Mithun Prakash Saste vs State of Maharashtra - Land Acquisition

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Mithun Prakash Saste And Ors. vs State Of Maharshtra Through Principal ... on 27 March, 2026

Author: Manish Pitale

Bench: Manish Pitale

2026:BHC-AS:15110-DB 908-WP-2218-2022 @ ORS.DOC

                         IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                  WRIT PETITION NO. 2218 OF 2022
                                            ALONGWITH
                               INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 11660 OF 2025
                                                IN
                                  WRIT PETITION NO. 2218 OF 2022

         Rajendra Nanasaheb Saste and Ors.                                     ...Petitioners
               Versus
         State of Maharashtra
         Through Principal Secretary Revenue
         and Forest Dept. and Ors.                                             ...Respondents

                                            ALONGWITH
                                  WRIT PETITION NO. 5191 OF 2018
                                            ALONGWITH
                               INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 10674 OF 2025
                                                IN
                                   WRIT PETITION NO. 5191 OF 2018

         Mithun Prakash Saste and Ors.                                         ...Petitioners
               Versus
         State of Maharashtra
         Through Principal Secretary Revenue
         and Forest Dept. and Ors.                                             ...Respondents

                                        _______
         Mr. Sushant S. Prabhune a/w Mr. Jairam E. Kashikedar and Mr. Firoz Khan
         for the Petitioners.

         Mr. B.V. Samant, Addl. G.P. a/w Ms. Tanu N. Bhatia, AGP for Respondent
         Nos. 1 to 3 - State in WP/2218/2022.
         Mr. B.V. Samant, Addl. G.P. a/w Ms. M.S.Bane, AGP for Respondent Nos. 1
         to 3 - State in WP/5191/2018.
                                          _______

                                              CORAM:       MANISH PITALE &
                                                           SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, JJ.

                                              DATE:       27th MARCH 2026
                                                      _________

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ORDER: (PER MANISH PITALE, J).

1.        Heard Learned Counsel for the parties.
   

2.        In these Petitions the Petitioners contend that by operation of [Section
   

25](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/72899864/) of the The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land

Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter

referred to as "the Act of 2013"), the land acquisition proceedings have

lapsed and that the awards passed in respect of acquisition of the lands of

the Petitioners would consequently be a nullity.

1. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioners in these Petitions heavily

relies upon judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of [Executive

Engineer, Gosikhurd Project, Ambadi, Bhandara, Maharashtra Vidarbha

Irrigation Development Corporation vs. Mahesh and Others](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/142295176/) 1 (hereinafter

referred to as "Gosikhurd judgment" ) and judgment of a Division Bench of

this Court dated 11th January 2024 passed in Writ Petition No. 11513 of

2015 ([Vitthal Rama Pawar (Katkari) and Ors. vs. Deputy Collector

(Acquisition) Raigad-Alibaga and Others](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/127793004/)) and connected Petitions. It is

submitted that the position of law has been crystallised in favour of the

Petitioners and that therefore, the Petitions ought to be allowed.

1. The Learned AGP on the other hand submits that the observations

made by the Supreme Court in the Gosikhurd judgment (supra) inure to

the benefit of Respondent - State, in as much as the Supreme Court took

into consideration the time period required for computing monetary

1 2022 2 SCC 772

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compensation under the provisions of Act of 2013 after it came to force

with effect from 1st January 2014. It was submitted that if the said aspect

of the matter is taken into consideration, the contentions raised on behalf

of the Petitioners may not be accepted. It was further submitted that in

any case the Petitioners have come belatedly before this Court and

therefore, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of [Swaika

Properties Pvt. Ltd. & Anr vs. State Of Rajasthan & Ors](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/527480/) 2 would apply and

on the said ground also the Petitions deserve to be dismissed.

1. Before we refer to the relevant dates concerning the two Petitions, it

would be appropriate to refer to the relevant portions of the judgment of

the Supreme Court in Gosikhurd judgment (supra).

