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April 3, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Danny Gambrel v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2024-CA-1204
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
• Judges: Eckerle

• Disposition: OPINION AFFIRMING

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (7.1K)

• PDF

Disposition

OPINION AFFIRMING

Combined Opinion

RENDERED: APRIL 3, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2024-CA-1204-MR

DANNY GAMBREL APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JULIE KAELIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 17-CR-002777

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

AND

NO. 2024-CA-1205-MR

DANNY GAMBREL APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JULIE KAELIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 17-CR-003586

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

AND

NO. 2024-CA-1206-MR

DANNY GAMBREL APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JULIE KAELIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 18-CR-003038

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION
AFFIRMING

---

BEFORE: ACREE, ECKERLE, AND KAREM, JUDGES.

ECKERLE, JUDGE: Appellant, Danny Gambrel (“Gambrel”), seeks reversal of

the Orders of the Jefferson Circuit Court, Division Four, Revoking Probation dated

September 5, 2024. After careful review, we affirm, as the Trial Court made the

mandatory statutory findings, and the record on appeal supports that Court’s

rulings.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal follows the Trial Court’s revocation of Gambrel’s

probation for three separate convictions and in response to his long history of

violating the terms of his probation. On September 28, 2017, Gambrel appeared

before the Trial Court and pled guilty to two counts of first-degree possession of a

controlled substance, methamphetamine. Record on Appeal (“ROA”) 17-CR-

-2-
2777, pp. 17-20.1 Pursuant to the Commonwealth’s plea offer, the Trial Court

granted Gambrel three years of pre-diversion in lieu of a one-year sentence on each

count, to be served concurrently. Id., pp. 21-23.2, 3

Unfortunately, Gambrel’s compliance with the terms of the diversion

program was short-lived. Sixty-days later, on November 29, 2017, the Jefferson

County Grand Jury indicted Gambrel on new charges of: (1) first-degree criminal

mischief for causing substantial damage to vehicles and breaking the windows of

an adjacent business; and (2) second-degree escape from the home incarceration

program (“HIP”) when he failed to return from his Court-ordered job release.

ROA 17-CR-3586, p. 11-12. Gambrel’s arrest warrant on these charges also

1
The record on appeal comprises three criminal cases (Nos. 17-CR-002777, 17-CR-003586, and
18-CR-003038), each containing a separately paginated volume. Citations concerning probation
and revocation records contained in all volumes will be “ROA 18-CR-3038, [page number],” and
citations to specific case numbers will be “ROA [case number], [page number].”
2
The Presiding Judge in this appellate matter was the Trial Judge in Jefferson Circuit Court,
Division 7, who accepted the plea and agreed Order to pre-diversion almost a decade ago and
retains no personal knowledge of it. No adversarial proceedings occurred in that case in Division
7, and this case and others involving Gambrel proceeded thereafter for many years in Division 4
before two other Jefferson Circuit Judges. No reason appears to recuse from this matter, and no
one has raised the issue or requested recusal.
3
Gambrel’s arrest warrant for the drug offenses alleged that he was noncompliant with
maintaining his current address with the Kentucky Sex Offender Registry. ROA, 17-CR-2777,
p. 4. In 2004, Gambrel was convicted of third-degree sodomy, a felony, and second-degree
sexual abuse, a misdemeanor. See Case No. 04-CR-002932. However, neither Gambrel nor the
Commonwealth disclosed the felony, which was more than 10 years old, when recommending
diversion to the Trial Court. ROA, Video Record (“VR”), 9/28/2017, 9:10:35-9:20:10.
Diversion is supposed to be reserved for first-time felony offenders, but Gambrel was already a
convicted felon when the Commonwealth offered to divert his newer felony charges.

-3-
revealed that he had failed to update his address as a convicted sex offender as

required by the Kentucky Sex Offender Registry. Id., p. 2.

