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March 31, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re: Mersad Rahmanovic v. Sconset Resources, LLC, Martin Bloom, Deanne R. Stodden, and Messner Reeves, LLP

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Colorado

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-01344

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (3.4K)

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Trial Court Document

IN THEF OURN ITTHEED DSITSATTREICST B OAFN KCROULPOTRCAYD OCO URT
The Honorable Michael E. Romero

In re:

Case No. 25-12622 MER

Mersad Rahmanovic

Chapter 7

Debtor.

Mersad Rahmanovic Adversary No. 25-01344 MER

 Plaintiff,                                                          

v.

Sconset Resources, LLC, Martin Bloom,

Deanne R. Stodden, and Messner

Reeves, LLP

 Defendants.                                                         

           ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS                          

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (“Motion”) filed by the Defendants, the response thereto filed by
Plaintiff/Debtor Mersad Rahmanovic (“Rahmanovic”), and the Defendants’ reply.1

                     BACKGROUND                                      

Rahmanovic commenced the underlying bankruptcy case on April 30, 2025.  On 

June 6, 2025, one of Rahmanovic’s creditors, Keirton Inc., filed a motion to dismiss his
case (“Dismissal Motion”). The Court granted the Dismissal Motion on July 7, 2025.2

A few days later, Rahmanovic filed a motion to reinstate his case (“Reinstatement
Motion”), which the Court granted on August 13, 2025.3

After Rahmanovic’s case was reinstated, Defendant Sconset Resources, LLP 

(“Sconset”) filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay.4 In its motion, Sconset
represented that after the case was dismissed and before it was reinstated, it foreclosed
on property owned by Rahmanovic known as 1607 South Oakland Street, Aurora,

1 ECF Nos. 8 & 9.

2 Bankr. Case No. 25-12622, ECF No. 53.

3 Id. at ECF No. 57.

4 Id. at ECF No. 62.

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case was reinstated before Sconset could initiate an eviction action to obtain
possession of the property. Rahmanovic did not object to Sconset’s motion for relief,
and the Court granted it on September 26, 2025.5

A few months after the Court granted Sconset’s motion for relief, Rahmanovic 

filed two emergency motions seeking to stop eviction proceedings at the Oakland
Property (“Emergency Motions”), along with several other motions related to Sconset’s
foreclosure of the property (“Foreclosure Motions”).6 In both the Emergency and
Foreclosure Motions, Rahmanovic argued that the foreclosure of the Oakland Property
is void and constitutes a willful violation of the automatic stay because it was
undertaken while the Reinstatement Motion was pending and because the Court had
previously denied a motion for relief from stay filed by Sconset. As such, Rahmanovic
requested the foreclosure be voided, the Oakland Property be turned over to him
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 542, and that the Court award him damages pursuant to
§ 362(k) for Sconset’s willful violation of the automatic stay.7 Additionally, Rahmanovic
also asserted that Sconset violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(“RESPA”) because it failed to provide him with certain documents before foreclosing on
the Oakland Property. On November 25, 2025, the Court entered an order denying the
Emergency Motions and incorporates such order within.8 In its order denying the
Emergency Motions, the Court found Sconset’s foreclosure of the Oakland Property did
not violate the automatic stay because it was done after Rahmanovic’s case was
dismissed and before it was reinstated. The Court denied the Foreclosure Motions for
the same reason and also found that Rahmanovic had not made any allegations or
presented any evidence to show that Sconset violated RESPA. The Court incorporates
its order denying the Foreclosure Motions within.9

Along with the Emergency and Foreclosure Motions, Rahmanovic also initiated 

the instant adversary proceeding. In his Complaint, Rahmanovic asserts eight claims
for relief, including: (1) violation of the automatic stay; (2) willful violation of the
automatic stay under § 362(k); (3) turnover pursuant to § 542; (4) declaratory judgment
that the foreclosure is void; (5) wrongful foreclosure; (6) RESPA violations pursuant to

5 Id. at ECF No. 71.

6 Id. at ECF Nos. 103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, & 110. The Foreclosure Motions also implicate Sconset’s
counsel, Defendants Messner Reeves, LLP, and attorney Deanne R. Stodden.

7 Any use of the term “Section” or “§” hereafter means Title 11 of the United States Code unless
otherwise stated.

8 Bankr. Case No. 25-12622 at ECF No. 112.

9 Id. at ECF No. 128. Rahmanovic also filed an action in the Colorado District Court, Case No. 25-cv-
03803-SKC-MDB regarding the foreclosure of the Oakland Property. The District Court entered an order
on January 5, 2026, finding that it agrees with this Court that the foreclosure of the Oakland Property was
not wrongful and that Defendants did not violate the automatic stay. The Court also notes that
Rahmanovic did not appeal either of the orders denying the Emergency and Foreclosure Motions.

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seeking dismissal of all of Rahmanovic’s claims.

