%20Opinion.pdf, is

instructive. There, we acknowledged “race-based discrimination exists in child

welfare proceedings,” but we held that the appellant’s claim failed both because

2 At such hearings, courts must presume racial bias affected the verdict, and the

party benefiting from the alleged racial bias has the burden to prove it did not.
Henderson, 200 Wn. 2d at 435. If that party cannot prove that racial bias had no
effect on the verdict, the verdict is “incompatible with substantial justice” and a new
trial is required under CR 59(a)(9). Id.
3 We cite to these cases, pursuant to GR 14.1, as necessary for a reasoned

decision.
5
No. 87655-4-I/6

“no party raised or perceived such a risk or raised the issue in the trial court” and

because we were not persuaded “bias affected the termination proceedings” when

the court’s comments were “read in light of the overall ruling” rather than “taken

out of context[.]” Id. 4

Here, we conclude Mr. M.’s claim of racial bias fails for precisely the same

reasons: the issue was waived and, when read in context, it also fails on the merits.

As to waiver, Mr. M. concedes he did not raise the issue of alleged racial

bias before the trial court. Consistent with N.M.L.H. and Aa.D.Y., “[i]t is not the

role of an appellate court . . . to address claims where the trial court could not have

foreseen the potential error or where the prosecutor or trial counsel could have

been justified in their . . . failure to object.” State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 100,

217 P.3d 756 (2009), as corrected (Jan. 21, 2010); see also Smith v. Shannon,

100 Wn.2d 26, 37, 666 P.2d 351 (1983) (holding that “[f]ailure to raise an issue

before the trial court generally precludes a party from raising it on appeal.. . . The

reason for this rule is to afford the trial court an opportunity to correct any error,

thereby avoiding unnecessary appeals and retrials.”) Here, Mr. M. not only failed

to ask for a new trial on that basis, but he did not make any related objection to

preserve the error he now asserts.

Mr. M. asserts his claim is preserved as manifest constitutional error under

RAP 2.5(a)(3). However, he provides only two conclusory sentences in his reply

brief for this assertion, summarily stating that Berhe “made clear this issue is one

4 We cite to these cases, pursuant to GR 14.1, as necessary for a reasoned

decision.
6
No. 87655-4-I/7

of a constitution [sic] dimension” and there is a “plausible showing the alleged error

had “practical and identifiable consequences” in the proceedings. This argument

is both inadequate and untimely. Norcon Builders, LLC v. GMP Homes VG, LLC,

161 Wn. App. 474, 486, 254 P.3d 835 (2011) (holding that this court “will not

consider an inadequately briefed argument.”); see also Cowiche Canyon

Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992) (holding that

“[a]n issue raised and argued for the first time in a reply brief is too late to warrant

consideration.”)

Nonetheless, given the serious nature of his claims, we consider the merits

as if he had sought a new trial. We first determine whether he could have made a

prima facie case that racial bias affected the verdict.

Mr. M. argues the objective observer standard from Henderson is “easily”

met because the trial court explicitly “relied on Mr. M.’s race and ethnicity as the

basis for terminating his parental rights.” He argues the court made comments

which “in no uncertain terms, punish[ed] Mr. M. for not being better acculturated to

the United States and less beholden to his cultural upbringing.” He even claims

there is “no doubt racial and ethnic stereotyping impacted the decision” to

terminate Mr. M.’s parental rights because the trial court “admitted it.” We disagree

for three reasons.

First, while the court did make comments mentioning Mr. M.’s language

and culture, there is no indication, when read in context, it based its termination

decision on those observations.

Specifically, the court made the following oral ruling:

7
No. 87655-4-I/8

[I]t’s clear to me that [Mr. M.]’s language and cultural barriers have
contributed both to the delays in this case and to his inability to
remedy his parental deficiencies. And I think it may be culture as
much as language. And that is sad and makes it, you know, harder
to do this. I believe that ultimately [Mr. M.] really isn’t going to
understand why I’m doing what I’m doing for the -- perhaps some of
the same reasons that he seems unable to understand [I.C.M.M.]’s
traumas and needs. But that really doesn’t change the findings I need
to make and what is in [I.C.M.M.]’s best interests here.