The Commonwealth moved to remove him from diversion for his

drug conviction based upon the criminal indictment, and Gambrel stipulated to the

violations for receiving new charges and agreed to be removed from diversion and

be sentenced to serve his one year of imprisonment without requesting probation or

a lesser alternative sanction. ROA 17-CR-2777, pp. 37-39, VR, 11/30/2017,

8:34:50-8:35:10. On December 20, 2017, Gambrel pled guilty to the charges of

first-degree criminal mischief and second-degree escape. Pursuant to his

agreement with the Commonwealth, the Trial Court sentenced him to two years’

incarceration – one year on each count – to run consecutively to each other and to

his prior sentence in case No. 17-CR-002777, for a total of three years. ROA 17-

CR-3586, p. 23-24. The Trial Court also ordered Gambrel to pay restitution in the

agreed sum of $6,516.82. Id., pp. 21-22.

On April 5, 2018, Gambrel sought release on shock probation in both

cases. ROA 17-CR-2777, pp. 40-42; 17-CR-3586, pp. 25-27. On May 11, 2018,

the Trial Court consolidated the two cases4 and granted shock probation for the

balance of Gambrel’s three-year sentence for a period of four years subject to

4
The reasons for the Circuit Judge in Division 4 (Judge Charles Cunningham, Jr., presiding at
the time before his retirement) to depart from the traditional practice and retain the case rather
than send it back to Division 7, who had the senior case, is not clear from the record.

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several conditions, including that he refrain from violating the law, remain drug

and alcohol free, and submit to random drug and alcohol testing. ROA 17-CR-

2777, pp. 46-47; 17-CR-3586, pp. 31-32.

Yet again, and also in very short order, Gambrel was accused of new

offenses, allegedly in violation of the terms of his shock probation. On May 18,

2018, Gambrel was arrested on charges of violating an interpersonal protective

order (“IPO”) and third-degree burglary for allegedly breaking and entering and

taking cash from the business where the subject of the IPO worked. ROA 18-CR-

3038, p. 8. Following this new arrest, the Division of Probation and Parole

(“P&P”) reported that Gambrel violated the conditions of his shock probation by

absconding supervision and failing to report as instructed on May 28, 2018, and

thereafter. Violation of Supervision Report (“VSR”), 6/13/2018, ROA 17-CR-

2777, pp. 50-51

In June 2018, the Commonwealth filed a motion to revoke. ROA 17-

CR-2777, p. 49-53.5 On July 2, 2018, the Trial Court issued a bench warrant for

Gambrel’s arrest, and he was taken into custody on July 21, 2018. Id., p. 56-57.

Pending consideration of the new felony and other misdemeanor charges in

5
The Commonwealth originally filed this motion to revoke in Jefferson Circuit Court, Division
7, where the Presiding Judge in this matter was serving as Trial Judge. Since the Circuit Judge in
Division 4 (Judge Charles Cunningham, Jr., presiding) had already taken over the case and
granted shock probation, the motion was directed back to Division 4. ROA 17-CR-2777, p. 54.

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Jefferson District Court, the Trial Court continued the motion to revoke for

multiple status conferences. ROA, VR, 10/3/2018, 10/10/2018. In October 2018,

by agreement of the Commonwealth and Gambrel, the Jefferson District Court

referred Gambrel’s third-degree burglary charge to the Rocket Docket. ROA, 18-

CR-3038, pp. 1-5. The Commonwealth offered Gambrel a plea agreement of two

years’ imprisonment to run consecutively to his three years’ incarceration on his

previous charges, for a total of five years. Id., pp. 29-30. The Commonwealth

advised Gambrel that it would object to probation. Gambrel agreed and entered a

plea of guilty, and the matter was continued for sentencing. Id., p. 32-33.6

On December 19, 2018, Gambrel appeared before the Trial Court for

the Commonwealth’s motions to revoke his probation in cases Nos. 17-CR-002777

and 17-CR-003586, and for sentencing on his guilty plea to third-degree burglary

in case No. 18-CR-003038. ROA VR, 12/19/2018, 3:12:46.7 At his appearance,

Gambrel had been in custody for over 150 days. Id., 3:14:01-35.

