Afamado Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. vs Maharashtra Wood Based Industrial Estate

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Afamado Advisory Services Pvt. Ltd. vs M/S. Maharashtra Wood Bases Industrial ... on 2 April, 2026

Author: N. J. Jamadar

Bench: N. J. Jamadar

2026:BHC-AS:15780

                                                                         WP 15518-25.DOC

                           IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                     WRIT PETITION NO. 15518 OF 2025

                   AFAMADO ADVISORY SERVICES PVT. LTD.
                   a company registered under the [Companies Act,
                   1956](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1353758/), bearing CIN No: U17120MH2013
                   PTC251052, having its Registered Office at
                   Shreeji Chambers Premises Co-operative Society
                   Ltd., Tata Road, Opp. Prasad Chambers Shanker
                   Sheth Road, Girgaum, Mumbai 400004,
                   represented through its Director Mr. Shashank
                   Shripad Vijayakar                                             ...Petitioner

                          Versus

ARUN
RAMCHANDRA
SANKPAL
1. M/s Maharashtra Wood Based Industrial
Digitally signed by
ARUN RAMCHANDRA
SANKPAL Estate, a Partnership Firm registered
Date: 2026.04.02
22:03:30 +0530 under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 represented through its Partner
Mr. Prabhudas Dayabhai Patel,
Age - 74 years, Occ - Business,
having its Registered office at House
No. 466, Jaihind Properties, Kalyan
Bhivandi Road, Kongaon, Kalyan-421311

                   2. Binani Industries Limited,
                      (currently known as BIL VYAPAR LTD.),
                      a company registered under the [Companies Act, 1956](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1353758/), bearing CIN No.
                      L24117WB196PLC025584, having its
                      Registered Office at 37/2 Chinar Park,
                      New Town, Rajarhat, Main Road, P. O.
                      Hatiara, Kolkata- 700157 and Corporate
                      Office at Mercantile Chamber, 12, J. N
                      Heredia Marg, Ballard Estate, Mumbai -
                      400001,represented through its Director
                      Mr. Rajesh Kumar Bagri.                               ...Respondents

                   Mr. G S Godbole, Senior Advocate, a/w Mr. Kuber i/b Mr. Abhishek
                         Ganesan, for the Petitioner.
                   Mr. Deepan Dixit a/w Mr. Virendra Pandey i/b B S Mahajani, for the
                         Respondent No. 1.
                   SAINATH/ARS                         1/21

                    ::: Uploaded on - 02/04/2026                ::: Downloaded on - 03/04/2026 22:18:08 :::
                                                         WP 15518-25.DOC

Mr. Ashish Mishra i/b MZM Legal, for Respondent No. 2.

               CORAM            :          N. J. JAMADAR, J.
               RESERVED ON      :          10th MARCH 2026
               PRONOUNCED ON :             02nd APRIL 2026

JUDGMENT: 1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith, and with the consent

of learned Counsel for the parties, heard finally.

1. By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of

India, the Petitioner - original Defendant No. 2 takes exception to

an order dated 25th June, 2025 passed by the learned District

Judge, Bhiwandi on an application (Exh. 23) in Commercial Suit

No. 02/2024, whereby the said application preferred by the

petitioner for rejection of the plaint under the provisions of Order

VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ('the

Code'), came to be rejected.

1. The background facts leading to this petition can be

summarized as under:-

3.1 M/s. Maharashtra Wood Based Industrial Estate (R-1) is a

registered partnership firm. Binani Industries Ltd. (R-2) - original

Defendant No. 1 is a company incorporated under the [Companies

Act, 1956](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1353758/). Afamado Advisory - the petitioner (original Defendant

WP 15518-25.DOC

No. 2), the Respondent No. 1 claims, is a sister company of Binani

Industries (D-1). (For the sake of convenience and clarity, the

parties are hereinafter referred to in the capacity in which they

are arrayed before the Commercial Court in Suit No. 02/2024.)

3.2 Before M/s. Maharashtra Wood Based Industrial Estate/the

plaintiff came to be registered as a partnership firm, it was a

proprietary concern and Prabhudas Patel was engaged in the

business as a sole proprietor thereof. On 01 st February, 2019,

Hiren Patel, the son of Pradbhudas Patel, joined Prabhudas Patel

to form the plaintiff - firm.