1. The Supreme Court considered the effect of enactment of the Act of

2013 on acquisitions that had been initiated under the [Land Acquisition

Act, 1894](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7832/) ("the L.A. Act "), particularly in situations where the awards were

yet to be passed. In that context it was found that Section 24 of the Act of

2013 would be relevant particularly Clause (a) of Sub Section (1) thereof.

1. On an analysis of the aforesaid provision read with the other

provisions of Act of 2013, the Supreme Court found that in cases where the

land acquisition proceedings had been initiated when the Act of 2013 came

into effect, all the provisions relating to determination of compensation,

including Section 25, would apply. The Supreme Court particularly took

into consideration situations where the initiation of land acquisition had

2 2008 4 SCC 695

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taken place under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act and declaration under Section 6 thereof had been issued prior to 1 st January 2014, when the Act

of 2013 came into effect. It was found there could be situations where the

period of two years specified in Section 11(A) of the L.A. Act would expire

within close proximity of 1st January 2014 and this could leave very little

time for the State Authorities to determine compensation and compute the

same as per the provisions of the Act of 2013. The Supreme Court also

took into consideration the fact that certain notifications were issued by the

State of Maharashtra under the provisions of the Act of 2013, which had an

effect on computation of compensation. Such notifications were stayed for

a brief period by an order of the Aurangabad Bench of this Court and

taking into consideration said factor, it was authoritatively laid down that Section 25 of the Act of 2013 would apply as regards lapsing of acquisition

even in cases where the award was to be rendered when the Act of 2013

came into effect, and that in such cases the time period for passing awards

would necessarily be 12 months from 1st January 2014.

1. The relevant portions of the Gosikhurd judgment (supra) of the

Supreme Court read as follows :

1. In the present case, clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act would apply as the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act had not culminated into an award till the repeal of the 1894 Act. Section 24(1)(a) partly nullifies the legal effect of savings under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act as it hybridizes application of the 1894 Act and the 2013 Act. While preserving validity of the acquisition proceedings by issue of declarations under the 1894 Act, it states that all the provisions for determination of compensation under the 2013 Act shall apply. The section consciously saves the legal effect of the notifications issued under Section 4 and/or Section 6 of the 1894 Act and obviates the

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necessity to issue a fresh notification under the 2013 Act. This
'perseveration of the determination date' for the computation of
compensation for the awards made under Section 24(1)(a) of the
2013 Act is a thought through legislative invocation that curtails
time delays and cost escalation of infrastructure projects, as well as
checks the post-acquisition notification malpractices, and at the
same time ensures that the landowners are entitled to the benefit of
the enhanced compensation as per the 2013 Act.

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1. Law of limitation is generally regarded as procedural as its
   object is not to create any right but prescribe periods within which
   legal proceedings should be instituted for enforcement of rights or
   adjudication orders should passed. Statutes of limitation, therefore,
   have retrospective effect insofar as they apply to all legal
   proceedings brought after they come into force. However, the laws
   relating to limitation have been held to be prospective in the sense
   that they do not have the effect of reviving the right of action which
   is already barred on the date of their coming into operation, nor do
   they have the effect of extinguishing a right of action subsisting on
   the date. In this sense, the limitation provisions can be procedural
   in the context of one set of facts and substantive in the context of a
   different set of facts. Therefore, unless the language of the
   provision dealing with period of limitation clearly manifests, in
   express terms or by necessary implication, a contrary intention
   divesting vested rights, such provision is to be construed as
   prospective. In the context of clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the
   2013 Act, it is to be stated that the said clause would apply only if
   the period for making of an award had not ended and time was
   available as on 1st January 2014. Where and if the period for
   making of the award had already lapsed before 1st January 2014,
   clause (a) to Section 24(1) would not apply so as to deprive and
   deny the vested rights which have already accrued in favour of the
   landowners. The present case is not of divesting of vested rights of
   the landowners on enactment of the 2013 Act.