Gambrel asked for continued probation on his prior and new

convictions because he claimed that most of his criminal history was nonviolent

and substance-abuse related. His counsel explained that he had previously

6
The Trial Judge in Jefferson Circuit Court, Division 6, received the Rocket Docket case,
accepted the plea, issued the Order, and continued the matter to December 19, 2018, for
sentencing. Division 4 then took over this case as well.
7
From this point forward, the Jefferson Circuit Court, Division 4 kept all three cases, even
though it did not have the senior action.

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overcome his alcohol addiction but subsequently became addicted to

methamphetamine followed by heroin, for which he needed treatment. Gambrel’s

counsel also explained that Gambrel had been accepted into a rigorous, residential,

substance-abuse-treatment facility, which met Gambrel’s unique circumstances as

a convicted sex offender. Gambrel had consented to and been screened for

Vivitrol therapy for his heroin use. Finally, he told the Trial Court that he had

employment prospects as well as family and community support for his

rehabilitation. ROA VR, 12/19/2018, 3:14:35-3:22:50.

The Commonwealth objected to probation, outlining the history of

Gambrel’s failure to comply with the terms of the diversion program and shock

probation and summarizing Gambrel’s series of felony offenses. The

Commonwealth argued that Gambrel posed a significant danger to the community

and himself and could not be managed within the community; it asked the Trial

Court to sentence him to five years to serve. Id., 3:22:51-3:27:04.

After allowing unsworn commentary from Gambrel, the Trial Court

reminded him that in May 2018, when he was seeking shock probation, Gambrel

had promised that he would get drug treatment, make restitution, and try to turn his

life around. He not only failed to do so, but also added a new felony charge. The

Trial Court recognized that Gambrel did have a seemingly-better, updated plan in

place, including a sober-living facility, daily substance abuse therapy, and Vivitrol

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to help with withdrawal and cravings. However, the Trial Court was not entirely

convinced that Gambrel was a good risk for probation. Id., 3:32:01-3:34:38.

In order to incentivize Gambrel to comply with the conditions of

probation and get more serious about turning his life around, the Trial Court

proposed its own option. Gambrel could accept the Commonwealth’s offer of two

years to serve on his new charges, but the Trial Court would revoke his probation

on the prior charges and sentence him to the agreed total of five years.

Alternatively, the Trial Court would continue his shock probation on the prior

offenses and agree to probation on the new case, if Gambrel would agree to the

maximum sentence of five years on the burglary charge (versus the

Commonwealth’s offer of two years). Under the second option, Gambrel faced

eight years’ imprisonment (three years longer) if he failed once again to succeed on

probation. Id., 3:34-39.

After conferring with counsel and against his counsel’s advice,

Gambrel accepted the Trial Court’s alternate option, and the Trial Court found his

acceptance to be knowing and voluntary; it then sentenced him to five years’

incarceration for third-degree burglary, probated for five years. ROA VR,

12/19/2018, 3:40-44. Once again, Gambrel’s probation obligated him to specified

conditions, many of which were the same, including to: remain on good behavior

and not violate the law; comply with all instructions and rules of P&P; remain drug

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and alcohol free and submit to random drug testing; obtain and maintain

employment; reside at a suitable sober living residence; continue a regular course

of Vivitrol therapy; agree to graduated sanctions for failure to comply; and pay all

applicable fees for supervision. ROA 18-CR-3038, pp. 36-38. Also, a separate

Restitution Order required Gambrel to pay restitution in the amount of $850.14 in

monthly payments in the amount of $52.50. Id., pp. 39-40.

In less than six months, Gambrel once again violated the terms of his

probation. In April of 2019, he was arrested for shoplifting, and by September,

P&P reported that Gambrel absconded, failed to submit to drug testing, and failed

to complete his Court-ordered drug treatment. ROA 18-CR-3038, pp. 42-49. The

VSRs also advised that Gambrel admitted to using methamphetamines on multiple

occasions. Id. On October 3, 2019, the Commonwealth filed a supplemental

motion to revoke Gambrel’s probation for absconding, failing to complete his

Court-ordered substance abuse treatment, and fleeing the P&P office before taking

a drug-screening test. Id., pp. 50-52.

