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Feb. 5, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Roberts

Oregon Supreme Court

• Citations: 374 Or. 821
• Docket Number: S071661
• Judges: Duncan

• Disposition: The alternative writ of mandamus is dismissed as moot.

• Opinion

• Authorities (31)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (28.3K)

• PDF

Disposition

The alternative writ of mandamus is dismissed as moot.

Combined Opinion

No. 10 February 5, 2026 821

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Adverse Party,
v.
ALLEN REX ROBERTS,
Defendant-Relator.
(CC 21CR38424) (SC S071661)

Original proceeding in mandamus.*
Argued and submitted April 17, 2025.
Nadia H. Dahab, Sugerman Dahab, Portland, argued the
cause and filed the briefs for defendant-relator.
Kirsten M. Naito, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for plaintiff-adverse
party. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General,
and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Amy E. Potter, Angeli & Calfo LLC, Portland, filed the
brief for amicus curiae Oregon Public Defense Commission.
Also on the brief was Joanna T. Perini-Abbott.
Jessica Snyder, Julie Vandiver, Assistant Federal Public
Defenders, and Stephen R. Sady, Chief Deputy Federal
Public Defender, District of Oregon, Portland, filed the brief
for amicus curiae Oregon Federal Public Defender.
Lindsey Burrows, O’Connor Weber LLC; Garner Kropp,
Fenwick & West LLP, San Francisco, California; and Kelly
Simon, American Civil Liberties Union of Oregon, filed the
brief for amici curiae Criminal Law & Justice Center and
American Civil Liberties Union of Oregon. Also on the brief
were Todd Gregorian and Kathryn Hauh, Fenwick & West
LLP.

---

• On petition for writ of mandamus from an order of Multnomah County Circuit Court, Benjamin Souede, Judge. 822 State v. Roberts

Before Duncan, Garrett, DeHoog, Bushong, James, and
Masih, Justices, and Pagán, Judge, Justice pro tempore.**
DUNCAN, J.
The alternative writ of mandamus is dismissed as moot.

---

**
Flynn, C. J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Cite as 374 Or 821 (2026) 823

DUNCAN, J.
This case is before this court on a petition for a writ
of mandamus filed by relator, Allen Rex Roberts. It arises
out of a criminal case the state brought against him.
In the criminal case, relator was arraigned on a
grand jury indictment. He requested, and was eligible for,
appointed counsel, but no lawyer was available to represent
him. After being without counsel for months, relator filed
a motion to dismiss the criminal case, asserting, among
other things, that the state had violated his right to counsel
under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution. That
provision requires that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall have the right * * * to be heard by himself and
counsel.” The trial court denied the motion.
Relator then filed a petition for mandamus relief in
this court, and we issued an alternative writ directing the
trial court to either vacate its order denying relator’s motion
or show cause for not doing so. The trial court did not vacate
its order, and this mandamus case proceeded to briefing. In
his brief, relator raises three legal issues: (1) whether the
state’s failure to appoint counsel violated his right to coun-
sel under Article I, section 11; (2) if it did, whether dismissal
of the criminal case without prejudice was an appropriate
remedy; and (3) if it was, whether relator was entitled to
dismissal of the criminal case without prejudice because he
had been unrepresented for a certain period of time.1
While the parties briefed this mandamus case, rela-
tor’s criminal case remained pending in the trial court and
relator remained unrepresented. Then, almost a year after
relator’s arraignment, the trial court dismissed the crimi-
nal case because of the unavailability of counsel. This court
asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing regarding
1
Trial courts and the Oregon Public Defense Commission (OPDC), which
is part of the executive branch, have roles in the appointment of counsel. See
ORS 135.045(1)(b) (“If the defendant does wish to be represented by counsel, the
court, in accordance with ORS 135.050, shall appoint counsel to represent the
defendant.”); ORS 151.216(1)(h)(B) (providing that one of OPDC’s duties is the
adoption of “policies, procedures, standards and guidelines regarding[,]” among
other things, “[t]he appointment of counsel”). Thus, throughout this opinion and
for ease of reference, we refer generically to the obligation of the “state” to appoint
counsel to represent eligible criminal defendants.
824 State v. Roberts

whether the dismissal of the criminal case rendered this
mandamus case moot and, if so, whether this court should
exercise its discretion to decide the case under ORS 14.175,
which provides that courts may decide certain moot cases
that present legal issues that are “capable of repetition” and
“likely to evade judicial review.”
For the reasons explained below, we conclude that
this mandamus case is moot, but that we should exercise our
discretion under ORS 14.175 to decide it. We also conclude
that this is the type of case in which mandamus relief is
possible because relator does not have a “plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” See ORS
34.110 (stating that a writ of mandamus shall not be issued
in any case where the relator has such a remedy).
On the merits, we answer the three questions raised
by relator’s petition, as follows:
(1) The state violated relator’s Article I, section 11,
right to counsel. The right to counsel is fundamental to
our criminal justice system. It helps ensure that criminal
prosecutions are conducted fairly and in accordance with
the law by guaranteeing that a defendant has access to a
legal advocate to respond to the state’s exercise of its pros-
ecutorial powers. When the state fails to appoint counsel, a
defendant’s legal interests are at risk of prejudice because
the defendant is without anyone to advise them, address
pretrial restrictions on their liberty, assert their rights, and
prepare their defense. In short, the defendant is subjected
to the state’s prosecutorial powers and all the accompany-
ing consequences but left without the means to effectively
respond. Allowing such a situation to persist for an extended
period, as in relator’s case, violates Article I, section 11.
(2) Dismissal without prejudice—which ordinarily
allows the state to refile the charges later—can be an appro-
priate remedy for the state’s failure to appoint counsel in
violation of Article I, section 11. A failure to appoint counsel
results in several pretrial harms that are independent of the
ultimate resolution of the criminal prosecution. First, the
defendant is subject to restraints on their liberty but lacks
counsel to challenge or modify them. Second, the defendant
Cite as 374 Or 821 (2026) 825

is deprived of the means necessary to move their case for-
ward. The defendant is without a legal advocate to review the
state’s charges and evidence, gather and preserve defense
evidence, and take steps to advance their case toward reso-
lution, whether through dismissal, plea, or trial. Meanwhile,
the state has counsel to protect its interests and prepare its
case. Third, the failure to appoint counsel can have a coer-
cive effect. An extended delay in the appointment of counsel
can cause a defendant to abandon their right to counsel. As
the burdens of having an open case without counsel grow, so
does the likelihood that a defendant will waive their right
to counsel just to be able to move their case forward. That
undermines the purpose of the right to counsel, which, as
mentioned, is to help ensure that criminal prosecutions are
conducted fairly and in accordance with the law.
Dismissal without prejudice can mitigate those pre-
trial harms. It relieves the defendant from being subject to
liberty restrictions and criminal charges while being unable
to respond. It also reduces the pressure on a defendant to
waive their right to counsel and proceed without represen-
tation. At the same time, it allows the state to refile the
charges later, when the defendant has access to counsel as
the constitution requires.
(3) Relator was entitled to dismissal of the criminal
case without prejudice. We conclude that, as a general rule,
dismissal without prejudice is required when, at any point
post-arraignment, the state has failed to provide counsel
to an eligible defendant for a period of more than 60 con-
secutive days in a misdemeanor case or more than 90 con-
secutive days in a felony case. There must be a limit to the
amount of time that the state can maintain a criminal pros-
ecution without appointing counsel for an eligible defendant.
We acknowledge that setting such a limit involves a judg-
ment call. Oregon’s current public defense crisis requires us
to make that call and establish a general rule that can be
applied consistently across the state. We base the general
rule on the pretrial harms identified above: that the defen-
dant is subject to restraints on their liberty but lacks counsel
to challenge or modify those restraints, that the defendant
cannot move their case forward, and that an extended delay
826 State v. Roberts

in the appointment of counsel puts pressure on a defendant
to waive their right to counsel. We also base it on laws, prac-
tices, and standards relating to criminal cases, which sup-
port a conclusion that leaving a defendant without counsel
for longer periods is unreasonable in light of the time within
which many cases can be, and are expected to be, completely
resolved. Finally, because in setting the limit we are deter-
mining the appropriateness of a particular remedy, we base
the rule on our best assessment of the relationship between
the violation and the requested relief. Applying the general
rule, we conclude that relator, who was unrepresented for
more than 90 days while appearing for court as required, was
entitled to dismissal of his criminal case without prejudice.2
I. BACKGROUND
A. Oregon’s Public Defense Crisis
Before turning to the facts of this case, we begin by
briefly describing the context in which they arise. For several
years, Oregon has experienced a systemic, statewide public
defense crisis that has resulted in thousands of pretrial, out-
of-custody defendants lacking counsel to assist them.3
2
Relator also contends that the failure to appoint counsel violated the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides, in part, that “[i]
n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” Because we conclude that, under the cir-
cumstances of this case, the failure to appoint counsel to represent relator vio-
lated Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, and because relator does
not contend that he is entitled to additional or greater relief under the Sixth
Amendment, we need not, and do not, address his arguments under the federal
constitution. See State v. Gray, 370 Or 116, 128, 515 P3d 348 (2022) (so reasoning).
3
In May 2024, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a federal district
court injunction, requiring, in general terms, that in-custody defendants who
had not been appointed counsel within seven days had to be released from cus-
tody subject to reasonable conditions imposed by state trial courts. Betschart v.
Oregon, 103 F4th 607, 613 (9th Cir 2024); see also Betschart v. Garrett, 700 F Supp
3d 965 (D Or 2023) (describing injunction); Betschart v. Garrett, No CV-01097-CL
(D Or Nov 14, 2023) (amending injunction and describing exceptions, including
that the order did not apply to defendants who were charged with murder or
aggravated murder, who fired their attorneys, who failed to execute a release
agreement, or who were released under the order but had their releases revoked).
As noted, relator was not subject to that federal injunction because he was not
in custody, having been released pending trial subject to restrictive conditions.
As of February 2, 2026, there were over 2000 out-of-custody defendants without
counsel. See Oregon Judicial Department, Oregon Circuit Courts Unrepresented
Individuals Summary, https://app.powerbigov.us/view?r=eyJrIjoiNDQ2NmMw
YWMtN-zhiZi00MWJhLWE3MjgtMjg2ZTRhNmNmMjdmIiwidCI6IjYxMzN
Cite as 374 Or 821 (2026) 827