The court then acknowledged Mr. M. had “worked hard to try—in terms of showing

up and doing services to try to move and change things[,]” but held “ultimately . . .

what prevents . . . progress from happening, and what puts [I.C.M.M.] in danger

and makes you an unfit parent is the fact that you still will not acknowledge your

part -- the abuse that happened in that household, your part in it, and your part in

[her] trauma or why [she] might be traumatized.”

Thereafter, it mentioned his culture only once more when it stated:

And, frankly, even that failure to acknowledge may be in part due to
cultural barriers and educational barriers. I think, you know, someone
more sophisticated than [Mr. M.] with a better cultural understanding
might have better understood how important it would be for him to
acknowledge the abuse and trauma that occurred, as opposed to
continuing to deny it. But the reality is that that failure means that he
could not make progress; [I.C.M.M.] could not progress to wanting to
spend any time with him; and, therefore, no progress could be made
to remedying parental deficiencies towards reunification.

Similarly, the court’s written order concluded:

. . . ultimately what prevents progress and puts [I.C.M.M.] at risk of
[Mr. M.] being an unsafe parent is his inability to acknowledge his
part as well as his lack of ability to understand her mental health
needs. This could be, in part, due to cultural barriers. But regardless
of the cause of [Mr. M.]’s unwillingness to acknowledge the past and
inability to understand [I.C.M.M.]’s needs, those deficits render him
an unsafe and unfit parent for [I.C.M.M.].

8
No. 87655-4-I/9

We hold that none of these statements are comparable to the statements

at issue in Henderson, which “evoke[d] . . . harmful stereotype[s],” appealed to

implicit racial bias, and therefore permitted the inference that an objective observer

could conclude race was a factor in the outcome. 200 Wn.2d at 436. The court

here did not allude to “racist stereotypes” of any kind, let alone convey a “false

stereotype” based on his race. Id. at 437. There is nothing in the court’s comments

that suggest it made its decision based on a belief that, for example, Latinos are

prone to child abuse, even assuming such a stereotype is trafficked in our culture.

Instead, when viewed in their full context, the court affirmatively made clear

it did not base its decision on Mr. M.’s culture, let alone on his ethnicity or race. It

specifically explained that barriers to reunification existed, no matter their cause or

the possibility that cultural influences had some role to play. Even if there was

something inappropriate in referring to Mr. M’s upbringing and culture—which

there is not, as explained below—the court’s decisions were based on the

existence of insurmountable barriers to reunification.

And evidence of those barriers was significant. Professional reports and

other testimony described in detail the abuse experienced in Ms. C. and Mr. M.’s

household, which included: bruising caused by a rod; getting hit with electrical

cords and belts; sometimes while handcuffed; scars from being burned; being

forced to eat their own feces after a potty-training accident and losing a tooth after

being hit in the face; and exposure to weapons and drugs. The children had

reported the abuse was committed both by their mother and Mr. M., and after one

of the children disclosed Mr. M. hit them, the other siblings reportedly responded,

9
No. 87655-4-I/10

“No he doesn’t, you’re not supposed to say that.” Moreover, it was apparent

I.C.M.M. likely saw some of this or other abuse because she suffered from severe

behavioral issues, such as screaming, extreme prolonged tantrums, physical

aggression towards adults including the foster parents, destruction of belongings,

bedwetting, nightmares, inappropriate sexualized behavior, hypervigilance,

trauma-related flashbacks, and suicidal statements.

In this context, and given this unchallenged evidence, it is clear why the

court would cabin any cultural explanation and base its decision on Mr. M.’s denial

that he had played any role in the abuse—which he never acknowledged

occurred—and his resulting inability to recognize I.C.M.M.’s mental health needs,

which arose from that trauma.

In short, based on the court’s statements alone, viewed in their full context,

we hold that no objective observer could view race as a factor in the court’s

termination decision.

Second, two of Mr. M.’s own witnesses testified about his cultural

background throughout the termination trial. Dr. Claudette Antuña opined that Mr.