Gambrel appeared on February 26, 2020, and stipulated to the

probation violations. ROA, VR, 2/26/2020, 2:34-2:36. Nonetheless, he and his

counsel asked the Trial Court to continue his probation. He said that he had begun

private drug treatment and claimed that he did not require Vivitrol treatment

despite his prior admission to using heroin. He stated that he had secured a job and

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maintained a consistent residence. Id., 2:37-41. Over the Commonwealth’s

objection, the Trial Court agreed to continue Gambrel’s probation, noting that he

was still a poor risk but giving Gambrel one last chance. Id., 2:48-2:50:30. In

candor, Gambrel’s counsel advised the Trial Court that she had been made aware

of possible criminal citations pending for Gambrel but did not have additional

information. Id., 2:50:50. After the hearing, Gambrel was served with

misdemeanor citations charging him with four counts of second-degree possession

of a forged instrument and a criminal summons for fourth-degree assault of his

roommate. The Trial Court issued a written order denying revocation on February

27, 2020. ROA 18-CR-3038, p. 54.

In less than a month, on March 17, 2020, the Commonwealth filed its

fourth motion to revoke Gambrel. Id., p. 55. According to the attached VSR,

Gambrel had failed to report to P&P for a drug test. When Gambrel finally

returned some days later, the P&P Officer, upon seeing Gambrel walking with an

unusual gait, searched him and located a bottle and tubing taped from his torso to

his penis. The officers removed the device and took Gambrel into custody. Upon

questioning, Gambrel ultimately admitted that he used the device to defraud the

drug screening process because he had used methamphetamine. Id., pp. 55-64. On

March 27, 2020, upon the agreement of the parties, the Trial Court placed Gambrel

on HIP (where he had absconded from before) pending a hearing on the

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Commonwealth’s motion to revoke. Id., p. 65. Within a few days, Gambrel

admitted to using methamphetamine while on HIP and was taken into custody. Id.,

pp. 66-67.

On June 23, 2020, Gambrel appeared before the Trial Court on the

motion to revoke. As the misdemeanor charges from February were still pending,

the parties agreed to continue the revocation hearing until those charges could be

resolved. The parties also agreed that Gambrel could be released back on HIP,

again. Several status hearings were held during 2020 and into 2021. On May 10,

2021, the Trial Court denied the motion to revoke but sanctioned Gambrel for his

violations by denying him credit for the four months he spent in custody between

March and June 2020. ROA 18-CR-3038, p. 10.

In 2022 and 2023, Gambrel appeared before the Trial Court on

multiple other occasions on additional motions to revoke and related hearings.8

The violations included new charges for drug possession, testing positive for drugs,

failures to report, and failures to make restitution payments. Gambrel’s counsel,

the Commonwealth, and the Trial Court collectively gave Gambrel even more

opportunities to reenroll in intensive substance abuse treatment and seek

employment.

8
On January 2, 2023, Judge Julie Kaelin assumed office as Jefferson Circuit Court Judge for
Division 4, serving as Trial Judge for the remaining proceedings in these cases.

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On January 30, 2024, the Commonwealth filed its most recent motion

to revoke for Gambrel’s failure to make any significant payments to the Crime

Victim’s Compensation Fund for the restitution he owed in cases 17-CR-3586 and

18-CR-3038. ROA 18-CR-3038, pp. 105-07. The Commonwealth supplemented

its motion to revoke on August 14, 2024, after Gambrel was arrested for more

charges, namely second-degree assault and first-degree criminal mischief. Id., pp.

110-11. On September 4, 2024, the Trial Court conducted another revocation

hearing on all three cases: 17-CR-2777, 17-CR-3586, and 18-CR-3038. ROA, VR,

9/4/2024, 1:08-1:51. The Commonwealth called two witnesses, Louisville Metro

Police Detective Smallwood and P&P Officer Adrienne Coffey.