According to amicus curiae the Oregon Public
Defense Commission (OPDC), the state agency responsible
for establishing and maintaining Oregon’s public defense
system, there are “simply not enough defense attorneys in
the state to represent every indigent defendant.” Although
“OPDC’s goal is to provide counsel promptly for all indigent
defendants,” meeting that goal “for every defendant has not
been achievable in recent years” for a variety of reasons. The
agency acknowledges that, “at least in the near term,” it will
be unable promptly to appoint counsel for all indigent defen-
dants and that “many may be without counsel for weeks if
not months.” Both parties acknowledge that the legislative
and executive branches of our state government are working
on systemic reforms to address the immediate effects of this
crisis and establish policies to ameliorate it.
Our role in this case is not to suggest which policies
those branches should adopt. Cf. Bellshaw v. Farmers Ins.
Co., 373 Or 307, 328, 567 P3d 434 (2025) (“[A] court cannot
faithfully carry out [legislative] intent by choosing for itself
how best to accomplish legislative goals, ignoring the means
by which the legislature has chosen to do so.”). Instead, our
role here is quite limited. We must determine whether the
failure to appoint counsel to represent an eligible defendant
post-arraignment for an extended period of time violates
the state constitutional right to counsel and, if so, whether a
trial court is required to grant a defendant’s motion to dis-
miss the criminal case against them after the passage of a
certain period of time. See State v. Rodriguez/Buck, 347 Or
46, 79, 217 P3d 659 (2009) (“[T]he Oregon Constitution rep-
resents the fundamental expression of the people regarding
the limits on governmental power. And it is the obligation of
the courts to ensure that those fundamental principles are
followed.”); State ex rel. Ricco v. Biggs, 198 Or 413, 430, 255
P2d 1055 (1953), overruled in part on other grounds by State
ex rel Maizels v. Juba, 254 Or 323, 327, 460 P2d 850 (1969)
(“The constitutional rights of an individual are fundamen-
tal and inalienable rights. * * * The duty of seeing that they
are protected and preserved inviolate falls squarely upon
the shoulders of the judiciary.”).
lYzg5LWU1MWItNGExYy04YjY4LTE1ZTg2ZGU3MWY4ZiJ9 (last accessed
February 2, 2026).
828 State v. Roberts

B. Facts
With that understanding of the current crisis and
this court’s role, we turn to the facts of this case, which are
procedural and undisputed. In 2021, relator was charged
by indictment with two crimes—specifically, unauthorized
use of a vehicle, ORS 164.135(1), and possession of a stolen
vehicle, ORS 819.300—both of which were alleged to have
been committed on August 9, 2021. Those charges were ulti-
mately dismissed without prejudice in October 2022 because
the state was unable to appoint counsel for relator.
Then, in April 2024—about a year and a half after
the dismissal of the previous indictment—relator was re-in-
dicted on the same two charges that had been dismissed.
Relator was arraigned on the new indictment and released
on conditions, including that he “[a]ppear at all times and
places ordered by the Court until discharge or final order
of the Court” and “not leave the State of Oregon without
permission of the court.”4 The trial court determined that
relator had requested and was eligible for appointed coun-
sel and appointed “OPDC”—not a named attorney—to rep-
resent relator. Over the next few months, several hearings
were held for the purpose of appointing counsel, but no
attorney was available.
In December 2024, a volunteer lawyer filed a notice
of limited representation in the trial court, stating that
she represented relator only in connection with a motion to
dismiss for lack of counsel. In that motion, relator argued,
4
Relator’s release agreement required that he comply with the general
release conditions in ORS 135.250(1), which provides:
“If a defendant is released before judgment, the conditions of the release
agreement shall be that the defendant will:
“(a) Appear to answer the charge in the court having jurisdiction on a
day certain and thereafter as ordered by the court until the defendant is
discharged or the judgment is entered;
“(b) Submit to the orders and process of the court;
“(c) Not depart this state without leave of the court; and
“(d) Comply with such other conditions as the court may impose.”
The agreement also imposed two other conditions: (1) that relator “[k]eep in con-
tact with [his] attorney once one is appointed or retained” and notify the attorney
of any updates to his phone number and mailing and residential addresses; and
(2) that relator comply with “Pretrial Monitoring and report to Pretrial Release
Services immediately after [his] next court hearing.” (Boldface omitted.)
Cite as 374 Or 821 (2026) 829

among other things, that the state’s failure to appoint an
attorney to represent him violated his right to counsel under
the state and federal constitutions. On January 2, 2025, the
trial court denied the motion to dismiss, noting that relator
had been “represented at the critical stages” that the case
had reached to that point and that the case was in “sus-
pended animation” due to “a failure of the system” that pre-
vented the case from proceeding to “the next critical stage.”
Relator timely sought mandamus relief in this
court. By that point, relator had been without named coun-
sel on the current indictment for about nine months. On
January 29, we issued an alternative writ, commanding
the trial court to vacate its order denying relator’s motion
to dismiss or to show cause for not doing so. The trial court
did not vacate its order, so the mandamus case proceeded to
briefing.
The final hearing for appointment of counsel in
the criminal case, which the trial court described as the
sixth setover for the appointment of counsel on the current
indictment, was scheduled for April 17, 2025. That date was
almost a year after relator’s arraignment on the indictment
and the same day as oral argument in this court. Following
the hearing, the trial court entered a judgment dismissing
the criminal case against relator without prejudice “due to
lack of attorneys.”5
II. ANALYSIS OF PRELIMINARY ISSUES
Before we can address whether, as relator claims,
the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss his
criminal case, we must address three preliminary issues: (1)
whether this case is now moot; (2) if so, whether the case is
nevertheless justiciable under ORS 14.175, which allows this

5
Notwithstanding the trial court’s dismissal of the charges without preju-
dice, the parties agree that the dismissal in this case was effectively a dismissal
with prejudice, because the statute of limitations for the charged crimes precludes
the state from refiling the charges. See ORS 131.125(8)(a) (providing generally
that “prosecutions” for unenumerated felonies “must be commenced” within
three years “after their commission”). Other crimes may have different limita-
tions periods. See ORS 131.125(2) (20 years or longer, depending on age of victim);
ORS 131.125(3) (six years or longer); ORS 131.125(4) (four years or longer); ORS
131.125(6), (7) (six years); ORS 131.125(8) (three years for unenumerated felonies,
two years for unenumerated misdemeanors).
830 State v. Roberts

court to resolve certain moot cases that involve challenges
to acts that are capable of repetition but likely to evade judi-
cial review; and (3) if so, whether we can and should resolve
the case, given that it is a mandamus case and mandamus
relief is appropriate only if, among other things, the relator
lacks a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
A. Mootness
As described above, after relator initiated this man-
damus case, the trial court dismissed underlying criminal
case without prejudice. As a result of that dismissal, we must
determine whether this mandamus case is now moot. The
state asserts that it is, and relator does not argue otherwise.
“Whether a case is moot depends on whether a jus-
ticiable controversy exists.” Rogue Advocates v. Board of
Comm. of Jackson County, 362 Or 269, 272, 407 P3d 795
(2017). A justiciable controversy is one in which the “inter-
ests of the parties to the action are adverse” and “the court’s
decision in the matter will have some practical effect on the
rights of the parties to the controversy.” Rains v. Stayton
Builders Mart, Inc., 359 Or 610, 624, 375 P3d 490 (2016)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[g]enerally
speaking, a case becomes moot when a court’s decision will
no longer have a practical effect on the rights of the par-
ties.” State v. K. J. B., 362 Or 777, 785, 416 P3d 291 (2018)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, relator has
already received the relief he is seeking from this court—
specifically, the dismissal of his criminal case without prej-
udice. The state has not appealed that dismissal, and the
time for it do to so has passed. Therefore, this mandamus
case will have no practical effect on the parties and is moot.
B. Justiciability under ORS 14.175
Although this case is moot, it is nevertheless justi-
ciable if it meets the requirements of ORS 14.175. As rele-
vant here, ORS 14.175 allows a court to adjudicate a moot
case if (1) a party is challenging the legality of an act of
a public body, (2) the party had standing to commence the
case, (3) the challenged act is capable of repetition, and (4)
Cite as 374 Or 821 (2026) 831

the challenged act is likely to evade review in the future.6
If those four requirements are satisfied, a court may choose
to adjudicate the case. Couey v. Atkins, 357 Or 460, 522, 355
P3d 866 (2015) (explaining that ORS 14.175 “leaves it to the
court to determine whether it is appropriate to adjudicate
an otherwise moot case under the circumstances of each
case”); see also Penn v. Board of Parole, 365 Or 607, 613, 451
P3d 589 (2019) (“[C]ourts are not required to decide any and
every moot case that falls within the terms of ORS 14.175.”
(Emphasis in original.)).7
In this case, the parties agree that the first three
requirements of ORS 14.175 are satisfied, as do we. First,
relator is challenging the legality of an act of a public body;
he is asserting that the state’s failure to appoint named
counsel to represent an eligible defendant violates Article I,
section 11, of the Oregon Constitution. Second, relator
had standing to commence this case; at the time he filed
his mandamus petition, relator had moved to dismiss his
criminal case based on the state’s failure to appoint coun-
sel and that motion had been denied. Third, the challenged
act is capable of repetition; the failure to appoint counsel is
a recurring issue in this state and will continue to affect
defendants in the same way it affected relator. See Penn, 365
Or at 622 (holding that the “capable of repetition” require-
ment does not demand a showing that same party will be