3.3 The plaintiff asserts, the Defendant No. 1 agreed to sell a

large tract of land situated at Khanivali and Ambiste, Tq. Wada

admeasuring 23H 8R to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs.
14,25,00,000/-. Pursuant to the said agreement, on 03 rd January,

2019, a sum of Rs. 21,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty One Lakhs) was

credited to the account of Defendant No. 1 towards part

consideration. A receipt was passed by the Defendant No. 1 on

03rd January, 2019.

3.4 Subsequently, on 21st January, 2019, a Memorandum of

Understanding came to be executed by and between the

                                                    WP 15518-25.DOC

Defendant No. 1 and Prabhudas Patel on behalf of the then

proprietorship concern.

3.5 In pursuance of the said contract, evidenced by MoU, the

plaintiff took various steps and parted with consideration of Rs.

59,40,000/- (Rupees Fifty Nine Lakhs Forty Thousand) over a

period of time. No objection of the state level committee for the

establishment of the proposed Wood Based Industrial Estate was

obtained. The Defendant No. 1 also obtained permission to put

the subject land to non-agricultural use. A draft deed of

conveyance was submitted for adjudication of the stamp duty.

3.6 The Defendant No. 1 thereafter resiled from its obligations

under the said contract. Instead, the Defendant No. 1, during the

subsistence of the said contract, between the plaintiff and

Defendant No. 1, executed a conveyance in favour of Defendant

No. 2, on 31st March, 2021 and got it registered on 11 th May,

1. Thus, the Plaintiff No. 1 had initiated various measures

including institution of the Special Civil Suit No. 265/2021

seeking specific performance of the contract contained in the MoU

dated 21st January, 2019.

3.6 In the said suit, the Defendant No. 1 had moved an

application for rejection of the plaint. By an order dated 22 nd

                                                      WP 15518-25.DOC

February, 2024, the learned Civil Judge, Bhiwandi rejected the

plaint in the said suit opining that, there was no cause of action

for the plaintiff firm to institute the suit when the contract was

executed by and between Prabhudas Patel, the proprietor, and

Defendant No. 1.

3.7 The plaintiff has instituted the instant commercial suit

invoking the provisions contained in Rule 13 of Order VII. The

plaintiff has sought specific performance of the MoU dated 21 st

January, 2019; a declaration that the conveyance executed by

Defendant No. 1 in favour of the Defendant No. 2, is null and

void; cancellation of the said instrument and the consequential

reliefs including compensation and injunction, and, in the

alternative, for refund of the consideration paid and the expenses

incurred by the plaintiff alongwith interest.

3.8 In the said commercial suit, the petitioner filed application

for rejection of the plaint contending inter alia that, it has already

been determined that, the plaintiff has no cause of action qua

Defendant No. 2 to seek relief of specific performance. Thus, the

instant commercial suit was also sans any cause of action and,

resultantly, the plaint was liable to be rejected under clause (a) of

Rule 11. Secondly, the relief claimed in the suit appeared to be

                                                        WP 15518-25.DOC

clearly barred by law of limitation. Since the suit was instituted

beyond three years of the execution of Memorandum of

Understanding dated 21st January, 2019 and even three years

beyond the termination of the contract by the Defendant No. 1,

the suit was ex facie beyond the period of limitation. Thirdly, since

the order of rejection of the plaint in Special Civil Suit No.

265/2021 passed by the learned Civil Judge has attained finality,

the plaintiff could not have again instituted the suit on the same

cause of action.

3.9 The plaintiff contested the application.

3.10 By the impugned order the learned District Judge rejected

the application observing inter alia that, the rejection of the plaint

under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, does not preclude the

plaintiff from instituting a fresh suit on the same cause of action

as it is explicitly permitted by Rule 13 of Order VII. The challenge

to the tenability of the suit on the ground of bar of limitation was

repelled observing that, the questions as to whether the time was

essence of the contract and the suit was barred by limitation

under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, appeared to be mixed

questions of law and facts and, thus, the issue of limitation was

required to be adjudicated at the trial. At any rate, since the

                                                    WP 15518-25.DOC

plaintiff came to know about the conveyance executed by the

Defendant No. 1 in favour of the Defendant No. 2, on 19 th June

2021, the institution of the suit appeared to be within the period

of limitation.

1. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has invoked the writ

jurisdiction.

1. I have heard Mr. Godbole, the learned Senior Advocate for

the petitioner, and Mr. Deepan Dixit, the learned Counsel for the

Respondent No. 1, at some length. The learned Counsel for the

parties took the Court through the pleadings in the previous suit

and the instant suit and the orders passed by the learned Civil

Judge rejecting the plaint and the impugned order.

1. Mr. Godbole, the learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner

would submit that, the finding of the learned Civil Judge in the

previous suit that there was no cause of action for the plaintiff

firm to institute the suit for specific performance of the contract

contained in the MoU, governs the plaint in the second suit as

well. The fact remains that, when the purported MoU was

executed, the plaintiff firm was not in existence. The purported

MoU was between Prabhudas Patel, as a proprietor, and the

Defendant No. 1. The said position would not alter by the

                                                     WP 15518-25.DOC

subsequent formation of the plaintiff as a partnership firm. Thus,

the plaintiff firm even now has no cause of action to institute the

suit.

1. Secondly, Mr. Godbole urged with a degree of vehemence

that instant suit is ex facie barred by limitation, even if it is

assumed that, the plaintiff could institute a fresh suit by invoking

the provisions contained in Order VII Rule 13 of the Code. Mr.

Godbole further urged that, the second suit is but an abuse of

process of the Court. Thus, the learned District Judge committed a

manifest error in rejecting the application for the rejection of the

plaint, submitted Mr. Godbole.

1. To buttress these submissions, reliance was placed by Mr.

Godbole on the judgments in the cases of Saleem Bhai & ors. Vs.

State of Maharashtra & ors.1, Sopan Sukhdeo Sabale & ors. Vs.

Assistant Charity Commissioner & ors.2, [T. Arivandandam Vs. T. V.

Satyapal](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1747770/) & anr.3, Dahiben Vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali &

ors.4, Daryao & ors. Vs. State of U. P. & ors. 5, Mathura Prasad

Bajoo Jaiswal & ors. Vs. Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy 6, State of U. P.

1 2003 (1) SCC 557
2 2004 (3) SCC 137
3 1977 (4) SCC 467
4 2020 (7) SCC 366
5 1961 SCC OnLine SC 21
6 1970 (1) SCC 613

                                                       WP 15518-25.DOC

Vs. Nawab Hussain7, [Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust

Association Vs. Sri Bala & Co.8](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/176629212/), and K K Modi Vs. K N Modi9.

1. In opposition to this, Mr. Deepan Dixit, the learned Counsel

for the Respondent No. 1/plaintiff would urge that, under the

terms of the MoU itself the Defendant No. 1 had agreed to execute

the conveyance in favour of Prabhudas Patel or his nominee.

Therefore, the very premise of the application that there was no

cause of action for the plaintiff firm, is completely flawed.

Secondly, it was submitted that, the application for rejection of the

plaint on the ground of res judicata which was sought to be tacitly

urged, was wholly misconceived. Rule 13 of Order VII explicitly

provides that, the plaintiff is not precluded from instituting a fresh

suit even when a plaint is rejected on any of the grounds under

Rule 11. Mr. Dixit forcefully submitted that, the learned District

Judge was wholly justified in recording a finding that, in the facts

of the case, the question as to whether the suit is barred by

limitation is indeed a mixed question of facts and law. Thus, the

instant petition does not merit countenance.