Detective Smallwood testified that he investigated the most recent

criminal complaint against Gambrel and issued an arrest warrant for second-degree

assault and first-degree criminal mischief. ROA, VR, 9/4/2024, 1:10-1:14:30.

Detective Smallwood recounted the following alleged facts leading up to the

felony charges. On July 7, 2024, Gambrel drove his van to the premises of a

private, women’s-only, residential, substance-abuse-treatment facility and walked

inside. When the house manager of the facility asked him to leave, Gambrel

refused. The house manager called the facility’s off-site security guard, who, upon

arriving, also directed Gambrel to vacate. The guard escorted Gambrel outside.

After returning to and starting his vehicle, Gambrel accelerated with the door open,

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striking the security guard with the open door and pinning him against a garage.

The victim sustained several large contusions on his arms and legs, bruised ribs,

and chest pain. He required hospital treatment and several days of bed rest to

recover. After the alleged assault on the security officer, Gambrel accelerated and

damaged the facility’s fence, causing $2,300 in damage. Subsequently, Detective

Smallwood interviewed the witnesses, reviewed the medical records of the injured

victim, and reviewed the body-cam footage of the officers who first responded to

the scene. Id., 1:27-1:28

Officer Coffey, the P&P officer assigned to supervise Gambrel,

summarized three separate VSRs that she had filed with the Trial Court between

January and August 2024, reporting Gambrel’s failure to pay restitution and

supervision fees, admission to using methamphetamine, and arrest on the new

felony charges. ROA, VR, 9/4/2024, 1:28:30-1:33:40. Although not previously

reported, Officer Coffey also testified that she had difficulty reaching Gambrel for

weekly telephonic reporting even while he was serving on HIP. Finally, she

reported that, despite repeated efforts by P&P, Gambrel had showed virtually no

progress toward obtaining or maintaining employment. Id., 1:33:45-1:37:40.

At the conclusion of the testimony, Gambrel stipulated that he had

failed to pay restitution, except for a few small payments. ROA, VR, 9/4/2024,

1:43-44. His counsel acknowledged that the Commonwealth had met its burden to

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show by a preponderance of the evidence that he had admitted to using drugs,

failed to find and maintain employment, and been charged with the new felonies.

Id., 1:44-45. Regarding the new charges, Gambrel’s counsel stated that, while they

were not seeking to litigate the new case, Gambrel had a different version of the

story. Id., 1:45-46. Gambrel also argued that, except for owing restitution, his

supervision on some of the charges had been set to expire. Id., 1:46. Yet again,

Gambrel asked for the Court to release him back to HIP with a sanction, in lieu of

prison. Id. The Commonwealth summarized the testimony presented, highlighted

Gambrel’s history of 17 total violations of probation and 15 bench warrants,

argued that he was dangerous to the community and could not be managed in the

community, and asked for revocation of his probation in all three cases. Id.,

1:47:15-1:49.

The Trial Court reminded Gambrel that, in December 2018, it was his

own choice, against the advice of counsel, to accept the Trial Court’s offer of a

maximum sentence of five years in order to extend Gambrel’s probation versus

going to prison at that time. ROA, VR, 9/4/2024, 1:49:30-1:50. While serving his

probated sentence totaling eight years in three cases, Gambrel was convicted of

four separate misdemeanors and a felony within a year. Moreover, it was evident

to the Trial Court that Gambrel was doing the very least to meet the conditions of

his release, and that Court believed that the new felony arrest was the last straw.

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Id., 1:50-1:50:30. The Trial Court stated on the record: “I do not believe that you

have made every effort to pay this restitution by a long stretch. And, more

importantly, with this new case, I do not believe that you are able to be supervised

in the community without being a danger. So, I am granting the motion to revoke

and imposing eight years to serve.” ROA VR, 9/4/2024, 1:50:30-50. The Trial

Court issued its written Orders Revoking Probation on September 5, 2024, which

were identical in each case, and recorded its finding that Gambrel violated the

terms of his probation, granted the Commonwealth’s motion to revoke, and

remanded Gambrel to serve a total of eight years. ROA 18-CR-3038, pp. 115. It is

from this Order that Gambrel appeals.