6
ORS 14.175 provides:
“In any action in which a party alleges that an act, policy or practice of
a public body * * * is unconstitutional or otherwise contrary to law, the party
may continue to prosecute the action and the court may issue a judgment on
the validity of the challenged act, policy or practice even though the specific
act, policy or practice giving rise to the action no longer has a practical effect
on the party if the court determines that:
“(1) The party had standing to commence the action;
“(2) The act challenged by the party is capable of repetition, or the policy
or practice challenged by the party continues in effect;
“(3) The challenged policy or practice, or similar acts, are likely to evade
review in the future.”
7
As we have previously noted, “ORS 14.175 may not represent ‘the full scope
of a court’s constitutional authority to decide moot cases.’ ” Woodland v. Dept. of
Rev., 371 Or 334, 336 n 2, 536 P3d 985 (2023) (quoting Penn, 365 Or at 613 n 2).
However, when the requirements of ORS 14.175 are satisfied, there is no need to
look beyond the statute for authority to decide a moot case. Penn, 365 Or at 613
n 2.
832 State v. Roberts

affected again; it requires only that the challenged act “be
reasonably susceptible to repetition as to someone”).
But the parties disagree about whether the fourth
requirement of ORS 14.175—that is, that the challenged act
is likely to evade review—is satisfied. Relator argues that
the state’s failure to appoint counsel to represent eligible
defendants in their criminal cases is likely to evade review
because the defendants are unlikely to be able to timely and
effectively assert that their constitutional right to counsel is
being violated and that they are entitled to dismissal of their
cases as a remedy. He asserts that unrepresented defen-
dants “cannot be expected to know when and how to seek
a dismissal remedy,” and he points out that his challenge
to the state’s failure to appoint counsel is before this court
only because of his volunteer counsel’s limited-scope repre-
sentation. In response, the state argues that the challenged
act is not likely to evade review because, in some cases, eli-
gible defendants will eventually have counsel appointed in
their criminal cases and, if those defendants are convicted,
they can bring direct appeals in which they can challenge
the constitutionality of the delay in the appointment of their
counsel.
When determining whether “[t]he challenged pol-
icy or practice, or similar acts, are likely to evade judicial
review in the future,” ORS 14.175(3), we focus on “whether
the general type or category of challenge at issue is likely
to evade being fully litigated—including by appellate
courts—in the future,” Eastern Oregon Mining Association
v. DEQ, 360 Or 10, 17, 376 P3d 288 (2016). As the text of
ORS 14.175(3) requires, the focus of the “general type or cat-
egory” inquiry is on the challenged “policy, practice, or act”
itself and whether “the challenged action was in its dura-
tion too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or
expiration.” Penn, 365 Or at 615 n 4 (quoting Weinstein v.
Bradford, 423 US 147, 149, 96 S Ct 347, 46 L Ed 2d 350
(1975)); see generally Actions, 1A CJS § 82 (2024) (explain-
ing that the “evading review” inquiry concerns whether the
duration of the challenged action is too short to be fully lit-
igated before it ceases); id. (“[T]he inquiry is whether the
activity itself is by nature so short in duration that it will
Cite as 374 Or 821 (2026) 833

not be fully litigated before the objected to activity ends, as
where the duration of the challenged action is short and the
time required to complete an appeal is lengthy.” (Footnote
omitted.)). For example, in Penn, this court concluded that
the relator’s challenge to a post-prison supervision condition
was likely to evade review because most post-prison super-
vision terms would expire before such a challenge could be
resolved by this court. Penn, 365 Or at 623.
In addition, whether a challenge is likely to evade
review depends on whether “it is probable that a similar
challenge will evade judicial review in the future. Certainty
is not required.” Couey, 357 Or at 479 (emphases added).
Consequently, a court may determine that a challenge is
likely to evade review even when there are other instances
in which parties were able to complete litigation of the same
or similar challenges before those challenges went moot.
Penn, 365 Or at 623. As this court has stated, “the fact that
there are a few reported cases in which a party in similar
circumstances was able to complete the litigation before the
challenged act ceased or expired is insufficient to establish
that the act is not likely to evade review.” Id.
Applying those principles here, we conclude that
the challenged act—viz., the failure to appoint named coun-
sel to represent an eligible defendant post-arraignment—is
likely to evade review. Because of the public defense crisis,
trial courts across the state are frequently unable to appoint
counsel to eligible defendants. Generally, a defendant needs
counsel to litigate whether an act violates their constitu-
tional rights. Consequently, most indigent defendants will
be unable to timely and effectively challenge the state’s fail-
ure to provide them counsel. As relator points out, he was
able to file his motion to dismiss and then bring this man-
damus case only because a lawyer volunteered to represent
him on a limited basis. Unlike relator, most indigent defen-
dants will be unable to challenge the state’s initial failure
to appoint counsel in their criminal cases until the state
eventually appoints counsel for them in those cases. But by
that time, the challenged act will have ended. So, the chal-
lenged act is likely to evade review because, by its nature,
it is likely to end before a challenge can even be initiated,
834 State v. Roberts

much less fully litigated. And, even in the unusual situa-
tions where an indigent defendant is able to initiate a chal-
lenge, either on their own or through volunteer counsel, the
challenged act could still end before the challenge is fully
litigated because, while the challenge is pending, the state
could appoint counsel or dismiss the criminal case, as hap-
pened here.
As mentioned, the state argues that the chal-
lenged act is unlikely to evade review because, if counsel
is appointed and if the defendant is ultimately convicted,
the defendant can file a direct appeal and the effects of any
delay in the appointment of counsel can be reviewed then.
However, as we have explained, whether a challenged act
is likely to evade review requires an assessment of whether
the act itself is likely to end before the challenge is fully
litigated, and the challenged act at issue here, which is the
failure to appoint counsel, will necessarily end when coun-
sel is appointed.
Moreover, the state’s argument assumes that rela-
tor’s challenge is the type that can be addressed on direct
appeal of a defendant’s conviction. But that assumption is
based on a misunderstanding of relator’s claim, which is
that the failure to appoint counsel is a constitutional viola-
tion that causes harms independent and irrespective of the
ultimate judgment in the defendant’s case but that never-
theless require a remedy. As such, relator’s claim is similar
to a defendant’s claim that they are being subjected to pre-
trial restraints that violate their rights, which this court
has held to be a type of claim that will evade review if it
is not addressed pretrial. See, e.g., State v. McDowell, 352
Or 27, 32, 279 P3d 198 (2012) (allowing petition for writ of
mandamus to compel pretrial release of defendant whose
pretrial detention exceeded the statutory maximum).
To be sure, there may be harms that result from the
delayed appointment of counsel that affect the ultimate out-
come of the criminal case. For example, the delay could result
in the loss of evidence and thus prevent the defendant from
having a fair trial. Those types of harms can be the basis for
motions to dismiss a case with prejudice, and if a trial court
denies such a motion, the denial can be challenged through
Cite as 374 Or 821 (2026) 835

a direct appeal. But those harms are different from what
relator is alleging here. Relator is asserting that his consti-
tutional right to counsel was violated, and that the violation
caused pretrial harms distinct from any effects that the lack
of counsel might have on the outcome of the trial. At bot-
tom, he is claiming that the state cannot maintain a crim-
inal case against him—thereby subjecting him to contem-
poraneous, negative consequences—for an extended period
of time without providing him counsel to resolve the case.
That is a type of claim that is likely to evade review because
the pretrial situation that relator is challenging is likely to
end before a challenge to it can be initiated, much less fully
litigated.8
Consequently, we conclude that the four require-
ments for review under ORS 14.175 are satisfied here: rela-
tor is challenging an act of a public body; he had standing
to do so when he initiated this mandamus case; the act is
recurring; and act is likely to end before challenges to it can
be fully litigated.
Given that conclusion, the question becomes whether
this is the type of case in which it is appropriate for this
court to exercise its discretion under ORS 14.175. See, e.g.,
Penn, 365 Or at 624 (exercising discretion under ORS 14.175
because the petitioner raised a “serious challenge” to the
constitutionality of the board’s imposition of a supervision
conduct and a decision in the case would have “broader rele-
vance”). We conclude that it is. The legal issues in this case
concern a core constitutional right that is essential for the
functioning and integrity of our legal system, and they arise
out of an ongoing public defense crisis, which affects many
persons and institutions throughout the state. Moreover, as
relator points out, there is no consistent approach among
the state’s trial courts when an attorney is unavailable to
8
As noted, in this court, relator seeks dismissal of his criminal case without
prejudice. When a criminal case is dismissed without prejudice, the state can
bring a later case against the defendant for the same crimes, provided that that
case is not barred for other reasons, such as the expiration of the applicable stat-
ute of limitations. But if a case is dismissed with prejudice, the state cannot bring
a later case for the same crimes. As relator himself acknowledges, whether a
delay in the appointment of counsel requires dismissal with prejudice will depend
on the case-specific effects of the delay on the defendant’s ability to present a
defense and receive a fair trial.
836 State v. Roberts