1. The aforesaid submissions now fall for consideration.

7 1977 (2) SCC 806
8 2025 SCC OnLine SC 48
9 (1998) 3 SCC 573

                                                    WP 15518-25.DOC

1. To start with, there does not seem much controversy over

the elementary facts and the contractual relationship between the

parties to the lis. The facts that M/s Binani Industries Ltd (D1)

was the holder of the subject land and by a resolution dated 26 th

January 2018, the Board of Directors of D1 had resolved to sell

the suit properties, are not in contest. Secondly, the execution of

the MoU dated 21st January 2009 by D1 in favour of Prabhudas

Patel, the proprietor of Maharashtra Wood Based Industrial Estate,

incorporating the terms of the contract between D1 and

Prabhudas Patel is not in dispute. The acknowledgment of a sum

of Rs. 21 lakhs towards non-refundable deposit, to be adjusted

towards the consideration, after the ascertainment of area and the

total consideration at the mutually agreed rate per acre, is borne

out by the said MoU. The balance consideration was to be paid

on the completion of the transaction by execution of a registered

Deed of Conveyance by the Vendor in favour of the Purchaser or

his nominee within 60 days.

1. By and large, it is not in dispute, on 31 st March 2021, D1

executed a Conveyance in favour of D2, and it was registered on

11th May 2021. Asserting that the Plaintiff became aware of the

said transaction in the month of April 2021, the Plaintiff had

                                                                   WP 15518-25.DOC

instituted SCS No. 265 of 2021 on 26th April 2021.

Incontrovertibly, the Plaint in the said Suit was rejected by the

learned Civil Judge by an order dated 22 nd February 2024. In the

meanwhile, the Plaintiff firm came to be registered with the

Registrar of Firms on 28th January 2022. The instant suit came to

be instituted on 15th April 2024.

1. The learned Civil Judge had rejected the Plaint in SCS No.

1041 of 2023 (old SCS No. 265 of 2021), on the ground that the

Plaintiff-firm had no cause of action as the MoU was executed by

D1 in favour of Prabhudas Patel in his capacity of the proprietor of

Maharashtra Wood Based Industrial Estate, and not as a partner of

the Plaintiff-firm. It was not the case of the Plaintiff that after the

execution of the MoU, the proprietary concern of Prabhudas Patel

amalgamated into the Plaintiff partnership firm.

1. Undoubtedly, the said order of rejection of the Plaint has

attained finality. However, it is necessary to note, at the outset

itself that, the Application for rejection of the plaint in the instant

Commercial Suit on the ground that the order of rejection of the

plaint in the prior suit operates as res judicata and precludes the

Plaintiff-firm from instituting fresh suit, was completely

misconceived.

WP 15518-25.DOC

1. In view of the clear and explicit provisions contained in

Order VII Rule 13 of the Code that the rejection of the Plaint on

any of the grounds mentioned in Rule 11 of Order 7 of the Code

shall not of its own force preclude the Plaintiff from presenting a

fresh Plaint in respect of the same cause of action, the order

rejecting the Plaint, neither operates as res judicata nor precludes

the Plaintiff from instituting a fresh suit on the same cause of

action.

1. A profitable reference, in this context, can be made to the

judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Wakf Board

Vs Jagdish Kumar Narang,10 wherein it was enunciated that a suit

filed on the same cause of action, subsequent to the rejection of

the Plaint, in the previous suit under Rule 11 is not liable to be

dismissed on the ground of being barred by order rejecting the

Plaint in the earlier suit.

1. Even otherwise, it is well-recognized that a Plaint cannot be

rejected under the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code on

the ground that it is barred by the principles of res judicata. A

profitable reference in this context can be made to the decision of

10 (1997) 10 SCC 192.

WP 15518-25.DOC

the Supreme Court in the case of [Shrihari Hanumandas Totala Vs

Hemant Vithal Kamat and Ors,11](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/62758350/) wherein the Supreme Court has

enunciated in clear and explicit terms that a plea for rejection of

the Plaint on the ground of res judicata would be beyond the

scope of Order VII Rule 11(d), where only the averments in the

Plaint will have to be perused.

1. Mr. Godbole, the learned Senior Advocate, for the Petitioner

would urge that notwithstanding non-applicability of the ground

of res judicata, the Plaint in the instant commercial suit is

required to be rejected on parity of reasons for non-disclosure of a

cause of action.

1. It was submitted that the foundational facts of the Plaintiffs

claim remain intact. The mere fact that the Plaintiff-firm came to

be subsequently registered as a partnership firm does not alter the

basic premise of the suit. The edifice of the suit is still the MoU

dated 21st January 2019 which was executed by D1 in favour of

the Prabhudas Patel as the proprietor of Maharashtra Wood Based

Industrial Estate. Thus, once it was found that there was no cause

of action for the institution of the previous suit, despite the

11 (2021) 9 SCC 99.