2. Section 25 is a rule of procedure immediately following Section
   24 and a part of fasciculus of "all the provisions", from Sections 25 to 30, "relating to determination of compensation". Hence, the
   expression "all the provisions relating to the determination of
   compensation" under the 2013 Act will encompass Section 25 of
   the 2013 Act.
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1. The determination of compensation is never simple. It is a
   complex factual and legal exercise. As per sub-section (2) to Section
   26 of the 2013 Act, the market value calculated under sub-section
   (1) is to be multiplied by the factor to be specified in the First
   Schedule. Section 30(2) requires the Collector to issue individual
   awards detailing the particulars of compensation payable and
   details of payment as specified in the First Schedule. As per the First
   Schedule, the factor/multiplier in case of rural areas can be
   between one and two, based on the distance from the urban area,
   and this factor/multiplier is to be notified by the "appropriate
   government". This aspect is of importance when we examine the
   second issue and would be adverted to later. Thus, it clearly
   delineates that until notification of the multiplier is issued by the
   "appropriate government" for rural areas, compensation in terms of
   sub-section (2) to Section 26 cannot be determined. When a
   multiplier of more than 1 applies, the compensation payable under Section 26 of the 2013 Act would be higher than the market value
   of the land.

2. Section 30(1) of the 2013 Act adumbrates that the Collector
   having determined the total compensation shall, to arrive at the
   final award, impose 'solatium' of an amount equivalent to 100% of
   the compensation amount. As per Section 30(3), the landowners in
   addition to the market value of the land are entitled to an amount
   calculated at the rate of twelve percent per annum commencing
   from the date of publication of
   "the notification of the Social Impact Assessment study under
   sub-section (2) of Section 4, in respect of such land, till the date of
   the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the
   land, whichever is earlier".

3. Per contra, the provisions for determination of compensation
   under the 1894 Act are different. Under the 1894 Act, no
   multiplier/factor is to be applied and solatium payable is 30
   percent. Prescription of 14Forthe purposes of the present dispute,
   we are not interpreting provisions of Section 30(3) of the 2013 Act.

4. Given the object and purpose behind Sections 24, and 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act, we notice that practical absurdities and anomalies
   may arise if the two-year period for making of an award in terms of
   Section 11A of the 1894 Act commencing from the date of issue of
   the declaration is applied to the awards to be made under Section
   24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. This would mitigate against the
   underlying legislative intent behind prescription of time for making
   of an award in respect of saved acquisition proceedings initiated
   under the repealed 1894 Act, which is two-fold: (i) to give sufficient
   time to the authorities to determine compensation payable under
   the 2013 Act; and (ii) to ensure early and expedited payment to the
   landowners by reducing the period from two years under Section
   11A of the 1894 Act to twelve months under Section 25 of the 2013
   Act. In case of declarations issued in January 2012, on application
   of Section 11A of the 1894 Act, the time to determine compensation
   under the 2013 Act would vary from a day to a month, and while in

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          cases where the declarations were issued within twelve months of
          the repeal of the 1894 Act, the landowners would be at a
          disadvantage as an award beyond the twelve-month period
          specified in [Section 25](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/158228882/) of the 2013 Act would be valid. In the first
          set of cases, given the onerous factual and legal exercise involved in
          determination of compensation and the need to issue notification
          under [Section 26(2)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/148556708/) of the 2013 Act, publication of the awards
          would be impractical. Hasty and incorrect awards would be
          deleterious for the landowners. If the awards are not pronounced,
          the acquisition proceedings would lapse defeating the legislative
          intent behind [Section 24(1)(a)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1485112/) of the 2013 Act to save such
          proceedings. We would, therefore, exercise our choice to arrive at a
          just, fair and harmonious construction consistent with the
          legislative intent.

1. A rational approach so as to further the object and purpose of Sections 24 and 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act is required. We are
   conscious that Section 25 refers to publication of a notification
   under Section 19 as the starting point of limitation. In the context
   of clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act there would be no
   notification under Section 19, but declaration under Section 6 of
   the 1894 Act. When the declarations under Section 6 are valid as on
   1st January 2014, it is necessary to give effect to the legislative
   intention and reckon the starting point. In the context of Section
   24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, declarations under Section 6 of the 1894
   Act are no different and serve the same purpose as the declarations
   under Section 19 of the 2013 Act.