be appointed to represent an eligible criminal defendant.9
Exercising our discretion under ORS 14.175 to resolve the
legal issues in this case will help ensure that the right to
counsel is protected consistently across the state.
C. Availability of Mandamus Relief
Because this case comes to this court on relator’s
petition for a writ of mandamus, we must address one more
preliminary matter: whether this is the type of case in which
the extraordinary remedy of mandamus relief is available.
This court may issue a writ of mandamus to compel a lower
court to perform a legally required act. ORS 34.110; see
HotChalk, Inc. v. Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, 372 Or
249, 255-56, 548 P3d 812 (2024) (explaining that mandamus
relief is available if the trial court had a “legal duty to act in
a certain way”). But “the writ shall not be issued in any case
where there is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of the law.” ORS 34.100.
The state contends that mandamus relief is not
available here because relator has a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the form of a direct appeal. Generally,
direct appeal is regarded as a plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in criminal cases. State ex rel Automotive Emporium
v. Murchison, 289 Or 265, 267, 611 P2d 1169, reh’g den, 289
Or 673, 616 P2d 496 (1980); see also State ex rel Maizels
v. Juba, 254 Or 323, 333, 460 P2d 850 (1969) (explaining
that challenges to denials of demurrers and motions to sup-
press can be raised on direct appeal, as opposed to manda-
mus). But that general rule does not apply when a direct
appeal will not vindicate a relator’s rights. See, e.g., State v.
Moore, 361 Or 205, 212, 390 P3d 1010 (2017) (holding that
a mandamus action is an appropriate means to challenge
a trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss on
double-jeopardy grounds because “the right to appeal after
9
Relator asserts that trial court responses to the unavailability of counsel
for indigent defendants vary “from court to court, from judge to judge, and from
case to case.” Relator describes three different approaches: (1) in Multnomah
County, trial courts appear to have had a policy of dismissing cases where defen-
dants were unrepresented for a period of time, but then to have changed that pol-
icy; (2) in Washington County, trial courts did not dismiss cases, but would allow
defendants to “jump the line” when they pursued other avenues to challenge their
lack of counsel; and (3) in Marion County, trial courts appointed public defenders
despite their assertions that they lacked the capacity to take additional cases.
Cite as 374 Or 821 (2026) 837

a conviction would not vindicate his constitutional right to
be free from a second prosecution for the same offense”);
State ex rel Anderson v. Miller, 320 Or 316, 322, 882 P2d
1109 (1994) (holding that a mandamus action is appropriate
under certain circumstances where “direct appeal will not
sufficiently serve to vindicate a party’s rights with regard
to discovery”). As explained above in our discussion of why
relator’s challenge is the type that will likely evade review,
direct appeal of a judgment of conviction, in the event that
a defendant is convicted, will not provide an opportunity to
address the alleged pretrial harms resulting from the fail-
ure to appoint counsel. Consequently, we conclude that rela-
tor does not have a “a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of the law,” ORS 34.110, that would
preclude mandamus relief.
Whether relator is entitled to mandamus relief
depends on whether, as he asserts, the trial court had a
legal duty to grant his motion to dismiss. The answer to
that question is inextricably intertwined with the answers
to the constitutional questions to which we now turn.10
III. ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
As noted, this case presents three legal questions:
(1) whether the failure to appoint counsel to represent rela-
tor violated his right to counsel under Article I, section 11,
of the Oregon Constitution; (2) if it did, whether dismissal of
the criminal case without prejudice was an appropriate rem-
edy; and (3) if it was, whether the trial court was required
to dismiss the case after relator had been unrepresented
for a certain period of time. Because the parties’ competing
arguments help to more precisely frame the issues that we
need to resolve, we start there.
A. The Parties’ Arguments
Relator argues that, having been arraigned on the
current indictment, his Article I, section 11, right to counsel
had attached and continued “uninterrupted” thereafter. He
10
The constitutional questions are novel, but “mandamus can be used to
decide a novel legal question.” State ex rel Kristof v. Fagan, 369 Or 261, 285, 504
P3d 1163 (2022); see also, e.g., Gray, 370 Or at 135-36 (announcing, in a manda-
mus case, that the scope of the state constitutional right to counsel includes the
right to have counsel present when the defendant testifies before a grand jury).
838 State v. Roberts

further argues that, once that right had attached, the fail-
ure to appoint named counsel within a reasonable period
thereafter violated his right to counsel under the state
constitution.
According to relator, Article I, section 11, does not
permit “the complete deprivation of counsel for any period
of time,” let alone the indefinite deprivation of counsel “for
months and, in some cases, years, “ while criminal charges
remain pending. (Emphasis in original). Noting that the
right to counsel is the right through which other constitu-
tional rights are given effect, relator explains that his lack
of counsel prevented him from being able to respond to the
state’s exercise of its prosecutorial powers over him and pre-
pare a defense. All the while, relator continues, he remained
subject to “restraints on his individual liberties” as a conse-
quence of the pending charges.
Relator contends that such a complete, indefinite
denial of counsel calls for the court to fashion a bright-line
remedy to restore a criminal defendant to the position that
the defendant would have been in had the state remained
within the limits of its authority. As a general proposition,
relator argues that the “only constitutionally adequate rem-
edy” in these circumstances is dismissal of the criminal
charges without prejudice after no more than 30 days with-
out counsel.
For its part, the state agrees that relator’s right
to counsel had attached in this case. It also concedes that
“the trial court was required to appoint counsel” for relator
“after determining that he was financially eligible” and that
the court “did not satisfy that requirement by appointing
‘OPDC’ * * * as a placeholder for an actual lawyer.”
However, according to the state, the scope of rela-
tor’s right to counsel following its attachment was limited: it
guaranteed only the right to have counsel present at a “crit-
ical stage” and appointed “within a reasonable time before
a critical stage occurs.” Put simply, the state’s position is
that there is no constitutional problem if an eligible crim-
inal defendant lacks appointed counsel post-arraignment
as long as the defendant is not required to participate in a
Cite as 374 Or 821 (2026) 839

“critical stage” without the presence of counsel and the trial
court “continue[s] the case (and any critical stages in the
case) until” counsel can be appointed.
The state further contends that, contrary to rela-
tor’s argument, “[a] trial court is not compelled to dismiss
the charges [against an eligible criminal defendant] any time
there is a 30-day gap in representation.” Instead, the state
argues that “[d]ismissal is required only if an unreasonable
delay causes incurable prejudice to an individual defendant.”
The state reasons that delays in the appointment or substi-
tution of counsel that, in turn, create delays in scheduling or
holding a critical stage, including trial, can be “assessed in
the speedy trial context on a case-by-case basis.” In that con-
text, the state explains, a defendant who can establish that
the “delay in the appointment of counsel result[ed] in preju-
dice to [the] defendant’s ability to prepare a defense” would be
entitled to a “dismissal with prejudice.” (Emphasis added.)
B. Whether Relator’s Article I, Section 11, Right to Counsel
Was Violated
With the issues framed by the parties’ arguments,
we turn to the relevant law, beginning with the law relating
to the nature of the right to counsel and then turning to the
law relating to the scope of the right. We then apply the law
to the facts of this case to determine whether relator’s right
to counsel was violated.
1. The nature of the right to counsel
Article I, section 11, guarantees criminal defen-
dants rights that are intended to ensure that criminal pros-
ecutions are fair and reliable. It provides, in part:
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the
right to public trial by an impartial jury in the county in
which the offense shall have been committed; to be heard
by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof;
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor[.]”11

11
The quoted portion of Article I, section 11, is the full text of the original
section. It was amended in 1932 and 1934 to add provisions relating to jury trials,
which are not relevant to the issues in this case.
840 State v. Roberts

The portion of Article I, section 11, that is at issue here is the
guarantee that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall have the right * * * to be heard by himself and coun-
sel[.]” That guarantee is a core component of our criminal
justice system, which is an adversarial one. State v. Craigen,
370 Or 696, 704, 524 P3d 85 (2023). In an adversarial sys-
tem, opposing parties conduct their own investigations,
develop competing legal and factual theories, and present
evidence and arguments to support those theories in court.
Adversarial systems are premised on the belief that the best
way to resolve legal disputes correctly is through a compet-
itive process, with each party making its own case. State v.
Lacey, 364 Or 171, 180, 431 P3d 400 (2018). Consequently,
in an adversarial system, each party plays an essential role
in ensuring that the legal rulings are correct and factual
findings are accurate. If one party is unable to develop and
present its case, then the system is compromised. By guar-
anteeing criminal defendants the right to counsel, Article I,
section 11, helps ensure that our adversarial criminal jus-
tice system functions properly. As this court has observed,
without the right to counsel, “a trial court cannot reliably
serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or
innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as
fundamentally fair.” State v. Cotter, 373 Or 381, 387, 567 P3d
1034 (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The right to counsel under Article I, section 11,
serves as a check on governmental powers. Oregon’s found-
ers were concerned that governmental powers could be
misused, and—like many other provisions of the Oregon
Constitution—Article I, section 11, exists to protect against
such misuse. See Stevenson v. Holzman, 254 Or 94, 101-02,
458 P2d 414 (1969) (stating that the purpose of the right to
counsel “is to give assurance against deprivation of life or
liberty except strictly according to law” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). The founders gave the state the power to
prosecute persons for crimes while simultaneously giving
such persons the right to counsel to defend against the pros-
ecutions. The right to counsel helps ensure that “the state
abides by the legal limits on its authority, that criminal pro-
ceedings are fair, and that verdicts are reliable.” Craigen,
370 Or at 705.
Cite as 374 Or 821 (2026) 841