WP 15518-25.DOC

registration of the plaintiff as a partnership firm there would still

be no cause of action for the fresh suit as well.

1. Refraining from venturing into the exercise of examining

the legality, propriety and correctness of the order passed by

learned Civil Judge rejecting the Plaint in the previous suit, this

Court proposes to examine the averments in the Plaint to

appreciate the aforesaid submissions on behalf of the Petitioner.

1. The fundamental principles which govern the consideration

at the stage of the rejection of the Plaint as expounded in the

cases of Saleem Bhai Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra), Sopan

Sukhdeo Sable Vs. ACC ([supra), T. Arivandandam Vs. T V

Satyapal](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1747770/) (supra) and Dahiben Vs. Arvindbhai (Supra), are too

well-settled to need reiteration. Appraising the averments in the

Plaint as a whole, along with the documents annexed to the

Plaint, which are only germane, at the stage of consideration of

the Application for rejection of the Plaint, this Court finds that the

Plaintiff has categorically asserted that though the initial MoU

was by and between Prabhudas Patel, in the later's capacity as the

proprietor of Maharashtra Wood Based Industrial Estate, and D1

and the initial deposit of Rs. 21 lakhs was transmitted from the

personal account of Prabhudas Patel, yet, under a month of the

                                                      WP 15518-25.DOC

said MoU, Prabhudas Patel formed a partnership firm with his

son, and, thereafter, the consideration of Rs. 59,40,000/- flowed

from the account of the partnership firm, Defendant No. 1 had

acknowledged the receipt of the consideration from the

partnership firm, the Board of Directors of D1 had passed a

Resolution appointing Mahesh Thakur to represent D1 in the

proceeding to adjudicate the stamp duty and delivered signed

draft Sale Deed and Agreement for Sale to be executed in favour

of the Plaintiff partnership firm, clearly recording that conveyance

was to be made in favour the partnership firm.

1. The substance of the Plaintiff's claim is that both the parties

including Prabhudas Patel, the proprietor of Maharashtra Wood

Based Industrial Estate, had agreed and understood that the

transaction was to be by and between Defendant No.1 and the

Plaintiff firm. Subsequently, there was a refusal on the part of

Defendant No.1 to perform its part of the contract, which was

manifested in the execution of the Sale Deed by Defendant No.1

in favour of Defendant No.2 - Petitioner on 31st March 2021.

1. The aforesaid tenor of the Plaintiff's case is prima facie

borne out by the documents which are annexed to the Plaint.

Thus, at this juncture, it would be rather difficult to accede to the

                                                     WP 15518-25.DOC

submission of Mr. Godbole that the averments in the Plaint, even

if at taken at their face value, do not disclose a cause of action.

Nor can it be said to be a case of clever drafting so as to create an

illusion of a cause of action, where none exists.

1. Even if the case of Defendant No.2 that initially the

transaction was between Prabhudas Patel, in his capacity as the

proprietor of Maharashtra Wood Based Industrial Estate and

Defendant No.1, is taken at par, yet, the case set up by the

Plaintiff cannot be said to be incompatible with the partnership

firm acquiring interest to lay a claim for specific performance of

the contract for the sale of suit property.

1. Firstly, it is pertinent to note, under the MoU Defendant

No.1 had covenanted to execute conveyance in favour of

Prabhudas Patel or his nominee. Secondly, the legal implications

of Prabhudas Patel bringing his rights under the MoU as a capital

of the partnership firm may also be required to be examined.

1. Section 14 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 specifies

what constitutes the property of the firm. It provides, subject to

contract between the partners, the property of the firm includes

all property and rights and interests in property originally brought

                                                     WP 15518-25.DOC

into the stock of the firm, or acquired, by purchase or otherwise,

by or for the firm, or for the purposes and in the course of the

business of the firm, and includes also the goodwill of the

business. It further provides that, unless the contrary intention

appears, property and rights and interests in property acquired

with money belonging to the firm are deemed to have been

acquired for the firm.

