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April 1, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Patrick Hrdlichka v. Samantha Bengston

Court of Appeals of Arkansas

• Citations: 2026 Ark. App. 205

• Docket Number: Unknown

• Opinion

• Authorities (2)

• Cited By (1)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 205
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CV-25-106

PATRICK HRDLICHKA Opinion Delivered April 1, 2026

APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE BENTON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 04CV-23-3080]

SAMANTHA BENGSTON HONORABLE JOHN R. SCOTT,
APPELLEE JUDGE

DISMISSED

STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge

Patrick Hrdlichka, pro se, appeals from the Benton County Circuit Court order

awarding appellee, Samantha Bengtson, $10,000.00 in compensatory damages as well as

$237.50 in costs under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-118-107 (Repl. 2016). On

appeal, Hrdlichka argues (1) the circuit court incorrectly applied Arkansas Code Annotated

section 16-118-107; (2) there was no evidence of felony conduct introduced, so he cannot be

liable under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-118-107; (3) compensatory damages were

awarded without meeting the standard of preponderance of the evidence; (4) the circuit

court’s interpretation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-118-107 contradicts well-

established Arkansas jurisprudence; and (5) the court’s ruling violates his constitutional

guarantee to equal protection under article 2, section 3 of the Arkansas Constitution.
Bengtson did not file a response brief in this appeal. Due to numerous fatal briefing

deficiencies under the Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals and Arkansas

Rules of Appellate Procedure–Civil that prevent us from engaging in meaningful review,

including the submission of fictitious cases, we dismiss the appeal.

On November 7, 2023, Bengtson filed a complaint in the Benton County Circuit

Court alleging that on the night of February 3, 2022, Hrdlichka committed a felonious

second-degree battery against her, and she suffered damages as a result. Bengtson sought to

recover damages under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-118-107, which allows for

crime victims to seek damages in a civil action. After a bench trial, the circuit court denied

Bengtson’s request for punitive damages but awarded Bengtson $10,000.00 in compensatory

damages plus interest at the rate of 5 percent until paid plus the cost of the service and filing

fees. Hrdlichka did not object to the court’s award of damages. On November 1, 2024, the

circuit court entered its written judgment awarding Bengtson $10,000.00 in compensatory

damages and an additional $237.50 in costs.

The standard of review on appeal from a bench trial is whether the court’s findings

were clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., El Paso

Prod. Co. v. Blanchard, 371 Ark. 634, 640, 269 S.W.3d 362, 368 (2008). A finding is clearly

erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire

evidence is left with a firm conviction that an error has been made. Id. Facts in dispute and

determinations of credibility are solely within the province of the fact-finder. Id.

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The present appeal contains multiple fatal briefing deficiencies that prevent us from

conducting a meaningful review. Parties appearing pro se, like Hrdlichka, receive no special

consideration of their argument and are held to the same standard as licensed attorneys. See

Perry v. State, 287 Ark. 384, 699 S.W.2d 739 (1985).

Hrdlichka’s brief fails to comply with Rule 4-2 of the Rules of the Arkansas Supreme

Court and Court of Appeals in numerous respects. Rule 4-2(a) prescribes the required

contents and organization of an appellant’s brief, and the deficiencies here are pervasive.

The points on appeal and the table of contents are not arranged in the order required by the

rule. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(2)–(3). The statement of facts fails to include citations to the

record for nearly the entirety of the narrative and omits essential procedural history necessary

for appellate review. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(6). Instead of presenting a unified statement of

the case and the facts as contemplated by the rule, Hrdlichka includes a separate paragraph

labeled “Statement of the Case,” further departing from the prescribed structure. Id.

Moreover, the argument section is not presented under clear subheadings numbered to

correspond with the points on appeal. Rule 4-2(a)(7) requires that each argument be set out

under a separate, clearly designated heading that corresponds to the point relied on. This

requirement ensures that the court and opposing parties may readily identify the issues

presented for review. Hrdlichka’s failure to organize the argument in this manner renders

the brief difficult to follow and inhibits meaningful appellate consideration. Although any

one of the above-described deficiencies, viewed in isolation, might appear technical or minor,

taken together they reflect a complete failure to comply with Rule 4-2.