Criminal prosecutions carry significant conse-
quences for defendants. Obviously, for those who are con-
victed, the potential consequences include fines, restitution,
probation, jail, and prison. But other consequences flow
simply from being charged. Although they are entitled to
a presumption of innocence until they are convicted, defen-
dants who are charged may nonetheless be subjected to
restrictions on their liberty and incur costs in time and
money to attend court and respond to the charges. In addi-
tion, pending criminal charges can affect many aspects of
a defendant’s life, including their personal and employment
relationships. Article I, section 11, reflects the founders’
recognition that, given the significant and often life-alter-
ing consequences of a criminal prosecution, it is essential
that criminal defendants have the right to call upon coun-
sel to help them respond to the state’s prosecutorial actions
against them.
The right to counsel is necessary because it can be
difficult for persons who are untrained in the law to respond
to the state’s actions in a criminal prosecution. They are
likely to be unfamiliar with the substantive law defining
crimes and defenses and the procedural law governing how
cases must be litigated. As this court has stated,
“ ‘[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little
avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by coun-
sel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small
and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged
with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfa-
miliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of
counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrele-
vant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both
the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense,
even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the dan-
ger of conviction because he does not know how to establish
his innocence.’ ”
Stevenson, 254 Or at 100 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287
US 45, 68-69, 53 S Ct 55, 77 L Ed 158 (1932)); see also id.
842 State v. Roberts

(“The assistance of counsel will best avoid conviction of the
innocent[.]”). The right to counsel “is meant to counteract the
handicaps of a suspect enmeshed in the machinery of crim-
inal process.” State v. Sparklin, 296 Or 85, 92, 672 P2d 1182
(1983) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Craigen,
370 Or at 704 (“The state utilizes trained professionals to
represent its interests in prosecutions, and Article I, sec-
tion 11, guarantees defendants the right to do the same.”).
Thus, the right to counsel is particularly important because
it affects a defendant’s ability to assert their other rights,
both substantive and procedural. Craigen, 370 Or at 705.
The right to counsel in a criminal prosecution is
guaranteed to all persons, including those who cannot
afford to retain their own counsel. That is so for the rea-
sons that the United States Supreme Court explained in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335, 83 S Ct 792, 9 L Ed 2d
799 (1963), which this court has repeated in connection with
Article I, section 11. Craigen, 370 Or at 704 n 7. In Gideon,
the Supreme Court stated that its “well-considered prece-
dents” and “reason and reflection” required it “to recognize
that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This
seems to us to be an obvious truth.” 372 US at 344; Craigen,
370 Or at 704 n 7 (quoting same). The Court pointed out
that, in criminal prosecutions, governments are represented
by lawyers, as are most defendants who can afford to hire
their own lawyers:
“Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend
vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defen-
dants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere
deemed essential to protect the public’s interest in an orderly
society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with
crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can
get to prepare and present their defenses. That government
hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the
money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications
of the wide-spread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime
to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential
to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the
very beginning, our state and national constitutions and
Cite as 374 Or 821 (2026) 843

laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substan-
tive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impar-
tial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before
the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man
charged with crime has to face his accusers without a law-
yer to assist him.”
Gideon, 372 US at 344 (emphasis added); see Craigen, 370 Or
at 704 n 7 (quoting Gideon, 372 US at 344).
Recognizing the importance of counsel, this court
has ruled that Article I, section 11, “mandates the appoint-
ment of counsel for all indigent defendants whose conviction
may result in a loss of liberty.” Stevenson, 254 Or at 103-04.
In doing so, we explained that the rule was consistent with
“our commitment to individual liberty and equality before
the law.” Id. at 104.
Although defendants are the immediate beneficia-
ries of the right to counsel, they are not the only beneficia-
ries. As discussed above, defense counsel help ensure that
our adversarial system functions properly. In doing so, they
protect the integrity of, and public confidence in, our crimi-
nal justice system. See Craigen, 370 Or at 705 (stating that
the constitutional rights of individuals, including the right
to counsel, “help preserve the rule of law and the integrity
of the legal system”). They also protect the interests of the
community at large, including the interests in ensuring that
the persons who have committed crimes are correctly iden-
tified; that legal requirements for investigations, detentions,
pleas, trials, convictions, and sentences are satisfied; and
that sentences are structured to promote rehabilitation and
protect the community not only through incarceration but
also upon eventual release, which occurs in most criminal
cases.
In sum, the Article I, section 11, right to counsel is
a fundamental Oregon right. It is essential to the fairness of
our adversarial legal system, in which disputes are resolved
through competing presentations of law and evidence. It
guarantees criminal defendants access to advocates who
can protect their substantive and procedural rights, and it
is necessary given the significant consequences and com-
plexities of criminal prosecutions. It protects the interests of
844 State v. Roberts

individual defendants, as well as the community at large, by
helping to ensure that criminal prosecutions are conducted
in accordance with the law and that the results of those
prosecutions are reliable.
2. The scope of the right to counsel
Generally, a defendant’s Article I, section 11, right to
counsel “begins when criminal proceedings have been initi-
ated, at which point the right is said to attach.” State v. Gray,
370 Or 116, 129, 515 P3d 348 (2022). In this case, the parties
agree that relator’s right to counsel attached in connection
with the current indictment when relator was arraigned.
But they disagree about the scope of the right. That is, they
disagree about whether the scope of the right includes the
right to have the assistance of counsel at a stage when, as
in relator’s case, a defendant has been arraigned, but the
state is not conducting any court proceedings regarding the
merits of the charges.
The scope of the right to counsel depends on the
particular circumstances at issue. See State v. Davis, 350
Or 440, 478, 256 P3d 1075 (2011) (“After the right attaches,
the court may evaluate the particular circumstances * * * to
determine the scope of the right[.]”); see, e.g., Gray, 370 Or
at 130-35) (determining whether the scope of the right to
counsel includes the right to have counsel present at when a
defendant testifies before the grand jury). When determin-
ing the scope of the Article I, section 11, right to counsel,
this court has applied the methodology described in Priest
v. Pearce, 314 Or 411, 415-16, 840 P2d 65 (1992), for con-
struing state constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Davis, 350
Or 446 (summarizing steps); id. at 462-77 (applying steps).
Under Priest, “we examine the text of the constitution in
its historical context, along with relevant cases interpret-
ing it.” Couey, 357 Or at 490 (citing Priest, 314 Or at 415 -
16). “In conducting that examination, our purpose is not to
freeze the meaning of the state constitution to the time of its
adoption, but is instead ‘to identify, in light of the meaning
understood by the framers, relevant underlying principles
that may inform our application of the constitutional text to
modern circumstances.’ ” Id. (quoting Davis, 350 Or at 446).
Cite as 374 Or 821 (2026) 845

This court has reviewed the history of the right to
counsel in prior cases. E.g., Davis, 350 Or at 464-72; State
v. Prieto-Rubio, 359 Or 16, 24, 376 P3d 255 (2016). In Davis,
this court traced the right to counsel from English common
law through the adoption of the Oregon Constitution. 350 Or
at 464-72. We explained that, “[a]t English common law, a
defendant accused of a felony was actually prohibited from
being represented by counsel” but that the American colo-
nies charted a different course. Id. at 465. Early colonial gov-
ernments “enact[ed] statutory guarantees to the assistance
of counsel in serious criminal cases.” Id. at 465-66. And,
after the Declaration of Independence, “a majority of states
adopted constitutions that explicitly recognized a right to
the assistance of counsel.” Id. at 466. The right was based
on a recognition that persons accused of crimes were often
unequipped to respond to the state’s actions against them.
Id. at 467-68. As the Louisiana Supreme Court explained in
a passage quoted in Davis,
“[the right] was a reproach to the Common Law of England
that prisoners were not allowed the aid of counsel when
accused of crimes. Their ignorance and timidity when pros-
ecuted by the high officers of government, their want of self
possession when life and liberty was put in jeopardy ren-
dered them incapable of defending themselves, and often
the greatest injustice and oppression occurred. This led to
the guarantee of the right to counsel in our liberal constitu-
tions, and the right should be liberally construed.”
Id. at 468 (quoting State v. Cummings, 5 La Ann 330, 331-32
(1850)).
In Davis, this court observed that the historical con-
text of the right to counsel indicates that, before the Civil
War, the right “would have been understood to guarantee
a right to counsel at trial, and, perhaps, some measure of
preparation for trial following the commencement of formal
adversary proceedings.” Id. at 472. That is because, “before
the Civil War, organized police forces as we know them
did not exist, professional prosecutors were rare, criminal
investigations of the sort that we are familiar with did not
occur, and the evidence against a criminal defendant was
marshalled during the trial itself.” Id. at 469. But “[a]s the
nature of law enforcement and public criminal prosecution
846 State v. Roberts