1. In view of the aforesaid concept of the property of the firm,

especially the latter part of Section 14, which incorporates a

deeming provision, namely, the property and rights and interests

in the property acquired with money belonging to firm, the

assertions in the Plaint that as and by way of part consideration, a

sum of Rs. 59,40,000/- was paid to Defendant No.1 from the

account of the Plaintiff firm (which find support in the extract of

the statement of account of the firm (Exhibit "6") and receipt

(Exhibit "7"), annexed to the Plaint), the Plaintiff-firm may

legitimately assert a claim that the contract for sale evidenced by

MoU creates an obligation annexed to the ownership of the suit

property within the meaning of Section 40 of the Transfer of

Property Act, 1882, enforceable against Defendant Nos. 1 and 2;

transferee of Defendant No.1.

WP 15518-25.DOC

1. In this context, it could also be urged that Prabhudas Patel

had brought into the stock of the partnership firm the right to

enforce the said contractual obligation of Defendant No.1 as his

capital. It may then assume the character of the property of the

partnership firm. In law, the property belonging to a partner, upon

his entering into a partnership, may become property of the

partnership, if there is an Agreement either express or implied

that the property was, under the Agreement of partnership to be

treated as the property of the partnership.

1. In the case of [Addanki Narayanappa And Anr Vs Bhaskara

Krishtappa And Ors,12](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1827392/) it was enunciated that the whole concept of

partnership is to embark upon a joint venture and for that purpose

to bring in as capital, money or even property including

immovable property. Once that is done, whatever is brought in,

would cease to be the trading asset of the person who brought it

in. It would be the trading asset of the partnership in which all the

partners would have interest in proportion to their share in the

joint venture of the business of partnership. The person who

brought it in would, therefore, not be able to claim or exercise any

exclusive right over any property which he has brought in, much

less over any other partnership property.

12 AIR 1966 SC 1300.

WP 15518-25.DOC

1. It is pertinent to note, in the case at hand, there does not

seem any dispute inter se partners of the Plaintiff firm as regards

the character of the right to claim specific performance of the

contract contained in the MoU. On the contrary, the Plaint

proceeds on the premise that the said contract was executed for

and on behalf of the partnership firm.

1. Resultantly, the submission on behalf of the Petitioner that

the Plaint in the instant suit also deserves to be rejected on the

count of absence of cause of action in favour of the Plaintiff firm

qua the Defendants, cannot be accepted.

1. As the second limb of the submission, Mr. Godbole would

urge that the Plaint in the instant suit would be barred by law of

limitation, as the MoU was executed on 21 st January 2019 and the

instant suit came to be instituted on 15th April 2024. Suffice to

note in paragraph 11 of the Plaint, the Plaintiff has made clear

and categorical averments to demonstrate as to how the suit is not

barred by law of limitation.

1. Though in the MoU a period of 60 days was stipulated for

the performance of the contract, with a condition super-added

that the time was to be the essence of the contract, yet, the

                                                     WP 15518-25.DOC

conduct of the parties, as manifested from the record, in passing

the resolution authorising Mr. Thakur to participate in the

proceeding before the Registrar of Assurances for adjudication of

the stamp duty, forwarding the signed draft conveyance and

obtaining the permission of the Competent Authority for effecting

the sale, prima facie demonstrate that the question as to whether

there was "date fixed" for the performance of the contract or the

period of limitation would begin to run from the date the Plaintiff

had notice of refusal of performance, is rooted in the thickets of

facts. Which part of the Article 54 of the Limitation Act would

govern the suit would be a mixed question of facts and law.

1. Having examined the legality and correctness of the

impugned order, in the light of the aforesaid material, this Court

does not find that the impugned order suffers from such

jurisdictional error, patent illegality or perversity which stares in

the face which would warrant exercise of the writ jurisdiction

under Article 227 of the Constitution of India despite the interdict

contained in Section 8 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

1. The Petition thus deserves to be dismissed.

WP 15518-25.DOC

1. Hence, the following order:-

::ORDER::

(i) The Writ Petition stands dismissed with costs.
(ii) Rule discharged.

                                           [N. J. JAMADAR, J.]