II. Standard of Review

When reviewing a Trial Court’s decision to revoke a defendant’s

probation, this Court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review.

Commonwealth v. Andrews, 448 S.W.3d 773, 780 (Ky. 2014) (citing

Commonwealth v. Lopez, 292 S.W.3d 878 (Ky. 2009)). An abuse of discretion

occurs only where “the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or

unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d

941, 945 (Ky. 1999). As applied to probation revocation, “we will not hold a trial

court to have abused its discretion unless its decision cannot be located within the

range of permissible decisions allowed by a correct application of the facts to the

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law.” McClure v. Commonwealth, 457 S.W.3d 728, 730 (Ky. App. 2015) (citing

Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 915 n.11 (Ky. 2004)). Moreover, “a trial

court’s decision to revoke probation is generally ‘not an abuse of discretion if there

is evidence to support at least one probation violation.’” Brann v. Commonwealth,

469 S.W.3d 429, 431 (Ky. App. 2015) (quoting Lucas v. Commonwealth, 258

S.W.3d 806, 807-08 (Ky. App. 2008)).

III. Analysis

A. Kentucky Statutes Confer Trial Courts with the Discretion to
Revoke Probation and Impose Incarceration

It is axiomatic that “the power to revoke probation is vested in the

trial courts and in the trial courts alone.” Brann, 469 S.W.3d at 432 (citing

Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 533.010 et seq.). Kentucky statutes reflect a

Trial Court’s “broad discretion in overseeing a defendant’s probation.” Id. This

includes “any decision to revoke: ‘. . . [c]onditions of probation [that] shall be

imposed as provided in KRS 533.030, but the court may modify or enlarge the

conditions or, if the defendant commits an additional offense or violates a

condition, revoke the sentence at any time prior to the expiration or termination of

the period of probation.’” Id. (quoting KRS 533.020(1)).

With the enactment of the 2011 Corrections Reform Bill, HB 463,

codified at KRS 439.3106, the General Assembly established specific criteria that

Trial Courts shall consider when evaluating whether an offender’s probation

-16-
should be revoked or lesser interventions imposed. KRS 439.3106 provides in

relevant part:

(1) Supervised individuals shall be subject to:

(a) Violation revocation proceedings and possible
incarceration for failure to comply with the
conditions of supervision when such failure
constitutes a significant risk to prior victims of the
supervised individual or the community at large,
and cannot be appropriately managed in the
community; or

(b) Sanctions other than revocation and incarceration
as appropriate to the severity of the violation
behavior, the risk of future criminal behavior by
the offender, and the need for, and availability of,
interventions which may assist the offender to
remain compliant and crime-free in the
community.

KRS 439.3106(1)(a)-(b).

Most recently, in Nantz v. Commonwealth, we conducted a thorough

analysis of the structure of KRS 439.3106(1)(a)-(b), and we apply that reasoning to

this case. 728 S.W.3d 804, 81-11 (Ky. App. 2026). The conjunction “or” in KRS

439.3106(1) conveys that once a Trial Court determines a probation violation, it is

within the Trial Judge’s discretion to revoke a probationer, possibly subjecting him

to incarceration, or impose sanctions other than incarceration. Id.; see also

McClure, 457 S.W.3d at 732; Andrews, 448 S.W.3d at 777. However, as we stated

in Nantz, “[t]he General Assembly’s use of the conjunction ‘and’ in subsection

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(1)(a) denotes the proscription against revocation of an individual’s supervised

probation and the imposition of incarceration absent the establishment of two

grounds[:] to wit, (1) the supervised individual’s incompliant behavior

demonstrates that the individual is a significant risk to the prior victims or the

community, and (2) the individual cannot be managed within the community.”

