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April 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

ANTONIO MEDEROS

Massachusetts Appeals Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-P-0947

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-947

ANTONIO MEDEROS, petitioner.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Between 1989 and 2000, the petitioner, Antonio Mederos, was

convicted of numerous sexual offenses and subsequently was

committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center (MTC) as a

sexually dangerous person. He has filed two prior petitions for

discharge pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 9, which were not

successful.1 The petition underlying this appeal was filed on

December 5, 2018. Following a trial in the Superior Court, a

jury found that the petitioner remained sexually dangerous. On

appeal, the petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence and claims that the Commonwealth failed to meet its

burden of proof to establish that he suffers from a mental

abnormality or personality disorder that produces in him a

1Two panels of this court affirmed those judgments in
unpublished decisions. See Mederos, petitioner, 88 Mass. App.
Ct. 1116 (2015), and 99 Mass. App. Ct. 1142 (2021). The Supreme
Judicial Court denied further appellate review on both matters.
See 473 Mass. 1110 (2016), and 488 Mass. 1106 (2021).
general lack of ability to control his sexual impulses.

However, because the petitioner did not file a motion for a

directed verdict at the close of the Commonwealth's case or at

the close of all the evidence on this ground, the issue is

waived. See McHoul, petitioner, 445 Mass 143, 157 (2005).

Thus, we review the petitioner's claim under the substantial

risk of a miscarriage of justice standard. See R.B.,

petitioner, 479 Mass. 712, 717-718 (2018). We have conducted a

careful review of the record and conclude that there was ample

evidence to support the jury's verdict. We therefore affirm the

judgment.2

Background. We need not provide a detailed description of

the petitioner's history of sexual offenses and misconduct as

that history has been adequately described by the parties and in

prior unpublished memorandum and orders issued by different

panels of this court.3 It suffices to note that the petitioner

was convicted of multiple sexual offenses against a fourteen

year old girl in 1989, three female children in 1992, his

fourteen year old son in 1997, and an adult woman in 1999. Upon

concluding his last term of incarceration, the petitioner was

2 We note that our conclusion would be the same even if the
petitioner had preserved his claim by moving for a directed
verdict.

3 See footnote one.

2
determined to be a sexually dangerous person and was civilly

committed to the MTC.

As required by G. L. c. 123A, § 9, the petitioner was

examined by two qualified examiners in connection with his

petition, Dr. Kaitlyn Peretti, Psy.D., and Dr. Katrina Colistra,

Psy.D., both of whom testified at trial and opined that the

petitioner remained a sexually dangerous person. In addition,

Dr. Gregg Belle, Ph.D., who testified as a member of the

Community Access Board (CAB), offered his expert opinion that

the petitioner remained a sexually dangerous person. Dr. Belle

also related that the other four psychologists who are members

of the CAB unanimously agreed that the petitioner remained a

sexually dangerous person. All three experts testified that the

petitioner met the criteria for a statutorily defined

personality disorder as that term is defined by G. L. c. 123A,

§ 1. Doctors Peretti and Colistra diagnosed the petitioner with

antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Belle and the four members

of CAB diagnosed the petitioner with other specified personality

disorder with antisocial traits. As explained by the experts at

trial, the presence of antisocial personality disorder and

antisocial traits is a risk factor for sexual offense

recidivism. Dr. Belle further testified that he and the other

CAB members unanimously opined that the petitioner has a

statutory mental abnormality and a clinical diagnosis of

3
unspecified paraphilic disorder as defined in the Diagnostic and

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.).

The Commonwealth also presented evidence that the

petitioner has exhibited antisocial traits in a variety of

circumstances throughout his childhood and as an adult as

demonstrated by his extensive nonsexual criminal history, which

includes convictions for various motor vehicle violations,

assault and battery on a police officer, and assault by means of

a dangerous weapon. In addition, around the time of filing his

§ 9 petition, the petitioner was accused, and later convicted,

of crimes related to his manufacturing a knife and providing it

to another MTC patient, who intended to commit murder and

escape. The petitioner also exhibited antisocial behaviors at

the MTC and received a number of behavioral reports for

fighting, aggressiveness, possessing sexualized pictures, and

touching another male MTC patient. At the time of trial, the

petitioner had not progressed in sex offender treatment and, at

one point, was suspended from treatment altogether due to his

lack of participation and negative behavior.

The petitioner called two expert witnesses, Dr. Eric Brown,

Psy.D., and Dr. Leonard Bard, Ph.D., both of whom opined that

the petitioner was not sexually dangerous. An immigration

attorney, a probation officer, and two released sex offenders

4
testified on the petitioner's behalf with regard to his plans

for re-entry into the community.

Discussion. At a trial on a § 9 petition for discharge,

the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving that the petitioner

continues to be a sexually dangerous person. See Hill,

petitioner, 422 Mass. 147, 156, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 867

(1996). A "sexually dangerous person" is defined as follows:

"[A]ny person who has been (i) convicted of or adjudicated
as a delinquent juvenile or youthful offender by reason of
a sexual offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality
or personality disorder which makes the person likely to
engage in sexual offenses if not confined to a secure
facility; (ii) charged with a sexual offense and was
determined to be incompetent to stand trial and who suffers
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which
makes such person likely to engage in sexual offenses if
not confined to a secure facility; or (iii) previously
adjudicated as such by a court of the commonwealth and
whose misconduct in sexual matters indicates a general lack
of power to control his sexual impulses, as evidenced by
repetitive or compulsive sexual misconduct by either
violence against any victim, or aggression against any
victim under the age of 16 years, and who, as a result, is
likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury on such
victims because of his uncontrolled or uncontrollable
desires."

G. L. c. 123A, § 1.

The petitioner does not dispute that he committed several

sexual offenses against multiple victims, including his son,

that he was previously adjudicated a sexually dangerous person,

or that he has a history of nonsexual criminal offenses. He

claims that, despite his prior conduct, the Commonwealth failed

to prove that he suffers from a "'mental illness, abnormality,

5
or disorder' that causes [him] to have 'serious difficulty in

controlling [his] behavior'" (citation omitted). Johnstone,

petitioner, 453 Mass. 544, 549 (2009).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see

Miller, petitioner, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 625, 635 (2008), the

testimony of the Commonwealth's experts coupled with their

reports were sufficient to satisfy the Commonwealth's burden to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner suffers from

a disorder such that he lacks control over his behavior and

therefore is likely to reoffend sexually if released. In

addition, contrary to the petitioner's assertion, the fact that

he offered contrary expert opinions is of no consequence in

determining whether the Commonwealth met its burden. Nor is it

significant that some evidence -- including his age at the time

of trial, sixty-five years old, or his relatively low score of a

five on the Static-99R, "an actuarial tool, designed to predict

the recidivism risk of sexual offenses," Commonwealth v. George,

477 Mass. 331, 335 n.2 (2017) -- established a reduced risk to

reoffend sexually if released. Although the jury were entitled

to consider this evidence, it could also disregard it. See

Commonwealth v. Sargeant, 449 Mass. 576, 583 (2007) ("Weighing

and crediting the testimony of witnesses during proceedings

under G. L. c. 123A are for the trier of fact, and we will not

6
substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact"

[quotation and citations omitted]).

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Vuono, Shin &
Smyth, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: April 6, 2026.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

7