M. did not understand the cultural nuances of living in the United States. And

another, Dr. Tedd Judd, endorsed a recommendation for cultural coaching

because Mr. M. came from a rural area in Honduras with limited education. 5 Thus,

5 Neuropsychologist Dr. Melissa Castro also offered testimony which referenced

Mr. M.’s language and culture. RP 136 (Explaining her analysis of Mr. M. had been
“culturally sensitive” because she used norms developed for people from Latin
America and compared him to others from Honduras with the same age and
education); id. at 137 (reiterating her assessment “was very much tailored to
someone of his cultural and linguistic background.”)
10
No. 87655-4-I/11

the court simply addressed and incorporated facts raised by Mr. M. himself.

Third, the court’s commentary served to recognize that Mr. M.’s particular

language and culture were a part of his identity and life experience. We cannot

agree with the idea that simply naming a person’s cultural identity—let alone

race—demonstrates an underlying bias. We note that such reasoning runs

counter to a scholarly study which found overt mentions of race actually increased

judges’ tendency to guard against the influence of implicit bias in their decisions.

See Bernice Donald, Jeffrey Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Getting Explicit

About Implicit Bias, 104 JUDICATURE, no. 3 (2020-21), at 76; Andrew J. Wistrich &

Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making: How It Affects

Judgment and What Judges Can Do About It, in ENHANCING JUSTICE: REDUCING BIAS

99 (Sarah E. Redfield ed., 2017) (concluding that “thinking about race explicitly is

a better approach than trying to ignore it.”) We are concerned that holding

otherwise in this case would chill discussions of culture, identity, and even implicit

bias in a way contrary to the intent of Henderson and GR 37.

Thus, we have no reason to believe that “racism affected the verdict” and

Mr. M. has not established a prima facie case entitling him to an evidentiary hearing

or for us to further consider this first assignment of error. Henderson, 200 Wn.2d

at 439.

B. Alleged Failure to Provide Required Services

Next, Mr. M. asserts that DCYF failed to meet its required burden under

RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) in three ways, which we address in turn.

Pursuant to Chapter 13.34 RCW, DCYF must establish by clear, cogent,

11
No. 87655-4-I/12

and convincing evidence that it satisfied six elements within RCW 13.34.180(1)

before a court may terminate a person’s parental rights. In re Dependency of

G.C.B., 28 Wn. App. 2d 157, 171, 535 P.3d 451 (2023).

RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) requires that the Department show all court ordered

services “have been expressly and understandably offered or provided,” as well as

“all necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the parental

deficiencies within the foreseeable future.”

The term “necessary services” is not defined in the statute, but our Supreme

Court has held that the following definition is consistent with the plain language of

the statutory scheme: “those services ‘needed to address a condition that

precludes reunification of the parent and child.’” Matter of K.M.M., 186 Wn.2d 466,

480, 379 P.3d 75 (2016) (quoting In re Dependency of A.M.M., 182 Wn. App. 776,

793, 332 P.3d 500 (2014)).

“[T]erminations are fact specific and must be decided on a case by case

basis.” In re Welfare of N.M., 184 Wn. App. 665, 672, 346 P.3d 762 (2014). “Our

role in reviewing a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights is limited to

assessing whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings.” Matter

of D.H., 195 Wn.2d 710, 718, 464 P.3d 215 (2020).

“Substantial evidence” is evidence in sufficient quantum to persuade a fair-

minded person of the truth of the declared premise. In re Adoption of M.J.W., 8

Wn. App. 2d 906, 925, 438 P.3d 1244 (2019). In addition, the applicable “clear,

cogent, and convincing” standard is met when the ultimate fact in issue is shown

by the evidence to be “‘highly probable.’” In re Dependency of K.R., 128 Wn.2d

12
No. 87655-4-I/13

129, 141, 904 P.2d 1132 (1995) (quoting In re Welfare of Sego, 82 Wn.2d 736,

739, 513 P.2d 831 (1973)); Mueller v. Wells, 185 Wn.2d 1, 10 n.5, 367 P.3d 580

(2016) (noting this standard requires “more than a preponderance of the evidence,

but less than what is needed to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”)

Therefore, taken together, we will not disturb a trial court’s factual findings

as to whether DCYF met its burden “unless there is an absence of clear, cogent,

and convincing evidence in the record.” D.H., 195 Wn.2d at 718. Put differently,

“[t]he court's factual findings must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence

from which a rational trier of fact could find the necessary facts by clear, cogent,

and convincing evidence.” In re Dependency of K.S.C., 137 Wn.2d 918, 925, 976

P.2d 113 (1999).