728 S.W.3d at 811 (citing Andrews, 448 S.W.3d at 780).

In this instance, Gambrel does not and cannot contest his repeated and

substantial violations of the terms of his probation under multiple grounds. At his

final revocation hearing, as well as on prior occasions, he stipulated to the

violations, including substance abuse, failure to report to P&P, failure to pay

restitution, failure to find and maintain employment, and allegations that he had

committed new crimes. Rather, he argues that the Trial Court improperly applied

KRS 439.3106 in finding that he was a risk to the community and could not be

effectively managed. He argues that the new charges levied against him were only

allegations, and there was no other showing that he was a danger to the

community. Additionally, he argues that the Trial Court should have come to a

different conclusion considering that he was trying to find a job, trying to make

restitution payments, and had been appropriately managed in the past. Finally, he

argues that the Trial Court abused its discretion because its findings were not

supported by “current violations.” Appellant’s Brief, pp. 9-10.

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When presented with similar challenges to a Trial Court’s discretion,

this Court has turned “[o]ur analysis . . . to two intertwined questions: Whether the

evidence of record supported the requisite findings that [the probationer] was a

significant risk to, and unmanageable within, his community; and whether the trial

court, in fact, made those requisite findings.” McClure, 457 S.W.3d at 732. For

efficiency, we consider these questions in reverse order.

B. Sufficiency of the Trial Court’s Findings

First, we consider whether the Trial Court made the requisite findings

that Gambrel was a significant risk to, and unmanageable within, the community in

a manner that satisfies the statutory requirements of KRS 439.3106(1)(a). The

Trial Court issued its findings orally on the record, then issued its written Orders

Revoking Probation. In stating its findings from the bench, the Trial Court did not

directly quote the language used in KRS 439.3106(1)(a). Nonetheless, the Trial

Court explicitly found that Gambrel was not “able to be supervised in the

community without being a danger” to that community. Moreover, the Trial Court

prefaced its findings with a clear evidentiary basis, which is discussed infra.

Additionally, Gambrel’s reliance on Helms v. Commonwealth is

misplaced and does not support his argument that the Trial Court’s findings were

insufficient. 475 S.W.3d 637 (Ky. App. 2015). In making its findings, a Trial

Court is under no obligation to “provide detailed explanations for the findings

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required by KRS 439.3106.” Kendrick v. Commonwealth, 664 S.W.3d 731, 735

(Ky. App. 2023) (citing New v. Commonwealth, 598 S.W.3d 88, 90 (Ky. App.

2019)). Furthermore, “[t]hese findings can be either oral or written to satisfy both

KRS 439.3106(1) and the defendant’s due process rights.” Commonwealth v.

Gilmore, 587 S.W.3d 627, 630 (Ky. 2019).

We reiterate here what we stated in Nantz: “The Trial Court is under

no obligation to elaborate as to the reasoning behind its conclusion that [a

probationer’s] actions made him a significant risk to the community at large and

cannot be appropriately managed in the community. . . . Trial Courts are busy

places; short, clear orders are a necessary part of efficient docket management.

Unlike Courts of Appeal, Trial Judges do not have the luxury of time to draft

lengthy dissertations supporting all of their decisions.” Nantz, 728 S.W.3d at 812-

1. At Gambrel’s revocation hearing, the Trial Court succinctly issued findings

that satisfied the KRS 439.3106(1)(a) prerequisites to revocation.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Next, we consider whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient

evidence to support a finding that Gambrel was a significant risk to, and

unmanageable within, the community. Once again, we emphasize that Gambrel

acknowledged and stipulated that he had violated the conditions of his probation in

each of three cases both recently and historically. Illustratively, P&P issued 17

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separate VSRs for Gambrel’s plethora of violations, including absconding from

supervision, failing to report, testing positive for drugs or refusing to submit for

mandatory substance abuse testing, including strapping artifices to his

undercarriage, and failing to pay over $7,000 in restitution owed to the Crime

Victim’s Compensation Fund. During his probation, Gambrel amassed four

separate misdemeanors and a felony conviction. Additionally, the Trial Court

issued 15 separate bench warrants to secure Gambrel’s appearance to address these

violations of his probation and answer to criminal charges.