[have] changed,” courts have had to consider whether the
scope right to counsel includes the right to the assistance
of counsel at stages other than trial. Id. at 469. Generally,
issues regarding the scope of the right to counsel have been
presented in cases where the defendant has asserted a right
to have counsel present during a particular nontrial event,
like police questioning.
This court has ruled that, after a defendant’s right
to counsel has attached, the defendant has the right to have
counsel present at certain nontrial events, including out-of-
court events at the beginning and end of a prosecution. For
example, in Sparklin, this court ruled that a defendant who
is represented by counsel on charged crimes has the right to
have counsel present during police questioning about those
crimes. 296 Or at 93 (“Once an attorney is appointed or
retained, there can be no interrogation of a defendant con-
cerning the events surrounding the crime charged unless
the attorney representing the defendant on that charge is
notified and afforded a reasonable opportunity to attend.”)
Later, in Prieto-Rubio, this court ruled that, in addition to
having the right to have counsel present during police ques-
tioning about charged crimes, a represented defendant has
the right to have counsel present during police questioning
about uncharged crimes when “it is objectively reasonably
foreseeable that the questioning will lead to incriminating
evidence” concerning the charged crimes. 359 Or at 18.
When determining the scope of the right to coun-
sel, this court has focused on the principles underlying the
right and the purposes of the right. See Prieto-Rubio, 359
Or at 36 (focusing on the purpose of the right); id. at 25
(stating that a defendant has the right to have counsel pres-
ent when “counsel’s presence could prevent prejudice to [the]
defendant”); see also Gray, 370 Or at 129 (observing that
this court in Davis and Prieto-Rubio analyzed the history
and purposes of the right in ways that are instructive when
determining the scope of the right). As discussed above, the
basic principle underlying the right is that criminal pros-
ecutions should be fair, reliable, and conducted in accor-
dance with the law. See, e.g., Cotter, 373 Or at 387 (without
the right to counsel, “a trial court cannot reliably serve its
Cite as 374 Or 821 (2026) 847

function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence,
and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamen-
tally fair”); Craigen, 370 Or at 705 (explaining that the right
to counsel helps ensure that “the state abides by the legal
limits on its authority, that criminal proceedings are fair,
and that verdicts are reliable”). The primary purpose of the
right is to give effect to that basic principle by guaranteeing
defendants the assistance of counsel to protect their legal
interests when the state exercises its prosecutorial powers
over them. See, e.g., Stevenson, 254 Or at 100 (generally, a
defendant “ ‘has small and sometimes no skill in the science
of law’ ” and “ ‘requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings against him’ ” (quoting Powell, 287
US at 69)); Sparklin, 296 Or at 93 (the right to counsel “is
meant to counteract the handicaps of a suspect enmeshed
in the machinery of criminal process” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Consequently, in cases involving whether a
defendant’s right to counsel includes the right to have coun-
sel present at a particular event, this court has considered
whether the defendant’s legal interests would be at risk of
prejudice if counsel was not present. When doing so, this
court has considered the nature of the event at issue and
how counsel could protect the defendant’s rights during the
event.
State ex rel Russell v. Jones, 293 Or 312, 647 P2d
904 (1982) is illustrative. In Russell, a mandamus case, the
relator—who had pleaded “no contest” to a criminal charge
and was awaiting sentencing—asserted that the scope of
the right to counsel under Article I, section 11, includes
the right to have counsel present during presentence inter-
views. Id. at 314; see generally ORS 137.530 (governing pre-
sentence investigations); ORS 137.090 (authorizing trial
courts to designate persons to conduct presentence investi-
gations). This court agreed. Russell, 293 Or at 317. In doing
so, we considered the nature of presentence interviews and
how counsel could assist a defendant during an interview.
Id. at 317-20. We acknowledged that presentence interviews
do not relate to whether a defendant is guilty of the charged
crimes. Id. at 318 (“After guilt is no longer in issue, the
inquiry is into defendants’ background, present situation
and attitude.”). We also acknowledged that a presentence
848 State v. Roberts

interviewer is required to prepare a report, which defense
counsel can challenge and supplement at sentencing, and,
therefore, there “rarely” would be a “risk of irremediable
harm” if counsel was not present at a presentence interview.
Id. at 318. Nevertheless, we concluded that Article I, section
11, guarantees a defendant the right to have counsel pres-
ent during presentence interviews because “circumstances
are conceivable where the presence of counsel would be help-
ful.” Id. at 319. In some cases, counsel could be “helpful to
the fact-gathering process or to the protection of the clients’
rights[.]” Id. at 320. Given those possibilities, we ruled that
“counsel cannot be barred” from presentence interviews.
Id.12
This court’s most recent case concerning the scope
of the right to counsel under Article I, section 11, is Gray,
370 Or 116, another mandamus case. In Gray, one of the
issues was whether a defendant who exercises their statu-
tory right to testify before a grand jury has a right, under
Article I, section 11, to have their counsel present in the
grand jury room. Id. at 128. Consequently, this court had
to consider the scope of the Article I, section 11, right to
counsel. We began by noting that, as evidenced by our anal-
yses in Davis and Prieto-Rubio, when determining the scope
of the Article I, section 11, right to counsel, we are guided
by the principles underlying the right and purposes of the
right. Gray, 370 Or at 128-29. Accordingly, our cases have
“always focus[ed] on whether the absence of counsel would
risk prejudice to the defendant’s legal interests.” Id. at 130
(citing, inter alia, Russell, 293 Or at 315 (“[A] criminal defen-
dant’s guarantee of the assistance of counsel exists at least
at all court proceedings from arraignment through proba-
tion revocation as well as all post-indictment out-of-court
critical stages where, without the assistance of counsel,
the legal interests of the defendant might be prejudiced.”);
Prieto-Rubio, 359 Or at 25 (“Under Article I, section 11, the
12
In Russell, this court made it clear that, although we were holding that
the scope of Article I, section 11, includes the right to have counsel present at
presentencing interviews, we were “not hold[ing] that the presence of counsel is
required at every presentence interview or that [their] absence would constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel”; rather, we were holding that Article I, section
11, requires “that counsel may not be barred from attendance at a presentence
interview.” 293 Or at 318.
Cite as 374 Or 821 (2026) 849

scope of the right to counsel encompasses stages in criminal
proceedings in which counsel’s presence could prevent prej-
udice to a defendant.”)).
Applying that standard, this court held that a defen-
dant’s right to counsel under Article I, section 11, includes
the right to have counsel present in the grand jury room
when the defendant testifies. Id. at 132-33. It did so because
counsel’s presence “would lessen the risk of prejudice” to the
defendant’s interests. Id. at 132; see also id. (explaining that
in Russell, it “found a constitutional right to the presence
of counsel when there was only a low chance that counsel
would be able to protect a defendant’s interests”). As it had
in earlier cases, this court considered the nature of the cir-
cumstances at issue and what counsel could do in those cir-
cumstances to protect a defendant’s interests. Id. We con-
cluded that counsel’s presence in the grand jury room could
be helpful to the relator because, “[a]t a minimum, coun-
sel’s presence means that relator may consult with a fully
informed counsel, who will have directly heard the question
and can provide relator with informed advice.” Id.
In sum, because the primary purpose of the right to
counsel is to protect a defendant’s rights in a criminal prose-
cution, a defendant has the right to the assistance of counsel
in circumstances where, without that assistance, the defen-
dant’s legal interests would be at risk of prejudice.
3. Application
Having reviewed the relevant law regarding the
nature and scope of the Article I, section 11, right to counsel,
we now apply that law to determine whether relator’s right
to counsel was violated.
As mentioned, the parties do not dispute that defen-
dant was arraigned on the current indictment or that his
Article I, section 11, right to counsel had attached by that
time. Nor do the parties dispute that the trial court was
required to appoint named counsel for relator after deter-
mining that he was financially eligible and that the appoint-
ment of OPDC—as a placeholder for a named attorney—was
insufficient. In fact, the state concedes that point, and we
accept its concession.
850 State v. Roberts

Instead, the parties’ dispute centers on the scope of
the right to counsel under the circumstances of this case,
in which an eligible criminal defendant invoked his right
to counsel but the state failed to appoint named counsel to
represent him post-arraignment. As described above, rela-
tor argues that his right to counsel was violated because the
state failed to appoint counsel within a reasonable period
after his right to counsel attached. The state counters that
the failure to appoint counsel did not violate defendant’s
right to counsel because the scope of that right is limited.
According to the state, the right guarantees the assistance
of counsel only in connection with “critical stages,” by which
the state appears to mean adversarial contacts between the
state and a defendant, such as police questioning or court
hearings. Therefore, according to the state, as long as rela-
tor’s case did not proceed to any critical stages, his right to
counsel was not violated.
The state is correct that a defendant has a right to
have counsel present at “critical stages.” But, as this court
has held, a defendant’s Article I, section 11, right to counsel
is not that limited. Davis, 350 Or at 475; see Sparklin, 296
Or at 92 n 9 (“When Article I, section 11 is implicated ‘[t]he
right of an accused under Article I, section 11, to be heard
by himself or counsel, * * * , is guaranteed in “all criminal
prosecutions,” not limited to “critical stages” of such prose-
cutions.’ ” (Quoting State ex rel Russell v. Jones, 293 Or 312,
321, 647 P2d 904 (1982) (Lent, J., concurring) (brackets and
ellipses in Sparklin).)). Consequently, rather than frame the
question as whether the stage in the proceedings in which
relator was without counsel constitutes a “critical stage,” we
ask whether the absence of counsel would risk prejudice to
the defendant’s legal interests, or stated differently, whether
the absence of counsel would undermine the purposes of the
right to counsel.
To answer that question, we consider what assis-
tance counsel could provide to a defendant, even outside of an
adversarial contact like police questioning or a court hear-
ing. Generally stated, defense counsel’s role is to respond to
the state’s exercise of its prosecutorial powers over a defen-
dant. That role is not limited to being present at certain
Cite as 374 Or 821 (2026) 851