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Even more concerning to this court is the fact Hrdlichka cites multiple cases that,

upon review, do not exist. The authorities relied on in support of his arguments are not

found in the Arkansas Reports, the SouthWestern Reporter, or any recognized legal

database. In short, they are fictitious. We cannot evaluate arguments predicated on

nonexistent precedent. The appellate process depends on accurate citation to existing

authority so that we may assess the legal foundation of a party’s claims. When a party cites

fabricated cases, we are deprived of any meaningful ability to conduct review. Fictitious

citations fail to comply with Rule 4-2 of the Rules of the Arkansas Supreme Court and

Appellate Court. Rule 4-2(a)(7) requires that arguments contain citation to authority relied

on and that citations conform to the required format. This rule is not aspirational. It ensures

clarity, uniformity, and fairness in our appellate process. Hrdlichka’s citations do not

conform to the rule’s formatting requirements and, more critically, do not correspond to

any real authority.

Additionally, all counsel appearing before this court are bound to exercise

professional judgment and responsibility and to comply with the rules of appellate

procedure. Among other obligations, Rule 11 provides that by presenting a submission to

the court, an attorney certifies “to the best of his knowledge, information and belief formed

after reasonable inquiry, the document is well grounded in fact [and] is warranted by existing

law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.”

Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 11(a). At the very least, the duties imposed by Rule 11 require that

parties read, and thereby confirm the existence and validity of, the legal authorities on which

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they rely. Indeed, we can think of no other way to ensure that the arguments made based on

those authorities are “warranted by existing law.” Id. R. 11(a). These significant violations of

our rules mandate dismissal of this appeal.

We further take this opportunity to address a growing and troubling practice: the

submission of appellate briefs generated in whole or in part through artificial-intelligence

tools that contain fabricated, inaccurate, or nonexistent legal citations. This practice presents

serious risks to the integrity of judicial proceedings and undermines the administration of

justice.

First, the appellate process depends on accuracy. Appellate courts review legal

arguments grounded in established authority. When a party cites precedent, the court must

be able to rely on the representation that the authority exists, that it stands for the

proposition asserted, and that it has not been mischaracterized. Fabricated citations—

whether created intentionally or through unverified use of artificial intelligence—waste

judicial resources, delay resolution of cases, and erode confidence in the judicial system.

Second, all litigants, including pro se appellants, bear responsibility for the contents

of their filings. The use of artificial intelligence does not relieve a litigant of the duty to verify

the accuracy of citations. A brief containing nonexistent cases is no different, in effect, from

a brief containing invented precedent.

Third, the court emphasizes that technology, including artificial intelligence, is not a

substitute for legal judgment, verification, and professional diligence. For these reasons, the

court strongly discourages pro se appellants and attorneys from submitting artificial-

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intelligence-generated arguments without thorough verification. The integrity of the

appellate process depends on the reliability of the record and the authenticity of the law

cited. That responsibility remains squarely with the party who signs and submits the brief.

Filings that contain fabricated or materially inaccurate citations may be struck, and

appropriate sanctions, such as dismissal, may be imposed where warranted.

Finally, filing an appellate brief with fictitious citations in this court, for any reason,

is a flagrant violation of the duties of candor Hrdlichka and every other appellant owes to

this court. We regret that Hrdlichka has given us our first opportunity to consider the impact

of fictitious cases being submitted to this court, an issue that has gained national attention

in the rising availability of artificial intelligence. “Citing nonexistent case law or

misrepresenting the holdings of a case is making a false statement to a court[;] [i]t does not

matter if [generative A.I.] told you so.” Maura R. Grossman, Paul W. Grimm & Daniel G.

Brown, Is Disclosure and Certification of the Use of Generative AI Really Necessary? 107 Judicature,

no. 2, 2023, at 68, 75. As a federal district court in New York recently noted,

A fake opinion is not “existing law” and citation to a fake opinion does not provide
a non-frivolous ground for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law, or for
establishing new law. An attempt to persuade a court or oppose an adversary by
relying on fake opinions is an abuse of the adversary system.

Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (internal citation omitted)

(dismissing a filing and sanctioning a party for submitting bogus legal citations generated by

ChatGPT); see also Model Rule of Prof’l Conduct 3.3 (Am. Bar. Ass’n 2025) (imposing an

ethical duty to demonstrate candor to the courts and prohibiting the making of false

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statements of material fact or law). To protect the integrity of the justice system, courts

around the country have been considering and enacting local rules specifically geared

towards prohibiting or disclosing the use of generative artificial intelligence in court filings.

We urge all parties practicing before this court, barred and self-represented alike, to be

cognizant that we are aware of the issue and will not permit fraud on this court in violation

of our rules.

Dismissed.

KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and BROWN, J., agree.

Patrick Hrdlichka, pro se appellant.

One brief only.

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