At the revocation hearing on September 4, 2024, the Commonwealth

presented an abundance of testimonial and written evidence demonstrating that

Gambrel had violated the conditions of his probation within just the past six

months. Contrary to Gambrel’s previous assertions that he was a nonviolent

offender, his newest charges were for allegedly assaulting a security guard and

damaging private property with his vehicle. He also had prior charges of violating

a protective order. Gambrel had failed to pay over $7,000 in restitution to the

Crime Victim’s Compensation Fund and showed no real effort to secure

employment in order to make payments. He had admitted to continued substance

abuse. And finally, Officer Coffey persuasively testified that Gambrel had

frustrated nearly every regular and graduated supervision effort made by P&P,

including failing to report even while he was on home incarceration.

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After stipulating to most of the evidence presented, Gambrel’s chief

argument on appeal is that the new charges “were only allegations” on which the

Trial Court should not have relied when considering whether he was a significant

risk to the community. Appellant’s Brief, p. 9. However, “[i]t is not necessary

that the Commonwealth obtain a conviction in order to accomplish revocation of

probation.” Tiryung v. Commonwealth, 717 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Ky. App. 1986); see

also Barker v. Commonwealth, 379 S.W.3d 116, 122 (Ky. 2012); Lopez, 292

S.W.3d at 882. Moreover, the new felony charges were not the only violation the

Commonwealth presented, and they followed a pattern of behavior that flouted the

law in a reckless manner and that was escalating. Gambrel’s admission that he

continued to abuse drugs under the threat of eight years imprisonment was itself

enough to demonstrate his significant risk to the community. In McClure, this

Court upheld a Trial Court’s finding that a probationer who used prohibited

substances and attempted to alter the results of his drug screening “under penalty

of five years in prison posed a significant risk to, and was unmanageable within,

the community in which he lived.” 457 S.W.3d at 733. Likewise, in Andrews, our

Supreme Court upheld revocation of probation where the violation consisted of a

single failed drug test along with the probationer’s criminal history and refusal to

acknowledge his need for rehabilitation. 448 S.W.3d at 780.

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In this matter, the Trial Court demonstrated extreme forbearance in

light of Gambrel’s self-described “lengthy history of making mistakes while on

probation” – although we find Gambrel’s labeling of his intentional misdeeds as

“mistakes” a stretch at best. Appellant’s Brief, p. 9. Upon conviction of his third

set of felonies in 2018, the Trial Court issued a very clear and emphatic warning to

Gambrel. His continued substance abuse posed a significant danger to the

community, and his failure to meet a graduated level of supervision in a prolonged

treatment plan would result in his incarceration. Nonetheless, the Trial Court

extended Gambrel seemingly endless opportunities to comply with this warning

over a number of years. Revocation was utterly the last resort after the graduated

sanctions had failed, including the intensive drug treatment programs, limited

periods in jail, and extended home incarceration with work release. After

Gambrel’s new charges and the latest in his innumerable violations, we cannot say

that the Trial Court abused its discretion when it finally revoked his probation.

The evidence in the record amply supports the Trial Court’s finding that Gambrel

was a significant risk to, and unmanageable within, the community. Thus, the

Trial Court’s decision to revoke Gambrel’s probation “was well within the ‘range

of permissible decisions allowed by a correct application of the facts to the law.’”

Kendrick, 664 S.W.3d at 736 (quoting McClure, 457 S.W.3d at 730).

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IV. Conclusion

The Trial Court made the requisite findings pursuant to KRS

439.3106, and those findings are supported by the evidence in the record on

appeal. For these reasons, we affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court’s Orders

Revoking Probation.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Adam Meyer Russell Coleman
Assistant Public Advocate Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
Stephanie L. McKeehan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky

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