events. There are numerous actions that defense counsel
can take to protect a defendant’s rights and to prepare and
present a defense. Many of those actions can be taken on
defense counsel’s own initiative, outside of court, and before
any trial.
Defense counsel has a role to play as soon as a
defendant is charged with a crime. Defense counsel needs
to promptly contact the defendant to explain the defendant’s
rights and options and to gather information from the defen-
dant. Many defendants do not understand what is happen-
ing to them and how their cases will proceed. And they may
need to speak candidly to a lawyer about the events under-
lying the charges while those events are still recent and
to have those discussions protected by the attorney-client
privilege.
In addition, defense counsel needs to assess the
charges against the defendant. As mentioned above, Article I,
section 11, guarantees a defendant the right “to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him[.]” That is
something that counsel can help a defendant do. Indeed, it
is something that a defendant will probably need counsel to
do. See Stevenson, 254 Or at 100 (“ ‘Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, gen-
erally, of determining for himself whether the indictment
is good or bad.’ ” (Quoting Powell, 287 US at 69.)). If a defen-
dant receives a charging instrument that is deficient, they
can move against it by filing a demurrer. That can be done
at the outset of a criminal prosecution because a demurrer
is based on the charging instrument itself. ORS 135.630(2)
(authorizing demurrers based on “the face” of the charging
instrument). There are several bases for demurrers, includ-
ing that “the facts stated [in the charging instrument] do
not constitute an offense” and that the charging instrument
“contains matter, which, if true would constitute a legal jus-
tification or excuse of the offense charged or other legal bar
to the action.” ORS 135.360(4), (5). If a demurrer is allowed,
then the state cannot proceed on the charging instrument.
Thus, at the outset of a criminal prosecution, a defendant
has rights that defense counsel can assert based solely on
852 State v. Roberts

the charging instrument and that can result in the termi-
nation of case.
Defense counsel also can assist a defendant by
investigating the alleged crimes. See Sparklin, 296 Or at 92
n 9 (“There can be no question that the right to an attorney
during the investigative stage is at least as important as the
right to counsel during the trial itself.”). Defense counsel can
assert a defendant’s right to discovery under ORS 135.815,
which requires the state to provide information and materi-
als. See also ORS 135.845 (requiring the state to provide dis-
covery to a defendant “as soon as practicable” following the
filing of the charging instrument). Defense counsel can also
take steps to secure physical evidence before it is lost and to
record witness statements before memories fade. They may
also be able to arrange for medical and psychological exam-
inations of the defendant close in time to the alleged crimes,
when the examinations will be most relevant. In addition,
defense counsel can determine whether the defendant has
any defenses, such as self-defense or defense of others, that
the defendant could present to the grand jury. See ORS
132.320(12) (providing that a defendant, who is represented
by counsel, has a right to appear before the grand jury, if—
prior to the filing of an indictment—counsel files a written
notice requesting the appearance). Thus, if a defendant has
counsel early in a criminal prosecution, counsel can arrange
to have the defendant testify before the grand jury, and the
defendant’s testimony could cause the grand jury to decide
not to indict the defendant.
Defense counsel can also take steps to resolve a
criminal prosecution by negotiating a civil compromise or
arranging for the defendant to participate in a diversion pro-
gram, each of which could result in the eventual dismissal of
the charges against the defendant. See ORS 135.703 - ORS
135.709 (civil compromises); ORS 135.881 - ORS 135.925
(diversion agreements); ORS 813.200 - ORS 813.270 (DUII
diversion charges); ORS 430.450 - ORS 430.555 (diversion to
treatment programs).
Defense counsel can also resolve cases through plea
negotiations. If counsel reviews the charging instrument,
conducts any necessary investigation, and assesses potential
Cite as 374 Or 821 (2026) 853

sentences, counsel may be able to negotiate a plea in a fairly
short time, especially in cases where there is little dispute
about the relevant facts, law, and potential sentences.
In addition to taking steps to resolve the charges
against a defendant, defense counsel has a role to play in
protecting a defendant’s rights by ensuring that any prose-
cutorial powers that the state is exercising over the defen-
dant are being exercised lawfully. The state’s prosecutorial
powers include its power to exercise control over a defen-
dant’s liberty pending resolution of the defendant’s case,
which the state does when it holds a defendant in jail, puts
a defendant on supervision, or otherwise restricts the defen-
dant’s freedoms. Defense counsel can ensure that the state’s
exercise of those controls is lawful. For example, defense
counsel can make sure that any release conditions comply
with the law.
In sum, defense counsel’s role is not limited to
being present at events when the state is confronting the
defendant. It is not merely reactive; it is proactive. There
are many actions that defense counsel can take to protect a
defendant’s rights in the context of a criminal prosecution,
including actions that counsel can (and may have to) take
early in a prosecution. But in cases like this one, defendants
are left without anyone to take those actions.
The failure to appoint counsel within a reason-
able time harms defendants in several ways. First, defen-
dants with charges pending against them are subjected to
restraints on their liberty, while being deprived of the ability
to challenge or modify them. Every defendant with an open
case is required to appear when ordered by the trial court.
ORS 135.290 (governing contempt); see also ORS 135.250
(governing pretrial release). If a defendant fails to do so, the
court can issue a warrant for the defendant’s arrest, and
the defendant can be criminally prosecuted. ORS 162.195
(defining second-degree failure to appear); ORS 162.205
(defining first-degree failure to appear). If the defendant
posted funds to obtain a security release, they could lose
those funds. ORS 135.280(3) (providing for the forfeiture of
funds or property posted for security release). Consequently,
in cases like relator’s, defendants must continue to appear
854 State v. Roberts

for hearings, under threat of arrest and criminal prosecu-
tion, only to be told that the state is unable to appoint coun-
sel and that they will have to return again later.
In addition to being subject to the control of the
court, most defendants are subject to other restrictions on
their liberty. All defendants who are released from custody
pending resolution of their cases are subject to mandatory
conditions, including that they not leave the state without
permission of the court. ORS 135.250(1). Many of those
defendants are subject to additional restrictions, including
restrictions on contacting certain persons or going to cer-
tain places. See ORS 135.260(1)(b) (authorizing restrictions
on the defendant’s “activities, movements, associations and
residences”); ORS 135.247 (requiring courts to prohibit
defendants from contacting alleged victims of certain types
of crimes). Defendants who are on release may also have
affirmative obligations, including reporting to a release
supervisor. ORS 135.260(1)(a). If a defendant breaches a
release restriction, they can be arrested and detained, and
they may lose any money posted as security. ORS 135.280.
They may also be held in contempt of court. ORS 135.290.
Although pretrial restraints on a defendant’s lib-
erty are permissible and usually appropriate, what is dif-
ferent for relator and others is that they are subject to
those restraints while being denied the means they need to
respond to them.
Second, the defendant cannot move their case for-
ward. In addition to restraints on their liberty, defendants
experience other consequences as a result of being charged
with a crime, regardless of the presumption of innocence.
These include effects on a person’s relationships, employ-
ment, and housing opportunities. Although these conse-
quences exist for all criminal defendants, with or without
counsel, defendants like relator experience them for an
extended and indefinite time while being unable to respond
to the charges against them. They do not have a legal advo-
cate to review the state’s charges and evidence, gather and
preserve defense evidence, and take steps to advance their
case toward resolution, whether through dismissal, plea, or
trial.
Cite as 374 Or 821 (2026) 855

Meanwhile, the state has counsel to continue to col-
lect evidence, interview witnesses, and take other steps to
prepare its case. In addition, the failure to appoint counsel
undercuts the protection of the statute of limitations. The
statute requires the state to initiate a criminal prosecution
within a certain period of time after the alleged crime.13 One
of the ideas underlying the statute is that the passage of time
can harm a defendant’s ability to respond to the charges. If
the state charges a crime after the limitations period has
passed, a defendant is entitled to dismissal with prejudice.
That is, the defendant has a simple, statutory basis for dis-
missal with prejudice because of the delay. When the state
charges a defendant within the applicable limitations period
but fails to appoint counsel, the defendant is disadvantaged.
Because the state’s filing is timely, the defendant cannot
move to dismiss on statute-of-limitations grounds. But,
because the defendant is without counsel, defendant is still
exposed to harms that result from delay that the statute is
intended to protect against.
Third, the failure to appoint defense counsel can
have a coercive effect. As just discussed, having an open
criminal case without counsel harms a defendant because
they cannot respond to the restraints on their liberty or the
charges against them. Being in such a situation can put
pressure on a defendant to waive their right to counsel, and
that pressure mounts over time. As the burdens of having an
open case without counsel grow, so does the likelihood that a
defendant will waive their right to counsel just to move their
case forward. Thus, an extended delay in the appointment
of counsel can cause a defendant to abandon their right to
counsel and proceed at a disadvantage.
As discussed above, when determining the scope of
the state constitutional right to counsel, this court is guided
by the principles underlying the right and the purposes of
the right. It considers whether the denial of the assistance of
counsel in the particular circumstances at issue would “risk
prejudice to the defendant’s legal interests.” Gray, 370 Or
at 130; see also, e.g., Russell, 293 Or at 317-20 (considering
13
As noted above, different crimes have different limitations periods, rang-
ing from two years to more than 20 years, 374 Or at 829 n 5, and some crimes
have no limitation period, ORS 131.125(1).
856 State v. Roberts