                       ANALYSIS                                      

A. Applicable Standard

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (incorporated by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012), a 

complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts
as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and views them in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.10 A complaint will be dismissed unless it “contains
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.”11 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”12 “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability
requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.”13 A court is not required to accept mere conclusory allegations.14

B. Dismissal of All Claims is Warranted

Defendants assert Rahmanovic’s first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and seventh 

claims are precluded by the Court’s orders denying the Emergency and Foreclosure
Motions. Defendants also assert that Rahmanovic’s sixth and eighth claims fail as a
matter of law because RESPA does not apply to Sconset’s loan since it is a commercial
loan, and because Rahmanovic is not entitled to punitive damages since Defendants
did not violate any federal law. In response, Rahmanovic does not dispute that all
claims in this proceeding should be dismissed. Indeed, Rahmanovic even states that
he “does not seek to relitigate matters previously decided by this Court.”15 Instead,
Rahmanovic argues that dismissal of this proceeding should not operate as an
adjudication on the merits of any of his claims.

10 In re Matt Garton & Assoc., Adv. Pro. No. 21-1215-TBM, 2022 WL 711518, at *3 (Bankr. D. Colo. Feb.
14, 2022) (citing Burnett v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 2013)).
Any use of the term “Rule” hereafter means the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

11 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

12 Id. 13 Id. (Internal quotations omitted).

14 Mira Holdings, Inc. v. ZoomerMedia, Ltd., 676 F.Supp.3d 909, 913 (D. Colo. 2023).

15 ECF No. 9, ¶ 4.

1. First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Claims

The Court agrees, and Rahmanovic does not dispute, that the first, second, third,
fourth, fifth, and seventh claims for relief are precluded by the Court’s orders denying
the Emergency and Foreclosure Motions. In its orders, the Court already found that the
foreclosure of the Oakland Property is not void and did not violate the automatic stay
because it occurred after Rahmanovic’s case was dismissed and before it was
reinstated.16 As such, the Court also determined Rahmanovic is not entitled to
damages under § 362(k), nor is he entitled to turnover of the property pursuant to § 542.

Therefore, Rahmanovic’s first, second, third, fourth, fifth, and seventh claims will be
dismissed.

2.    Sixth Claim                                                    

Rahmanovic’s sixth claim for relief is for RESPA violations.  Although the Court 

addressed Rahmanovic’s argument regarding Defendants’ alleged RESPA violations in
its order denying the Foreclosure Motions, it did not make a definitive finding regarding
violations of RESPA. Instead, the Court found that Rahmanovic had not alleged any
facts nor provided any evidence that RESPA applies to Sconset’s loan. As such, the
Court will briefly address whether Rahmanovic’s claim for RESPA violations should be
dismissed.

RESPA only applies to persons who make federally related mortgage loans.17  

Federally related mortgage loans are defined in relevant part as

Any loan (other than temporary financing such as a construction loan) which 
(A) is secured by a first or subordinate lien on a residential real property . . 
.  and (B)(i) is made in whole or in part by any lender the deposits or 
accounts of which are insured by any agency of the Federal Government or 
is made in whole or in part by any lender which is regulated by any agency 
of the Federal Government, or (ii) is made in whole or in part . . . by the 
Secretary or any other officer or agency of the Federal Government or under 
or in connection with a housing or urban development program . . . or (iii) is 
intended  to  be  sold  by  the  originating  lender  to  the  Federal  National 
Mortgage Association, the Government National Mortgage Association, the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, or a financial institution . . . or 
(iv) is made in whole or in part by any “creditor,” as defined in section 1602(f) 
of title 15, who makes or invests in residential real estate loans aggregating 
more than $1,000,000 per year . . . 18                               

16 In re Murphy, 493 B.R. 576, 580 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2013).

17 12 U.S.C. § 2605 (a); 12 C.F.R. § 1024.5 (a).

18 12 U.S.C. § 2602 (1).

Section 1602 of Title 15 defines “creditor” as a person who regularly extends
consumer credit. As such, RESPA does not apply to commercial loans.'9
Here, Rahmanovic has not alleged any facts to support his claim that RESPA
applies or that Defendants violated RESPA. Rahmanovic also does not dispute
Defendants’ argument that it is not subject to RESPA because its loan is a commercial
loan. Therefore, this claim will be dismissed.
3. Eighth Claim
Rahmanovic’s eighth claim for relief is for punitive damages. The only
allegations Rahmanovic makes in support of this claim are that “Defendants acted
recklessly, willfully, and in conscious disregard of federal law,” and that “punitive
damages are appropriate."*° Rahmanovic does not specify which federal laws
Defendants violated, but the Court assumes he is referring to Defendants’ alleged willful
violation of the automatic stay and RESPA. As the Court has already discussed,
Defendants did not violate the automatic stay, and Rahmanovic has not alleged any
facts showing Defendants violated RESPA. As such, this claim will be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court ORDERS the Motion is GRANTED.
This adversary proceeding is DISMISSED.
Dated March 31, 2026 BY THE COURT:
MEE
Michael E. Ro , Judge
United Statés Bankruptcy Court

1912 C.F.R. 1024.5(b)(2); West Ridge Group, LLC v. First Trust Co. of Onaga, 414 Fed.Appx. 112, 119 (10th Cir. 2011).
20 ECF No. 1, {I] 45-46.