Such “deference to the [lower court’s] findings is of particular importance”

because “[t]he trial judge has the advantage of having the witnesses before him or

her.” Id. Accordingly, “[w]e defer to the trial court’s weighing of the evidence and

witness credibility determinations.” D.H., 195 Wn.2d at 718. And we may affirm

the trial court’s findings on any grounds supported by the record. Johnson v. Liquor

& Cannabis Bd., 197 Wn.2d 605, 611, 486 P.3d 125 (2021).

1. Psychological Evaluation with Parenting Component

The first way Mr. M. argues DCYF did not satisfy RCW 13.34.180(1)(d) is

that it did not provide all court ordered services. Specifically, he avers it did not

adequately or timely provide him with a psychological evaluation which included a

parenting component, as ordered by the dependency court. He then argues DCYF

never provided him with one. These arguments fail for several reasons.

13
No. 87655-4-I/14

For one, the record does not support that DCYF failed to provide the

services that the dependency court ordered. In its initial 2021 dependency order,

the court did require that DCYF provide Mr. M. with a psychological evaluation

“with a parenting component,” but it did not expressly require a parent-child

observation. To the contrary, it subsequently modified its initial order and

prohibited such an interaction, because it adopted a recommendation that Mr. M.

and I.C.M.M. have no contact. It ordered I.C.M.M. should be evaluated on her own

and specified her individual evaluation “shall substitute for the parent child

observation anticipated to be included in the parenting assessment or in a

psychological evaluation of the parent.”

What’s more, the court never defined “parenting component” in any other

detail, and regardless, Dr. Melissa Castro’s neuropsychological evaluation

expressly noted that she assessed his parenting abilities.

Mr. M.’s argument also rests in large part on the allegation there was an

impermissible delay between when DCYF initially attempted to refer him for an

evaluation (September 2022) and his ultimate evaluation (in May 2024). However,

our Supreme Court has explained that a delay, on its own, does not constitute a

total failure to provide necessary services. See Matter of D.H., 195 Wn.2d 710,

725, 464 P.3d 215 (2020). Rather, “the Department fails to provide all necessary

services where the earlier delay in one service creates a separate deficiency or

results in an unaddressed deficiency.” Id. (emphasis added). It specified, “[t]his

occurs in instances where [1] the Department takes a sequential approach and

withholds a service or program and that decision engenders additional parent-child

14
No. 87655-4-I/15

bonding and attachment issues,” or “[2] where the delay results in the Department

ultimately never providing the service.” Id. at 725–26 (emphasis added).

Thus, Mr. M. does not establish that the delay “create[d] a separate basis

for termination or result[ed] in the complete failure to provide a necessary service.”

D.H., 195 Wn.2d at 726 (emphasis added). And, “[e]ven if the delay was

attribut[able] to the Department,” he (1) did receive a neuropsychological

evaluation before the trial, and (2) he was “participating in treatments that were

recommended” in the interim. See id.

Finally, Mr. M. provides no legal authority for his assertion that a

“neuropsychological evaluation cannot substitute for a psychological evaluation.”
6 DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962)

(“Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required

to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has

found none.”) In other words, he provides no case for the proposition that because

psychology and neuropsychology are technically distinct fields, that means a report

from one discipline cannot be equivalent to the other for purposes of DCYF’s

obligations under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d). In fact, as a matter of its substance and

function, Dr. Castro’s neuropsychological evaluation appears to have met the

purpose of the original order for a psychological evaluation; namely, to provide a

professional scientific assessment of Mr. M.’s mental state to better identify his

6 Mr. M. also does not assign error to the court’s findings on this basis.
See Br. of
App. at 7; Clark County v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hrgs Rev. Bd., 177 Wn.2d 136,
144, 298 P.3d 704 (2013) (noting the scope of a given appeal is determined, in
part, by the appellant’s assignments of error).
15
No. 87655-4-I/16

needs and capacities as a parent. Thus, this claim fails.