the nature of presentence interviews and how counsel could
assist a defendant during an interview); Gray, 370 Or at
132-33 (considering how counsel could be helpful to a defen-
dant testifying before a grand jury).
Applying that approach to the circumstances at
issue here, we conclude that when, as in relator’s crimi-
nal case, the state fails to appoint counsel for an eligible
defendant for an extended period of time, the state violates
Article I, section 11. Such a failure undermines the purposes
of the right because it denies the defendant the means nec-
essary to respond to the state’s exercise of its prosecutorial
powers, creates an imbalance in the adversarial system,
and puts pressure on a defendant to waive the very right
that is intended to help ensure the fairness and legality of
criminal prosecutions.
C. Whether Dismissal Without Prejudice Is the Appropriate
Remedy
Having concluded that relator’s Article I, section
11, right to counsel was violated, we must now determine
whether relator is entitled to the remedy he requests. As a
general proposition, this court tailors remedies for the viola-
tion of the right to counsel under Article I, section 11, to the
nature and effects of the violation. See, e.g., State v. Stanton,
369 Or 707, 715, 511 P3d 1 (2022) (holding that, where
the record failed to establish that a defendant had made
an intentional and knowing waiver of his right to counsel
and the court could not determine what the outcome of the
case would have been had the defendant been represented,
remand for a new trial was appropriate); Prieto-Rubio, 359
Or at 38 (holding that, where a detective questioned a defen-
dant in violation of Article I, section 11, the remedy was “the
exclusion of any prejudicial evidence obtained as a result of
that violation”).
The nature of the violation in this case is unlike
those that we have previously encountered. This is not a
case in which the violation of the right occurred in the con-
text of a hearing or a trial that can be conducted again. Nor
is this a case in which the violation resulted in the state
obtaining evidence that can be excluded. Instead, the state
Cite as 374 Or 821 (2026) 857

arraigned relator on criminal charges but then denied him
the appointed counsel to which he was entitled.
As described above, when the state maintains a
criminal prosecution against a defendant while failing to
appoint defense counsel for an extended period of time, the
defendant is harmed in several ways. Dismissal without
prejudice is an appropriate remedy for those harms. It termi-
nates the imbalanced situation where the state is asserting
its prosecutorial power over the defendant, but the defen-
dant is without counsel to help them respond to that asser-
tion. It also releases the pressure on a defendant to waive
their right to counsel. At the same time, it does not preclude
the state from prosecuting the defendant later, when the
state is able to provide the counsel to which a defendant is
entitled.
D. When Is a Trial Court Compelled to Dismiss the Criminal
Charges
Having concluded that dismissal without prejudice
is an appropriate remedy, the question becomes: At what
point is a defendant entitled to that dismissal? As men-
tioned, relator urges us to announce a bright-line rule that
a defendant is entitled to dismissal after a certain num-
ber of days. We agree that, in this situation, a bright-line
rule is appropriate. It will help ensure that similarly situ-
ated defendants are treated consistently across the state.
And it will be a tool for courts to remedy denials of counsel
efficiently.
Where the “bright line” should be set is a novel
question. To answer it, we take into account the fact that the
burdens and pressures of having an open case without the
assistance of counsel will increase over time. As time goes
on, the risks of harm to the defendant’s rights and to the
integrity of the proceeding increase and dismissal becomes
appropriate.
We also look to the statutes that govern criminal
procedures. As we discussed above, those statutes reflect that
certain actions are expected to be taken early in a criminal
case. See, e.g., ORS 135.815 and ORS 135.845 (governing dis-
covery); ORS 135.360 (governing demurrers); ORS 135.703
858 State v. Roberts

• ORS 135.709 (civil compromises); ORS 135.881-135.925 (diversion agreements). They also show that it is possible for some criminal prosecutions to be resolved relatively quickly, which indicates that maintaining an open case against a defendant for an extended period, while denying the defen- dant the ability to move the case forward, is unreasonable. The time-to-disposition standards adopted by the Chief Justice in 2018 also provide guidance. See Oregon Judicial Department, Time to Disposition Standards for Oregon Circuit Courts (2018), https://www.courts.oregon.gov/ rules/Pages/other.aspx (accessed January 26, 2026) (Time to Disposition Standards). The workgroup that recommended the standards was guided by the principle that they were to be “both realistic and aspirational.” Time to Disposition Standards at 2. To that end, the workgroup considered “recent data from Oregon circuit courts” and “relevant stat- utes and rules pertaining to the timely disposition of cases in Oregon.” Id. Separate standards were established for fel- ony and misdemeanor cases. Id. at 4. The standard for mis- demeanor cases is to resolve 75 percent of cases within 60 days, 90 percent within 90 days, and 98 percent within 180 days.14 Id. at 4-5. The standard for felony cases is to resolve 75 percent of cases within 90 days, 90 percent within 180 days, and 98 percent within 365 days. Id. at 4. Our under- standing is that those time standards account for the vari- ety of different ways that criminal cases may be resolved (e.g., dismissal, plea, trial), some of which may result in a faster disposition than others. The standards indicate that most cases (75 percent) are expected to be resolved in less than 60 days (misdemeanors) or 90 days (felonies).

14
The Oregon Judicial Conference originally had adopted Standards for
Timely Disposition in 1990. Time to Disposition Standards at 2. The 2018 stan-
dards reduced the time to disposition when compared to the 1990 standards.
For felony cases, the 1990 standard was to resolve 90 percent of cases within
120 days, 98 percent within 180 days, and 100 percent within one year. Time to
Disposition Standards at 3. For misdemeanor cases, the standard was the dis-
position of 90 percent of cases within 90 days, 98 percent within 180 days, and
100 percent within one year. Id. The 2018 standards appear to reflect, at least in
part, changes to docket management and case processing that had occurred since
1990. Those changes included “[t]echnological advancements” that had “dramat-
ically changed how courts process filings, schedule hearings, and track cases,”
which was “especially the case with the advent of electronic filing, sophisticated
case and document management systems, and automated workflow.” Id. at 2-3.
Cite as 374 Or 821 (2026) 859

The Time to Disposition Standards are not dispos-
itive of the length of time that a defendant may be denied
counsel under Article I, section 11, before a trial court is
required to remedy that denial. But they are instructive.
According to the state, “[b]efore 2019, Oregon’s indigent
defense system—although overtaxed—was able to provide
prompt legal representation to eligible criminal defen-
dants.” Thus, the 2018 standards reflect the time-to-disposi-
tion goals absent a statewide public defense crisis in which,
according to OPDC, there simply are not “enough defense
attorneys in the state to represent every indigent defendant”
and, “at least in the near term,” it will be unable promptly to
appoint counsel for all indigent defendants, many of whom
“may be without counsel for weeks if not months.”
Viewed in that light, the state’s failure to appoint a
named attorney to represent an eligible criminal defendant
for a period of 60 days or more in a misdemeanor case, or 90
days or more in a felony case, would be starkly inconsistent
with the current dispositional standards of resolving 75 per-
cent of misdemeanor cases within 60 days and 75 percent of
felony cases within 90 days. It would leave a defendant with-
out counsel for all or most of the time that the standards set
for resolution of most criminal cases.
There must be a limit on the amount of time that the
state may maintain a criminal prosecution without appoint-
ing counsel for an eligible defendant, and this case requires
us to set that limit. We do so based on the pretrial harms
described above; the relevant statutes and rules contemplate
that some cases can be resolved at early stages of a prosecu-
tion; and the time to disposition standards reflect the goals
for resolving most criminal cases within 60 or 90 days. In
light of those considerations, as well as our own assessment
of when the pretrial harms justify the remedy of dismissal
without prejudice, we conclude that, when an eligible crimi-
nal defendant lacks appointed counsel after arraignment for
a period of more than 60 consecutive days in a misdemeanor
case, or 90 consecutive days in a felony case, dismissal of the
criminal charges without prejudice is ordinarily required.15
15
By “misdemeanor case,” we mean a case in which the most serious crime
charged is a misdemeanor. By “felony case,” we mean all cases in which a felony
is charged.
860 State v. Roberts

Applying that rule in this case, the trial court had a legal
duty to grant relator’s motion to dismiss because relator had
been without named counsel post-arraignment for over 90
days.
IV. CONCLUSION
To summarize, although this case is moot, it qual-
ifies for adjudication under ORS 14.175 because it presents
questions regarding an act of a public body that is capa-
ble of repetition but likely to evade judicial review in the
future, and it is appropriate for us to exercise our discretion
to adjudicate it because it presents important constitutional
questions that affect many cases across the state on a daily
basis. Regarding those questions, we conclude that (1) the
state violates Article I, section 11, if, as in relator’s criminal
case, it fails to appoint counsel for an eligible defendant after
arraignment for an extended period of time; (2) dismissal
without prejudice can be an appropriate remedy for such a
failure; and (3) a defendant is entitled to that remedy when,
at any point after arraignment, the state fails to appoint
counsel for a period of more than 60 consecutive days in a
misdemeanor case or 90 consecutive days in a felony case.
Applying those conclusions to the facts of this case,
relator was entitled to mandamus relief. But, because the
trial court has now dismissed the criminal case, there is no
additional relief we can provide to relator.
The alternative writ of mandamus is dismissed as
moot.

Dismissal is not required if, during the 60- or 90-day period, the defendant
failed to appear for court as required.
Our decision does not foreclose a trial court from determining that there are
case-specific reasons to dismiss the criminal charges against an eligible defen-
dant who has been denied appointed named counsel post-arraignment at an ear-
lier point. And, because we cannot foresee all the possible circumstances that
may arise in the future, we leave open the possibility that, in truly extraordinary
circumstances, a court could decline to dismiss a case after the 60- or 90-day
period for exceptionally good cause.