2. Consequently, we hold that in cases covered by clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act, the limitation period for
   passing/making of an award under Section 25 of the 2013 Act
   would commence from 1st January 2014, that is, the date when the
   2013 Act came into force. Awards passed under clause (a) to Section 24(1) would be valid if made within twelve months from
   1st January 2014. This dictum is subject to the caveat stated in
   paragraph 16 (supra) that a declaration which has lapsed in terms
   of Section 11A of the 1894 Act before or on 31st December 2013
   would not get revived.

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1. The foregoing discussion makes it abundantly clear that
   inasmuch as the High Court had, on 26th May 2014, stayed the
   operation of the notification dated 19th March 2014, and
   subsequently modified the order on 23rd September 2014
   permitting publication of the awards, the intervening period of 129
   days between 26th May 2014 until 23rd September 2014 and in
   any case of 79 days from 26th May 2014 till the new notification
   dated 13th August 2014 was issued must be excluded. Ordinarily,
   an award made or passed before 31st December 2014 would be
   valid. However, owing to the abovementioned intervening period of
   79 days, it could be made up to 20th March 2015. Be it noted that
   the specific case of the landowners before the High Court was about
   lapsing of acquisition proceedings owing to the mandate of Section
   11A of the 1894 Act. It was not even remotely suggested that the
   acquisition proceedings had lapsed even in terms of the mandate of
   the new legislation being 2013 Act, in particular Section 25 thereof.
   In other words, the High Court was essentially called upon to
   answer the assail in reference to the lapsing provision in the 1894
   Act. However, as aforesaid, that will have no bearing on the fact
   situation of the present case, to which the regime predicated in Section 25 of the 2013 Act ought to apply.

2.        The said position of law was followed by the Division Bench of this
   

Court in the case of Vitthal Rama Pawar (Katkari) (supra) and it was

applied to the facts of the said case, categorically holding that if the award

was not passed within 12 months of 1st January 2014, the acquisitions

would stand lapsed. On facts it was found that the acquisitions had lapsed

and therefore, the awards were quashed and set aside and the Respondent

• State was directed to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings by following

the procedure under the Act of 2013.

1. In order to apply the said position of law to the case of the

Petitioners in these two Writ Petitions, it will be appropriate to refer to the

relevant dates.

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1. In Writ Petition No. 2218 of 2022, the notification under [Section

4(1)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/169774/) of the L.A. Act was issued on 28 th May 2013. The declaration under Section 6 of the L.A. Act was issued on 14th July 2014 and the last of

publication the same was 20 th August 2014. In the interregnum the Act of

2013 came into effect from 1st January 2014. It is an undisputed position

that the award was passed in the said case on 25th October 2016.

1. In Writ Petition No. 5191 of 2018, the notification under [Section

4(1)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/169774/) of the L.A. Act was issued on 28 th May 2013. The declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 14 th March 2014 and it

was last published on 30th April 2014. In the interregnum the Act of 2013

came into effect from 1st January 2014. It is undisputed that the award in

the said case was passed on 10th August 2016.

1. The Petitioners relied upon the said admitted position on facts to

contend that since the awards were passed well beyond the period of 12

months from 1st January 2014 available to the Respondent - State

Authorities, by operation of law, the acquisition proceedings themselves

lapsed and therefore the impugned awards were rendered null and void. It

was submitted that the position of law clarified by the Supreme Court in

Gosikhurd judgment (supra) enures to the benefit of the Petitioners and

therefore, this Court may set aside the awards and consequently issue

directions for acquisition proceedings to be undertaken as per the

procedure in the Act of 2013.

1. The Learned AGP placed much emphasis on observations made by

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the Supreme Court in the Gosikhurd judgment (supra) in Paragraph Nos.

26 to 30, to contend that since in the present case the declarations under Section 6 of the L.A. Act were issued after the Act of 2013 came into effect

from 1st January 2014, the time period available to the State Authorities to

compute the compensation in terms of the Act of 2013 was reduced and

this aspect ought to be taken into consideration by this Court. The Learned

AGP could not dispute the admitted position on facts about the dates when

the awards were passed in the present case.