1. Services for Domestic Violence Victims

Mr. M. also argues DCYF did not meet its obligation to investigate and

identify his particular needs, claiming it ignored his experience of domestic

violence and did not “investigat[e] how Ms. C.’s consistent dehumanizing abuse of

Mr. M. affected his ability to parent” and offer related services.

Thus, he assigns error to the court’s findings which concluded DCYF

provided adequate services:

Mr. M. is correct that “[w]ithin the prerequisite of RCW 13.34.180(1)(d), the

services must be tailored to the needs of the individual.” D.H., 195 Wn.2d at 727.

This means “[t]he Department is required ‘to identify a parent’s specific needs and

provide services to meet those needs.’” Id. (Quoting In re Parental Rights to

I.M.M., 196 Wn. App. 914, 924, 385 P.3d 268 (2016)). However, his argument that

DCYF failed to do so is unsupported.

Namely, the record contradicts his claim that DCYF did not identify Mr. M.

had a specific need to process Ms. C’s abuse and its effect on his parenting and

then provide any related services. There is substantial evidence it did identify this

need when it asked the initial psychologist who examined him to identify whether

she recommended any additional services “to ensure that any and all concerns of

abuse or neglect are adequately addressed and that [Mr. M.] may be able to parent

his daughter long term.” Dr. Antuña responded Mr. M. should “participate in

culturally competent, linguistically sensitive individual psychotherapy in order to

understand the dynamics behind his attraction to [Ms. C.]and how he became

16
No. 87655-4-I/17

entrapped in a cycle of abuse.” And there is evidence it did provide related

services because Mr. M. participated in about five months of individual

psychotherapy DCYF arranged thereafter.

Mr. M. nonetheless contends that DCYF did not investigate the extent of

“the problem” posed by the abuse he experienced from Ms. C., and he claims it

“summarily dismissed the entirety of Dr. Antuña’s report” in a “clear dereliction of

its duty.” Though DCYF did later seek additional evaluations, Mr. M. does not

identify any specific action or inaction by DCYF showing that it rejected the first

report in its entirety as he claims, and thereby failed to investigate and respond to

his individual need to process abuse by Ms. C. See Cowiche Canyon

Conservancy, 118 Wn.2d at 819 (holding we are not required to search the record

to locate the portions relevant to a litigant’s arguments). To the contrary, DYCF

did provide him with individual psychotherapy as the first report had recommended,

to assist him in processing the abuse he suffered.

1. Culturally Competent Services

Finally, Mr. M. argues DCYF failed to consistently ensure he received

culturally competent services. This claim is undeveloped, unsupported, and

ultimately unpersuasive.

DCYF initially referred Mr. M. to Dr. Alysa Ruddell for a psychological

evaluation, and she assigned the case to Dr. Antuña, who was able to evaluate

him in Spanish. She issued a report in August 2022, but in September 2022, the

court granted a motion DCYF had filed to complete a new psychological

evaluation. It explained the first report did not satisfy its order because (1) it was

17
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written by Dr. Ruddell, who had not actually met with Mr. M. and (2) Dr. Antuña did

not consider collateral evidence about the full extent of the abuse and criminal

cases which had been provided to her.

DCYF subsequently referred Mr. M. to another doctor, Dr. Sierra Swing,

after he retained Dr. Judd—who it had wanted to use—as a defense expert. Dr.

Swing issued a report in August 2023 after conducting testing with a third-party

interpreter because she does not speak Spanish. She noted Mr. M. and his

interpreter had difficulty with translation during the testing. Her report also included

recommendations for numerous services including individual therapy, parenting

education and support groups, and a neurocognitive assessment.

To provide the latter service, DCYF searched for a suitable

neuropsychologist and eventually referred him to Dr. Castro who spoke Spanish

and examined him in Minnesota in May 2024. In August 2024, she issued a report

which summarized that DCYF had referred the case for her to evaluate Mr. M.’s

“risk to his child and his needs in order to reunify and safely parent his daughter

long-term [due to] concerns he has been unable to provide adequate safety and

support for his child’s well-being.” Her report noted he was already engaged in

psychotherapy and did not make any recommendations for additional services

beyond those he was already engaged in. (“I have no additional recommendations

for Mr. M[.] beyond what has already been pursued.”)