1. We are of the opinion that the position of law with regard to

applicability of Section 25 of the Act of 2013, to the cases covered under Section 24 (1)(a) of the Act of 2013 has been amply clarified. There is no

confusion regarding the same. The Division Bench of this Court in the case

of Vitthal Rama Pawar (Katkari) (supra) followed the said position of law

to hold that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed. Thus, it is clear that

the awards could have been rendered within 12 months of 1 st January

2014, with an additional provision for the period during which interim

order, passed by this Court in respect of certain notifications, had been

operating. As a matter of fact the Supreme Court in Gosikhurd judgment

(supra), particularly in Paragraph No. 44, considered the said aspect of the

matter and laid down that an additional period of 79 days would have to

be added to the 12 months period beyond 1st January 2014.

1. In this context we are inclined to accept the submissions made on

behalf of the Petitioners. It is brought to our notice that the period of 79

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days was reckoned by the Supreme Court on the basis that the interim

order was granted on 26th May 2014 and it operated till 23rd September

1. It was correctly pointed out, as regards the Writ Petition No. 2218 of

2022, that since the last date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the L.A. Act itself was 20th August 2014, which was beyond the

new notification dated 13th August 2014 issued by the State, it would not

be necessary to add any further days to the period of 12 months from 1 st

January 2014.

1. As regards Writ Petition No. 5191 of 2018, since the Section 6 declaration was last published on 30 th April 2014, the entire period of 79

days would have to be added. Even if that be so, we find that the awards

being passed in both the cases in the year 2016 demonstrates that the law

as laid down by the Supreme Court enures to the benefit of the Petitioners.

1. Even if, for the sake of argument, the contention raised on behalf of

the State is to be considered, to the effect that since declarations under Section 6 of the L.A. Act were issued after the Act of 2013 had come into

effect from 1st January 2014, we find that the awards were passed well

beyond the period of 12 months from the dates when the declarations

under Section 6 of the L.A. Act were last published in both the cases. Thus,

viewed from any angle, the operation of law enures to the benefit of the

Petitioners and the only conclusion that can be reached is that the

acquisition proceedings lapsed by operation of Section 25 of the Act of

2013.

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1. In this context, the conclusions arrived at by the Special Land

Acquisition Officer in the awards with regard to the limitation for passing

the awards are found to be erroneous and unsustainable.

1. As regards reliance placed on behalf of the State on the judgment of

the Supreme Court in the case of Swaika Properties Pvt. Ltd. & Anr .

(supra), suffice it to say that the facts are clearly distinguishable. In the

said case the Supreme Court was really concerned with the challenge

raised in writ jurisdiction to the notification of acquisition of land, after

possession had been taken. As a matter of fact the Supreme Court found

that the such a challenge to the notification and consequently to the award

could not be entertained in writ jurisdiction and that no fault could be

found with the approach adopted by the High Court in that case.

1. In the present cases, it is brought to our notice that the award was

communicated to the Petitioners in Writ Petition No. 2218 of 2022 (Writ

Petition filed in the year 2019) on 6 th June 2017 and in Writ Petition No.

5191 of 2018, the award was communicated on 4 th August 2017. Even on

facts we find that there was no delay, much less inordinate delay on the

part of the Petitioners in approaching this Court by filing the present Writ

Petitions.

1. In any case, when the acquisition proceedings have lapsed by

operation of law, the Respondent - State cannot contend that the Writ

Petitions could not have been entertained. Therefore, the said submission

made on behalf of the Respondent - State is also rejected.

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1. In view of the above, the Writ Petitions are allowed. It is held that

the land acquisition proceedings as regards the lands of the Petitioners

lapsed by operation of Section 25 of the Act of 2013. Consequently, the

awards dated 10th August 2016 and 25 th October 2016 are quashed and set

aside.

1. The Respondents are directed to take steps expeditiously for

acquisition of the lands of the Petitioners as per the procedure prescribed

under the Act of 2013.

1. Pending Applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

(SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, J.) (MANISH PITALE, J.)

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