However, Dr. Castro criticized the validity of the psychological testing and

procedures Dr. Swing had used, because of translation issues and because she

had not employed metrics considering Mr. M.’s language and culture. Dr. Judd

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No. 87655-4-I/19

agreed with those concerns and testified Dr. Swing’s use of testing was “in large

part invalid.”

Considering all of this, the court agreed Dr. Swing’s testing and

methodology had been “flawed” because of “language and cultural barriers where

the tests had not been normed for Spanish-speaking or Honduran populations.”

Thus, it found Dr. Swing’s “use of interpreters was not valid and did not satisfy the

provision of that service.” However, overall, it concluded “that deficiency was

remedied by the comprehensive evaluation completed by Dr. Castro in Spanish.”

Mr. M. now challenges the court’s related findings:

• Even without considering Dr. Swing's report or her testimony in its
entirety, the Court still finds that all of the 13.34.180 elements have
been met by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.

• The Department was cognizant of the father's cultural background. 7

We disagree for the following reasons.

First, Mr. M. cites requirements related to cultural competency which were

satisfied here. See RCW 74.04.025(1) (“In the case of non-English speaking

parents, this includes bilingual services, qualified interpreters, and written

communications in the native language.”) He does not dispute that DCYF ensured

he had access to interpreters and translation of its service letters and Dr. Castro’s

evaluation was conducted in Spanish.

7 Also, it is worth reiterating that, while it is true the court concluded Dr. Swing’s
evaluation was conducted deficiently, it also concluded Dr. Castro’s subsequent
evaluation in Spanish was satisfactory and carried out competently. We do not
reweigh the evidence and defer to its credibility determinations. D.H., 195 Wn.2d
at 918.

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No. 87655-4-I/20

Second, the crux of Mr. M.’s argument is that by demanding he comply with

services recommended in Dr. Swing’s report, DCYF inappropriately continued to

rely on her evaluation even though there was “ample” evidence the report was

“irredeemably flawed” for “not [being] cognizant of [his] particular cultural

circumstances.” Yet his sole support for asserting “Dr. Swing’s evaluation of Mr.

M. was fundamentally flawed and unacceptable” are the critiques which Castro

and Judd raised about her testing methodology. Also, he does not cite anywhere

in the record to support his specific contention DCYF “continu[ed] to proffer that

Dr. Swing credibly addressed Mr. M.’s ability to parent.” He simply argues in vague

terms that DCYF failed to provide culturally competent services because it was

“guided” by Dr. Swing’s report, ostensibly referring to the fact that it provided

services from among her treatment recommendations.

This argument is unavailing because it simply does not follow that problems

with Dr. Swing’s testing methods inherently meant all the services in her report

were culturally incompetent recommendations. Moreover, Mr. M. does not identify

any particular service he claims was culturally inappropriate.

At oral argument, he similarly asserted in general terms that “there is

nothing in the record that says [Dr. Swing’s report] is good enough.” Wash. Ct. of

Appeals oral argument, In the Matter of the Parental Rights to I.C.M.M., No. 87655-

4-I (January 6, 2026), at 19 min., 08 sec. through 19 min., 13 sec. video recording

by TVW, Washington State’s Public Affairs Network, https://tvw.org/video/division-

1-court-of-appeals-2026011123/?eventID=2026011123. But he has offered

nothing in the record indicating Swing’s recommended services were not culturally

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No. 87655-4-I/21

competent. In fact, the record belies such a suggestion. Dr. Castro—whose

cultural competency Mr. M. does not question, see id. at 19 min., 31 sec. through

19 min, 39 sec.—raised no issues with the services DCYF pursued after receiving

Dr. Swing’s report, and she did not recommend any different ones.

In summary, Mr. M. does not provide legal authority or persuasive support

for his arguments that DCYF failed to provide required services. As a result, he

has not shown the record lacks evidence from which a rational trier of fact could

find it did provide all necessary services, on a clear, cogent, and convincing

standard. K.S.C., 137 Wn.2d at 925. Therefore, we do not disturb the court’s

conclusion that DCYF satisfied RCW 13.34.180(1). D.H., 195 Wn.2d at 718.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

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